De Anima (On the Soul)
117. What Is Virtue? A Thing's Own Act, Moral vs. Intellectual Virtues, and the Two Ends of Reason
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/117-what-is-virtue-a-things-own-act-moral-vs-intellectual-virtues/

[0:00] these two powers. Now some people they use the word virtue in a very narrow way, and this gets them into some difficulty in understanding it, right? Because you have to understand the general before you understand the particular.

[0:18] Now a friend of mine had in his kitchen this plaque. This he's written, "Much virtue in herbs, little in men." Well, there you see something of the broad meaning of what virtue, huh?

[0:40] Aristotle the Philosopher says that wealth is the virtue of money. Not the virtue of the man, now. It's the virtue of money. Okay. Or as I say to students, sharpness is the virtue of a knife.

[1:22] Or I could say my left eye is more virtuous than my right eye. The wall over there, is a little blurry with my right eye. I see more distinctly with my left eye. I say this is my more virtuous eye. This is less virtuous. I tell the students, I don't. That's not because I look at the girls with this eye, and I don't look at the girls with this side.

[1:50] I'm doing more virtue, right? I see. What is this broad meaning of virtue? Where Not only man could be said to have a virtue, but many other things, right?

[2:07] And only man could be said to have a vice, but many other things could be said to have a knife, a vice, like dulness is the vice of the knife.

[2:34] Remember how our Lord used this comparison too. when. He said, "You are the salt of the earth, right? " And the salt loses its savor. Yeah, it's cast out, trampled upon, right? Okay, he's making a comparison there, right? Okay, so what is this broad and very general meaning of virtue? Yeah, there is the Greek sense of the excellence. Okay, okay, right? Is that the word? Yeah, yeah.

[3:19] Purpose and yeah. Well, actually, the broad meaning of virtue that that we start with in the Ethics before we come to talk about human virtue, right? Okay. Presupposes understanding Plato's famous definition in the first book of Republic, the definition of a thing's own act. Oh, okay. Have you ever heard that definition before? Have you seen that before? I don't remember the book before. I don't remember the definition.

[3:50] Okay. Long time ago. Because everything that has its own act, right, can have a virtue or a vice in this broad sense of the word, virtue or vice, right? Okay. But first of all, yeah, I can see what a thing's own act. Yeah, son.

[4:17] Well, Plato's definition of a thing's own act is the act which either that thing alone can do, right, or at least that it does better than other things. Okay. Okay. Again, please. Yeah, I'll put it on the board here. The act which

[4:41] that thing alone can do, right? So, if, for example, if it's only through my eyes that I can see, right? And only through my ears, I'd say that I can hear. Yeah. Then to see is the eyes own act, right? To hear is the ears own act, right?

[5:07] Or the act which it can do better than other things. Okay. Now you ever seen somebody walk in his hands? Okay. But the person can't walk in his hands like he can walk on his feet, can't he? And so we'd say the walk is the feet's own act, right? Mm-hmm. Not the hands own act, right? Right. Okay. The same way, you know, one thing I learned about screwdrivers, right?

[5:51] It's important to have the right screwdriver for the screw you're working with. Otherwise, you tend to to ruin the sc the screw top, Obviously. And I noticed, you know, I remember one time with trying to repair the refrigerator, right, and not having the right screwdriver, Then someone gave me the right screwdriver. All of a sudden, you know, you need to turn the screw that you couldn't turn before at the other one, right?

[6:13] Okay. So it might be that I can use a screwdriver for many different size screws, right? Yeah. But there's a certain what screwdriver that is that can best work with that screw, right? Yeah. Okay. Mm-hmm. Such a definition of things own act. Okay. Now, in the broad meaning of virtue and vice, you can say everything having its own act, right? Could be said could have what its own virtue or its own what vice, right?

[6:54] Okay. Okay. Now, what do you mean by virtue there? What you mean by vice in that sense, right? Well, you could say virtue is the what's it quality of the thing kind of broader, or can be more more precise, see disposition of the thing, right?

[7:26] Which makes it and its own act good. Okay. I don't know if you hear what I'm saying here. Virtue is the what? Let's say disposition. It's a disposition of the thing, right?

[7:49] Which makes it and its own act good. Okay. Okay. It's the quality, right, of the thing, right? Okay. Now, when I say "thing," I mean a thing having its own act, right? Right. Okay. Let me make that power clearer so you can read much. Yeah, thank you.

[8:18] You say the virtue of a thing having its own act is the quality of it, right? The disposition of it—the one you want to say—is the disposition

[8:43] of it that makes it and its own act. Good. Okay. Usually you just say what I was trying to say is, what makes a thing in its own act right? Okay. But it's really like the quality, the disposition of that thing, right? Yeah.

[9:17] Now, once I've defined that, then I ask students sometimes, "What is the main virtue of a knife? " Well, before you can answer that question reasonably, you have to know what a knife's own act is, right? And what is a knife's own act? Was to cut, right? But what enables the knife, right, to cut well? Well, in this case, it's pretty easy to figure out what that is.

[9:45] It's sharpness, right? Okay. The vice would be just the opposite of that, right? The vice of a thing having its own act, right, is the disposition of that thing that makes it and its own act bad, right? So what would be the vice of a knife? Dullness. Yeah. See that? Okay. Now, it may be not in other things so easy to tell what the virtue of the vice is, but you see in general what it is, huh?

[10:14] Now, as they say, when I look at that statue over there with my right eye, it's kind of blurred, huh? I can see it better with my left eye, right? So we could say my left eye has more the virtue of an eye than my right eye, huh? But it might take someone like an optometrist or somebody, right, who examines my eye and knows more exactly what is the vice of the right eye or what is the virtue of the left eye, right?

[10:46] You see? But if I saw twenty-twenty or something like that, I'd be a most virtuous eye, right? You see me? Then you'd have more virtue, right? But you have to know what is the eye's own act, right? Right. It's to see, and what enables the eye to see what? Well, right? Okay.

[11:06] Mozart had a very what? Virtuous ear. See? Okay. One guy I was talking to is in college, right, and he was in some kind of a music appreciation or some kind of music course, right? And of course the professor you know would hit a chord on the piano, you know. Okay, now y'all know that, don't you?

[11:29] So your ears, you know, are more virtuous, right? You can tell exactly what this is, huh? You see Mozart, you know, he blew a trumpet, feet almost because his ears are so sensitive to these sounds. You see? Okay.

[11:45] But then you get, you know, what's his name, Parker? You know, the guy who sells those wines, you know, and so on. Oh. And he's pretty good, but judge in these things, see? Okay. She has a more virtuous tongue, shall we say, or sense of smell. I get a.

[12:03] I don't trust my my judgment too much in these matters, you know. You know, I mean, if I have some appreciation of good wine, but I mean, you know, it came down to some greediness, yeah. You see, okay. Now,

[12:21] go up to this thing up here. Much virtuous herbs lead to a mint, right? Now, what is an herb's own act? What's to season the food, right? Okay, so if it seasons the food well, then it has the virtue of a what herb? Okay.

[12:47] Now, a lot of people don't aren't too knowledgeable these days, right? And they buy herbs and they have them on hand for some time, right? Right. I guess they lose their savor. They do that. And I had a big, connoisseur chef in my kitchen one day. I said, "Oh, this is not good for that. He's throwing out stuff on it. " Is it around too much?

[13:15] Well, you see, you know, just like the eye doctor, right? Who knows the virtue of the vice of my eye? This guy knows the what virtue of the herbs, and when the herb is lost, the virtue, yeah, okay. But this is appropriate to have this thing hang in the kitchen. A friend of mine had because the herbs are apt to have the virtue of an herb for the men who are eating there, overeating and all the rest, right?

[13:43] Getting drunk and so, you see what I mean? Okay, but notice our Lord makes that comparison, doesn't he? Yeah, you see, and how you are the salt of the earth, right? And you are supposed to be good, and you are supposed to what?

[13:59] You know, save the world just like those good people in the city there. that's going to spread the city for if you find so many good people in there, right? He said. So I can. Yeah, yeah. I was, you know, Castel was being silly, right? Eventually, he does. So you see the broad meaning of virtue there, right? Yeah. So now, why is Aristotle? You'll find in Plato and Aristotle in the Greek temple they talk about the virtue of the horse, right?

[14:26] Yeah. Virtue of the dog or something, you know. You know, if the horse, you know, behaves the horse should, you know, at least in the service of man, right? Then it has the virtue of a horse. Okay. Now, why does Aristotle say wealth is the virtue of money?

[14:49] Doesn't say the virtue of the man. He says the virtue of money. Well, what must you always know before you can know the virtue or the vice of that matter of thing? What must you always know before? What its own act is? Yeah. So what's money's own act?

[15:09] What do you use money to do? To buy. To buy. Yeah, yeah. So if you're wealthy, then you can buy well. The best cut of meat, the fancy car, etc. , etc. , right? If you're poor, you've got to buy the second-hand clothing, right? Used car, the cheap cut of meat, the two-dollar wine. It's a center, right? See what I mean? You buy poorly, right? See what I mean?

[15:40] So poverty would be the vice of money, and wealth the what virtue of money? You see that? Okay. So in Nicomachean Ethics, of course, Aristotle is concerned with the virtues of what man, right? Okay. This is a little more involved, right? The virtue of the knife, but you're asking me for what quality is it, or qualities, right? That make a man, and what a man does. Well, okay.

[16:20] We're not going to go into all the virtues, today That's the Nicomachean ethics course, but we want to talk about the virtues of what reason, in particular.

[16:34] I might just mention passing that Aristotle at the end of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, he divides human virtue into what two kinds, right?

[16:52] The moral virtues, and then the what virtues of reason? Which some people call the intellectual virtues. Okay. Virtues of the intellect or understanding, right?

[17:16] Now, what is the basis for this division, right? The virtues of reason, of course, are going to be in reason, and the moral virtues will be in the emotions and in the what will. Okay. So courage, for example, and moderation are in the emotions. Although different emotions, right? So courage is concerned with emotions like fear and. Boldness, right, and things are dangerous to the body, and so on.

[17:56] And temperance is about what hunger and thirst and sexual desire, and so on. And mildness is about anger, and so on, right? And okay, so these are virtues that are obviously in the emotions, huh? And then there are virtues like justice, say, that are in the will. Okay. Okay. Now, what's what's the basis of this division of human virtue into these two kinds, right? Into one from the other Well, before you can know what the virtue of anything is, you've got to know what its own act is, right?

[18:35] Right. Now, things own act is the act which either it alone has, right, or at least it just has better than other things. And Aristotle, in the first book, before he gets to this, he he asks, "Does man have his own act, or is he naturally without the act?". There is some act that man has that the other animals don't have, or at least don't have to the extent that man has it.

[19:07] Well, man of course has reason, right? Okay. Now, if you define reason exactly the way, like say Shakespeare does in the definition of reason, then man alone has reason, right? Right. If you a little more loosen your understanding of reason, or you might say the higher animals have some partaking of reason, right, but not the extent that man has, right? So, man's own act is going to be an act involving reason, right?

[19:39] That's the act which man alone has, something has more fully than other animals, son. Okay. Well, now what's the basis for this division here?

[19:53] Well, it's because the will, especially, but also the emotions, they can partake in something of reason. Sorry, reason. They can partake of reason. So my emotions can be what habituated, right? Yeah. To listen to reason, huh? Yeah. And a fortiori my the acts of my will, huh? Okay. So they can have something that's what involving reason, huh? Okay. And a fortiori, so it's not just the acts of reason itself, but also the acts of what partakes of reason.

[20:39] See, that's the basis for the division there. So sometimes we say that man is an animal with reason. So therefore, man's own act, right, is the act with reason, right?

[21:19] That's why I usually state it when I teach this. And I say to students now, why did I say the act with reason? Why didn't I say the act of reason? I

[21:35] say do these two phrases mean the same thing? An act with reason and an act of reason. Do they mean the same thing? An act with reason, an act of reason. No.

[22:01] What does Shakespeare say? Love and reason keep little company nowadays. A pity no one makes them better acquainted. So notice a love can be what reasonable or what unreasonable, right? Right. Anger can be reasonable or unreasonable, right? When our Lord chases the money changers out of the temple, right? He has a reasonable anger, right? If you're using my kids for target practice, right? And I come over to stop you for doing this sort of thing, I should have a little bit of anger there, right?

[22:42] Okay, may not have to kill you, but enough to firmly stop you with this kind of behavior, right? See, so eating and drinking, right, can be reasonable or unreasonable, right? See,

[23:02] so things that are not acts of reason, but that can be ordered or measured by reason, they are said to partake of reason, right? Okay.

[23:17] And Plato sometimes makes an interesting comparison. You know that reason is to the emotions like a man is to his horse. When the man first gets on the horse, the horse wants to what pull the man off, right? And if the man doesn't continue to get on top of the horse, the horse will kind of what go its own way, right? But if the man continues to get back on top of the horse, he may succeed in what habituating the horse to obey him, right?

[23:48] And that's in a way what what moral virtue is, right? It's the habituation of the will or the emotions to obey reason. Okay. Aristotle's interesting comparison that the reason should rule the emotions like a man rules his son, not like a master rules his what slave, right? Okay. So it's for the good of the emotions and the good of the will that they are ruled by reason.

[24:24] So it's not just the reason ruling them for its own good, right? Who said that about reason? Aristotle. Aristotle. Yeah, Aristotle. You raise the philosophical question, right? Should reason rule the emotions like a master his slave or like a father his son? And the argument should rule like a father his son.

[24:42] It's kind of interesting when Thomas is in the Secunda Secundae there. He's talking about the sins of the flesh and the vices of the flesh, right? And he calls them childish vices, right? And you say, well, why does he say this, right? Well, he says it's because if you don't chastise the child, right? He eventually becomes unruly, and you can't rule him, right? And that's where the word chastity comes from, really, right?

[25:07] You know, you know, originally we speak of chastising a child, right? You see, when the child gets out of hand, right? If you don't chastise the child, he becomes ungovernable eventually, huh? And the same way, if you don't chastise, right, your emotions.

[25:24] I was driving up to Quebec one time, see, and had a new car. The crazy Frenchman passed me on this bad road, and thwomp! And I could hear the the rock his tires kicked up into the side of my car, and there was a mark there, you know. So I, you kind of thought to myself, "What's this mark?" I'm a philosopher, I'm not getting excited about this.

[25:46] I said, "See, so, so, Sarpedon will quote Homer, you know, saying, 'You know, you know, but the poet Homer now is trying to calm himself, right? You know, worst things have I endured, you know, and so on. ' Okay, so an act of reason includes not only the act of reason, but acts measured or directed or ordered by reason, huh? Okay.

[26:21] I know, in a sense, your your mother and father are doing that before your own reason is developed, right? Yeah. So grandma or aunt so and so gives you a box of candy for your birthday, and your first inclination is to stuff yourself eating that candy, right? And your mother says, "They've had enough today, right? Put away. Maybe has some tomorrow, right? " But she kind of rules a little bit of reason there, right?

[26:47] Because eat it all today, we'll be thinking for tomorrow, right? Yeah. And you know, the tenth piece is not as enjoyable as the first piece, right? You might get actually kind of sick to your stomach, right? I remember we used to have a little book there about the little rabbit there, wasn't? Who wanted to? They asked me when it was birthday. He wanted to have all the candy he could eat that day.

[27:12] Remember that story? And of course, he got so sick by the time all the relatives came over for birthday cake, he had to go to bed. He couldn't, you know, because he learned the lesson, right? It was a kind of really good little story for a child to hear, right? But you know, even the children, you know, they they would set up a big table with all kinds of sweets and candies and so on, and then some more healthy food.

[27:38] Of course, the first few days the kids are, you know, stuffing the candy all the time and not even proper diet, but before long they kind of, you know, they don't feel too good from it, and they don't, you know, and they start eating more balanced diet, okay?

[27:56] But the same, the same way, if you are angry, see, huh? My brother used to, you know, sign his pickups like a toy to me, you know. And so my my mother would always stop and give him a spanking or something, right? That's right. And then finally, you'd see, you know, they get angry. You start picking up, and then you stop and look around to see. Nah.

[28:16] Already, you've got a little bit of control. So, your parents kind of start. Your parents don't help you. You know, a little bit different start towards these things. And I noticed, you know, with with my first time in California, you know, I first I really met. I had students who had drunk wine, you know, at the dinner table with their parents. So they'd grown up with it, and they had, you know, maturity toward towards drinking that I'd never known among my high school buddies.

[28:46] Let's get fucked this weekend, I suppose. You know, no level of maturity, right? And if you learn to drink with your buddies, you don't learn to drink moderately. You learn to drink to get drunk or something, you know. That was my buddies understand

[29:03] but but if you learn to drink at the dinner table with your mother and father. Well, then you know they probably you know watch you and and you learn to enjoy it, but not to you know go in excess, right? Huh. But even you know they say you know the freshmen even in college, even our crazy colleges nowadays, that freshmen get sick you know from drinking beer more often than seniors do.

[29:28] You know because they don't you know you know how to enjoy the stuff, really. You know. So as such a person, you know, to some extent from experience and so on, right? He can learn some of these things. But you have this game of things, you know. we had them, you know, irascible, they were given to anger, right? And some of them became very mild and gentle people, right?

[29:51] Because they learned how to what control their anger. I think Saint Francis de Sales had a temperance, and he learned to do this, right? And Saint Jerome too, for all I know. There's other other other men, huh? So

[30:14] this is the basis for the distinction of human virtues. They all involve reason in some way, right? But the intellectual virtues are the virtues of reason itself, and the moral virtues are the virtues of something other than reason, but that can partake of reason, huh? That can listen to reason, can be habituated to follow the lead of what reason, huh? Okay. Incidentally,

[30:47] in the theological virtues, huh? Faith is in reason, although it, as it depends upon the will. While hope and charity are in the will, right? Okay. But Aristotle doesn't talk about those, because they're supernatural, right? Okay. So he divides the virtue into these two groups. Now today we're going to talk a little bit about the virtues of reason because it's connected with this text we have here on the distinction between

[31:21] looking reason, speculative reason, as Thomas calls it, or theoretical reason, architectonic doing doing. So we're looking, therefore, for the virtues of reason. The virtues of reason are going to be the habits or dispositions. Acting

[32:06] the dispositions and its habits, which make reason and its own act good. Okay. Now it might be good here to stop a little bit and talk about the word good,

[32:36] and something we met before in our study of causes. When we talk about the good, we come to a first definition by induction. You know, if Socrates was to ask the slave boy instead of how do you double square, if he was to ask the slave boy what is good, afraid to ask a little boy what is good, right? Would he give you a definition of good?

[33:19] He give you demonstrations. Yeah, he enumerates many good things, right? Huh? So he'd say candy is good, right? He'd say bicycles are good, maybe, right? Baseball is good, right? Huh? And he'd have a whole number of things, and Socrates would say like he does in the dialogue. So people very often they give examples, right? If he asked a little boy, "What is a nose in here? " A friend of my grandchildren is a nose.

[33:46] They point, you know, to my nose, your nose, and this person's nose, right? What is a chair? This is a chair. This is a chair. Chair. Right. So, and Socrates says, "Without what do all these things have in common? " Huh? The candy and the bicycle and the baseball and so on, right? What do they all have in common? Why do you call these things good? Are they all sweet like candy?

[34:08] No. Can you all ride them like a bicycle? No. And probably the only thing the child could think of is these are all the things he wants, right? Okay. Remember my son Paul kind of figured this out on his own. You know, they set the table there, you know, and sometimes you know, and the dinner is here. Oh, this is a good meal tonight. You know, I guess spaghetti or something, right?

[34:30] Or sometimes, no, this is not a good meal. This is fish or something. And he says, he says, I have been saying to his little brother and sister, you know, that see when they like the meal, you know, we call it good, right? We don't like it, we call it bad, right? This is not good. So you're writing what is called the first definition of good. The good is what all want.

[35:04] Now, that's the first definition of good. Yeah, good is what all want, what all desire. And Socrates touches upon this in the Meno, right? And Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics with an induction for this.

[35:22] We could, you know, spend some time talking about the good, but. But remember, we talked about the four kinds of causes. Remember that? I don't know if you read on that or not. Material, formal. Yeah. We came to the cause called the end. And the end, if you recall, is defined as that for the sake of which, right? Yeah. Okay.

[35:49] That for the sake of which. So it makes no difference. I mean, whether you have a thing or an operation, you have the same kind of cause, right? So the chair is for the sake of what sitting. So sitting is the end of the chair. Taking medicine is for the sake of health, right? So health is the end there. Taking medicine.

[36:24] Studying is for the sake of knowing, right? So knowing is the end of the study, right? Now Aristotle made a connection there between the end and the good. You remember that? In the study of that fourth kind of cause. I know it's the definition of the two is not identical, but even from the definitions, you see a connection between them.

[37:02] Well, something is good or seems to be good at least, right? Yeah. Then people will aim at, won't they? Okay. And vice versa, you see people aiming at it, right? Yeah. That's a sign that something is good or at least seems to be good, right? Right. Okay. Now, sometimes we speak of the the means as being good too, or as being useful, right? Mm-hmm. But it's useful because it leads to the end.

[37:27] To the end. Yeah. Yeah. Now the end is especially important too when you're trying to understand what is better. Aristotle talks about perfect, and imperfect, and better. So he says the the whole is better than the part, right? Mm-hmm. And the end is better than what is for the sake of the end. Mm-hmm. But you could say the parts can say for the whole. So especially, right, the end seems to be better than other things.

[38:09] That's one way we show that God is the best thing, right? If He's the end of the whole universe, He must be better than everything else.

[38:20] Now I go into this a little bit here to see the relevance of the distinction, right? That we saw today of looking reason and doing reason, theoretical and practical reason, and the distinction of the virtues of reason. What's the connection between the two? Can you see what I'm leading up to?

[38:46] Could you possibly repeat? exactly what we just said about it? Yeah. You see what I'm leading up to. When Thomas is going to divide. The virtues of reason, and there are five main virtues of reason. Okay. And the way he divides it in the prima secunde

[39:08] is into the virtues of looking reason, right, and the virtues of practical reason. Okay. Okay. And he'll subdivide each of those. But now, what is the relevance of that distinction between practical reason and looking reason, right? Yeah. For distinguishing the virtues of reason, what's the connection, right?

[39:35] Yeah, yeah. The looking reason and the practical reason. Yeah. The looking reason, the doing reason, differ by their end, right? Yeah. Okay. And end is tied up with the good, right? Right. Good is tied up with what virtue is, right? Okay. Okay. So that the virtue of something has to perfect that thing with respect to its end or goal. If the end or goal of the knife is what the cut, right?

[40:10] What disposition, what quality, what condition of the knife, right, disposes it for achieving that end, achieving that end well. Well, the main virtue is going to be sharpness, right? Okay. Or the vice would be uh dullness. huh? You see that? Could you say that once again? Yeah. Perfects the thing. I say a thing's own act is really its end or purpose. Yeah. Okay. And so, if a virtue perfects a thing with regard to what achieving its end or helps it to achieve its end, then you can see the relevance of the end or reason for discussing the virtues of reason.

[41:00] And this distinction of two ends, right, will lead to a distinction of two kinds of virtue: the virtues of looking reason, which are perfect reason with regard to just understanding, right. And the virtues of what practical reason, which will perfect reason with regard to doing or making. Okay. You see the idea. I think so. See how everything fits together there, right? Yeah. The truth, all things harmonize, huh?

[41:31] See. So if you have two ends there for reason, in other words, reason is both for the sake of what understanding, right, and for the sake of directing us in what we do and make. Sure. See. It's like you could say in a similar way that we have eyes. Not only to help us in making and doing what we do and make, right? We also have eyes to see rainbows and see sunsets and see beautiful paintings and so on, right?

[42:15] That's a part of, right? Okay. So we have reason, likewise, for these two ends, right? Something to understand, which is like just seeing, you might say, and for the sake of directing us in what we do and make. And therefore, we're going to have two kinds of virtue, right? Or two groups of virtues corresponding to those different ends, right?

[42:57] It's like my tongue, right? Is my tongue for eating or for talking? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. See now, I noticed you know my contact with French-speaking people, huh? They tend to want to say "da" rather than "the" because they're not accustomed their tongue to forming the that sound, huh? In vice versa, there's sounds in French that we're not accustomed to make in English, right? So it's hard for us to make those sounds, right?

[43:41] Huh? Right. But now, when you start to drink, say wine, right? Huh? You have to use your tongue in a different way than you do when you what drink? Yeah, or when you drink water, right? Huh? Yeah. Okay. So you take a little wine over there, you know, you have to draw air in over your tongue and so on, right? Let the let the the wine roll to the sides, right?

[44:13] Can't take too much in there, right? Huh? My father always tried to imitate me all the time. He always done coughing and gaffing, right? Because he didn't take the right amount into his drink, huh? See, so his tongue lacked the virtue, right? It was not accustomed, right, to a certain way, huh? You see.

[44:33] But I was mentioning that, right? Because I'm not too good at pronouncing things, see. And some people are much better, you know, in foreign language than I would be, huh? And they learn how to pronounce these things in a foreign language, and

[44:51] so their tongue, you might say, is what accustomed or disposed, right, or trained or in a say, right. To form these sounds, and I probably wouldn't say exactly right in the way the French man would say it, huh? Yeah. You see, in the same way, your tongue has to be used a certain way in eating, huh, or drinking, huh? Shouldn't bite your tongue for one thing. Yeah.

[45:19] Well, it happens sometimes, huh? Kind of painful when it happens, you know. Okay. But notice the way the tongue would get accustomed to make those particular sounds in French or some other language, or I don't think I could ever speak Chinese, you know. But in the way by accustomed to drinking wine or something like this would be a little different, wouldn't it? Wouldn't be the same thing, right?

[45:55] So, I need to do both, right? Okay. So, so Thomas is going to divide the virtues that perfect reason into two groups, right? The virtues that perfect looking reason, or what he calls speculative intellect, right? Aristotle calls it theoretikos nous, right? And the virtues that perfect what? What I call doing, or he calls practical intellect, right? Practical reason, or practikos in Greek, you know.

[46:39] You see the relevance of doing that, right? Because the virtue is perfecting you with regard to your own act, which is also your what, end or goal, right? And because the theoretical and the practical differ by end, right? That's a natural way of dividing the virtues, isn't it? Okay.