De Anima (On the Soul)
111. Article 7 Replies and Article 8: Reason and Understanding as One Power, Motion and Rest, Episteme and Natural Understanding
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[0:00] Okay. The second, it should it it should be said that the past and the present can be proper differences of the sensitive powers, right? Or they can be differences, proper differences that are diversifying sense powers, not our intellectual powers. The reason given above, okay, that refers back to what was said in the body, but also the reply in the preceding article to the second objection, right? And that's because of the fact that the senses know the what singular, yeah, particular, yeah, and the past is referring to that sort of a thing.

[0:57] The third argument is the one from what are these arising together, okay? But he says understanding arises from memory, as an act arises from a what habit, right? Okay.

[1:12] Well, notice, so that you can say that, can't you? Right? Okay. I could go to the board now and do the Pythagorean theorem on the board if I want me to, right? But by actually showing the or understanding the Pythagorean theorem again and the reason for it on the board right now would proceed from my what habitual knowledge of. Book one of Euclid, right? Usually during the final exam, I'll put the Pythagorean theorem on the board and do it just to amuse myself so I don't forget the proof.

[1:43] Okay, I can do it right now if I want to. See, okay. But notice, if I understand what wisdom is, and from that understanding of what great knowledge wisdom is, I start to love wisdom, right? Then it's one power. What

[2:07] giving rise to something another power, isn't it? What do you mean? I'm sorry. Well, no, I'm just saying this idea that this arises from that, right? Mm-hmm. Right. Could mean that an act in this power arises from an act in that power, right? Oh. Okay. And that way, I say my loving. Okay. My loving wisdom arises from understanding what wisdom is, huh? Okay. Oh. Say. Or my liking the girl arises from my what seeing the girl, right?

[2:41] Hmm. You see the idea? Yeah. Okay. Okay. Well, you hear about you know Augustine and Thomas takes the example there, rhetoric, right? You hear about rhetoric, you know this is the art by which you can persuade the crowd. Oh boy, I want that. Yeah. I want to sway the crowds, right? Huh? So you hear something about something. Remember when I was one time in graduate school there and some guy who had studied the Dominicans, you know, about how this Dominican priest was so enthusiastic about what Lexus de Tocqueville, right?

[3:18] And what a careful writer was, just like Aristotle, you know. Hey, you see what? That kind of turned me on? so I started reading de Tocqueville, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So my desire to read de Tocqueville arose from my what? Experience of Aristotle. Yeah, yeah, yeah. My hearing, you know, he was something like Aristotle. I don't think he is exactly, but but you know, in fact, he's been praised so highly, right?

[3:42] So you hear some book, you know, really highly praised, and you know, you want to read the book now or read the thing. You see, it happens all the time, right? Mm-hmm. Um, but there, the act of one power is arising from the act of another power, right? Mm-hmm. But now, if I should start to think about the Pythagorean theorem, and drawing upon my knowledge of Book one of Euclid, right?

[4:04] There would not be one power arising from another power, would it? Or the act of one power arising from the act of another power, would it? Yeah. No, it would be

[4:15] the act of understanding the Pythagorean theorem arising from my habitual knowledge, right? My habitus, right? Okay. Which I try to preserve the habitus by you know doing this during every final exam. Yeah. When he says here now, but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention, Could I say that that is our storehouse, the storehouse of intellectual species in the passive intellect? Yeah, yeah, the passive intellect intellect.

[4:50] And then by intelligence, the act of the intellect. Does he mean that the act of intellect itself is the power by which the intelligence understands? Yeah, you could say that when I want to understand, I can understand, right? Through the power of the act. of intellect. Yeah, yeah, but if I have the habit here, I can understand when I want to understand, right? But I can't. I haven't learned, you know, the first book of Euclid.

[5:21] I can't understand the Pythagorean theorem whenever I want to, right? They don't have the habitus yet. Okay. That's in a sense referring again back to Augustine, right? Augustine is saying one of these arises from another, right? But there is a way in which something can arise from another in more than one way, can it? And

[5:52] sometimes the act of one power arises from another power as act, right? But that ain't the only way that one thing arises from another. So the act of the understanding can arise from its what? Habit, habit, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[6:12] Okay. So something that's in our memory is recalled and we think about it. Actually, right? And such as a good thing, we start to what? Love it, right? So Shakespeare's definition of reason is what? It's habitual with me now, right? Okay.

[6:36] So that habitual knowledge of what reason is, from that proceeds my actually thinking again about what reason is. And when I actually think about what reason is, then I what? Love reason, huh?

[6:55] And magnetize my memory with its offspring. And then I have the image of the Trinity in me, right? So those who wanted to say a memory was different than the understanding, I don't know but it, seems they'd end up saying when you are once you've learned the theorem, and you do it on the board, you are not using your understanding, but it's another power of the memory.

[7:45] Well, it'd be like the sense powers. You see, where I go back to the thesaurus I am the treasury of my memories, right? And I pull something out, right? I talk about the old times, right? Out of my treasure house, they bring me like Christ says, there, right? But? In the senses, you don't. When you recall something in your memory, it's your memory. You are not. You don't sense it again.

[8:07] You don't. With your, it's a different faculty. So. Yeah, would be in its in its sense, yeah. So if they would say then intellect just kind of receives it, but after that it's another faculty, but that would be strange in the mind. Yeah.

[8:30] But but but if you are getting if you are drawing that out, you are a treasure house, right? Now it's actual in the understanding, wouldn't it? If you're following St. Thomas, well, in your case, even if you had two powers, right? One would take off the other ones, and then, you know, am I going to my treasure house? Right. What's crazy about the man who has, you know, the New Testament, the Old Testament.

[8:54] He goes to his treasure house, and you can take out the new and the old. Yeah, yeah. I can, you know, just like the Like the Evaricious man, right? I can go in and take his jewels and take them out, look at them, put them back in there again.

[9:14] Go to your treasure house right there. Open the box and unlock it. Look at the jewels and put them up and lock them up. Go off.

[9:26] Go to the photo album, you know. Treasure all these old pictures. Is it because we have the same object being the intellectual species, why it's not distinguished? Well, that's another question. I was just talking about that again, right? The reason why there's a distinction in the sense powers is because of the bodily nature of these things. Okay.

[9:55] You have to have a different power. Yeah. For the intellectus. See, you can begin from the idea that in both the sense powers and in the understanding powers, you can both receive and retain what you receive, right? Okay. But then, when you examine more closely, you say in the sense powers, it's not the same individual power that receives and retains, right? Right. And the reason given for that is because of the nature of matter, right?

[10:27] The sense powers are bodily organs, and what enables a body or a material thing to receive well is not what enables it to retain well, and vice versa. See. But the understanding, you don't have any bodily organ, so it's the same power that receives and retains, unless you say, with Avicenna, right, that you don't retain the forms, right? Which is contrary to what Aristotle said when he said that the soul is the place of what forms, huh?

[11:04] But then, St. Thomas is also against reason, right? Because the understanding receives things in a immaterial way and therefore in a more permanent, stable way than a body could receive, right? So, if there's retention of forms in the body, which is mobile and changeable, right? Even more so, there must be a retaining of the forms in the understanding, because whatever is received is received according to the way of the receiver.

[11:39] That's shown by the word understanding itself, right? You know, when Thomas is, you know, showing what Aristotle said before that there are three looking sciences, right? And he points out that they're distinguished by their separation from what matter and from motion in some way.

[12:04] And the reason he gives is well, the understanding is something immaterial, right? So to get something into understanding, it has to be separated from matter. But also, you know, he points out the fact that sciences of necessary things, right, and things that are unchangeable, right. But even the word understanding brings it out, right? Understanding is named from standing, from being at rest rather than from motion. So for something to be understandable, it has to be separated from what motion.

[12:35] Okay. Now in the case of of mathematics and natural philosophy, the first two sciences we see. In natural philosophy, we can't leave motion out of the picture because nature is defined by motion and so on. But we can define motion, and the definition of motion is what motionless, right? The definition of time is not in time, is it? The definition of time: past, present, or future. Can't say one of the other things, can you?

[13:10] And the definition of motion is what motionless, huh? And the understanding of the changing is unchanging. Aristotle shows in the first book of Natural Hearing that change is between opposites, right? And so on. He has an unchanging knowledge of what the changing, right? Okay. So that's one way to be free from change, right? But then in the case of mathematics, right? You define these things that are in the changing world without matter, right?

[13:50] Without sensible matter, as they call it, huh? You kind of talk a bit about sensible matter there, right? And therefore, there is no reference to change. So the geometrical sphere has no sensible matter, so it's neither what heavy nor light, is it? You know, I mean, if you leave go of a helium balloon, it's going to go up, right? Leave go of a lead balloon, it's going to go down.

[14:14] Leave go of a geometrical sphere. You can't say one or the other because there's nothing to refer. To you know that if you throw a rubber ball against the wall, it bounces back, right? You throw a glass ball, maybe it'll shatter. You throw a steel ball, maybe it'll go through the wall or stick in the wall, right? Geometrical sphere was going to be like. Can't say anything.

[14:34] First emotion, right? What's the melting point of a geometrical sphere, right? Freezing point, right? See, because you have no sensible matter, right? Okay. So, natural philosophy and mathematics is about changing material things, right? But they separate from that in two different ways, right? And then you have a third science, which is about things that are what that don't depend upon matter for their existence, right?

[15:08] Either because they don't require matter, or because they can't have matter, right? That's why we have only three sciences. It can't be a fourth science, right? You know, you know the way Thomas gives it there in the beginning. He'll say things either depend upon matter

[15:35] for their existence. Existence, or do not depend upon matter for their existence. And then he says what? Either they are defined with matter, or defined without matter, meaning matter in the sensible sense.

[16:12] Okay. Now, why does it give you only three sciences and not four? I can't define something without with matter, but doesn't depend. Natural philosophy here is what is about things that depend upon matter for their existence, and they're defined with matter and motion in general, right?

[16:37] Mathematics is about things that depend. Pure mathematics, again, in particular geometry. Things that depend upon matter for their existence, but they're defined without matter, right? He likes sphere and cube. Those are things. Now,

[17:01] what things do not depend upon matter for their existence and are defined without matter? Well, that's wisdom or philosophy. metaphysics, some people call it. Okay.

[17:19] Now, is there a fourth one there? That would be false. Yeah. Because if something did not depend upon matter for its existence, how would you define it with matter? The object here is mathematics, right? The mathematics points to the immateriality of the human understanding.

[17:42] But in this case here, there'd be nothing on the part of the mind or reason for putting matter in, because it's immaterial together, and the object is immaterial, right? So this is not a real what? Possibility, right? Remember that

[18:00] example that I give of from the poetics. You know, the division where you crisscross two. Aristotle says, "Any part of a plot is either before something or after something. It's either before something or it's not before something. It's either after something or it's not after something. Well, how many possibilities do you get there?

[18:26] Well, if it's before something and after something, then it's the middle. If it's before something and not after something. It's the beginning. If it's after something and not before something, it's the end. So you have the beginning, middle, and end. Why isn't there a fourth part that's not before anything and not after anything?

[18:47] Right? That's obviously an absurd possibility, right? Right? Don't have any connections to the parts. It doesn't come back to anything or before anything, right? There's no connection to anything else. You see? So there can only be three things, there, right? Well, here you can have a reason why there's no third thing, right? Because neither on the side of the thing being known, nor on the side of the power knowing it, is there any matter, right?

[19:13] So there's no reason why you should define such things with matter, right? You see? Mathematics is kind of the odd animal, right? It's very dealing with things that do depend upon matter for their existence, unless you're a Platonist, right?

[19:36] And yet they're defined without matter, right? And that's why Monsignor Dionne used to quote there in the Heath edition there that from Proclus, I think it is, that mathematics purificat oculum mentis, it purifies the eye of the mind, because the mind is being kind of freed from matter here, right? Mathematics, huh Raised up. But Monsignor Dionne said, but logic, you know, which is even more immaterial, even more purifies the mind, right?

[20:08] Because in mathematics you're still resolving to the imagination, but in logic, you know, you're talking about things that you cannot imagine, like the universal. You can't imagine the universal, can you? And yet, as the great Albert the Great said, that's the first thing to be considered logic is universal. Or as I say, the first thing to be considered is names said of many things. That's why the great work of Porphyry, right?

[20:37] The Isagoge, right? But even before the Isagoge, you could distinguish between names said of many things, univocally and equivocally, and so on. That's where logic begins.

[20:52] But even the young Socrates, right? He tries to imagine universal as a sail covering all these people, and then he gets into all kinds of troubles. In the Parmenides. I'm going to take a little break here before we do article 8, or? Okay. A little breather. In other words, your end is to see God as He is, but that's not the last end. That's kind of the.

[21:27] equivocation that people think the end is what is it the vision or to love God right? But your last end is is in a sense more to what to see God as He is face to face right? But that's ordered to something further right?

[21:47] I mean these are so closely connected you know. You can't have that kind of knowledge without loving God. Okay, to the eighth, he proceeds thus. It seems that reason is another power from the understanding. That's very interesting. These two words here.

[22:10] And in Latin you have the word ratio and the word what intellectus. Intellectus can be translated by understanding, huh? An understanding can name the what? I mean the act, but the power itself, right? So if you look at that work of John Locke, the Essay on Human Understanding, right? Understanding there means more of the what? the power, I think, huh? the act of understanding, right? And ratio is called what reason, right?

[22:52] Okay. And that's these two different powers, huh? Reason and understanding, huh? Okay. Now this is a little side bit. Sometimes we divide understanding, the power of understanding, into reason and understanding.

[23:25] Or the divide intellectus into what intellectus and ratio. That might seem to be illogical, but one power of understanding keeps the name understanding, and the other power of understanding gets a new name. Okay. In terms of names equivocal by reason, what is the basis for this way of naming things? There's two ways in which the common name becomes equivocal by reason of being kept, right? But one of the particulars, while the other particular gets a new name as its own name, huh?

[24:12] There's two ways that takes place. We've explained this before, I think, in logic, but it's worthwhile saying again. Or to better place, right? What's worth saying can be said twice, he said. Okay. What are the two ways in which names become equivocal by reason? In this.

[24:35] Way of being kept by one of the two, which is said, and the other getting its own name. What's the one? Is when like the kitten, the cat, and the the fully developed cat gets the new name, or gets in the kitten a different name. Keeps it. The cat keeps it. Yeah. See. No, no. That example, you know, someone said to you, "What's the difference between a kitten and a puppy?"

[25:00] You probably say, "Well, the kitten is a cat, and the puppy is a dog, right?" But then sometimes you might distinguish the cat and the kitten, right? And the cat keeps the common name, right?

[25:16] As its own name, right? And the kitten gets a new name. A new name. Okay. Now, what's the reason for that? The adult cat, the perfected cat. Yeah. Yeah. In other words, the adult cat has fully. What is meant by cat huh? The kitten is not yet fully developed, right? Perfect, huh? Okay. The same way when you speak, you know, of, you know, a man, a boy. He's only a boy.

[25:47] He's not a man, right? But sometimes you say the boy is a man, and the girl is a a woman, right? No. Okay. Now there's another way in which you sometimes do this, which is where, what? One has something. Yeah.

[26:09] Standing animal, like animal, man. Yeah. And this is this is the other way of what you just said. And the reason why animal keeps the name is not because it has more fully what is meant by it, right? But because what? Man has something more, has reason. Yeah. Whereas animal, what we might call the beast, likes their own name, right? The beast has nothing noteworthy in addition to what's meant by animal.

[26:42] So it keeps the name animal, and man has something noteworthy namely reason and will and so on. So he gets a what? A new name, right? Okay. Example of logic there is the word disposition, right? Disposition is said of disposition and habit, right? Well, habit gets a new name because it's a firm disposition, right? Okay, the unfirm disposition keeps the common name disposition, right? Okay.

[27:17] And this is like you know the rule here, you know, of the natures of things are like numbers, right? So two plus one and just two, just two keeps the name two, and two plus one gets a new name three, right? Okay. This three is not just two; it's two plus one. Do you see that? Okay. So because reason is an imperfect understanding, right? Okay. It's a sometimes they call it in Latin intellectus ab umbra tusa, an overshadowed understanding, right?

[27:59] Okay. It gets the new name, right? And the understanding of God or an angel gets a what? Keeps the common name, right? So sometimes you say that we have reason or ratio, and the angels have an intellectus, right? But then some other time you might say we do have an intellectus, right? But a what? Ab umbra tusa, an overshadowed understanding, right? Okay. That's because we can't understand without some discourse, for the most part, and.

[28:31] Without some images, right, and these show that we hardly be able to understand, right? You understand the difficulty, yeah? But now, if you just you know name these from their acts, and you say, well, reason reasons and understanding understands, right? Thomas is kind of approaching it from that point of view, huh?

[29:06] He says in the book about the spirit and the soul, which doesn't have much authority, as Thomas says, it was attributed by some people to Augustine, huh? In the book about the spirit and the soul, it is said that when we wish to ascend from the lower to the higher, first there occurs to us sense, then imagination, then reason, then what? Understanding.

[29:33] Therefore, what? Reason is a different power from the understanding, just as imagination is from what? Reason, right? Or sense from imagination, right? Okay. It's like we sense and then we imagine and then we we think and then we understand.

[30:01] And of course, Thomas is going to reply that that book doesn't have a great deal of authority, but if you want to you know see something in that words, he says it's referring to what? An order of acts, he'll say, right? And he replied to that.

[30:15] Moreover, Boethius says in the book about the consolation of philosophy that understanding is compared to reason as eternity to time, beautiful proportion. But it's not of the same power to be an eternity to be in time. Therefore, it is not the same power. of reason and understanding.

[30:40] Of course, Boethius has a little less difficult proportion. He says that what reasoning is to understanding as what? Motion is to rest. Yeah, yeah. I often use that. A lot of times, you hear me using that a lot, huh?

[30:57] Moreover, man has in common with the angels understanding, but with the brute animal sense. But reason, which is proper to man, by which he is said to be a rational animal, is a different power from the sense, right? Therefore, for like reason is a different power from the what? Understanding, right? Which properly belongs to the angels, whence they are called what? Intellectual substances, right?

[31:30] I make the distinctions I make among pleasures, right? You know, I add something to him, and where, what's his name, Aussie said that the pleasures of the fine arts and so on are most pleasing proportion to man. They're too high for the animals, and too low for the what angels, right? Okay. So we're

[31:59] seeing reason as what proper to man, right? And something therefore too high for the beasts, but too low for the angels, right? And there's some truth to that, right? Yeah. Because the the beast can't understand at all. Yeah. I I try to make Moppet understand, but he doesn't understand. You know, try to understand the truth that she's a beast, and and she should make less complaints and the more, okay?

[32:37] But you might say reason is too low for the angels because they understand without any what movement or discourse, huh? Okay. But again, this is what Augustine says in the third book upon Genesis to the letter that that by which man excels the irrational animals is reason or mind. They're using mind for the what power rather than the whole part of the soul, right? Or understanding, right?

[33:06] If you take intelligencia, like this, being like intellectus, or by some other vocabulary, it can be more commodious what they name. But reason, therefore, and mind and intellect or understanding are one power. I answer: It should be said that reason and understanding in man cannot be diverse powers, right? Which is known manifestly if the act of each is considered. For to understand is simply to what grasp a understandable truth, huh?

[33:45] But to reason is to proceed from one thing understood to another, to knowing some understandable truth, huh? And therefore the angels, who perfectly possess, according to the way of their nature, a knowledge of understandable truth, do not have any necessity to proceed from one thing to another, but simply and without discourse and without running from one thing to another, yeah. They apprehend the truth. truth of things, as Dionysius says in the seventh chapter about the divine names.

[34:20] So if you get around to studying the angels, right? I remember saying to Kasurik, "I want to study the angels." Anytime he says, "We're going to go and study the angels," he says. You're ready, Dwayne. We'll do it. Okay. But man, in order to what understand truth, to know, understandable truth, or men, you might say they arrive at understanding, at knowing intelligible truth, by proceeding from one thing to another, right?

[34:52] As is said there by Dionysius, right? And therefore they are called what rational, right? So that's why the great Shakespeare defines man by what the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right? And looking means he's trying to understand, right? But he's going to understand as a result of some kind of a what discourse, right? And to some extent, it's even true about natural understanding in so far as it involves somewhat memory and experience, right?

[35:27] And they bring together memories, right? There's a kind of a discourse there, right? In order to understand the what universal, right? Okay, though not a discourse, maybe of universal reason, right? As you have in the case of geometry, right?

[35:47] It is clear, therefore, that to reason is compared to understand, as to move is to what rest, huh? Or as to acquire is to having, right? Huh? Of which one is of the perfect and the other of the imperfect. And because motion always proceeds from the immobile, huh? And is terminated at some kind of rest. Hence, it is that human reasoning, in the way of inquiry or of discovery, proceeds from some things simply understood, which are the first principles or first beginnings.

[36:29] And again, in the way of judgment, by resolving, it returns to the first principles in the light of which it examines the things that it has what found. So Thomas Aquinas speaks of a kind of a circle in our knowledge, huh? Okay. And Aristotle actually teaches that in the in the Analytics, huh? The Prior Analytics, huh? It's kind of interesting that these are called Analytics because that's really the last part of it, right?

[36:57] When you return to the principles and you judge things in the light of them, huh? But you know the first, like the first book of the Prior Analytics, the first part is the, uh, you know talking about the generation of syllogisms, right? And the second part is how you can discover the middle terms of syllogisms therefore make syllogisms, right? The third part is really giving its name to the whole book, the taking part of syllogisms, right?

[37:26] Reducing them back to their what origin, to their principles, huh? So it's kind of a of a circle in our knowing there, right? Now he says it is manifest that to rest and to move are not reduced to diverse powers, but to one and the same, also natural things. He gives a simple example from the ancient knowledge there, because through the same nature something is moved to a place and what rests in that place, huh?

[38:05] Much, therefore, more through the same power will we understand than what reason, huh? And thus it is clear that in man there is the same power that reason and understanding are the same what power, huh? I can't reason except through what something I understand, huh? Now sometimes going back to this proportion.

[38:49] We can say that reasoning is to understanding as motion is to what rest, okay? This is very clear in the word understanding itself, because the word understanding comes from the word what standing, right? It's named from what being at rest, okay? But it's not too hard to see that reasoning is like a motion because you reason from one thing to another, right? So your reason goes from one thing to another, okay?

[39:29] Now sometimes we use the word thinking to name the movement of reason too, but that's not quite as clear, right? Because sometimes we use the word thinking for what one's opinion, right? I think this is so, right? And there is a kind of rest, right? But not a complete rest here. Yeah. Okay. Now, once you see that proportion, you can learn a lot of things from this proportion.

[39:57] And I say to the students, you can understand rest as before or after motion. And so I stand in front of the class and I say, now I'm at rest, okay? And now I in motion as I walk from here, and now I stop, and this is what I rest after motion, right? Okay.

[40:25] Now, when we're reasoning and thinking about something, our mind is in motion, right? But if we succeed in thinking out something, then our mind comes to a what halt or stop, right? And I call that reasoned-out understanding, right? Because I don't have a word in English to really express that, but the Greeks call that what? Episteme. Yeah, and both Plato and Aristotle point out that episteme comes from the Greek word for coming to a halt or a stop.

[41:06] So when the guy was thinking in the bathtub there, right? He said Eureka I have found it. Right? He jumped out of the bathtub. He was supposed to run off without putting his clothes on and get into some. But but no, his thinking was over. He wasn't thinking anymore at this point. But this is an understanding that comes after the motion of reason, do you see? Okay.

[41:30] And so the Greeks called it episteme from the Greek word to halt or come to a stop, right? As I say in English, I try to express that by saying it's a reasoned out right understanding, huh? Okay. Episteme in Latin is in Greek episteme. Right. The Greek word in Latin is translated by scientia right? But scientia in Latin doesn't have any etymological connection with coming to a halt or a stop, at least.

[41:58] I know of. So in what we've been just reading, though, I thought too yet. Okay, I'm sorry. Okay. All right. So I'm saying, I say once you see this proportion, you can say that reasoning is to understanding as motion is to rest. Then someone can say now rest can be understood as being before motion, right, or after, right?

[42:28] And an understanding that comes after the motion of reason, right? Could be called a reasoned out understanding, right? Okay. Now a reasoned out understanding

[42:47] is a rest that comes after reasoning, huh? Okay. And the Greeks, as I say, have a one word for that, episteme, okay? Which, as I say, comes from the Greek word to come to a halt or stop, huh? So it obviously means a standing that is after motion, right? So I'm trying to translate that into English with some respect for the etymology of the Greek word, huh?

[43:20] I call that a reasoned out understanding, right? But that's obviously a understanding that is after motion or reason, huh? Now you could also speak of that when you have thought out something, you have a thought out understanding of something, huh? While you're thinking about something, your mind is in a kind of motion, right, huh? When you finally succeed in thinking it out, your mind comes to a kind of halt or stop, huh?

[43:52] And so this is a thought out understanding, huh? Reasoned out understanding. Now the question is, is there a what understanding that is before the movement of reason, huh? Is there something you understand before you reason? Well, if you understood nothing before reasoning, you'd have nothing to reason from, right? So there must be an understanding before reasoning. Now that understanding before reasoning is called by Aristotle simply nous understanding.

[44:35] Because it doesn't presuppose pure understanding, you might say. It's called by Thomas in Latin intellectus, right? Okay. But I, I think I've spoken of reasoned out understanding, I call this natural understanding, huh? Okay.

[44:55] The things you understand before reasoning, and this is called in Greek there are nous and in Latin intellectus, I'm given the same name as the faculty of understanding, right? Okay. Because it seems to be an understanding that doesn't require this discourse, huh? Okay.

[45:21] Now, what what Shakespeare is defining is is what not reason insofar as it is a nature and naturally understands some things, right? He's defining reason as reason, right? Okay. And that's what he's talking about. It is the ability for discourse, right? Looking before and after, trying to understand, right? Okay, so it's kind of kicking it off from here. What you know, reason has in addition to what it naturally knows, right?

[45:53] Okay, reason as an agent, right?