De Anima (On the Soul)
113. ST I q.79 a.9: Higher and Lower Reason in Augustine, and Names Equivocal by Reason (Wisdom and Science)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/113-st-i-q-79-a-9-higher-and-lower-reason-in-augustine-and-names/

[0:00] in control? When when his anger is in control, then Joe is not in control of himself, right? When his reason gets into control, you know, then Joe's, yeah.

[0:17] So next time we'll do nine and ten, huh? Cherubic angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Great. Help us to understand all that you've written. Amen. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So we're going to do nine and ten today, huh?

[0:48] So this article nine begins from a distinction that Augustine makes, huh? Between higher and lower reason, huh? To the ninth, one proceeds thus: It seems that superior and inferior, or higher and lower, reason are diverse powers. For Augustine says in the twelfth book about the Trinity that the image of the Trinity. Is in the higher part of reason, not in the lower part. Then, but the parts of the soul are its what powers or abilities.

[1:31] Therefore, the higher and the lower reason are two powers. Huh? What I was going to solve that simply by the fact that the word "part" has what Many meanings. many meanings, yeah.

[1:46] And not every part that you might distinguish in the soul are referred to diverse powers, yeah. So, so, so the. Okay. So Augustine is using the word right. You know, part there. Aristotle used the word "part" for the different powers of the soul, right? Aristotle uses "part" for the powers of the soul. Yeah, yeah. Okay, but it's part there in the sense of a part of the power of the soul, right?

[2:15] Is its ability or power to do this? Another part of its power is the ability to do that, right? Okay, but the word "part" is a very universal word, right? Yeah, and so I can even speak within the same power, right? Of

[2:31] of parts, not quantitative parts, but in terms of the acts and the objects. Okay. Morever, nothing arises from itself, right? But lower reason arises from higher reason, and it's ruled and directed by it. Therefore, higher reason is another what power from the lower reason, huh? But notice, you can have even within the same power different habits or virtues, right? One of which directs or commands, say, what another one, right?

[3:13] Huh? And even we talked about discursive, using the discursive, right? One is directed by the principles or the premises to the what conclusion, right? Okay.

[3:33] Moreover, the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that the scientific, let's say, part of the soul, for want of a noun there,

[3:46] is that by which the soul knows what necessary things, and he says that that is another beginning and another part of the soul from the part that has opinions, right? And is reasoning in the sense of knowing contingent things, huh?

[4:07] And he proves this because those things which are other in genus or kind, another particle, another part of the soul. Is ordered right. Another kind of part in the soul is ordered, but the contingent and the necessary are other genera, just as the corruptible and the incorruptible. So the contingent is defined as what?

[4:37] Something dependent, right? Well, as you define in terms of it's able to be and not be, right? Okay. So the professor is lecturing, right? He's able to be standing and not standing, right? Or able to be standing or sitting, so on, right? While the necessary is what is not able not to be. Yeah. Right. Okay, that's a good definition. So, following on the analogy of the professor, what would be necessary if he's lecturing?

[5:18] He's talking, or? Yeah, in that sense, yeah, yeah, it's a necessary connection between them. Of course, there are many senses of necessary, but when you contrast contingent and necessary, right? Sure. Sure. We could say two is necessarily what half of four, right? Huh? It's not able not to be half of four, right? Okay. But you are sitting, right? Is contingent, right? You're able to be sitting, and you're able to not be sitting, right?

[5:49] While the impossible is what is not able to be, right? The necessary is what is not able not to be. Okay. But must be, therefore. Since, however, the necessary would seem to be what is eternal, what is always so, right? Okay. And the contingent would seem to be something what temporal, right? Because sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not, right? It seems that they are the same.

[6:20] What the philosopher calls the scientific part of the soul, and the higher part of the reason, which, according to Augustine, intends or what aims at, right? Looking at eternal things or consulting eternal things, huh? So Augustine is calling that higher part of reason the part that what

[6:48] aims at, you might say, right? Is directed towards what the contemplation of the eternal, right? Or that will go to the eternal in order to be directed by the eternal, and what it says about the what temporal lower things.

[7:07] And this would seem to be, and what the philosopher calls the reasoning or. Thinking part, the opining part, and the inferior reason, which Augustine says, aims at what disposing temporal things.

[7:28] Therefore, there is a what another power of the soul that is called higher reason and lower reason. Now, so he's doing that third argument. There, he's going back to a text of Aristotle, right? Right. Aristotle makes a distinction between two things, right? And Aristotle seems to say these are different powers of the soul, right? And he's saying isn't Augustine saying something more or less like that same distinction that Aristotle made, right?

[7:53] So, they have to understand both Augustine and Aristotle to see how just this comparison is. What does Aristotle mean when he talks about these things there?

[8:09] Moreover, Damascene, St. John Damascene says, right, that from imagination comes about what opinion, right? Then the mind judging the opinion whether. it. Be true or false, right? And judges there for the truth. Whence the mind is called from what? At the end, though, from measuring, right? It's interesting,

[8:37] and when such things have been judged, right, and determined truly, then it's called what? Intellectus understanding. Thus, therefore, the thinking or opining part, which is the lower reason, is other from the mind or the understanding through which one could understand what Augustine calls the superior understanding, right? Or superior reason, rather. I've just got to be careful of these words because sometimes they're naming power sometimes act, right?

[9:10] And Thomas will interpret that Damascene there in a certain way. We'll see. But against all this is what Augustine himself says in the twelfth book of the Trinity, huh? That higher and lower reason are not distinguished except by their what? What they do, right? Yeah. Therefore, they are not two different what? Powers, right? Hmm.

[9:37] I know sometimes we we distinguish between these things, like for example. Sometimes I use my senses, what, to direct me in what I'm doing. Like I use my eyes to drive up here. You didn't know that. Yeah. But sometimes I use my eyes just to what? See something beautiful, right? Not to do something at all, right? Just look at the painting, or look at the beautiful sunset, or the rainbow, wherever it may be, right?

[10:03] Yeah. Okay, is it two different eyes that I have? One by which I, I, you know, do this very plebeian thing of driving my car, right? Yeah. Trying to avoid the opposite cars. And this more elevated one, while looking at these beautiful paintings in the museum or something, or looking at the beautiful sunset we have tonight or something. I don't know about tonight, but okay.

[10:33] Now I answer, Thomas says. It should be said that higher reason and lower reason, according as these are taken by Augustine, right? Hmm. In no way, he says, are able to be two different powers of the what? Soul, right? Hmm. That's what Augustine means. For he says that higher reason is the one that he might say pays attention, right, or applies itself to looking at the eternal, right, and consulting it, right?

[11:15] Conspicientis huh? According as It what speculates these things in themselves, right? Huh? So you look towards divine things just because they're wonderful things to think about, right? Huh? And you want to contemplate them, right? Just like in heaven, we'll contemplate the the beauty of God, right? Huh? Like Augustine says in the beginning of Confessions there, right? Doesn't he say that too late have I come to know thee, thou ancient beauty?

[11:43] Okay. And of course, Plato speaks of God as being the beautiful itself there in the symposium, right? But the beautiful, something that you want to see just to what look upon it, right? Huh? Okay. But consulendis, right? Because we get the word consul from right? Huh?

[12:03] According as from these eternal things it gets rules of action, right? Rules of what should be done, huh? Okay. So he's saying, huh? What?

[12:24] I'm sorry, I lost. Yeah, Augustine is saying that higher reason looks towards the divine, the eternal things, right? Partly just to look upon them because they're beautiful and want to contemplate them, but also in order to draw from them rules for action down here, right? Okay. But lower reason is said by him to be what what applies itself to, right? Directs itself to temporal things, right? Huh?

[12:54] Okay. Its intention is what temporal things, huh? Here and now, huh? Now he says these two things, temporal things and eternal things, are compared to our knowledge in this way that one of them is the what middle, right? The medium, right? The middle term, so to speak, for knowing the other, right?

[13:24] For according to the way of invention or discovery, huh? To temporal things, we come to some knowledge of eternal things. According to that of the apostle, and it's the epistle of the Romans, chapter one, verse twenty. Now this is a very famous text, huh? It's used a lot in the Vatican One, for example. This text, huh? Is that right? Yeah, because this is a text where Saint Paul is saying that even through natural reason we can come to some knowledge of God, huh?

[14:00] Okay. If you look at the context there, you know this is being applied even to our natural knowledge, huh? The philosophers. So he says the invisible things of God, through the things which have been made, which are the temporal things, huh? The material things, being understood, are looked upon, huh? So the first argument for the existence of God is the one that begins from what motion, right?

[14:26] Which is tied up with time, right? And natural philosophy takes up motion and time because motion takes time, right? It's obviously a temporal thing, and we reason from motion to the existence of something eternal, the unmoved mover, huh?

[14:44] But in the road of judgment, right, to eternal things now known, right, we judge about what temporal things, huh? Yeah. And according to the reasons of eternal things, we dispose of what temporal things, huh?

[15:09] Okay. So one of these is known to the other, right? Huh? Okay, two different ways. One is known to the other, vice versa, and may seem to belong more to the same power, right? Huh? Just like it would seem to be maybe one power that would know what the premises of an argument, right? Yeah. And the what conclusion, right? Okay. If I know one thing to another, right?

[15:36] Huh? Okay. Now he says it, however, can happen that the middle and that to which through the middle one arrives, or as a means, maybe because it has a means there, right? That they pertain to diverse habits, right?

[16:00] As the first indemonstrable beginnings principles pertain to the habit of what understanding, what I call natural understanding, okay? But the conclusions which are deduced from these they pertain to the habit of what science, huh? A reasoned out understanding, right? Okay. So I sometimes translate scientia, which is a translation of the Greek word episteme, they mentioned last time, into what reasoned out understanding, right? Mm-hmm. But the reasoned out understanding goes back to the things naturally understood,

[16:43] okay? And therefore, from the principles of geometry, it is possible to conclude something even in another science, as in what perspective, right? Huh? But it is the same power of reason to which belongs the what middle or the medium and the last, huh? For it is an act of reason. As we're a certain motion, right? Yeah. Arriving from one thing into another, right? Mm-hmm. But it's the same mobile thing that goes through the middle in order to arrive at the what?

[17:32] End. Okay. Hence, it is one and the same power of reason that is higher reason and lower reason. But they are distinguished according to Augustine through their offices, right? Through their acts, you might say, right? And also according to diverse habits, right? Which makes these acts more perfect. For to higher reason he attributes wisdom, right? Which is about eternal things and divine things, and to lower ones science in the sense of what?

[18:10] In knowledge of temporal things, huh? Mm-hmm. The words sapientia and scientia are used in many senses, but yeah, you see the same thing, in Aristotle. right Aristotle will speak of episteme,

[18:30] and in the sixth book of Physics, he distinguishes between episteme and what sophia, right? But then at other times he'll call sophia an episteme, okay?

[18:53] Now in Latin they'll use the word scientia, but sometimes they will distinguish between scientia and sapientia, okay? Now I think we should have only one word that completely covers that, but something like if we use the word knowledge, and then we distinguish between knowledge and what wisdom, huh? Now we've spoken about this way of speaking before. Is Aristotle contradicting himself when in the sixth book, Nicomachean Ethics, he distinguishes between episteme and sophia, right?

[19:35] But then in the book on wisdom, the Metaphysics, he calls sophia an episteme. Now, serious distinction between sapientia and scientia, but other times they say sapientia is a scientia of divine things, okay? Now people don't realize this very common way of what? Naming. Naming, yeah, yeah. And but the word episteme there, or the word scientia, or the word knowledge here, is equivocal by what reason? Reason. Okay.

[20:26] Now I mentioned this way of last time we talked about it again last time. What kind of equivocal by reason is this? The kind where the the new thing is the perfection of the first thing. Yeah. Sometimes with a name, right? Instead of two things, right? Even with one meaning in mind, right? It's indubitably another reason to, right? Sometimes it is kept by one of them as its own name, right?

[21:06] Yeah. See, the common name, right? Yeah. Is kept by one of the two as its own name, right? Okay. In other case, right? The other gets a new name as its own name, right? Okay.

[21:46] That's what you have in all these three here, right? Because Sophia, among all episteme, has a what—an excellence that sets itself up above all other episteme, right? It's a knowledge of what—not just of causes, but a knowledge of the very first cause. It's a knowledge of God, ultimately, right? Okay. So, because it has an excellence, it gets a new name, right? It's not just a knowledge of causes, but something very noteworthy.

[22:15] It's a knowledge of the very first cause. You see that? It has a peculiar excellence, huh? Above the common meaning of episteme. Episteme in general means to know why things are the way they are, right? To know the causes of things, right? So, any knowledge of the causes of things could be called episteme. Yeah. But wisdom, among all knowledge of causes, has a peculiar excellence, right? It's about the very first cause of all things.

[22:47] It's about God Himself, right? Is it? So it gets a new name, right? And the other knowledge of causes keep the common name. So, in one sense, Sophia is an episteme, right?

[23:04] In other sense, Sophia is distinguished against episteme, right? Okay. Now we mentioned last time the example: there are animals, right? Sure. Now sometimes we say man is an animal, intending no insult. Okay. But as I

[23:29] say to the students, if your girlfriend says, "You know, you're an animal," that's not a—that's insulting, right? But if if the philosopher or the biologist is an animal, that's not necessarily an insult, is it? See. I told you how my mother, you know, didn't like me calling man an animal. I said, "well, I don't mean he's just an animal, see." She's thinking of, see, she's thinking of animal as distinguished from man, right?

[24:00] Okay. Not animal as common to man and the irrational animals. But man has something very noteworthy, right? That sets him apart from all the other animals, right? That he has reason and will, and so on, and a immortal soul, et cetera, et cetera, right? Do you see the distinction there? Yeah. So notice, huh? You could both affirm and deny that man is an animal, couldn't you?

[24:35] Because an animal is being kept for the brute, the irrational animal, right? Then man is not an animal, right? Okay. But if you take animal in the broad sense, a living body having sensation, well, we're a living body with senses, right? Just as the cat is a living body with senses, right? Okay. Do you see that? Now that's a very common thing, right? Again and again and again, right?

[25:03] You know, they're always talking about treating somebody like a person, not like a thing, right? Okay. But is a person a thing? Yes. Yeah. In some sense, a person is a thing. A person is not nothing, are they?

[25:21] You see? Yes. But because a person is a very special kind of thing, right? Yeah. Sometimes the other things keep the name king or thing rather, and person it's the name.

[25:41] You see the idea? Yeah, and perhaps there was a weirdly other kind of clue. My reason was like a cat to a cat or a kitten. The is that the same as this one, or no? The other one is where only one of the two has fully what is meant by the common word, right? Okay. So you say cat instead of cat and kitten, right? Right. Well, cat is the adult cat, right?

[26:12] It has the perfection of... Yeah, it has the fullness of it. Fullness. And the kitten, right, is an immature, not fully developed cat, right? Right. So the kitten gets the new name, right? That was the reason why we said, you know, if you want to take a philosophical example, that is very common. When you divide intellectus or understanding into understanding, meaning now the

[26:40] power, right, and reason, right? Okay. Well, understanding means what? The ability to understand. But man has this ability to understand in a very weak way, right? Very imperfect way, huh? And they see a Latin there from Isaac there the intellectus Isaac there, the intellectus obumbratus, right? The overshadowed understanding, right? Okay. Sure. So we have a hard time understanding things, right? Huh? And so notice that Shakespeare defines reason there, huh?

[27:18] As ability for large discourse, looking, right? Before and after, looking means what? Trying to see, trying to understand, right? Huh? Okay, so as Augustine says, there are more things in sacred scripture he doesn't understand than he does understand, right? And so there are few things we understand really well, right? And it takes us time and discourse in order to understand them, right? So we have a kind of imperfect and defective ability to understand.

[27:50] So we get the new name, right? You see, see, because we lack, we have imperfectly what's meant by the common here, right? Here you mean the ability to understand. it. Well, the man really had the ability to understand? See, well, in a very weak way, he has the ability, right? In a defective way, but he has, has sensation and memory, experience, and and they don't tell him too much, right?

[28:20] And he has to reason and think out. Things and so on. Yeah. We have this the angel understands everything right away. Right. It doesn't have to study. Doesn't have to reason. You see what I mean? Yeah. So this is the other kind of way. So, what's like a shorthand version to refer to these two kinds of? I don't if they have a name, you see, but in one sense, you know, reason is divided here against understanding.

[28:50] Yeah. Other case is not. Now these are two ways in which a name becomes equivocal by reason. Yeah. And most people, you know, they emphasize

[29:07] ones where t here is a greater difference, right, between the meanings than these. But these are still common enough that people you know have to understand them. In the categories, Aristotle used the word disposition, habit right? And sometimes he'll say that habit is a disposition. Sometimes he will what? Divide habit against disposition.

[29:39] We see a habit here is a firm disposition, right? One not easily lost. So virtue is a habit. It's a firm disposition, right? But disposition then is what

[29:59] a weak disposition, right? You know. Okay. It's a little bit like you know. I think in English when we use the word mood, I am in a good mood today, or I am in a bad mood today. Mm hmm. Weak disposition. Yeah. In other words, that can pass fairly quickly, right? And sometimes you know you run into somebody who's in kind of a bad mood, and and he cracks a joke or something, and he starts to right change, right?

[30:28] Or you see these these advertisements for the the in the in the bars, you know, for the happy hour, right? They call attitude readjustment. You see, you step out of the bar, have a drink or two, and laugh with your friends, and then your what? Your mood has changed, right? You see what I mean? You know, a little child that goes through all these moods during the day, right?

[30:54] So habit then adds something noteworthy to disposition, right? Yeah. Maybe a certain firmness, right? The fact that this is not easily what lost, you know. So this example here of disposition.

[31:17] Ah. And this is in habit is divided to is the other kind of name equivocal by reason. Now I call this kind of equivocal. I distinguish it from the other kinds of names that are equivocal by reason. I say in these cases here, the name becomes equivocal by reason, right? By being kept of one of the two things which you just said. All right. Say. Well, the other thing which you just said gets a new name, right?

[31:49] And there's two ways here that I exemplify that takes place, right? Okay. Two different ways. Now in Latin, see, when you're in Greek, you'll see them dividing nomen into nomen and verbum.

[32:17] Okay. And in Greek, you'll see something like that. The same thing. You'll see in Greek onoma divided into onoma and rhema right here. right here should be wrong. We call that rhema. Okay. Now, if you read some of Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, right, in the Greek, right, or in the Latin, you'll see this confusion, right, that can arise, huh? Because sometimes Aristotle will distinguish rhema against onoma, or in the Latin verbum against onoma nomen Other times, he'll say verbum is a what?

[33:07] Nomen onoma, huh? Right. Okay. Now, which example is this up? Which one of these two is that? Let's see, because verb would be something in action. Would that be an imperfection or a perfection? Well, it doesn't necessarily mean it's more perfect, but the common meaning of nomen here, right? Yeah. Is a vocal sound. Yeah. Signifying. Signifying by human agreement, right? Yeah. No part of it signifies by itself.

[33:48] Yeah. Okay. Now the difference between the nomen and the verbum, right? Yeah. Is that the verbum signifies with time? Oh, with time. Oh, interesting. And the noun signifies without time. Yeah. Okay. Okay. So it's it's kind of you know mistake to define noun as the name of a person, place, or thing. Okay. And verb as the action. Yeah, something to do with it. But take the word action itself, right?

[34:20] Yeah. The word action is that a noun or a verb? So now, right? You see, the name of action isn't not the name of what, you know? You see, but the difference between the word action, let's say, the word acts, right, or acted, right, is that when you say act or will act or or acted, right, you signify with the present or the past or the future, right?

[34:44] When you say action, is that past, present, or future? It's timeless. Yeah, yeah. See, so it signifies the noun signifies without time, without time. The verb signifies with time. So the verb adds something, right? The common notion of of name. See, the verb is a vocal sound that signifies by human agreement, no part which signifies by itself, but signifying with time, right? The noun doesn't have that addition, so it gets the new what name, right?

[35:19] Okay. Now see, in English we tend to translate these. We can say noun and verb, and then use for onoma, maybe name, right? Okay. And then we can avoid that, maybe you know. But otherwise, we tend to use name to mean noun too. Don't we? You tend to think about you know name usually as a noun rather than a verb. That's true. So then you get interesting you know argument class you know.

[35:45] How about when you divide man into man woman, which is it, right? You know what Saint Thomas says. I know. But they say this is other way around. Maybe the woman has something special to her, you know. So I'll tell what I think. I just I already have these things, right? You see, because I think the word woman, you know, came from the word man. When looking up, you know, I used to joke at woe to man.

[36:14] Yeah, yeah. But apparently, woman it doesn't have an etymology, right? What doesn't? Apparently, it goes back to the idea of of hoodery, the fact that women wore a what a veil, right? Okay. Wow. They're still having some countries, right, where women tend to, you know, so the woman has something additional to man, right? Oh, something over her face. Veil. Yeah, yeah. You see it. A veiled man.

[36:41] Yeah. A veiled human being, right? A veiled person, true. Yeah. But but whatever the you know, which I really understand it properly. The point is, the word man here is equivocal. So in one sense, a woman is a man, right? Yeah. In another sense, woman is not a man. And sometimes I used to, you know, pick a you know pick out a girl I can do often, and I'd say now.

[37:12] Is man an animal? Is man the only animal with reason? And she'll say yes, right? And then I say, now you a man or a woman? Oh. So she's not a man because she can't reason, right? And I say now show me that you can reason. You know. Ah yeah. See. Well, one sense the woman's not a man, right?

[37:35] Another sense she is a man, right? So you say man is the only animal that can reason, right? And she says she's not a man.

[37:46] Is the word man the same sense? No, no, see. But it's equivocal, right? Yeah. Okay. So in the in the present context here, sophia is kept for a knowledge of the lower things, right? And wisdom is a new name given to the sophia, which is about the highest things, about the eternal things, the divine things. Do you see that? Yeah. But you have an already near a style of, that thing, right?

[38:21] See. When you read the sixth book of the of the um of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle is distinguishing the virtues of reason, right, or the perfections of reason, he'll distinguish between episteme and sophia, two different things, right? And yet, in another book where he's talking about sophia, right, he'll say that sophia is the episteme, of the first cause of the first cause, and so on. So sometimes he'll distinguish sophia against episteme.

[38:53] other times he'll say sophia is an episteme. Is he contradicting himself? No, no more than that woman is contradicting herself, right? Right. You see? Okay. Yeah. They go into a a nursery, right? A plant nursery. And now, usually, they won't call a tree a plant. So, if you're going to buy a plant, you're not, you know. I'm going to buy a tree. Yeah. So, so the tree gets its own name, so to speak, right?

[39:20] And the word "plant" tends to get kept for for a smaller thing, right? And maybe not even a bush is called a plant so much, right? Sure. But certainly not a tree. huh? Certainly not. so I chopped down a tree in my yard there the other day, and I don't say chopped down a plant; it was a tree. My neighbor was

[39:40] asking me, you know, near that side where the tree was. Did you know it was going to fall this way? Oh, that guy knew it was going to fall this way. I read that towards his house, you know. But he's like, you know, this way of cutting trees will fall some way, you know. He said, you know, he's he's kind of naive in a way the way he explains these things to me sometimes, which I know that's the way I've got to get tree.

[40:03] But I mean, I mean, probably the tree is already leaning that way to begin with, you know. Yeah. Plus, there's some trees on the other side, so if it went that way, it can go into the house anyway. It would hit the other trees. That's true. And but I was also cutting it, I mean, so it was going to fall that way too, you know. It's cutting more on that side.

[40:17] It was too short, I'll do that. One thing with this text here, St. Thomas, it, seems like he's saying that sapientia and scientia are habits. Yeah. Yeah. Is that always the case, or sometimes that's there's something else too? There's sapientia. Otherwise, is sapientia defined as a habit? Yeah, it is a kind of habit. Yeah, a virtue, right? You see, you know, you divide habit here into what virtue and what vice, right?

[40:53] Okay. So, in some sense, wisdom is a disposition of my reason, right? My reason is disposed a certain way by this. Okay. It's habituated, right? Okay. And what what habit does is not to give you the raw ability to think about something, a habit of reason now, but to think what orderly and easily when you want to think about these things, right? So, so for these. This habit that I have called geometry, I can go to the board whenever I want to, and at least those early theorems I can demonstrate them without any difficulty.

[41:33] You see, so it makes it easy for me to do those things, right? Okay. The same way for the moral virtues, right? If if I am a just person, I really have the habit of justice, right? Then I find it easy to to to give you what is yours, right? Okay, I don't have a struggle there to return your money or something, right? You see.

[42:00] Aristotle will distinguish after he goes through the virtues. He'll distinguish those things like continence and incontinence, where a man has a what struggle between following his passions and following his reason, huh? Yeah. And sometimes the reason wins, and sometimes the passions win, right? Yeah, absolutely. Batman doesn't have the the habit of the virtue yet, huh? You see. Okay, so man really has the virtue of temperance. He doesn't have this struggle, you know, to avoid eating or drinking too much or pursuing the woman too much or something like that, right?

[42:31] huh? You see? He just doesn't think about doing those sort of things, right? Yeah. Okay. So I was taking off from the last words of Saint Thomas there, for to higher reason he attributes the habit of what wisdom, the virtue of wisdom, to the lower one what scientia right? Yeah. See, Now notice sapientia and scientia are often used in more than one sense, but they all always have that that that distinction, right?

[43:02] That they're opposed to each other. That wisdom is of the higher things, and scientia the lower things. They even use those two words, and they talk about the gift of the Holy Spirit, right? Yeah, and and and sapientia is a higher thing than scientia in the in the they call knowledge usually and wisdom, right? Yeah. In English, huh? Yeah. The wisdom is something higher, okay?

[43:28] But the philosophers originally used that wisdom to name the most divine part of philosophy. So he would say that the gift of the Holy Spirit called knowledge is. He would distinguish that as the lower. reason. Well, I don't get into discussion now of the gifts of the Holy Spirit right now, but but the one called wisdom would be a higher thing, right? Of higher thing. Yeah, but but the the wisdom there is is attached to charity, right?

[43:56] Okay. Okay. I I just mentioning you know that the word wisdom is used in more than one sense. To go back to begin the prima pars here, Thomas will be distinguishing between the wisdom that is theology and the wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit. Oh yeah. Yeah. But I mean, when you contrast wisdom with scientia or knowledge, right? It's always a higher thing, right? Ah.

[44:22] Okay. Now the first objection was taken from Augustine there right that he speaks of the image of Trinity being in the higher part of reason the emphasis upon the word part there right okay and Thomas says to the first therefore it should be said that according to whatever reason there is for making a partition right one can speak of a part right so in so far as we just divided by diverse what offices right diverse acts you might say right higher reason and lower reason are called what parts or partitions right and not because they are diverse what powers.

[45:07] powers huh okay now the second objection is saying nothing arises from itself right but lower reason arises from higher reason and is ruled and directed by it therefore they have to be different what powers huh and he says that to the second it should be said that lower reason is said to be deduced from higher reason or to be regulated by it in so far as the principles which lower reason uses are deduced from and directed by the principles of what higher reason huh okay we have that even in philosophy right or even in the natural order you have that same sort of thing right because the higher is going to give principles to the lowers huh in the way that arithmetic gives principles to

[46:08] music right and geometry gives principles to what yeah yeah and to astronomy right and even give medical apparently they discovered in practice that if I poke you with a round instrument right instead of with a blade right that the round wound doesn't heal as quickly as the other one does we can see the reason for right if I if I have a blade I can hit you then the parts can come together more easily right to heal right but if I got round hole the parts can't you see you see well here it's like a personal you know like that you have this kind of wound that can you know close up more easily staple but it goes back to the fact that in geometry

[46:59] you have a common what angle there right huh the two lines are meeting right and therefore they can close up more easily right while round thing cannot so easily right goes back to geometry huh.