De Anima (On the Soul)
114. Article 9 continued: Necessary and Contingent Knowledge, Contradiction, Opinion and Certitude
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[0:00] Okay, now the third one requires him to go into uh discussion what Aristotle means. It's kind of obscure text Aristotle in some ways. The third, therefore, now to be said that the scientificum about which the philosopher speaks is not the same thing as superior reason, although it might seem to be some likeness there, right? Yeah. Um, for necessary noble things are found even in what temporal things, huh?

[0:32] Okay. So, example, we're studying change there, right? We always said, for example, the changes between what opposites, right? Okay. That's always true, isn't it? So there can be things that necessarily true even in what. The Temporal. order Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. Man is always an animal, right? The cat is always an animal, right? Yeah. And about these things is what natural science and what mathematics, right? Now you may recall that the distinction between natural science and mathematics, they're both about material things.

[1:19] They're both about what is found only in the material world. But the difference is that in natural science, you're dealing with things that must be defined by what sensible matter, like flesh and blood and bones. By mathematics, you define them without sensible matter, right? So the geometrical sphere is neither hard nor soft, nor hot nor cold, nor heavier or lighter, anything else, right? That is sensible.

[1:53] Okay. So you can see scientificum is not the same thing as what Augustine calls a higher reason, right? The higher reason is studying these eternal things, not temporal things, right? So it's not the same thing as Aristotle calls scientificum, right? Aristotle is thinking of scientificum here more in the sense of episteme, right? You know, it's a knowledge of what is necessary, right?

[2:24] Okay. Episteme is is result of demonstration, right? The syllogism making us know the cause and that which it is the cause that cannot be otherwise. Okay. So you have this in geometry and mathematics in general, and in at least in the general study of natural things, you have things that necessarily so, right? They seem by reason to be necessarily so. Okay. And it's always a result of a demonstration.

[2:53] Yeah, some kind of demonstration. Through a syllogism. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Yeah, the syllogism whose premises are seen to be necessarily what true. Okay. Okay.

[3:08] So that scientificum doesn't correspond to higher reason, which is just about the divine or eternal things, huh? Okay. So in a way, scientificum includes something more than what knowledge of divine things. See, for higher reason is just the knowledge of divine things.

[3:35] But Aristotle calls the opinativum and ratiocinativum sinativum is in less than lower reason, right? Because Aristotle is referring to there is its knowledge of the contingent as contingent, right? Okay, I was talking to the abbot out there about the chapel going up out there, right? And he was comparing with some chapel one up here, the Benedictine one, right? And how it's going to be cost less, but be better than the the the Benedictine one had wallboard inside or something.

[4:11] He says, and you're not going to have that for anything; have better interior. But there are different ways of making a house, right? Okay. And we're watching this addition. You know, a lot of people put additions on their houses in my neighborhood. You know, and apparently it's cheaper. You know, to make an addition your house and try to buy a sell your house and buy a bigger house.

[4:32] But anyway, this one people put on. My wife doesn't think too much of it because the addition has got different size windows in the original house, and there's all kinds of different size windows in the house. Yeah, I don't know so much, and she knows a little bit. You know, it's kind of, you know, and other people have, you know, I think better, you know, additions put on, and it matches the house better, right?

[4:58] You need somebody who knows what he's doing so the house will fit in, right? But no, it's it's able to be this way or that way, right? This way or not this way, right? And someone could have designed that addition so that the windows would max more. The windows are already up there on the house, right? It's going to change all the windows that are already there, right?

[5:21] You see what I mean? See, so there you're dealing with the contingent, right, here and now. Sure, sure. Or I'm the cook here. I'm going to cook this meat today. I want to make it nice, and I could, you know, use this flavor, it I could, use that, right? Huh? So you see one of these these recipe books, right? I mean, it's got all kinds of ways of flavoring or you know preparing the meat, right?

[5:42] It's infinite. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I could do it this way or not do it this way, right? Do it this way, do that way, huh? You see? And the

[5:56] I could cook the meat sometimes. You know, I had a piece of ham last night. Usually put on the grill, but just pouring rain yesterday, so I did just in a frying pan on the on the stove. You know, you see. So there's you know, it's contingent thing. I can do one way or another depending upon circumstances or what my my whims are that night or something, right?

[6:15] You see, I can probably grill tonight because it looks like the sun's coming out. See, and a fortiori for zero, you get into the domain of prudence, right? There's all kinds of things, right? Yeah, I could study this time. I could study that time, right? You know.

[6:32] So Aristotle's talking about you know when you break down to the singular contingent, when he talks about the opinativum and ratiocinativum, okay. I could have this tea or that tea, right? I have a variety of teas to drink, right? Did

[7:01] you have white wine with chicken or red wine? Say, well, red wine might taste better, but white wine might fit better, but maybe not. It's

[7:11] so now dealing with the very contingent in that sense, sir. Aristotle may be talking there in the second thing upon something that is actually in the order of an interior sense, the cogitative power, right?

[7:33] Okay. Now Thomas goes on here though to say, nevertheless, it should not be said simply without a distinction that it is another power by which the intellect knows necessary things and another power by which it knows contingent things, because in some way it knows both according to the same definition of its object, because it knows everything under the definition of being or what and true, yeah. Hence, necessary things which have perfect being and truth, it knows perfectly, right?

[8:18] As attaining to their what to what they are, right? Through which it demonstrates about these things their what proper accidents, right? Okay. I think example, example, classes, right? A very simple example of this.

[8:49] I can understand what this is. Not beyond my powers of understanding. I can understand what intersecting what straight lines are, right? Okay. These are intersecting straight lines.

[9:10] Now, because and by the way, because I mean the cause being right, because these two lines intersecting, that's why you have these opposite angles here, right? Like A and B here, right? Okay.

[9:28] But now, because the lines intersecting each other are straight, right? Then A plus X is going to have to be either two right angles, right? Or two angles equal to right angles, right?

[9:49] And because. This is a straight line meeting a straight line. It also makes two right angles, or angles equal to two right angles. Okay, that's the previous theorem, right? Okay. So b plus x must equal two right angles. Now the rest is just the axioms, right? Quantities equal to the same are equal to each other, right? Therefore, a plus x must equal b plus x, since they're both equal to right angles.

[10:19] Another axiom: the equals subtract from equals. Therefore, a must equal b. But notice all this follows because the intersecting lines here are straight, huh? Yes. And because they're straight, that's why a plus x must be two right angles, right? Equal to right angles, right? That's why. That's the reason why, right? That's the cause of b plus x being equal to right angles, huh? If one of these was bent, then a plus x would have to be two right angles In fact, it couldn't be, right?

[10:52] Right. Okay, so because I understand what this is, I understand what it is for lines to intersect, right? I understand what it is for lines to be straight. Then I can demonstrate, right, a property that follows upon intersecting straight lines, because intersecting follows that their angles, and because the lines are intersecting are straight, it follows necessarily that they are what equal, right? Okay. Now there are other theorems, you know, like the one about the triangle, which require even more theorems before you get to there, right?

[11:29] Right. But you know the way Euclid does it, he extends one side and shows that this exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite ones by the parallel theorems. But you can do it more simply if you don't want to show the other part. Just draw a line through the vertex parallel to the base, and then by the parallel theorem, because alternate angles are equal.

[11:57] Well, never, the third angle makes up the two right angles, right? Okay. So you demonstrate by your understanding of what a triangle is, and by the previous theorems, that the triangle must form three angles equal to right angles. Okay.

[12:14] That's what. So I can know truly the truth of that, right? Huh? It's necessary truth, right? Right. Ordinary triangle. Flat surface. I said you get a modern mathematician, you know, likes to talk about a triangle drawn on the what? On the surface. sphere Yeah, Yeah. Then using the word triangle in an equivocal sense, right? Yeah. Yeah. Here you're talking about a triangle, you know, on the flat surface, right?

[12:41] Yeah. You know, with straight lines and so on, right? Okay. So here you have a necessary truth, right? Yeah. Just like you had with these intersecting straight angles, right? Necessarily truth, right? Whence, necessary things which have perfect being and truth, right? Reason knows perfectly, right? I know completely and perfectly, right? As it were, pertaining to the what? To what they are, right? Huh? Okay. Through which the proper accidents or properties, as they're sometimes called, it demonstrates about these things, right?

[13:17] So he demonstrates that the triangle has as a property, right, as a proper accident, those angles equal to right angles, right? We demonstrate of the intersecting straight lines that the opposite angles are what equal, right? Huh? Mm-hmm. But it knows contingent things imperfectly, right? Just as they have an imperfect being and truth, huh? Mm-hmm. So Brook was just sitting, right? Huh? Well, maybe you can know that, right?

[13:48] Huh? But for all you know, maybe I push the chair back and I'm just crouching here, right? Yeah. But the point is, if you leave the room, I might. You know, stand up and walk around or something, right? You see. In other words, Brook was just sitting is sometimes true and sometimes what? True. Yeah. See. So the truth about this is hard to know, isn't it? Huh.

[14:15] You only know when you're right there and you can sense me sitting, right? Huh. Mm-hmm. But he says perfect and imperfect do not diversify a power in act, right? But they diversify the acts as far as the way of what? Yeah. Mode of acting. Mode of acting, yeah. And consequently, the principles of action and the habits themselves, huh?

[14:47] And therefore, the philosopher lays down two particular parts of the soul, the scientific one and the ratiocinativa, not because they are two powers necessarily, but that because they are distinguished according to diverse aptitude to receiving diverse habits, whose diversity he there intends to inquire. You know, sometimes they'll talk about what foresight or prudence and art as being about the contingent, right? And science being about the what necessary, right?

[15:19] Huh. Okay. But nevertheless, he says contingent things, necessary things, although they differ according to their own genera, they come together in a common notion of being, right? Huh. Which the understanding what regards, right? To which they have themselves diverse according to perfect and what imperfect, huh? Incidentally, because of the fact that the reason knows the necessary better than the contingent, right?

[15:53] And that it's more perfected by knowing the necessary, therefore, right? You see. That's kind of a sign of the immortality of the soul, right? That's perfected by knowing the necessary, right? Rather than by knowing the contingent, huh? Now, what did the British statesmen say? You know, England has no permanent friends or enemies. We may have permanent interests, he says, but no permanent friends. See. So, what is the friend of England?

[16:23] Is it France or Germany? Right. Well, the Napoleonic Wars, Germany was the friend of what? Of England, right? But in the First World War, in the Second World War, it was simply reversed, right? Okay. Our France was our friend there during the Revolutionary War, right? Maybe in the Second World War, they were more our friend, but now during this last war, you know, this they're kind of opposing us, right?

[16:53] Going into the Iraq War, huh? You know, so there's been kind of a, I don't know if you followed at all, but there's been kind of a heard a little bit about that. Yeah, people you know stop buying French wines, you know, and see we were actually pouring out their French wine, you know, and so that the sales of French wine have gone down, you know, and and yeah, people are not buying French cheeses and so on, right, and then you know, I know the French are going to an Italian subway, but we buy much more from France than they buy from us, so we're hurting them, you know.

[17:23] Yeah. So it's kind of pickier that way, yeah. But anyway, you know, so French are a little concerned about that, see. So. Yeah. But no, it's the idea there. There's nothing permanent there, right? See, we were actually supporting Iraq at one time when they were in a war with Iran because Iran had, you know, the time when they captured our embassy there and they imprisoned our people there, you know, and you know, we were Carter tried to rescue them and all that sort of stuff, you know.

[17:57] Well, they went from Iraq. No, no, no, no. See, in Iran, yeah, we were supporting Iraq, you know, to kind of get even with the Iranians, you see. But suddenly, you know, in this last war, the Iraqis were enemies, right? And yeah, so I mean, these things are always changing, right? Yeah. In the same way in politics, right? You know, in a sense, you know, two politicians will be allies.

[18:18] You know, in the time they'll be what? They'll be running for the same office or something, right? And then they'll be enemies, right? Or maybe you know, I need you to balance the ticket. Yeah, yeah. In Europe, you know, you and I might be both from you and I might be both from New England, you know, but you happen to help me in the ticket. You see, Like Kennedy needed LBJ to carry the South, right?

[18:40] huh? You see, so you need to balance tickets. You see. Oh. So I mean, Kennedy might be an enemy of LBJ, and they're both trying to get the nomination, right? But then when Kennedy gets the nomination, then he needs LBJ to to try to hold the South. You see. And or sometimes you have a guy in the in the in the west in the east, right? who gets away from the west, let's say, you know.

[19:02] So New Yorker might get a Californian to run with them or something, you know. So that's right, right? So these are always changing. You know who's your friend and who's your enemy, huh? Who's your competition, see? But that's the nature of the contingent, right? Yes. You see, and and

[19:20] you know, Germany was a great enemy, you know, in the First World War, but especially in the Second World War, right? And now they're more more friendly. Now you know they're a little bit friendly, but this will probably be friends, right? You see, so these things are changing all the time, right? Mm. It's hard to know who your friend and your enemy is, right? Quite. You see, it's the contingent thing, so.

[19:50] So reason, as far as knowing is concerned, is perfected by knowing more than necessary than the contingent. And when by the contingent, it wasn't necessary to act and to make, huh? You see. But the but that the fact that the soul is perfected by the necessary in the in the eternal, more, is a sign that the soul is what immortal in its very nature. Because perfection, perfection and perfectible are relative to each other.

[20:27] Will you repeat that again, real quick? The soul is perfected more by. Yeah, knowing the necessary than by knowing the contingent. Knowing, okay. That's a sign that we're meant to view

[20:52] Does that Go along the lines with we don't have any you know there's a reason for everything there's nothing without a purpose. the fact that the reason is perfected by a knowledge of necessary shows that it's akin to the what necessary huh because the perfection of the thing the perfectible are what relative relative to each other yeah perfectible and the perfection yeah just going

[21:28] back to what Thomas is doing to reply to the third objection right he's first of all saying that the proportion that they made in the objection is not correct right that these two that Aristotle distinguishes right are not the two that Augustine distinguishes right so that's that's the first defect you might say in the objection right huh but then he's going on to point out that the necessary and the contingent both in some way come under the object of reason which is being and the true right okay

[22:03] so if reason is the ability to know what is true right your reason can know not only what is necessarily true right my reason can know that you are sitting right okay I can know necessary truths and contingent, they both come under the object of truth do you see okay even though I can know more perfectly that those angles equal than that you are sitting huh you see and that you are sitting will not always be true but that's going to always be true right so I can know it more fully huh

[22:46] now the fourth one as as I pointed out it might be based also upon the what do those words mean huh are they naming powers in the Damascene or are they naming objects I mean acts to the fourth it should be said that that distinction of Damascene is according to a diversity of acts not according to a diversity of powers huh for opinion signifies an act of the understanding which is carried to one part of a contradiction but with fear of the other right okay but now this is the famous thing huh this is the famous thing here that

[23:28] in the in the second part of logic are we talking about statements right yeah and we talk about statements that are what contradictory right okay okay now what are contradictory statements

[23:47] okay well first of all contradictory statements Are statements with the same subject and predicate? Okay. Okay. They have the same subject and predicate, but one is affirmative and the other is what? Negative, right? Okay.

[24:29] And they're opposed, right? You might expect, right? Yeah. If one's affirmative, negative, and opposed, such that both, both, let's put this way, put the same line, that both cannot be true, both cannot be false, right? The one must be true, and then it must be false.

[25:08] And you may not know which is the true, which is the false one, right? Right. But one must be true, and the other false. Okay. Now,

[25:23] if the subject of the statement is a singular, it's easy to see what is the contradictory of that statement. So the statement Berquist is standing, right? What's the contradictory of that statement? Berquist is not standing. Yeah. And notice you have the same subject, Berquist in both statements. The same predicate, standing, right? But one is affirmative, one is what? Negative, right? Now, can they both be true? Berquist is standing, and Berquist is not standing?

[25:52] No. No. Can they both be false? No. No. One must be true, and then it must be false. But you may not know which is true, which is false, right? Okay. Okay. Now it's a little more difficult, and we were maybe this in our study of logic. If you have a universal subject like man, right? You see. Because grammatically, man is standing, man is not standing, might seem to be like Berquist is standing, Berquist is not standing, right?

[26:21] Right. But Berquist is an individual, unique person, huh? Why man is something universal, right? So if I say, you know, man is standing, you might say, you mean every man is standing, or you mean some man is standing? What do you mean? You know, you see. And so that's where Aristotle compares the universal and the particular, right? And he says, what statements are contradictory? Is it every man is standing and no man is standing?

[26:50] Well, notice every man is standing and no man is standing. They have the same subject and predicate, right? One is affirmative, one is negative, right? Right. Well, they oppose such that both cannot be true. Well, that's true; they can't both be true. But couldn't they both be false? Every man is standing and no man is standing. They're both false. Yeah, just in this room we can see that, right?

[27:16] Because all you need is one man standing to make no man is standing false, right? And one man sitting to make false, right? See, so they're not contradictory, right? Now, what about some man is standing, some man is not standing?

[27:33] They're both true. You see, so that opposes, right? So it's the universal affirmative and the particular negative that are contradictory, or the universal negative and the particular affirmative. Every man is standing, some man is not standing. Can they both be true? No, because if every man is standing, right, there's no exception, right? So man, some man is not standing would be false. But if some man is not standing is true, then every man is is standing is what false, right?

[28:08] The same way, if you take the universal negative and particular affirmative, no man is standing and some man is standing. Can they both be true? No, because it is true that some man is standing. It's obviously false that no man is standing, right? And if it's true that no man is standing, then there's not even one man who is standing, is there? So they can't both be true, right?

[28:32] Okay. So Aristotle there teaches us in the Prior Peri Hermeneias what contradictory statements are, right? Okay. Now, what the logic of the second act doesn't teach you though is which half is true, which is not, right? Okay. How do you know which is the true side, which is the false side, right? Well, sometimes you know it by sensation, right? So Berquist is standing is true at least now, right?

[29:04] And Berquist is not standing is false at least now, right? You know by sensation, right? Okay. Sometimes you know which side is true and which is false by understanding the parts of the statement, right? If I say, for example, no odd number is even, and some odd number is even, which is true, which is false. First is true. Yeah. Now there you know it through knowing what odd is and what even is, right?

[29:34] You see. By the senses. But now, if someone says to you, every triangle, right, has interior angles you two right angles, some triangle does not have it. Even you know what you mean by right angles and so on, and you know what you mean by triangles. It's not obvious from the definitions, is it? Well, in the case of no odd numbers, even, right? Sure. See, and then you have to what reason it out, right?

[30:05] But if you reason from statements that are known to be true, right, necessarily, that still doesn't. Then you would also eventually know that every right, every triangle has interior angles with right angles. Yeah. All right, you could show there's a thing that if these sides are equal, that these angles must be equal, right? Okay. And it shows the reverse too, right? Okay. Okay. Now, when Aristotle distinguishes between dialectical reasoning, huh, and demonstrative reasoning, huh, you point out that in dialectical reasoning, you reason to one side of a contradiction, one of the two. contradictory. statements, right?

[30:54] But not with complete what necessity, right? You reason with probability towards that, right? And therefore, you are what has some fear, right? That possibly the other side might be true, huh? Okay. Therefore, it's all right if you descend to something, you know, very contingent, like, "Well, George Bush have a second what term? Yeah, see, see. Well, many people think it's likely that he will, right? Huh? You see.

[31:29] But you can still have some fear that he might, huh? These terrorists running around, so he might assassinate him, right? Huh? Okay, the economy might, you know, go into tailspin again if there's more terrorist attack, right?

[31:45] So it may make some some political goof or something, right? Huh? You know. So it's all kinds of things, right? So even if I have reason to think that he's going to get a second term, which I do, I'm in some fear that the opposite side, right? But in the case of demonstration, that reason that I gave why straight line intersecting those two angles are equal, I see why they must be so, right?

[32:10] Huh? And therefore, I have no fear that they might not, in some case, be so, right? Do you see that? Yeah. Aristotle speaks of dialectical reasoning as reasoning from probable opinions, right? Yeah. And you can reason even with probability sometimes to both sides of a contradiction. Like Socrates reasons in the dialogue called *Meno* that virtue can be taught, right? With some probability, right? And then he reasons some probability that virtue can what not be taught, right?

[32:42] Okay. And he might be able to reason more strongly to one side than the other, so you would incline to that side, right? Huh? But you wouldn't know for sure, right? You wouldn't know in strict sense, huh? You wouldn't be altogether sure. Okay.

[33:00] You know, you know, you get into into the if you're on a jury or something like that, you hear one lawyer trying to prove he's guilty, yeah. And he's somewhat convincing this lawyer, right? And another lawyer proving he's not guilty, he's somewhat convincing too, right? And then you might what you might even have a hung jury, right? Huh? Sure. But sometimes they spend some time before they come down one side or the other, right?

[33:22] Mm-hmm. So when you speak of a of an opinion or a suspicion, right? One may be stronger than the other, but there's still something less than what certitude, right? Huh? Okay. All right.

[33:40] So what does he say here? We're down here. Yeah. So opinion signifies an acting understanding, which is carried to one part of a contradiction, right? But with some fear of the other side, right? Huh? Okay.

[33:57] But the iudicare to judge, right, or to measure, is an act of the understanding applying certain principles to examining to propose things, right? And from this is taken the name of mentis. So he's just taking away our friend Avicenna is saying this, right? And to understand is with a certain approbation adhering to what has been judged, huh? That's partly what the words are meant there. But Thomas just uses the word judgment there in logic to mean what certitude, right?

[34:36] Huh? Okay. We sometimes use it in a looser sense today. We speak in judgmental, right? Okay. But what Thomas is saying, in a certain sense, when I can judge it, this is that this side of the contradiction is true and that is not, right? Because they have a definite reason, right, for saying a necessary reason for saying one is so rather than the other. Now, if you read the dialogue called the Phaedo, right, Cebes is objecting to Socrates that his reasons are what probable but not what necessary, right?

[35:10] He wants Socrates to give a reason why the soul must survive death, right? And so Socrates attempts to do that with his last what argument, right? Okay. But notice, you can have many reasons for thinking that this or that side of the contradiction is what true, right? Okay. But in the case of of demonstration, you have the reason why it must be so on this side, right?

[35:38] In the case of dialectic, you don't have the reason why it must be so, but something weaker than that, right? Right. Okay. But you have some reason for thinking probably it's this side, right? Okay. Well, that's the second road in our knowledge: reasoning from probable opinions to reasoned-out understanding. Is that what I recall? Do not I'm saying? Well, no. You see, that's not a question there. The question of whether dialectical reasoning can prepare the way in some way for what demonstration, right?

[36:13] Yeah. And Aristotle says yes, and Descartes says no, right? It can prepare the way. That yeah, yeah. But you see, sometimes when you think about these things, you you suddenly see something you didn't see before, right? Oh. See, and you know, Descartes said, you know, well, if you're reasoning from things that are only probable, how can that enable you to see that something must be so? Aristotle is not saying that, huh?

[36:39] Yeah. You see. But I asked you a very simple example to bring this out. I said, you know, suppose you're looking out the landscape there, and I say. Do you see that dog out there? You say I don't see that dog. I say, wait, do you see that barn out there? I see the barn. Okay. Okay. Now look to the right of the barn. What do you see?

[36:59] See that big tree? Yeah. Okay. Now just to the left ah, now I see the dog. Right. You see. Now you came to see the dog by what? Seeing the barn and seeing the what tree. But do you see the dog through seeing the barn and seeing the tree? No. Okay. But you you could come to see it right now. Yeah. It gets you to think about things that make you see see something.

[37:27] Yeah. Yeah. Okay. I didn't. That's kind of a subtle thing, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But you can't reason that something's necessarily so. if it's only probable. Okay. See, but Aristotle would have seen that even better than Descartes thought, right? Obviously, That was just my question. Yeah. Okay.

[37:47] Yeah. So again, that's you know I get all the details of this, but he's pointing out that definitely is talking about different what acts of the reason there, huh? Okay. Okay. Okay.

[38:11] No, all this arises because Augustine spoke of higher reason, lower reason. What did Augustine mean, right? Well, Augustine means obviously what Thomas Aquinas says. Okay. But Augustine himself says, as it says in the second chapter, there in the twelfth book of the Trinity, that higher reason, lower reason are not distinguished except by their what offices, right? Okay. Not by different powers, right? Different locations. Yeah. So sometimes we have to, you know, your your abbot has to think about what the chapel, right, huh?

[38:46] Okay. And the chapel could be made this way or that way. It's a contingent thing, right, huh? You see. And you suddenly deliberate these things, right, huh? See. My my brother-in-law is a carpenter, and he's going to make you know, in addition to our house, and a deck. You know, well, how big is the deck going to be? You know, well, you know, I mean, it's like contingent there, right, huh?

[39:08] It could have been bigger than we made it. Somebody said we could have made you a couple feet long or something like that, you know, you know. But I mean, there's something contingent about that, isn't it? Right. There isn't a necessary length that has to be in addition, right? You see. And so there's something kind of arbitrary to say we're going to have this many, right? Huh?

[39:31] How many feet wide should your new church be, right? You know, is there a necessary width it should have? Could be otherwise. Is there? Could be another foot wider, or you know, say say. There's a lot of contingency in these things, right,

[39:49] huh? Yeah. Ah. Ah. But you see, this intersecting straight lines cannot be otherwise, huh? Could one have been a little bit bigger than the other? One of the same things. Not the intersecting straight lines, right? They, they cannot be otherwise, huh? They must be so, huh? It's a necessary thing.