De Anima (On the Soul)
116. Summa I, Q.79, Art.11: Are Speculative and Practical Intellect Different Powers? (Seeing vs. Doing; Knowing vs. Loving)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/116-summa-i-q-79-art-11-are-speculative-and-practical-intellect/

[0:00] I think some people you know started to think that way, you know. Sure. But that's your form of pride, right? Now you see. Yeah. Um. Ah. These things are owed to me, right? What I've done, right?

[0:17] You know, it all kind of depends upon His mercy, there. Yeah. Interesting. Thank you. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. and help us to understand what you've written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:49] Okay, so let's look at Article 11 today. This distinction between the as we call it in Latin the speculative intellect or in Greek the theoretical intellect, right? Or in English the looking intellect, right? And the practical or the doing intellect. This is a much more appropriate distinction for the philosophy to be making than the one that Augustine gave between higher and lower what reason, right? That's one that's appropriate to make in the context more of theology, right?

[1:29] But this distinction is one Aristotle makes in the third book about the soul, and Thomas uses this in his distinction of the virtues of the five virtues of reason. Maybe talk about that after we do the article in the first part of today. Okay.

[1:50] So to the eleventh, one proceeds thus. It seems that the now speculative comes from the Latin word for what looking at something, okay? And corresponds the Greek word what theoretical, huh? Yeah. Now the trouble is that theoretical and speculative in English now have taken on other connotations or other meanings, really. You know, speculative thinking means today what guessing, right? And speculation probably means what you're doing when you're trying to see how the stock market's going to go, right?

[2:24] Okay. So sometimes I have to put it into English and say it's it's the looking at the looking reason, huh? Okay, that's where the word comes from, huh?

[2:45] Theoretical theorem get the same root there. Theorem in geometry is something to look at. Okay. So he says the looking understanding and the practical or doing understanding, it seems, are diverse powers, right? That's not going to be his conclusion, obviously. The first objection says that the grasping and the mover are diverse genera of powers, huh? Well, you recall that in the distinction in the second book about the soul.

[3:20] You had five genera of powers, remember that? You had the the nutritive powers, the plant powers, right? Then you had two groups of grasping powers, the sense powers, and the powers of understanding, right?

[3:37] And then you had the desiring powers, and so on, and then you had the mover power, right? Okay. And he says, but the looking understanding is what knowing only, huh? It's grasping only, right? But the practical or the doing understanding is a mover, right? Okay.

[4:08] So the practical mind is going to change the world, right? As Karl Marx said, right? Philosophers have talked about the world. The point is to change it, he said. Okay, but the practical mind did work out here in your chapel here, right? It's what moving things around, right? Huh? So,

[4:34] so if that was correct in the animal that the mover, moving power is another what genus of power, right? Huh? From the merely knowing power, well then the active or doing understanding and the looking understanding would have to be different. What powers it seems, right? Therefore, they're diverse powers, huh? Second one. Moreover, a diverse definition of object diversifies powers. The powers are diversified by their acts, right?

[5:10] And the acts by their object. But the object of looking understanding is the true. But the object of the practical understanding is the good, huh? So the true and the good they differ in what definition, right? Therefore, the looking understanding and the practical or doing understanding are diverse what powers, huh?

[5:44] Moreover, this comparison Aristotle made, I guess, in the De Anima, in the understanding part, the doing understanding is compared to the what looking understanding, as the estimative power is to the what imaginative power in the sensing power. Now, notice, Aristotle made a comparison because the imagining power it pictures something, right? Huh? But doesn't say go for it or or avoid it or something, right? But the estimative power recognizes this is something to pursue or something to what avoid, right?

[6:26] Okay. So the estimative power seems like the practical understanding, doesn't it? Why the looking understanding doesn't issue in some kind of action in pursuing something or avoiding something, and fleeing something or pursuing it, seems to be like the imaginative power, right?

[6:47] But the estimative power differs from the imaginative power as one power from another. We saw that back in the article on the inward senses. Remember that.

[7:03] Therefore, the practical or doing understanding differs from the speculative understanding. It's a different power from it. I know there's a likeness between those two, but maybe you're what

[7:19] extending the likeness where it doesn't isn't really found, right? Remember that example I was giving you there: four is to six is two is to three. Take a very simple example over in math, where they're very exact things. Now, someone says, "Well, two is to three is the ratio of a what prime number to a prime number. " Therefore, four to six is the ratio of prime number to prime number.

[7:43] Well, obviously, you're not understanding the likeness, are you? Okay. Or if I say two is to three, it's the ratio of an even number to a what odd number, right? Therefore, four to six is the ratio of an even number to an odd number. See? Well, that's not in what the likeness consists. Okay. Now it's interesting. Aristotle talks about the fourth tool of dialectic, which is a tool of likeness.

[8:14] He uses the Greek word "skepsis," right? He's a skeptic, right? Skeptics a consideration, as it were, of the likeness, because you have to stop and kind of what savor the likeness and see exactly what way are these two things alike. You know the famous words of our Lord. You know he says we talked about us being one as the Father and I are one. Okay, but are we going to be like in the same way exactly as the Father and the Son are like?

[8:50] Don't we have one nature, individual nature? Right. No, no. So you got to be careful, as Plato says there in the Sophist, right? Likeness is a slippery thing. Aristotle attributes, you know, to likeness the deception there in the book on Sophistical Refutations. One is deceived by what?

[9:17] Where did the quote from the likeness is a slippery thing? It's from the Sophist. Play-Doh, I think, but it's kind of common sense in a way that one is what deceived by likeness. Huh? Now, as a little boy, you know, used to have ballpoint—I mean, not ballpoint pins, but the fountain pen. You had a little bottle of what ink, right? You can imagine the number of upsets that were with little kids, right, in those things.

[9:54] And I remember the old desks, like in grade school, right? You'd always have these, you know, Well, you had a hole, you put the little bottle in, right? But it would be, you know, stained with ink. Oh, yeah. I had one of those desks, yeah. Yeah, I saw the ink hole, and I saw the stains. Yeah, and so used to have these trick things, you know. I think it was like a little pool of ink, and you put it on your mother's nice white linen, you know, and come in, you are screaming, you know, who, you know, because you reach down, you realize it was that, and everybody's kind of a common thing, you know, because it was such a common. thing to have these accidents

[10:28] take place, But notice, the woman is deceived there by what? By likeness, huh? If you put salt in the sugar bowl or something like that, people are going to be deceived by the likeness, huh? But in general, the good sometimes looks like the bad, right? And the bad resembles the good, right? And the true is like the false sometimes, and vice versa. That's why they say, you know, the most dangerous mistakes are the ones which are have a real likeness to the to the true.

[11:01] huh No that imaginative power, imaginative power, we're talking about in a sense is that's not the same as we think again, right? That's more functions more like more like memory. It's a memory. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's not saying you know pursue this or avoid it, right? Like the estimative power is saying, right? And so Aristotle makes a comparison of the looking reason to the imaginative power, right?

[11:38] Where you're thinking about something, but you're thinking is not what issuing in any kind of action or any kind of doing or making, right? And therefore, it's like when you watch a what a movie or read a play of Shakespeare something like that, right? Maybe a murder being committed on the stage, but we don't jump up there and kind of stop the murder, do we? It's like it's like in a picture.

[12:03] If you see a painting there, somebody you know, battle scene or something like that, you don't run away or something. You don't run to help somebody, do you? You know, finish the last sacraments to the person dying in the painting there of Wolf or something like that. So Aristotle kind of compares it to that, right? But as I say, the likeness may not be so far as to what be a difference of powers in the case of the looking and the doing

[12:37] understanding. But against this is what is said in the third book about the soul that the looking understanding, Sarrastal's very words, by extension it becomes what practical, right?

[12:54] And as you're taking something, you understand or know, you're now what applying to doing something, right? Yeah. So it's kind of like an extension of that, huh? Yeah.

[13:06] But he says one power is not changed into another, right? Therefore, the looking, understanding, and the and the doing or practical one are not diverse powers, huh? Okay.

[13:26] Okay. Now you know another image of it. Appropriate to this, right? You know, would be to say, I can use my eye to what, just to see. So I look at the beautiful painting in the museum, right? Or I look at the what, beautiful sunset, right? I look at the beautiful mountains or the beautiful fall foliage, right? I look at the rainbow, whatever it might be, it's beautiful, right?

[13:57] And so my looking, is not for the sake of making or doing anything, is it? No. Just for the seeing, right? But when I drive up here, right, and I look at the stop signs and look out for the police, and look out for the other cars and something coming across the road and so on, right? Um, there my looking is for the sake of what, driving my car and getting here without an accident and so on, right?

[14:29] Huh? So is it two eyes that I have? One eye for seeing beautiful paintings and sunsets and rainbows and so on, right? Another eye for driving, right? No. In the case of driving, my seeing is ordered now to what, doing something, right? Huh? And the same when I make something, right? I have to use my eyes, right? But still the same eyes, isn't it?

[15:04] And so this distinction is like that. If you might recall, I think we did the premium, didn't we? The wisdom of Aristotle. Yeah, when he's talking in there at the first sentence of the premium, he says, "All men by nature desire to understand," right? And then later on, he gives this comparison to the eyes, doesn't he? Where he says that men use their eyes not just to do or make something, but sometimes they use their eyes just to see something.

[15:36] He recognizes something missing in somebody's life if they use their eyes only to make or do. Then you look at any beautiful mountains or any beautiful ocean or any beautiful starlit sky or whatever it might be, you see that? Yeah, sure. But that's a more exact likeness to this here, right? Because there you have the the same power, right, being used just to know, and then being used in some way to help you make or do something.

[16:09] Okay. Yeah, something like that. Of course, two in the ear, because again, after he says, "Now park your car further. You're going to get all dirty if you park your car there. " So okay, I took its word for it, right? I heard him not because his voice was particularly beautiful, right? But someone you know yells, "Watch out! " You know, he says, "Listen. " And but for the sake of what?

[16:35] Not because his voice probably is a little bit strained when he says that, but it's to avoid what? An accident or being injured or something of this sort, right? But then I used also use my my ear to listen to Mozart or something like this, and that's like looking at a beautiful painting, isn't it? It's the same ear, right? Whereby I hear, you know, I ask directions in the filling station, you know, I didn't get there, right?

[17:06] And so I listen so I can get directed to my destination. The same ear I use for that purpose, right? And then I use to hear Mozart, right? In one case, the hearing is itself the end, right? In the case what I'm hearing is being ordered to what? Doing something, right? What's your telephone number, right? Say, it's not I have any interest in knowing your telephone number for its own sake, right?

[17:38] But so I can call you up or something, right? You see the idea? Yeah. So that's the kind of distinction you're making there in the not between two different powers, right? Yeah. In all these cases, but between the power used for one end and the power used for another end, right? The power used simply to know, right? And the power being used for the sake of making or doing something.

[18:11] You see that? Okay. Let's look at the body of Thomas's article right now. I answer. It should be said that the practical or the doing understanding and the speculative, the looking understanding, are not diverse powers, right? And the reason for saying this, he says, is because as has been said above, what is accidental to the what? Definition of the object, huh? Which some power regards, huh? Does not diversify the power.

[18:54] He gives an example there. Like it happens to the coloured, which is the object in the way of the eye, right? There'd be a man, right? Or there'd be large or what? Small, right? Okay. Whence all of these are grasped by the same power of sight, huh? Same seeing power, huh? He says it happens to something grasped by the understanding that it's ordered to work, to doing something, right?

[19:27] Or that's not ordered, right? Okay. Of course, sometimes you take an interest even how something is made, not intended to make it ourselves, right? But kind of curious about it, right?

[19:42] Okay. Now, in this way, he says they could apply it to the present question. In this way, the looking understanding and the doing understanding, the practical and the theoretical or speculative, right, differ. For the looking understanding, does not order to doing what it apprehends or grasps, but it's ordered only to the consideration of the what truth, right?

[20:24] But the practical. or. Doing, understanding, orders to doing, what it grasps, okay? You see the difference in the two? That's why the consideration of truth belongs more to the looking reason than to the what practical reason. In in the sixth book of wisdom, Aristotle says that

[20:56] the speculative has as its very end the truth, right? By the practical, if it considers truth, it's ordered to doing something, right? So the end of one is is not the truth, but doing. The end of the other is truth itself, so it pertains more to the speculative.

[21:20] And of course, the the truth of the what that the practical mind is interested in is often a truth that is very contingent. Who's our friend? Who's our enemy? Right? As the British statesman said, we have no permanent friends. We have permanent interests, but not permanent friends. So this country or this individual can be your friend or your, you know, useful to you now, and then another time, not useful to you, right, or even harmful to you, right?

[21:52] So France is useful to us in getting independence, right, from England, huh? But they were harmful to us in in getting the Iraqi War resolutions passed in the United Nations, right? Okay, so these things are what contingent, aren't they? So they're not so true, are they?

[22:23] Okay. I'm sick today, so I need this medicine today, right? Another week, I won't be sick with that disease or whatever it is. I won't need that medicine, right? So you're dealing with things that are sometimes true and sometimes false, right? I have a headache, or I do not have a headache, right? One might be true one day and another true the next day, right? So one day I might need aspirin, another day I don't need aspirin, right?

[22:54] But that's what you're concerned about, though, because what you do is something individual and singular, right? Yeah, you're helping this man or or this thing.

[23:11] Okay, so this is one way Aristotle speaks of the difference there, right? Huh? That the looking reason considers truth. And doesn't it order it to making or doing something?

[23:28] But the practical reason is ordering whatever it considers to doing something. And this is what the philosopher says in the third book about the soul that the looking, speculative, theoretical, differs from the practical, the doing, by its what end? Yeah.

[23:52] Whence both are named from their end, right? This one speculative. Now, speculative, as they say, comes from the Latin word for looking at, right? For looking. Of course, you can see in English that the word "looking" means what you are trying to see. Looking is for the sake of what seeing, right? And therefore, for the sake of understanding, and that's the end or purpose to understand the truth.

[24:25] But the practical is named from doing praxis in Greek or in Latin. It's almost the same word in Greek and Latin, praktike. It's operativus, right? It's doing something, right? So I translate theoretical or speculative in English by looking, which is exact

[24:47] the same root, their etymology, and the practical by what doing, right? Okay. As I say, a nice mendiectu for that is to go back to the eye, right? When I use my eye just to see, I use my eye to do something. It's not two different eyes, do I? Not my right eye is for just for seeing beautiful things. My left eye for no, it's the same, same eyes I use for both, right?

[25:21] But I do have different what ends in mind, huh? Now the first objection, as you recall, was saying that in the second book about the soul, the moving power is a separate genus, a separate general kind of power from the grasping or knowing powers, right? And then the objection is saying, well, the practical reason is a moving power, right? It moves things, it changes them, and the speculative understanding doesn't change things, so that's just a grasping power, right?

[26:00] Well, this is based partly upon misunderstanding what you mean by the moving power. The moving power, you mean actually the bodily parts, right? They can carry out our desires and our knowledge, right? Okay.

[26:15] So he says to the first, therefore it should be said that the doing understanding, the practical understanding, is a mover not in the sense of what carrying out the motion. Because that's what the moving power is, but as it were, what directing to motion? Okay. So, like maybe, when one man is directing other men, right, and they do all the work, huh? But they're being directed by another man, right?

[26:45] So it's one man who's carrying out the order, another man who's giving the commands, right? So reason is directing us in the use of our body, right? Huh? Okay. But the power to move the body and so on—that's that motive power that is distinguished from the grasping powers.

[27:07] And so the direct belongs to it. He says, according to its way of what grasping things, grasps things and orders them, right? And those that comes under what Shakespeare said there, right? When he defined reason, he put looking in the definition, didn't he? Yeah. Because that is going to be by kind of extension of that, right? Yeah. Okay. But he says looking before and after that he's already talking about order there, right?

[27:37] Yeah. And that can apply to both the speculative, where you're trying to just see order, right? And here we're trying to order what you know to doing something, huh? Yeah. Can you see that first objection then? Huh? It's based on kind of misunderstanding what you mean by the the mover. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[28:01] You know, if if you or I became paralyzed, right, then that would be a defect of that motive power that we talk about in the dynamis, right? But my reason could still be quite what active, right? I forget who's that famous scientist, you know, who he was kind of crippled and couldn't carry out his experiments, but he had a faithful servant who carried out the experiments, but he would tell what to do, right?

[28:24] Oh. I forget some kind of. I think it was a French scientist, but you know, kind of a famous one back in the and it was the 19th century, something like that. Oh. But

[28:35] there you see the difference between the two, right? The one guy is doing all the the motions, you might say, as a motive power, but doesn't have the mind in order to know what to do, right? And the other guy tells him what to do, huh? Oh. But yes, something like that, maybe the kitchen too, where the grand chef is telling somebody else what to do. That's right.

[28:58] I want potatoes peeled, right? But you gotta. The second objection was saying was trying to say that the object of the looking reason is true, and the object of the practical reason is a good, right? Hmm. And actually, true and good do distinguish powers. They distinguish the the intellect from the will, right? Okay. But

[29:27] it's not. Good in that way, that's the object of practical reason. But let's see what Thomas says here to this. To the second, it should be said that true and good include each other. That's a kind of interesting thing, because one can know the truth about the good. Okay. And how is it there are two things? Why isn't there one? Well, I guess the anyway. Yeah. Well, Aristotle talks about the distinction there, the true and the good, in the sixth book of Wisdom, and he says that the good and bad are in things.

[30:09] Okay. But truth and falsity are primarily in the mind. In bad and thing. Yeah. See. And especially in the second act of the mind, there, where you have a statement that's true or false, right? So I have to affirm or deny something of you, right? Before there is something true or false there, and that's already a statement, and that's in the mind, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. Expressing judgment and well, you judge, yeah, but but you find truth and falsity in statements primarily.

[30:48] And statements are in the mind. I mean, you have the spoken or the written statement that more manifest to us, but that's really a sign of something inside, right? In a second act, there. So truth is primarily the mind, but the good and the bad are chiefly in things, huh? And that's why we see as a kind of contrariety between knowing and and loving, right? Because in knowing, you are trying to take the thing and put it into your mind, right?

[31:19] Right. In loving, your heart is going out to the thing, huh? So we say, "I left my heart in San Francisco," right? Or we say, "My heart's not in it," right? I don't want to do it, you know. Okay. But the case of the mind, you know, the fundamental act is to grasp. That's we use the word here all the time in the Latin, apprehensiva, right? Apprehensiva, which is the word for grasping, huh?

[31:49] And we sometimes use the word grasp almost as a synonym to understand, huh? If you grasp what I am saying, huh? Yeah. But notice when I grasp something with my hand, it's contained inside my hand, isn't it? You know, see. And so, when the mind grasps something, right? It's contained in the mind. Conversations, yeah. But with love, we use the opposite of grasping. We speak more of what giving, right?

[32:15] And I give my love to you. I give my heart to somebody, right? Yeah. I used to say to students, I say it's always bad to lose your mind. It's not always bad to lose your heart. Depends upon to whom you lose it, right? You see. But

[32:43] you know, when you talk about the mind, you talk about grasping, taking, right? You know, two halves of a contradiction. Take the two side, right? When I want to define something, I take the genus of it. I take the differences, right? Yeah. But grasping and taking doesn't signify the perfection of the heart, does it?

[33:08] You know where our Lord says, "Where your treasure is, there also shall your heart be." And Paul treasures in heaven, right? Hmm. Where neither you know moths nor thieves break in and so on, right? Remember that. But he says, "Where your treasure is." There also your heart shall be, okay. So it's saying that the heart is in the thing. What? Loved, right?

[33:42] I left my heart in San Francisco. See. Now when you say the good and bad are things, yeah. The bad is, isn't that just the absence of the good, the lack of good? Yeah, yeah. I mean, it's in the thing out there that there's a lack. I see. Yeah, I see. This is this is the the reason first a very important difference that there's the same knowledge of opposites, right?

[34:14] Knowledge of opposites. Yeah. See. So the knowledge of of virtue and the knowledge of vice they're almost the same knowledge, right? Oh, yeah. And one helps me to know the other. Yeah. My knowing what temperance is helps me to know what intemperance is Right. And vice versa. But now, is it the same love of opposites? See. If I love virtue, that impedes me or prevents me from loving vice.

[34:41] If I love vice, then impedes me from loving what? Huh. Virtue, right? Yeah. But it's because in things one opposite excludes the other, and because love goes out to the thing.

[35:02] See, when I go to the doctor, see, I don't want high blood pressure, right? Okay. So if the blood pressure is down, then I rejoice in that, right? Huh? It's obvious that I'm concerned about that, right? Huh? Okay. So if I want

[35:27] normal blood pressure, I can't want high blood pressure, can I? Um. But if I know what normal blood pressure is, that helps me to know what high blood pressure is, right? Mm-hmm. You see. It's just the same knowledge, in a sense, whereby he knows these what?

[35:55] Health and sickness, right? Mm-hmm. As a professor, I know some things, right? And this also enables me to know the ignorance of my students. Right. Yes, sir.

[36:15] But is the love of both the same? If I love knowledge, do I love ignorance? If I love wisdom, do I love foolishness? I was reading in Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson, and if you ever read it, there was some conversation there where they were talking about somebody was proposing something about, you know, beasts like the cats around here and dogs, you know, having life in the next world, right?

[36:49] And of course, Johnson didn't, you know, like this kind of talk, you know, this kind of foolish talk. So, I was one guy persisted, you know, upon you know pursuing this idea, you know, and and finally says, and when you see, you know, a very, you know, talented dog, you know, one does know what to think, he says, you know. And Johnson says, well, once he's a very foolish fellow.

[37:13] One does know what to think of him either. That's good. Yeah. So. Can I say one quick thing though? So it would suggest that if you really want to know about virtue, you got to really know about vice. I mean, I'm standing opposite like like what's his name? Father Brown mysteries. He knows about vice because he's so virtuous. Yeah. Well, see, see, if virtue, if vice involves negation, right?

[37:48] Yeah. A lack of something you're able to have and should have. Yeah. Then knowing what virtue is enables you to know better what vice is than the reverse. You see, just like in my example there, if I have knowledge of some subject, right? Right. Through that knowledge I have, I know the student's ignorance better than they could through their ignorance know my knowledge, right? I'm confused. I thought what you were saying is that with knowing one opposite, one thus knows something about the other, whereas loving the opposite really excludes the other.

[38:27] Yeah. Yeah. Well, again, you know, if you can see, you know, in kind of accidental ways, you know, that say a man who drinks too much, you know, this is bad, right? Sure. Then you kind of realize that to drink, you know, moderately, right, is something good, right? Okay. Okay. Or if you see the man who's stingy, right, or extravagant is criticized, right, then you can kind of see, hey, the man, you know, the Greeks put up the words at the Oracle Delphi, nothing too much, right?

[39:04] Okay. And people can see that, can't they? Huh? You eat too much, you drink too much, or you, you know, do other things too much. This is bad, right? Huh? And that kind of helps them to see that that the good must involve some kind of moderation, huh? Okay. Okay. Yeah, kind of what you go on with what you said. You love the Thomas is saying, you know, we become slaves to vices, to habits.

[39:35] Yeah, we just get these habits of doing bad things. Yeah. So there's a whole series of things that I'm pointing out here. Yeah. That kind of you know confirm what Aristotle says there, the sixth book of wisdom. Well, that was about the. I say one thing is the very words we use, right? If you use words like to grasp or to take for the mind, right? Yeah.

[39:57] And if you want to define something, the first thing you do is take its genus, then you got to take its differences, right? But taking grasping that kind of names perfection of the mind, right? Yeah. What's the defect of the mind? Mistake. Oh yeah. See. See. But taking and grasping doesn't seem to indicate the perfection of the heart, does it? Of the loving. power right. Okay. And so we tend to use the word "give" there for the heart, don't we?

[40:32] Yeah. I give my love to you. I give my heart to you, right? Okay. Yeah. And that's why I say, you know, to lose your heart to somebody is not bad if they're worthy of being loved, right? Hmm. But to lose your mind is always bad, isn't it? Okay. Um. But you know they apply this sometimes to to God too. See, they say, "Well, why is it in this life, especially, we can love God more than we know Him, right?

[41:15] " Well, in knowing, you are trying to put God into your mind, right? Hmm. And the famous, you know, vision of Augustine there—you know, the little boy said, you know, you know the story, don't you? Repeat again, because I can never remember exactly what. the story was. You know,

[41:29] he was on the beach there, and he'd been thinking about the Trinity. And the little boy was and dug a hole and running down to the ocean, bring up water in his pail where it was and trying to, put it in the hole. Yeah. And Augustine was distracted by the little boy, and said, what are you doing? He says, "I am putting the ocean in this Little hole.

[41:46] " I think that's why you can't fit the ocean in this little hole. And the little boy said, "Well, neither can you fit the Trinity into your mind. " And the little boy disappeared, right? But the point is, you could actually jump into the ocean, couldn't you? Yeah. You see, see, you would be able to put the ocean inside of you, right? But you could basically jump into the ocean, right?

[42:06] This kind of, you know, a metaphor there to understand the fact that we can more love God, right? Yeah. Our will is more proportionate, you might say, to loving Him than our reason is to understanding Him. Ah. But part of the thing is because we're trying to because knowing is what trying to bring God into our mind, right? Yeah. Oh.

[42:28] I can jump into the infinite, like I can jump in the ocean, but I can't put the ocean or the infinite into me very well. And when you say jumping into it, that's loving God, kind of. Yeah. Yeah. I never caught that before.

[42:48] Okay. Now the Holy Spirit, you know, if you study the names there in the questions, what thirty six, thirty seven, thirty eight in the here, but one of the names of the Holy Spirit is Donum Dei, right? The gift of God. Okay, so thirty thirty eight, I think it is. The name of the Holy Spirit, which is a gift, right? Well, why is the Holy Spirit called gift giving, right?

[43:18] Thomas the first gift. Yeah, the reason Thomas gives there is that every good thing we give somebody, right? We we give because we love them, right? So the first gift is really what love, right? And the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love, huh? So that's what he's called, the gift of God, right?

[43:47] But again, that another way of emphasizing, in general, the idea of giving is more characteristic of loving, right? Now, when I give, I go out, right? So yeah. Of course, you know metaphorically it's expressed by cold and what hot, right? Which is cold, which is hot. Reason or or will. Hot is will. Yeah, yeah. Hot is that slow, right? But when something gets hot, it what tends to expand and overflow other things, right?

[44:23] See, while the cold kind of what concentrates, right? Yeah. You know Shakespeare says, "Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, such shaping fantasies, that apprehend more than cool reason ever comprehends." See, and that's how we say to somebody, you know, when they have some kind of emotional thing and they kind of use their head, you know, keep your cool. We say, right? What's that mean? Don't use your mind, huh?

[44:51] See, okay. But the hot, just like you know, the pot there overflows, right? It tends to you know go out to other things, right? That's what love is like. So love is going out to the thing itself, huh?

[45:07] That's very important to see, huh? Okay. Now the second it should be said that true and good include each other, right? For the true is a certain good, right? Truth is something good, right? But it's not the only thing that is good. Health is good. Many other things are good, right? Okay.

[45:39] Otherwise, it would not be what desirable, right? But also the good is something true. Otherwise, it would not be what understandable, right? Okay. Thus,

[46:01] therefore, the object of the appetite, right, is able to be something true. Insofar as it has a definition of good, right, just as when someone desires to know the truth, so the object of the practical intellect is something good is able to be ordered to some doing. But under the what definition of the true, the practical understanding also knows truth as a speculative one, but it orders the truth known to what, yeah, to work, to doing something, right?

[46:47] Okay. So it's not you know exactly correct to say that the object of the looking reason is a true, and the practical reason is the what the good, right? That's really to say that the object of the will is the good, right? The object of the reason is a true, but the difference between the looking and the practical reason is that the looking reason is interested in truth for its own sake, right?

[47:16] And the practical reason is either not interested in the truth at all, or it's interested in a truth that can be ordered to something, doing something or making something, right? Okay. Okay. Yeah.

[47:37] Okay. Do you see that? Do you buy that then? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So Thomas, in a sense, is not denying that true and good are differences of object that differentiate two different powers, but it's the will and the reason that are distinguished by that, huh? Okay.

[48:27] But what gets the person confused is the fact that, in a way, the good can come under the true in some way, right? Yeah. Because you can know the truth about the good. Yeah. See, so when I take up the good, you know, I usually proceed like Socrates does, right? You know, he asks the slave boy, "What is good?" And the slave boy gives a bunch of things that he wants, you know.

[48:51] And Socrates says, "Well, what do all these have in common?" And these are all things he wants, right? But then you arrive at the first, the first definition of the good is what all want. Okay. But then you get asked the Socratic question, you know, is it good because we want it, or do we want it because it's good, right? But they were trying to determine now the truth about the good, right?

[49:11] Okay. See, the good is what all want. Yeah, that's true. Okay. That's true. Yeah. But is it good because they want it? Is that true? Say, or do they want it because it is good? That's what the truth is, right? So we're trying to find out the truth about the good, just like we try to find the truth about the triangle, right? Okay. So there's truth about the good, just as there's truth about other things, right?

[49:41] But vice versa, the truth is a good thing you can want, just like there are other good things you want, like health and houses and so on, right? Virtue and so on. So it's kind of interesting, right? Okay. Okay. Now the third objection was the one based on that proportion, right? Proportion. Yeah. And Thomas really says, to the third, it should be said that many differences diversify what the sensing powers, right?

[50:43] But do not diversify the what intellectual powers, right? Okay. We'll see that same thing again when we talk talk about the desiring powers, right? There'll be two different kinds of desiring powers tied up with the senses, but only one tied up with reason, huh? Okay. We saw it before when we talked about how memory, right? There's a kind of memory in the universal reason, but it's the same power, right?

[51:12] But in the sense powers, there was a diversity, huh? Okay. So we'll take a little break now, and then we'll talk about the virtues of