De Anima (On the Soul)
115. Article 10: Intelligentia and Intellectus; Thinking About, Thinking Out, Understanding; Mercy, Hope and the Kinds of Pride
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[0:00] Whether intelligentia right huh Is another power from the understanding intellect Now intelligentia names more the what the act huh Or intellectus right names more the ability or power though it can act named the act too in some cases sometimes even the what the habit of natural understanding. Right.

[0:27] Now, it is said in the book about the spirit and the soul, which is a book that was apocryphal attached to what Augustine, but now they don't regard it as being by Augustine, right? Okay, we mentioned that before, right? Yes. But it keeps on cropping up. People always quoting it, right? Just like the book Liber de causis was attributed by some people to Aristotle, right? But then eventually they realized it was what.

[0:53] Saint Thomas. No, the Liber de causis, Thomas would have come here on it. Oh. But it's it's a Arab work taken excerpted from Proclus's work, and Thomas is the man who when people discovered it, right? Oh. Say it's not by Aristotle, right? Okay, this is not by Augustine, right? Okay. That's why Thomas will say, you know, that you know he applies to it. He's if we're not to receive the authority of the book, right?

[1:22] I mean, it doesn't have the authority that some people attribute to it. To it. Okay. Has mentioned that famous conversation there that Heisenberg gives between himself and Einstein, where where you know Heisenberg says Einstein, you know. I thought that that your theory was based on the idea that the theory has to fit what you can really observe, right? You know. And Einstein says, "Well, that's not what I meant at all.

[2:03] " No. And I thought that's what they said was so great about your theory. Einstein says, "No, no, no, no, no. " But the point is that the theory determines what you can observe. It's not what you observe that determines the theory. And I just Heisenberg said to me, you know, you know, you know, they've got it all wrong, you know. But shows the importance, you know, of getting it from the horse's mouth, right?

[2:27] This is what he he meant, right? Huh? Say, and he said, you know, if I ever said that, that's not what I mean, you know. That's not what it's all about. And so Heisenberg, that already makes his own great discovery. He recalls those words of Einstein. Oh. You know, because it's kind of funny, you know, because the scientists are always saying, you know, they've seen this or that in their lab, you know, but the very thing that they claim to have observed is based upon what he said in theory, which enables them to interpret what they actually do see in a certain way.

[2:56] Would make no sense to the layman because he doesn't have that theory in mind. Yeah. But anyway, that's that's you know the minia slip tooks the cup and the lip, but it's amazing, you know how how you know. My friend Warren Murray kind of jokes about the scientists. You know, they make these outrageous statements about what Aristotle thought sometimes, right? And so what he did, you know, practice the experimental method.

[3:21] Yeah. Have an hypothesis into what Aristotle thought. They never go to verify it in the actual text. No, so it's kind of amazing you go back and you see what Aristotle actually saw sometimes. Certainly, actually. Yeah. But anyway, it's getting a little bit loose here. It is said in the book about the spirit and the soul that when we wish to ascend from what lower things to higher things, right?

[3:50] What first occurs to us is sensing, right, or sensation. Then imagination, right? Then reason, then understanding, and last of all, what? Intellegencia, whatever that means, right? That's the text, huh? But imagination and sense are diverse powers, as we have seen before. Therefore, also intellectus and intellegencia should be right, huh? Moreover Boethius says in the fifth book of the conservation of philosophy, huh,

[4:30] that in one way sense sees man, right? Another way, imagination. Another way, reason. Another way, what? Intellegencia sees them, looks upon them. But understanding or intellectus is the same power with reason. Therefore, it seems that intellegencia is another power than understanding, just as

[5:01] reason is another power than imagination and sense. Okay. Moreover acts are prior to potencies, huh? That they are what? On the road before the powers, right? Huh? We have to know the act. The powers through their acts, right? Okay. In general, that's true. We know act. We know ability only by the act for which it is an ability. Yep. How do you know you have the ability to see?

[5:32] Well, it's through seeing that you know that, right? But intellegencia is a certain act divided from other acts which are attributed to the understanding. For Damascene says that the first motion is what called intellegencia.

[6:01] But when intelligence is about something, it is called intention. When it is permanent and fixing the soul to that which is understood, it's called excogitatio Excogitatio, however, remaining in the same and examining itself and judging is called phronesis. Therefore, that is wisdom. Phronesis, however, spread out. Makes cogitation that is interiorly disposed speech, from which comes about speech through what spoken language, huh? Therefore, it seems that intelligencia is a very special power, huh?

[6:41] This is where Aristotle texts these problems, huh? What these different texts mean, right, huh? When we use the word, huh? Sure. You know, speech between Phronesis and Sophia. Well, Phronesis is is more used as practical wisdom, huh? Then, but sometimes people use it for what wisdom in general, right, huh? Okay. Okay. So we call you know our forefathers wise, right, huh? Okay. Must be a practical wisdom.

[7:09] Okay. It's not knowledge of the divine, really, huh? That George Washington and people had. Doesn't seem to be a separate word like that for Latin in Latin for practical wisdom. Well, sometimes they do it in that sense, though they do it that way, huh? Wisdom, huh? All right, the scripture says that now that prudence is wisdom for a man. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Kind of human wisdom, yeah.

[7:34] Okay. And usually, we say somebody's foolish, which is the opposite of wisdom. What do we mean when we say somebody's foolish? Impudent. Yeah, we kind of think of it in his actions; he's foolish, right? Okay. Okay. Although, another sense, we could say the fool has said in his heart, "There is no God, " right? Yeah. And that's be the folly opposed to wisdom in the sense of the what knowledge of God, right?

[7:58] Okay. But usually, we say you're a fool, you know, in your life, in your actions, what you do, right? Right. A fool with his money is soon parted, right? Huh.

[8:11] Okay. But again, this is what the philosopher says in the third book about the soul that intelligencia is of indivisibles, in which there is not a false. Well, there Aristotle is using intelligencia, the Latin translation here, for a text where Aristotle is talking about an act of reason, right? See. That's the first act, the reason, the understanding of what something is. But to know things of this sort pertains the understanding.

[8:41] Therefore, intelligency is not another power besides the understanding. I answer, Thomas says that this word or this name, intelligencia, properly signifies, right, the very act itself of the understanding, huh? Which is to understand, huh?

[9:03] In some books translated from the Arabic, right, the separated substances, huh, the material substances, which we call angels, right, huh? They are called intelligencia in some of the Latin translations, huh?

[9:22] Perhaps on account of this fact. That these substances always understand in what, an act, right? So they're named from the very act of understanding, right? Because they're always actually understanding, right?

[9:38] But in books translated from the Greeks, they are called what, understandings or minds, right? Thus, therefore, intelligencia is distinguished, is not distinguished from understanding or intellectus as a one power from another power, but as an act from its what? Yeah, yeah. No, that's something in the Latin, right? In English, we probably don't have two words like that, do we?

[10:11] We use the word understanding to mean the act sometimes, right? Like understanding what a triangle is—that's an act, isn't it? But. We also might use understanding for the ability to understand, right? Okay. Now, usually, understanding is translated by intellectus in Latin. I'd say sometimes we translate in English as well. Intellect, right? Huh? Intellect means more the power, the ability to understand, right? But then, this word intelligencia might signify more understanding in the sense of the what?

[10:55] Act of understanding, right? Huh? Okay. So sometimes you have in one language more explicit words than another language, huh? I was mentioning a couple examples of that,

[11:10] though. In Greek and Latin, huh? They seem to use the same word for name and for noun. Nomen, nomen, all right. Okay. Onoma in Greek, right? In English, we have two words: name and noun, right? Okay.

[11:34] More things. Well, maybe in Latin here, in this case, here you have what words, right? One of which is related to the other. Name is more the act, and the other name is more the what? Ability. Yeah, yeah. But in English, you have just one word, right? Yeah. Okay, so that's part of the problem, right? It is kind of a problem here with the word, right? Huh?

[12:00] Yeah. But I think that's that's probably what the word intelligencia means more in Latin, right? Huh? Although it could be used for the power too, right? Or even for the angels, right? Okay.

[12:18] Okay, there's found for there's found such a division even in the philosophers, huh? For sometimes they distinguish for what intellectus, right? Namely, the act upon understanding, the possible understanding, right? Huh?

[12:38] And then the understanding in habitu, and then the adeptum, the right. Of which four the agent intellect and the possible ones are diverse powers, right? Just as in all things, the active power is other from the passive power, right? But I call the acting upon understanding and undergoing understanding, right? But the other three are distinguished according to three states of the possible understanding, which is sometimes in ability only, right?

[13:12] And then is called possible. Sometimes it is the first act, which is science, and this is said to be the understanding in habit, right? Sometimes in the what? Second act. Yeah, which is to considerate, huh? And this is called the intellect in act, or the intellectus adeptus, right? Okay. No. And I don't worry too much about that. That's a problem in the Latin, right? Yeah. In practice, but the fact is that they'll use all these things, right?

[13:41] Okay. Can we go back to when he says the three other three are distinguished? So, so he's distinguishing the active intellect versus possible and habitu and adeptum, right? Yeah. And then those last three on the cite of the possible or the undergoing understanding, right? In other words, God gave me right this ability to understand, right? Yeah. Kind of the raw thing that Aristotle compares to a tablet on which nothing has been written yet.

[14:16] Yeah. And then then the first act of this thing, which is the habit, right? Okay. And then the second act, which is the what? Use of the act. Yeah, the act. Yeah. Consideration. Yeah. Yeah. So in some ways, it doesn't seem like it. I was asking the students the other day. I said, I was saying to them in the logic class, I put on the board there.

[14:40] I said, "Is man the animal? Is man an animal using reason or an animal having reason? " They all said, "An animal having reason. " We don't use very much, right? Huh? Okay. Yeah. But here it indicates both. Yeah, yeah. But sometimes you know people don't want to admit that man is a rational animal because they think that means what? He's an animal using its reason, right?

[15:06] Or acting reasonably, right? Yeah. See, when we say man is a rational animal, we mean he's an animal that has reason. We don't mean that he has a developed reason, right? But he's actually using his reason, right? You see what I mean? Yeah. So you have a little bit of ambiguity when you speak of rational animal. Yep. Sometimes I quote, you know, the you know what's his name, Oscar Wilde, you know, saying, "Man is a rational animal that gets angry when called upon to live in accordance with the dictates of reason.

[15:37] " You see? So I find I find authors sometimes saying that you know that you you know we we shouldn't call man a rational animal, right? Or a supposedly rational animal, right? And you see this, right? Hmm. I was having to see somebody taking pictures there, you know, in Iraq there, and taking pictures of the uh the Iraqis, the Shiites there, you know, the religious ceremonies, right?

[16:03] Oh. And there's one picture there. you know, they've got Leashes all over the place. All blood, right? Yeah. sure. Well, apparently they they They smash themselves. Yeah, yeah, yeah. so. I've seen pictures of that. Yeah, yeah. yes. I. I was waiting to go. What is that? You know, I guess they actually cut themselves and they're bleeding down. You know, so I don't know how they stop the bleeding or whether, they do, but they really must be kind of you know, you know.

[16:25] It's like the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel when you read that description of Elijah. Yeah, it's cut themselves with their knives. Yeah, yeah, very interesting. Yeah. Okay, so don't worry too much about this, but I mean, you'll find people in English having this problem too, right? Right. Yes.

[16:51] Once more, the Oscar Wilde, man is a rational animal. That gets angry when called upon to live in accordance with the dictates of reason.

[17:07] That's true, right? huh? Yes. Sure. That's for sure. I find it true myself. Man is a rational animal, Doesn't want to be reasonable, right?

[17:19] Yeah. so. My old teacher Kasurik, you know, he was pinning some guy down there at some philosophical conference, you know, and Kasurik said well, you contradicted yourself, right? You're in a contradiction, right? And the guy said, "Well, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with. "

[17:39] Modern man. Yeah, yeah, people are, right. Okay. Now, to the first, therefore, this is a text from the Spirit and Anima To the first, therefore, ought to be said that if one ought to receive that authority, right? You want to try to save that text, right, Hun?

[18:03] Inteligencia is laid down there for the act of the understanding, right, Hun? And thus is divided against intellectum as an act against its what power, right, Hun? No, so this kind of a texture it's almost impossible to translate into English because it doesn't have the same problem in English that you have in the Greek words, Hun.

[18:30] Okay. To the second, it should be said that Boethius takes intelligentia for the act of the understanding, which transcends the act of reason, right? Whence there he says that ratio, or reason, is only of the human what genus, right? But intelligencia is only of what the divine, huh? Okay. For it's proper to God that without any investigation he understands what all things, huh? Of course,

[19:08] as Heraclitus says, the human, the divine nature is understanding; the human nature does not. Now, to the third, it should be said that all those acts which Damascene enumerates are of one ability or power, namely the understanding. Which first simply grasps something, right? And this act is called intelligencia. Secondly, that which it grasps it orders to some, to knowing something else or to operating something, and this is called what intention.

[19:48] Then, when it persists in the investigation of what it intends, it is called excogitatio, thinking out, right? When that which it has thought out, when it examines that in the light of some certain things, it is said to what shire, huh, to know with certitude or to be wise, huh, which is phronesis, to use the one of the Greek words, or wisdom. What belongs to the wise men to judge, right?

[20:14] As Aristotle says in the first book of metaphysics, from which, when it has something for certain, as it were, examined in the light of what is certain. It thinks in what way it can manifest that to other people, right? And this is a disposition of interior sermon, right? So a lot of times I think, "Oh, I'm going to, I want to say something," you know. And then from that proceeds one's exterior speech, right?

[20:45] Now, now every difference of acts diversifies powers, but only that which cannot be reduced to the same what principle, yeah. Now in English, I you know take words like like this, you know, in English that not the same exactly, but you take a word like say thinking.

[21:17] Now, what would you contrast thinking with? Contrast with yeah, not not thinking. Well, some may contrast thinking sometimes with knowing, right? Oh, okay, yeah, and it's used in daily speech sometimes, right? Yeah, sometimes you say something, right? And someone will ask you, "Do you know that? You know that to be so, or you just think it so? " Sure. See, now what is the distinction there between thinking and knowing in that case?

[21:52] That one's an opinion versus. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So if I say, "I think George Bush will have a second term, " do I know that he has a second term? No, I don't know that he has a second term. I think he will, right? Well, then in that case, knowing involves what? Being certain, right? Okay, okay. But now someone may come back and say, "Okay, but complicated a little bit right now, okay?

[22:31] " Do I think that two is half of four? You know, I don't think the two is half of four. Is it? Now this is another little application here, right? I thought right away. See, see, I'm thinking. See, now if you ask me, Mr. Berkowitz, do you think that George Bush will have a second term? And I say, yes, I think George Bush will have a second term, right?

[22:59] Yeah. Do you think that two is half of four? Yes. But in the case of one of these, I'm not certain, right? So I just think that George Bush will have a second term, right? Yeah. Okay, may not be some be a wild guess, but you know, but I already know that. But I am sure, doesn't it? So this gets a new name, doesn't it? Knowing, you see.

[23:25] But more commonly, we don't bother with that. Thinking is common to both, right? We just contrast thinking with knowing. Most common in speech, right? True. But some some time I'd say, yeah, but the man who who knows, huh? The two is half of four. He thinks the two is half of four, too, doesn't he? He does. But not everybody who thinks something is so knows it is so, right?

[23:49] Right. Like I ask my students, you know, do you think you know that the Pythagorean theorem is true, right? Yeah. They do think that you know it is true, right? Yeah. But that thing is not obvious, is it? No. And they haven't gone through the demonstration. You see. Yeah. So I think I can demonstrate that. I, you know, help you could, right? So I know that that is so, right?

[24:12] No. But my students just think that it's so. Know that it's so, right? You see what I mean? So. Okay. Now. Now, how about this phrase "thinking about"?

[24:37] That mean the same thing as thinking? It's often this imagination or memory or something, but yeah, it's different. But here I'm going to contrast thinking about something

[25:03] often with understanding, right? Oh yeah. And I always quote this example there when Einstein's special theory of relativity came out, right? Yeah. Douglas MacArthur

[25:25] was a student at West Point, so the professor came in and was supposed to be lecturing on the special theory, I guess, that day, huh? And of course he couldn't understand himself, professor, right? So he called upon MacArthur, who was the the best student in the class. He said, MacArthur, he says, do you understand this? MacArthur says, No, I do not understand it. Professor says, Neither do I.

[25:51] Class dismissed. So because you can think about something, right? Yeah. You may say something. You have to say no, or you're thinking about it, and you say, Well, yeah, I'm thinking about it, but I still don't understand it. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Yeah. See, but now thinking about something could eventually lead to understanding, right? Possible. Yeah. And then we have another phrase in English, which is to think out something, right?

[26:21] Yeah. See, when you think about something, as the word "about" means, you're kind of going around it, right? Yeah. But when you think it out, you penetrated it, right, and come to understand it, right. So you could say that one understands as a result of thinking out things, okay? And I remember one time talking to Monsignor Dionne when I was teaching logic, right? And I kind of was thinking about this phrase "thinking out," right?

[26:53] And I, you know, had the fourth book of the physics there with De Koninck there, and in there Thomas distinguishes, or Aristotle does, eight senses of the word "in." But of course, finding the eight senses of "in" are eight senses of "out." And so I was using that to think about thinking out. And that there are many senses of thinking out, corresponding to the many senses of in and out.

[27:22] And so one sense of thinking out would be to think out the parts of some whole, right? Another would be to think out the definition of something. Another to think out the particular kinds of something, right? Another to think out the order of something, right? Another to think out a conclusion, right? These all correspond to different senses of in and out, right? And so I was saying to Monsignor, What would you think about this?

[27:51] This I'm doing?" He said, "That was good." He says, "But then he says, but you can't say that in French. You can't say 'think out' in French." Really. And then he, you know, he went to his general observation, know that English is superior to French for philosophy, right? And both Monsignor, Dion and Father Boulay there, whose native language is both French, right? Yeah. And are much more at home in French than English, especially Boulay or Diani, are much more at home in French than English.

[28:21] But they both thought that English was better for poetry and for what philosophy, for both, right? And Dionne used to say, you know, that French is to English a little bit like Latin is to Greek. Greek is superior to Latin for both poetry and for philosophy. But Latin is a more abstract language, and in the French, especially since Descartes, they're very abstract, so the French is to English, you say, a little bit like Latin is to Greek, you know.

[28:50] But anyway, I just mentioned that. We might go back to that thing, and part time I'd like to like to put French language a bit when I have a chance to,

[29:03] because I mean people say, "Well, you're not French; you're holding a French diploma, so who are you to judge this language?" Right? But here are men whose native language is French, right? And they can see, you know, superiority of English to French, both in poetry and in in in philosophy, right? We're all these classes taught in English, by the way. No, no. Dion was taught in French.

[29:25] See. Okay. Yeah, yeah. And all the classes we've all were taught in French. The only time a class was taught in English was in one of these advanced seminars. Yeah. And kind of found out that most of the students in that class were English, either American, yeah, or Canadian English. So you got to raise some teaching English. Oh, that was a rarity. Of course, they had in English.

[29:47] After all, all the other ones were in French, you know. But you know, the French. I mean, the the words are very similar. I mean, la logique. You know, you guys talking about. You know. You know. It's maybe the guy was maybe you know making a joke or alluding to some particular example. He might have a word you didn't know. Oh. Then, or if a guy spoke a very rapid French and then you know, let's say Jacques de Molay, I could understand him.

[30:12] He came from Paris. He spoke a very you know they called the hour charm, perfect French. I could understand him the first day. You know, and I said to my mother, I can understand everybody, but there was this Franciscan that talked there I couldn't understand that guy at all. Oh. His French, was And uh when we were having our first-oral exam with him, he was skipping about 45 minutes.

[30:34] because of the French. you know, Oh but anyway, Wow Uh these things in English, right? Thinking about, thinking out, and understanding, right? That's kind of peculiar to English, right? But it's very good, right? So the reason it's thinking about something; is, as a word going around the thing without penetrating or understanding, it, right? Yeah. But if it succeeds in thinking it out, then it comes to a halt or a stop, and it now understands.

[31:08] Okay, so what we call "science or episteme," I call it in English a reasoned-out understanding. When I say reasoned-out, I include all the other senses of thinking out that come before that. So thinking out definitions and thinking out the parts of some whole, thinking out the particular kinds of something, right, and so on. All those are included. The ultimate or the last thinking out is the thinking out of the conclusion, which can also be called reasoning out.

[31:39] Then, so I mean, we could make subtle things, you know, different than Thomas is making there. Yeah. You might ask in English sometimes, you know, what is the connection between thinking about something and understanding? Right. You know, and then I make a connection through thinking out. Right. That thinking about something is necessary in order to what? Understand, right? That that there are few things we understand, right?

[32:07] Maybe only some very vague and general things we understand without having to think them out. But most things we have to think them out before we understand them, right? They have something reflective of that, maybe in English, right? When someone is saying, you know, like

[32:25] "ex cogitatio" is closer to thinking out. I don't know how they translate your thing there, but "cogitatio" is often the idea of thinking, right? And, and of course, when Augustine defines to believe, right, you know, he defines it as "assentire cum cogitatione" to assent to something while thinking about it. See? Assent to there being three persons in God without fully, but understanding this, right? Yeah, yeah. See?

[32:56] I have an. Interesting text, by the way, the other day in the De Potentia, question disputata De Potentia, where Thomas is saying that we can conjecture that there is a thought in God, huh? You know, There's a certain likeness, huh? See, when we think about something, we form a thought about it, right? Yeah. Just like when you imagine something, we form an image, right? So when you try to imagine something.

[33:25] If you succeed in imagining it, there proceeds from your imagination an image, right? Yes. And when we think about something, there proceeds from our understanding or reason a thought. Yes. And so we might guess, he says, "conjecturare," that when God thinks about Himself, right,

[33:45] there proceeds from Him a thought, right? That's kind of interesting. We could guess that there is a. We wouldn't know, right? Yeah. But if his understanding is something like ours, right? You see. Thomas says, "Of the de potencia." Yeah, it's kind of interesting, huh? Because Thomas always maintained that we can't know by natural reason that there are three persons in God, and even aside the Holy Spirit, now it was the most difficult one to know of all, right?

[34:16] Right. Just just take the first two, you know. Yeah. Or take what Saint John says at the beginning of the Gospel. of St. John, there, In the beginning was a word. Right. And the word was, and the Greek says, "towards God," right? And the word was God, right? And this word here is not the physical word, right? Not the spoken word, but obviously it's a thought, right?

[34:36] Yeah. But this thought is in some way distinct from the one who thinks, right? Proceeding from him, and could we know that by natural reason? Well, no. Thomas would say no, right? We're being, is being revealed to us, you know, but that we could conjecturare to guess, huh? We might guess that if God understands, then He has a thought, right? Yeah. But that He understands everything by one act; He's only one thought.

[35:04] Yeah. But He expresses everything, huh? My little poem I I made there, huh? God, the Father, said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man, He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was a brevity and so a wit. You know, but my guess that God has a thought, right? You see, that's kind of interesting, you know, that this, that, you know.

[35:25] It seems Thomas belongs to nature, thought of thinking, right? To have a thought. Yes, sir. So we might guess this. Some likelihood, right? You know, kind of amazing thing to do that. Aristotle never guessed that one, did he? No, no, no, no, no, no. It's kind of amazing, you know, to see, huh? See that.

[36:00] Now, next time when we do this article eleven, I think I'll just do one article next reason time because I want to do that article very well, but also we'll make a what talk about the the way Thomas divides the virtues of reason. Okay. On the basis of that. Okay, virtues of reason. Yeah. The five virtues of reason that Aristotle distinguishes in the fifth, sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Five virtues of reason.

[36:30] Aristotle divides them in a certain way. That if you read the sixth book, which is interesting, we've read it. This division here, this distinction here, is made in the De Anima, the third book on the Dianima. But when Thomas divides the virtues, he divides them according to this: the virtues of speculative reason and the virtues of practical reason, right? So it would be we'll do a kind of an ethical, we'll do something of the of the ethics of the sixth book there, the distinction of the five virtues, but in the way Thomas divides them in the Prima Secundae, right, on the basis of this distinction, right?

[37:08] Yeah, virtues of reason. Yeah, so we'll just do eleven then, and then next time we'll do the twelve and thirteen, right? I'm looking ahead to to question eighty there. There's two articles, and I like to take those together rather take one of those with the last one here, right? So we just do one article next time, right? Yeah, that's good. But it's a reason for doing that article alone because we can use it as the foundation for understanding the distinction of the of the virtues of reason.

[37:33] That's very important thing to understand. There are no virtues of reason, which is very important to understand. A little texture that I mentioned before here, Pope speaks. One here I was talking about the connection between mercy and the theological virtue of hope, right? Well, this is the one from the John Paul II's homily at the dedication of the Shrine of Divine Mercy in Krakow, Lagiewniki, Poland, August 17th, 2002.

[38:08] Okay. Just two texts I want to give you. The first one is a thing from you know this is Saint Faustina, right? Is the one who's important for this, right? And at the beginning of his talk here, you have a quote here from her diary, I guess, huh? And this is the word, see, O inconceivable, an unfathomable mercy of God, right? Who can worthily adore you and sing your praises, huh?

[38:40] O greatest attribute of God Almighty, huh? You are the sweet hope of what sinners, huh? Okay. Number nine fifty one. Yeah. I think that's supposed to be her diary, you know. Yeah. The thing, you know. Oh yeah. Yeah, yeah. We got a couple copies. Yeah. Yeah. You have a number like that? Oh yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. They're all numbers. What number was that again? A nine fifty one.

[39:10] Okay. Anyway, she's she's she's admiring, right? Marveling at the divine mercy, right? And she says, "You are the sweet hope of sinners," right? Okay.

[39:26] Now, John Paul II here says, "Today, I repeat these simple and straightforward words of Saint Faustina. So he's approving of her words, there, right? Huh?

[39:38] In order to join her and all of you in adoring the inconceivable and unfathomable mystery of God's mercy, right? Huh? Okay. But now, in the next page, he's more precise here as far as what he's saying. Like Saint Faustina, right?

[39:59] We wish to proclaim that apart from the mercy of God, right? There is no other source of hope for mankind. Wow, Now that's very strong. but I'm lying in the red, there, you

[40:20] know. You see Wow. Now I don't. know i i if I have to look at it again, but you know the text there, there on hope, right? I don't know if it makes explicit connection there between hope and mercy, but this text suddenly does, right? Okay.

[40:40] I mean, remember rightly, the text there on hope it defines it as a theological virtue by which we desire, right? Eternal life in the kingdom of God, right? As our what last end, right? Okay. And then it says what, relying not our own strength, you know, but on the promises of Christ and on what the aid of God and so on, right? Yeah. But in a sense, the help he gives us is from his what mercy, right?

[41:18] Okay. Now, you know, I've talked to you before about how the catechism the Catechism of the Council of Trent and the Catechism, the New Catechism, right?

[41:34] Ah, they divide consideration of Christian religion there into four, as distinguished from Thomas and and Augustine divided into three, right? Okay. And I can see a reason for doing that, right? Okay.

[41:57] But in a way, you could say that the sacraments and prayer both have a connection with what hope, right? Yeah. Now, it's explicit connection between hope and prayer in Augustine and Thomas, right? And in the Catechism of the Church, right? It's explicit there, huh? Yeah. And that's why it speaks of the Our Father there, right? huh? Right. That's what Augustine and Thomas considered the Our Father, They explained the Our Father, what what it means, what the petitions are, and the order of the petitions, and so on.

[42:32] When they take up the virtue of hope, right? Okay. But it seems to me that you have something like this in the sacraments, right? Because you are relying upon what the divine help there, right? Right. Okay. Now, and you could also say that, as far as the sacraments are concerned,

[42:58] we don't have a right to them in the sense of of justice, right? In other words, does Dwayne Burquist or you have a right to be baptized? No,

[43:13] it doesn't seem to do right. Okay. Now, I was thinking. About again, Thomas's prayer there after communion. Maybe you could that. And he begins there by thanking God for this, right? But he said Nullis meis meritis right? By no merits of my own, right?

[43:35] But by your what, mercy, right? Gratias tibi, ago, Domine sancte, Pater omnipotens, aeterne Deus, qui me peccatorem indignum famulum tuum, right? Nullis meis meritis right? Sed sola dignatione misericordiae tuae, right? Only, right? It's almost like the words here of of John Paul, right? Where he says,

[44:05] speaking generally, but he's saying, apart from the mercy of God, there is no other source of hope for mankind, right? See, Thomas says, "I receive the what? I, your unworthy servant, right? " Through no merits of mine at all, right? I have what? But only through your mercy, right? Okay, I think it's fascinating. You compare those texts, right?

[44:36] Now, when Thomas talks about the dispositions of will necessary for prayer, right? In the exposition of our Father and so on, he always speaks of three dispositions, three habitus, right? Three things in the will that necessary for prayer. And if you read the Enchiridion, you know in prayer there, Enchiridion of intelligences, you'll see these three coming out. Sometimes, you know, one of them or two of them, you know.

[45:11] But if you go through the whole text, you'll see all three of them showing up eventually. Okay, what are the three dispositions of will that are necessary for prayer?

[45:25] Well, one of course is hope, right? Okay, because hope is the theological virtue, right? Of which we desire eternal life and the kingdom of God, right? As our last end, right? Okay, but relying not on our own what ability, right? But on God, right? Okay, so hope is one thing necessary for prayer, right? Okay, any many texts for that, huh? Now, second thing Thomas will mention will be humility, right?

[46:05] And of course, this is very much emphasized in Scripture, right? Christ tells the parable there, right? You know, the and it went up in the temple there to pray, right? You know, the one way justified is the one done. But it says that meantime, the Old Testament that God hears the prayers of the humble, right? So humility is what another disposition of the will, another virtue of the will, right?

[46:34] Most necessary in prayer, right? Most relevant to it, huh? Okay. The third thing Thomas will mention, but it's more the name of an act, huh? But he'll speak of what devotion, right? Okay. Now

[46:55] devotion, of course, is the primary act of what religion, right? Yes. Okay. Now, if you read the treatise on the virtue of religion, the primary act of religion is devotion, and then the second act is prayer itself, right? So prayer is an act of religion, right? Okay. So it's obviously tied with that, and this is, of course, the the moral virtue that's closest to the what we call the theological virtues, right?

[47:29] But it's especially tied up with what charity, right? Huh? Okay. So when Thomas takes up the Our Father, he has to show that it's based on all of these, right? Huh? Okay. Not enough to go into the whole exposition of that right now.

[47:54] These are three emphasized. If you go through the Enchiridion indulgences I'm talking about, you know, prayer and and and how you have to say these prayers, be able to touch upon these three, right? Well, you know, usually no matter all three of them, but one or two of these, and eventually it names all three of them if you go through the whole text. And those are kind of the key things here, huh?

[48:15] Okay. Um. Thomas, in the Our Father, pointed out how the word "father" is the name of love, right? Huh? Okay. You say "Our Father, love your neighbor, " yeah, and so on, right? And we say, you know, we pray for "give us, " right? Not just "give me, " "give me, " but "give us, " right? So you point out how how devotion comes in charity in a way, right?

[48:41] Huh? And so on. But let's go back to the idea of humility here, right? Huh? Now, isn't that text that we had from the from the catechism, right? Huh? He touched upon humility because you are relying upon what God's help, right? Rather than upon your own power, right? Huh? Okay. But I was thinking a little bit of that point beyond a little bit here, making maybe more explicit, maybe then.

[49:20] In the text there, but go back to. uh do kind of ducks it or by opposing to him um When Thomas takes up the opposite of humility, which is pride, right? He usually and he talks about the when he thinks out the various forms of pride, right? He follows what Gregory the Great, right? Okay. Now Gregory the Great gives four species, you might say, of pride, right?

[49:53] Okay, you've read to that text, okay, okay. But Thomas, when he explains it, sometimes he divides into three first, and then sub-divides one of them, right? Okay. Now,

[50:10] the first kind of pride, right, is to claim to have some excellence that you don't have. Okay, I tell you about this thing that's kind of funny. There's a rumor going around Assumption College that I had a PhD in physics. No. Or I was about to get my PhD in physics. No. Now I read some of the you know semi-popular books of the great physicists, right? I know what they say.

[50:40] I try to get it from the horse's mouth so far as I can, and I often you know refer to some of the Einstein said or Heisenberg said. Sure. So some of the first people that I must you know really really know an awful lot of physics, you know. I mean, because they they know nothing, right? Yeah. As I joke, I mean, whatever calculus I know, and I think I forgot about every calculus I ever knew if I ever knew my truth, you know.

[51:01] So far from being a physicist, I mean, it is ridiculous. And and yet, you know, I mean, it's easy to impress people here. Fast knowledge, you know. See, okay. So if I you know claim to have a knowledge of physics, right? Huh. I'd be claiming that I have an excellence that I don't have, right? Okay. You see what I mean? Okay. Um. And this this is sometimes called boasting, right?

[51:29] Okay. And Aristotle talks about this form of pride himself, huh? Talks about the political rhetoricians, right, who claim that they're politically wise, right? Okay.

[51:45] Party from. Okay. Now, that's one way of being proud, right? Okay. To think or claim that you have an excellence that you don't have, huh? Okay. Okay. Now, the second way of being proud is even when you do have an excellence, right? Yeah. That you have it from yourself. Okay. In other words, I know some philosophy, right? I know some logic. I know some philosophy of nature, et cetera, et cetera.

[52:27] Right, right. So I have some excellence in philosophy. And some people are in a position to judge. You know, think this is so. You know. Um. That's the importance. I could move myself. Okay. The one article, one article that I wrote for the Wall Street Journal that was the best thing ever appeared in the Wall Street Journal He. Didn't say it to me directly, but he said to people.

[52:53] Okay. So I have certain excellence, right? Okay. But I got this from what? Thomas and Aristotle. Yeah. And so on, right? See. So the pride here would not be in saying that I understand some logic, right? Huh. But that I arrived at this through my own what? Discovery, huh? These are my discoveries, right? You see what I mean? Yeah. You see.

[53:22] I know these things from my own what discovery rather than from my great teachers, right? Okay. Okay. Now, Thomas divides a second into two, though, right?

[53:40] Or, but I have it from my own merits. Right. I remember the famous saying of the saint: "There, but for the grace of God, go I." Right? Huh? That was to be a famous saying, right? Some saint, huh? Hmm. If it seemed to come of being, you know, brought to execution, right? Who was that? You know, St Mark. There, but for the grace of God, go I.

[54:12] Right. I don't know who said it, but I don't know who said to you. I haven't read it. There's something similar to St Francis, but yeah, not the same kind of story about being a criminal. Well, no, here's a saint, a man who's good, right? Has virtue or something, right? Good actions, so on, right? Yeah. So it would not be pride in his part to say what I'm a good man, or I mean, it could be pride in some sense, but but you can see, you know, that there's virtue in him compared to this criminal, right?

[54:44] Huh? Okay, so would not be claiming that you know he's not he's not didn't have the vices and so on, evil deeds that this criminal is going to suffer for. But

[54:56] if he thought he did this to his own what powers without the help of grace, right? Then that would be pride of another kind, right? Say, okay. So it's one kind of pride to say that I'm good when I'm not good. Say, um, or that I've done good things when I haven't done good things and done bad things, right? Hmm. Maybe one kind of pride, right? Another thing is that when I when I am good in some way, or I have done good things, but I did so from my own what natural abilities, right?

[55:29] Huh. You know how Augustine was always dealing with the the Pelagians and the semi-Pelagians, right? Huh. And and they want to hold on to some element of pride there, right? Huh. Okay. Um. That's when we understand those words, you know, if he gives to his beloved in sleep, right? You know that God's grace and his motion always precedes our action, right? But another way it would be to say, "Okay, I got it from divine grace, but I deserve that grace, huh?

[55:59] Okay. Yeah. Is it? Okay. Now you know sometimes we say you know if you use the grace that God has given you, or you use the powers that God has given you, well, right? Then to some extent you are what? It's suitable that that that you be given more grace, right? Okay. Just like you know, if we make a man what you know, like in the in the parable there, right?

[56:26] You know, the man who one guy buried his talent, another guy uses talent well, right? So if you use what God's given you well, then you are "quote unquote" deserving, right? Maybe receiving more, we say, right? But strictly speaking, are you? You see, I mean, strictly speaking, do you have a right to something more? Huh? See, you know, when people advance, you know, in the moral life or in the spiritual life, you know, go from virtue to virtue, right?

[56:56] You know, you can't seriously read some of the extended lives of the saints and their autobiographies and so on that they use this grace well, and then they receive another grace, and you know, and they go up, up, up like that. But still, it's it's it's still you are getting you don't you can't claim injustice that you should have a higher level, right? Huh? You see, and some people in the spiritual life or in the monastic life, whatever it may be, kind of level off, right?

[57:27] You know, and then you know Teresa Lisieux is going beyond them, even though she's been in the religious life, you know, less than they have, right? Here's an old nun, you know, who gets kind of envious almost of St. Teresa Lucia, at least the way they tell the story. sometime, you know, Mm-hmm. Yeah. Um,

[57:44] because she seems to be excite them all, right? You know, she's been less than you know less time in the religious order than the monastery, and this other woman has been. Okay,

[57:59] now so so those are two different species in in him, but Thomas puts them together against the other ones because he has something to come, right? Huh? Okay, that that is for my own. That anybody's help, right? Or that okay, I got somebody's help, but I merited that help, right? See, I deserve that grace that God gave me. You see, no, no, no, because someone else he didn't give the grace to, you know, every day, you know.

[58:30] What you know? If you say to yourself, you know, well, okay, I got baptized and I had the sacraments and so on, so I got that help, you know, but I deserve, you know, those things, you know. Well, no, you didn't. They didn't see see, and that's the construction about Thomas's parable, right? Nullis meis meritis, huh? He received the Eucharist, right? He's thanking God the Eucharist, right?

[58:54] Oh, you know, he's an unworthy servant, right? Nullis meis meritis, huh? sed sola dignatione misericordiae tuae, through no merits of mine, right? You see, okay, but to the divine mercy alone, right? You see, okay.

[59:15] So when you when you when you ask God for something, in a way, we should have both those in mind, right? See, one is that we need His help, right? We're not able by ourselves to do this fully, right? That's part of the reason why they speak of the incarnation is not coming right about right away, because man has to realize his own dependence upon these things, the grace.

[59:38] Mm-hmm. And even the law is not enough, right? That he can form the law, right? Without the grace, huh? But even you're asking these things of God, and you know God says, you know, knocking shall be opened, and so, and asking you shall receive, right, huh? But is God saying, you know, ask and you will have a right to these things? No, see, no, and it's a divine mercy again that even when you ask, right,

[1:00:11] you don't merit to receive these things, huh? Although some say you can say you're disposed, you know, in a way that makes appropriate to receive these things, right? But strictly speaking, it's still out of divine mercy that you're getting. these. Things, okay. Now the the four the fourth and last kind of person where one wants to be what above everybody else, right? Okay. And and have even the goods one might have in a unique way, right?

[1:00:43] Okay. I was giving the students the example here of the the. I think alone. I alone think. Do they mean the same thing? I think alone, and I alone think.

[1:01:30] No, they don't mean the same thing. Not ordinarily, yeah. See, I alone think would mean that I alone think about these things, right? Okay. But I think alone means that when I am by myself in my room, all by myself, right? You know, I alone understand what a triangle is.

[1:01:52] I understand alone what a triangle is, right? So this signal might imply quite a little bit of pride, right? Yeah, yeah. So in other words, suppose I really do understand Book One of Euclid, then I really do understand the Pythagorean Theorem, right? I do really know it, right? So I am not. It's not pride for me to say I know the Pythagorean Theorem. Right. I am not attributing to myself things I don't have, right?

[1:02:18] Now, if I said, you know, well, I didn't learn from Euclid. No, I thought out myself. You know, I was just sitting in my room one day and I was sitting around. I thought out. That'd be another, another kind of pride. See, you see. Um, a different kind, right? But suppose I didn't deny that I got it from Euclid. I deny that, but I say that I am the only guy who knows the Pythagorean Theorem these days.

[1:02:46] You know, You see? I'm sure that my brother mark, and some other people who study, you know, they know it, right? Yeah. But it seems to me that that the humility, right, the humility.

[1:03:18] I suppose it's opposed to all those kinds of pride, right? But. There's a special connection, though, between humility and those two middle ones I spoke about, right? Because you're relying upon God's help, right? And you're expecting God's help, not from your own merits, but from His what? His mercy, right? In the sense,

[1:03:57] he says, like Saint Faustina, right? He associated himself with Saint Faustina. We wish to proclaim that, not in this place, place you proclaiming. Apart from the mercy of God, there is no other source of hope for mankind, right? Okay. Well, then, then you see, you have to go to that that prayer that Thomas say, "Nullis meis meritis sed sola dignatione misericordiae tuae." see."

[1:04:24] To no merits my own, right? By receiving the Eucharist, right? Right. See, as you say, why was I born? You know, of Catholic parents, or you know, and baptized, and so. why wasn't I, you know, you know, one of those Mohammedans over there, and picked up someplace, right? You know, or in some Hindu down in in India, someplace, you know, some place where where it'd be very hard, maybe, you know, to

[1:04:58] you'd be exposed to Christianity, right? Yeah. You say, in Saudi Arabia, you own a Bible, I think, you know, and if you, you probably against the law to convert, you know, and so you wouldn't even have an opportunity, you know. So why was I blessed with, you know, this Catholic environment? You know.

[1:05:23] And I often remark, you know, to me, the the most reasonable men I've known were the men who were very strong in the Catholic faith, right? Like Kasurik was and De Koninck and Dionne and so on. And so, for me, it wasn't really a problem, you know, about reason and faith. Yeah. But but if I'd had you know men who were didn't have the faith, right, and maybe had problems with faith, or you know, and they were still kind of you know you know smarter than than men who had faith, right?

[1:05:57] Ah, you know, but why was I blessed with these kind of men? You see, why? You know, did I merit this? Then, then, did I merit baptism? Right, you know. Okay. Wow,

[1:06:19] you didn't have time. No, no. Right. You know, if you get in the morning and go to mass in the morning, let's say, you know, daily mass and like that. Now you got a right to communion. No, see, this is owed you now because of this wonderful act of getting out of bed.