De Anima (On the Soul)
118. The Five Virtues of Reason: Foresight, Art, Natural Understanding, Episteme and Wisdom (with Equivocal Names)
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[0:00] Now you know the old rule I gave you of two or three, right? Yeah. Okay. Which is a rule for the most part, right? For the most part, to understand a division into more than three, you have to divide one way, right? Okay. So the way Thomas divides them

[0:30] would be into two, right? Yeah. Okay. And that would be the. Let me say something a little more moving after that. Get you behind with another end here.

[0:58] The virtues of looking, reason, and the virtues of doing, or practical reason. Okay. Just like in the logic, there we had a division into five genus, difference, species, property, accident, and we divided them into what? Three and two. Remember that. I wasn't there. Yeah, three of them signify something inside the nature of the thing, and two of them signify something outside the nature of the thing. And then we subdivided those.

[1:42] Okay. Now, how does he divide the virtues of doing reason? Well, here the fundamental distinction is between doing and what making. Okay. Now you might say, what are you doing,

[2:08] Mister Professor? I should divide making, and how can you divide? I mean, excuse me. I should divide doing, and how can you divide doing into doing and making? Well, that's no problem for you people anymore now, right? Because you've learned what?

[2:27] You've learned there are many other examples of this, right? Aristotle divides disposition into disposition and habit. Sometimes one of the particulars, right, keeps the general name as its own, and the other one gets a new name. That's right. Okay.

[2:49] Now, why does making get the new name? It's a specific kind of doing, so it's it's producing something that comes out with something product. Yeah, yeah. Now, yesterday afternoon, I went for a walk. I've been up to exercise. I went for a walk, twenty minute walk. Yeah. I went to have show for it. Then I had a guest over at the house, and I I did some steaks, and you know I marinated them, and you know so pretty good tasting, you know, and the guy guests liked the steaks, right?

[3:29] Okay. So in the case of making, apart from the doing, there is a what product, right? Yeah. So these guys out here, right? Yeah. When they get through doing what they're doing out there, there's going to be a church there. Yes. See? So there is something in addition to a product, you might say, right? Yeah. Apart from the doing. Yeah. Okay. That's a distinction. Yeah, let's see.

[3:54] When I'm going for a walk, or even I play a game of baseball or something, right? Right. I get through I've nothing to show for it.

[4:07] Okay. You see that? Yeah. Yeah. So because making adds something noteworthy, right? Adds something noteworthy, right? Yeah. And it doesn't mean necessarily that making is better than doing, right? In fact, doing is really going to be higher than making, because it's even more important to do with that steak once you get it there, right? Whether you eat moderately or eat too much, you know, or whether you drink the too much wine or just the right amount, and so on.

[4:37] So this is the fundamental distinction there, right? And of course, making is really for the sake of the thing made. The way doing could be more of its own end, huh? Yeah. so the virtue that perfects doing should be called in English what foresight.

[5:03] Sometimes you see the Latin word prudencia, prudence. Prudence in Greek, huh? Okay, but as Thomas explains in the question of the integral parts of prudence, the word prudence comes from the word for what providentia huh? That's right. And that's not just Thomas's etymology. If I'm in the Latin dictionary, right? And providentia means just what foresight. Okay. So I have a whole bunch of things. So Winston Churchill likes to use the word foresight rather than the word prudence, right?

[5:46] Because prudence doesn't have a narrow meaning. Common day prudence, you know, quarks, right? But but foresight would be the real name of this virtue in English, foresight. Um.

[6:01] Now, sometimes it's defined as right reason about doing. That's kind of the first definition. Right reason about doing. Now making, huh? The virtue concerned making is called art, huh? And not art now in this artsy sense, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But art in the sense which are definite rules, right, to follow. So the art of farming or the art of carpentry, right? The art of the shoemaker, right?

[6:39] The art of cooking, right? We have recipes and definite, you know. That's right. Okay. So art, huh? Okay, this would be called right reason about making. Now, our foresight and art are they, from a logical point of view, now are they species that are also genera or are they lowest species?

[7:28] Oh, no, it's also a genus. Yeah, yeah. So under art there are many arts, right? Yeah. Okay. And under foresight there's many particular kinds of foresight, huh? Okay. We're not going to go into those details, but. Yeah. I just want to mention that, right? Yeah. Okay. And I might mention just a word too about how they distinguish them, right? Because you distinguish the arts by the matter out of which they make,

[8:04] more so than by what they make. See? Huh? Even though that might be a subdivision within there. Yeah. But in other words, my brother-in-law, who's a carpenter in his spare time, sometimes a full time, he might make a wooden house. He might make a wooden what? Table, right? Might make a wooden chair or desk. Okay. But a metal worker might make a what? Metal table and metal chair, right?

[8:39] So you don't have one art to make chairs, do you? No, but you have one art, more which makes things out of wood. Another art that makes things out of what? Metal, or another art that makes things out of what? Plastic or something, right? So a plastic company, they might make plastic tables and plastic chairs and plastic drinking cups, et cetera, et cetera, right?

[9:18] So you say that arts are differentiated by their materials, so. Yeah, yeah, by the matter. You have a you have a different matter that requires different tools and a different way of being worked.

[9:36] So my father's factory there. There's a wood shop and there's a metal shop, right? Yeah. I used to help in both of them, and in the metal shop we might heat the metal and bend it, huh? We might weld things together, right? While in the wood shop, there we wouldn't heat the material, right? Bend it. But we we would saw it and do things of that sort, and nail or screw things together or something like that, huh?

[10:05] But in the metal, we would we would weld things together. You see? So you have different tools that you use, huh? So my my wife and my daughter make dresses sometimes, and they use a scissors and and needle and so on, huh? Now my brother-in-law, he doesn't use a scissors and a needle when he makes something out of wood, because those tools that don't fit that matter, do they?

[10:33] You can't work with them in the same way, huh? A glass door, right? You use a hammer. You see that? Okay. Now foresight, again, as I say, is not a lowest species. Thomas would distinguish between the foresight of the individual man, the foresight of a father, right, and the foresight of a king or the ruler, right, and the foresight of a general. He distinguishes at least those four.

[11:09] But notice now the foresight is not distinguished by by the matter of which you're making something, right? But whether you're aiming at the good of the individual or some common good, like the good of the family or the victory, which is the good of the army or the good of the city.

[11:30] Yes. What did you call it? Some based on numbers. Well, you see, Aristotle at the beginning of Politics he discusses the Platonic opinion, right, that the rule of a man over his family, right, and the rule of the king over the city. that's only a quantitative difference. He says, "Well, no, no, the real difference in kind, because the end or goal is something different in these two cases.

[11:55] Okay, the family is oriented to the necessities of life, right? Generation and nourishment, education. But the the city is aimed at the with the good life, period, right? Okay, and the army is aiming at what? Victory, right? Right. Yeah. So, so the foresight. Yeah. So you have the foresight of the individual, right? Of the individual. Yeah, yeah. Okay, but you can see that in doing, right? Because some things I do as an individual man, considering the good of Duane Berquist period.

[12:27] Yeah. Other things I do as a father, right? Yeah. Other other things I do as a citizen. See, so when the children are little, I used to do them. I used to read before they go to bed, right? Sure. Now is it better for Duane Berquist to read

[12:46] this little child story, right? Yeah. Beatrix Potter or something, or for Berquist to read Shakespeare? Oh, just myself, there. I would read Shakespeare rather than Beatrix Potter, right? But children aren't ready for Shakespeare, right? So I choose to read Beatrix Potter or.

[13:08] I'm doing that as a father. That's the foresight of a father, right? Right. See, the good, the common good of the family is really the children, huh? Okay, so I'm doing that with respect to their good, right? Yeah. See, so the choice I make would be something different, right? See, but now, say, if if I was a a good general or a good soldier, good good officer, right?

[13:29] In the time of war, they might draft me or call me up, right? And this would not be for the good of my family that I be separated from my family. You see, but now this would be with respect to another good, right? See, but likewise, when I go into vote, let's say, huh, to my minimal participation here in the government of my country, should I vote?

[13:52] You know, say what vote will help Duane Berquist the most? Or even what what vote will help my family the most? You know, or should I, so far as I'm able, think of what's best for the country? See, because what might be best for the country, might not be best for my family, huh? Or vice versa.

[14:18] Just want to tell you, grandmother, you know, they help you with the people, you know, the family. Help you with the people, you should say. They're kind of funny English.

[14:36] See, they did. You know, when you had, you know, nepotism, see, you know, even the church there, you know, and time there. Well, you're considering, you know, not what was best for the church, huh? And you know, making. Twelve-year-old boys, bishops, and so on, right? Some things that you know, and a lot of times you had the absentee bishops in those days too. That was a very common thing before Trent, huh?

[15:01] So, I mean, that's not for the good of the diocese. that the bishop resides somewhere else, living it up, you know, and just drawing funds, you know, to support his lifestyle. You see, so so you have these different kinds of foresight, right? The foresight of the individual man, we're considering your good as individual. You know, some things I do as a father, and some things I do as a citizen, right?

[15:27] And it requires a different kind of what foresight, huh? It requires more foresight, let's say, to to to see what's good for the country than what's good for your family. But it but it takes more foresight to see what's good for the family than to see what's good for yourself as an individual.

[15:53] So those the two kinds of virtue, the two main kinds of virtue of the practical reason, but one perfects us in doing, and the other in what making. And so you can see that, right? Huh? The man who possesses the art will make things well. The man who who's the chef, when he possesses it, he's going to make a very, what, good meal, right? Huh? My my brother always say he possessed the art of of carpentry, right?

[16:24] He's built, he built the houses, and he built addition for us too, you know. But sometimes I do a little bit of carpentry around the house, there down the basement, like that. He'd say, "Would you do that for doing? You should do that. Oh yeah. " See, well, I'm not, you know, yeah, um, you know, we got tear this off and do it over again, right? So, I'm not making well, right?

[16:48] Right. Or with the what you're doing well? Well, maybe so, yeah. All right, and and sometimes you try to do fix the plumbing or something, right? And if you can afford, I found out there to call plumbing, yeah, yeah, because you know, heavens.

[17:10] So you know, was one of the was one of the old relatives there. Must have made a coffee cake, you know, instead of putting coffee, in there, she put the coffee grains in there, you know. so everybody's trying to eat this, you know. So obviously doesn't possess the art, yet, right? Yeah. But now, if a man possesses the art, then he can do these things what easily, right?

[17:34] Huh? This one kind of a fresh plumber used to come to the house, here, he always see the stupid things I'd done, and I say, turn on. Oh,

[17:44] Kind of a funny guy. Yeah. But the point is, you know, it seems so easy when they do it, right? Yeah, know exactly what to do, you know. So as Thomas says, that art enables you to do something orderly, easily, without error, right, or mistakes, right?

[18:15] Some women they get married, they possess very little of the art, right? Mrs. DeKay was a very good cook, you know. They said, "What's good about cooking? " My husband taught me, she said.

[18:27] I don't know. That was either compliment or, what? But as time goes on, people have to develop a certain art, you know. Yeah Of course the grandmother sometimes wasn't written down, you know. a pinch of this, a pinch of that, and so.

[18:52] So these are two of the five virtues of reason that Aristotle talks about in the sixth book. Foresight, which in Greek would be called phronesis, huh Prudentia Latin of course in English and techne in Greek, right? How might you spell phronesis? How do you spell. it. I mean, if the English, is spelled... what kind of like like the Greek letters? Phronesis, okay.

[19:31] I just in Greek, there's a Greek word for temperance, is sophrosyne. Understand its meaning. Preserves foresight or prudence. Interesting. Sophrosyne, because you know people usually tend to, you know, because of of drink or or lust or something like that, they they lose their mind. Yeah. Okay. There's always somebody doing something crazy, because of drink and other drugs, or, something like that. Or here you have Paris bringing back Helen and destroying his whole whole city, right?

[20:08] Those are the sort of things. So temperance preserves, right? That's just an interesting, interesting thing. Sophrosyne is a Greek word for temperance, sir. Now, what are the virtues of looking reason? Without

[20:30] looking reason, the end is simply to what? Understand the truth, right? But remember the distinction we pointed out before that understanding is to reasoning like what? Rest is to motion, remember. That yes, yes, yes. And that rest can be before or after emotion, right? And likewise, by standing, I'm standing now. Before I move, right? And now I move, and I come to a halt or a stop, right?

[21:07] Okay. Now, is there something like that in the case of the other two members of this proportion, right? Is there an understanding before reasoning, and an understanding arrived at as a result of reasoning? See, are there some things like the Pythagorean theorem, and other theorems in geometry? There, are there things where we reason out that the interior angles of a triangle, are equal to two right angles and all these other things.

[21:42] You reason out, reason out that in a right-angle triangle, the square, right? Yeah. Okay. And Socrates in the dialogue called Meno, right? He he helps the slave boy to reason out that the diagonal of a square would be the side of a square twice as big, right? Yeah. Okay. So there's what I would call a reasoned out understanding. Uh huh.

[22:10] And geometry is just you know a very clear example of reasoned out understanding, huh? Of all these things. Now, because that standing is a kind of rest after emotion, in Greek you have the Greek word what episteme. huh We get the word epistemology. so people know Episteme. that's a long E E to them, it's a short E but episteme. Yeah. That's what's called in Greek episteme. Now in Latin they translate by scientia, right?

[22:53] Okay. They name that virtue of reason, scientia. Okay. I call reasoned out understanding. But now, if reason, does reason understand anything. before it reasons, is there an understanding also before reasoning? Yes. Well, I argue that that

[23:24] if you understood nothing before reason, you have nothing to reason from. Okay. So there's an understanding then that comes to us without reasoning and more naturally, therefore, right? Yeah. And so I like to call that in English because of this other phrase we use, natural understanding.

[23:47] Like your understanding of the whole is more than a what part, right? Yeah. Understanding can't ever can't be needed. Something can't both be and not be, right? Yeah. Real famous thing there. The flowers how do you decide whether she loves you. You know, pick the petals from the flowers. She loves me. She loves me not. That's the the turn. Okay. Yeah. And you find out who gets the last one whether she loves you or she doesn't love you, right?

[24:17] Yeah. But notice, in the face of all that uncertainty, right? Either she loves me or she doesn't love me. Can't be both, right? Right. You see, you still accept it, right? That something can't both be and not be, right? There's natural understanding. There's

[24:39] some truth, therefore, we actually understand. And when I say natural, I don't mean we. Are born understanding it right, but we naturally come to understand. So you have to go to school to know that the whole is more than the part.

[24:55] You had to share your candy with your brother or something like that. You realize that the whole is not because of the part, right? So when you got a smaller family, it gets easier from a big family, right? So if you shared your candy with everybody, even everybody,

[25:17] so he says, "Yo, stop the remaining candy in his mouth before he goes in the house. " So if you can't eat, you know, without realizing that the whole and the part are not the same, right? The whole is more than the part.

[25:44] Now, is there another virtue here besides natural understanding and reasoned out understanding? Aristotle in Greek will call what he calls the next understanding merely nous, right? It's the Greek word for the understanding. Okay. Thomas will call it intellectus, right? You can see how beautiful the word intellectus become, right? Because we speak of the intellectus speculativus, you mean the power, right? Right. Here intellectus means a habit, a virtue, right?

[26:16] Okay. But Aristotle and Thomas name it that way because this is something that belongs more naturally to understanding, right? And it doesn't suppose this this reasoning out of things, right? Okay.

[26:37] Is that exhausted or not? Might there be some virtue that's the motion? So so far, right? We we've talked about what's prior to the motion and what's that? Well, see, the virtue is the idea of something you know that perfects something, right? And it makes its act good, right? When you start reasoning, you might you might fall into errors, so on. Okay. If you really reason it out, then you're not going to be mistaken.

[27:05] Okay. Well, something. Aristotle's third one there. I'm thinking that that has to be wisdom, but I can't think of why. Okay. Now, perfection. Aristotle says that wisdom is the head of both of these understandings, right? Really. Because wisdom is a knowledge of the first causes, right? Okay. But you also find out that wisdom knows the axioms, right? More distinctly, it can defend them. But natural understanding can't do that, you know.

[27:43] So if I give, as I tell you with my students, if I give them these sophistical objections against the axioms, they're going to be deceived by those sophistical arguments. Yeah. And they won't be able to distinguish the various meanings of the word what whole one part, type example I gave there, right? Remember, I gave an example there of,

[28:10] I get them to say, what is man? Well, man's an animal, isn't it? They'll say, yeah. I say, was he just an animal? No, he's an animal, but he has reason. So animal is only a part of what man is, not just animal. Okay. So they all agree that animal is a part of what man is. Okay. And then I say to them, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, etc.

[28:33] Right. Therefore, what she says is only a part of man, it includes much more than man. Therefore, sometimes the whole is more than the whole. The part is more than the whole. You see, yeah, I guess you're right. Come back. You see, by a sophistical argument, right? Yeah. I I played with two different meanings of the word what. Part and whole, right? See, and Aristotle distinguishes in the in the fifth book of wisdom, the four central meanings of the word whole and part.

[29:08] And one of the meanings of whole and part is the definition and the parts of the definition, and that's a kind of composed whole, as they call it. And then you have the universal whole, and it's what parts, right? You have the whole, in other words, that is put together from its parts, like the chair is put together from the legs and the seat and the back.

[29:33] Sure. And then you have the universal whole, which is not put together from its parts, but set of them, like animal is set of dog, cat, horse, and elephant. What you're doing is mixing up two things, right? An integral whole or composed whole always contains more parts than one of its parts, right? An universal whole is always set of more than one of its parts, right? So when you say that animal is a part of man, you're taking part there in the sense of composing part.

[30:06] When you say animal includes more than man, you're taking animal as universal. Well, the average guy couldn't figure that out, could he? Right. So Aristotle says that wisdom is the head of all understanding. It's the head of natural understanding because the wise man distinguishes the meanings of the words in the axioms, right? Like whole and part, and he defends it against sophistical objections, right? And so he perfects.

[30:38] Natural understanding, doesn't he? See, but the guy who just has natural understanding, when he meets one of these sophistical objections, he's he begins to think he doesn't know what he doesn't know, right? And the foundation of all his understanding starts to get called into question, doesn't it? Okay.

[31:01] At the same time, because wisdom is a knowledge of the very first causes, huh? It's a knowledge of the causes of the causes studied in the other

[31:14] various forms of reason out of understanding. So sometimes Aristotle will say wisdom is a reason out of understanding, right? Really? Yeah, they say it is an episteme, right? Okay. You'll say Sophia is an episteme. Other times you'll divide it into episteme. Again, the same thing we mentioned before down here, right? You know, it has these special excellences, see, just like man is sometimes, you know, said to be an animal, and sometimes man is divided. against. the animals So Sophia perfects both natural understanding and reason of understanding.

[31:55] so he puts that as a separate virtue of reason. Of course, that's very important because later on we're going to find out that human happiness consists, especially in wisdom, right? Of all the virtues, knowing God. A bit of a harmony there between nature and grace. There. Now it is. Okay, so episteme can divide out episteme and Sophia, but is there any kind of wisdom that's not an episteme?

[32:34] Well, sometimes sometimes they call foresight, you know, practical wisdom. So you'll find that term used, right? Okay. Okay. And Aristotle, at the end of Ethics, he'll compare political foresight with wisdom, right? Yeah. And which is higher, right? It's better to be Aristotle or to be Churchill. And he'll say, "Well, political foresight is really about human things, right? " Sure. And but but Sophia is about divine things, and God is better than man.

[33:09] If man is the best thing around, maybe political foresight, but he's not. Aristotle said, "It's better to know the divine, even though it's harder for us to know. Okay. Okay. Now it's interesting. If you look at Aristotle, he takes up the five virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics, in Book Six. He divides them into three and two as well, right? Right. But he doesn't divide them into this three and this two.

[33:37] Oh. Okay. So this this scheme is this plan is from Thomas. Thomas is at the Prima Secundae, yeah. Prima Secundae, Yeah. Now, what Aristotle does is to take up these three here first, right?

[33:58] Which one? Oh, ones are in the episteme. Okay. Episteme, foresight, and art. Okay. And why does he put these two together, natural understanding, wisdom, because they're about beginnings. Oh. Natural understanding is about the beginning of our understanding, right? Yeah. The axioms and so on. And wisdom is about the beginnings of reality, about God, about the first things, right? Two different kinds of beginnings, right? Yeah, yeah. And these things here are about things that are from the beginning.

[34:30] Right. Yeah. It's very interesting he hasn't divided it. And I think the reason why Aristotle does that is because these are, in a way, more known to us, aren't sure. You see. So now you know if you if you go out as I say you meet the carpenter or something like that or the plumber and the cook or what it is and

[34:55] and you find them useful and so on right you recognize that there is that that virtue of that man right he knows what to do right sometimes and then you you get a man with foresight you know you ever hear about Matt Anthony Did you hear the Revolutionary War of Matt Anthony No He's the guy who took the Stony Point there on Hudson oh yeah but anyway who did the planning for it I don't know George Washington right you see and he had this great respect for George Washington and for George Washington is what military foresight guy this is a this is a very important thing here you know the early parts there were the the scourge right but Mad Anthony he's so known because

[35:44] because he would he says you're a brave man right but he said I'd storm hell itself he said he said to Washington if you plan it oh yeah and the like MacArthur

[36:01] returned to the the Philippines right you know he was afraid that the the Japs are going to to kill the prisoners there you know and that thing so he personally directed that rescue of the prisoners right so the Japs before the Japs could hurt him you know and so it was really kind of a masterpiece you know I mean you know not only the whole battle thing but this this in particular wanted to get there and save those people who were in the prison so

[36:31] so you know they built their foresight of McCarthy, they built their foresight of Napoleon or somebody right you know these guys so so you can appreciate that right okay what's his name Churchill has a famous thing on his ancestor you know the Churchill that fought during the 17th century there you know for England right 18th century I guess it was too beginning the 18th century so you admire that great military leader right huh okay like all of the greats huh they've got that that kind of military foresight so these just stand out right and then you know the man like what Pythagoras right discovered the Pythagorean theorem this right so these virtues in some way kind of stand out for us and and wisdom is

[37:27] kind of more hidden isn't it true and we don't think of that as understanding because it comes so naturally we just don't even think about it being there right sure so I'm aware let's say the first time when I learned the Pythagorean theorem and First time you, you know, you did some of these things, but when did you first come to know that the whole is more than a part?

[37:47] It seemed like I always knew it, you know. I can. It comes so natural that you don't even aware of it. So I think Aristotle takes these three as being kind of more known to us, huh? Yeah, yeah. And these things are kind of more hidden, basically. So I think you know Thomas's way of dividing is is good too, though. I think they both they both, and I notice my own experience as a philosopher that it is possible sometimes to divide the same in more than one way, and actually both ways are what valid.

[38:23] Yeah, yeah, and they both kind of illuminate something. Oh, I see. Yeah. That's confusing. But I know, like, for example, in the beginning of logic, you know, when they talk about names said of many things, yeah, and sometimes Thomas will divide them into three. He says, when a name is said of many things, either you have exactly the same meaning in mind when said of each of them, or you have entirely different meanings when said of each of them, right?

[38:59] No connection, or you have something in between, right? Where they're partly the same and partly different, right? Yeah. Okay. So there he divides into three, right? How is it? Yeah. Now sometimes though he'll divide it into two. Either a name is said of many things with the same meaning in mind, or with other meanings in mind, right? Right. And then he'll subdivide the second, right, and say either entirely different, right?

[39:27] Sure. That's equivocal by chance, they call it. Or equivocal by reason. It's a connection, an order one. Oh, okay. I see where you are going with this. I see. Sometimes, therefore, he'll he'll call what you'll call analogous later on. You'll call that equivocal by reason, right? Other times, they use equivocal just for equivocal by chance. Then analogous is something in between. Analogous, okay. Yeah, so you can you can.

[39:54] I think both ways of dividing it are revealing, right? Sure. Yeah. So I think if you want two philosophy, you find some. Sometimes there are.

[40:16] But this is kind of striking, huh? It's yeah, very much kind of striking. But we notice both of them, in a sense, they're following the rule of two or three, aren't they? Yeah. Because they don't, you know, they divide it into two, yeah, and then subdivide one into two and three. So even one division is indeed two or three. Aristotle puts these three against these two, right?

[40:44] We met at the very beginning there when he talked about genus, species, difference, property, and accident. Right? We divided into three and two, and we subdivide those. And

[41:03] he said, "Wisdom is I beginning to understand the reality of God in a sense." I just got beginning of reality of God. Yeah. Well, one thing you find out about wisdom is that

[41:20] it not only goes the furthest as far as knowing causes; it goes all the way to the first causes of all things. First cause, God. But wisdom is also the most universal knowledge. Now, you remember we did the premium to wisdom. Remember that? Okay. As you go from sensation, memory, and experience towards episteme. You're going from the singular towards universal. Yes. Remember the two differences that he saw between experience on the one hand and art or science on the other hand.

[42:00] See, I remember that. Yeah, yeah. Well, the first difference he pointed out between experience on the one hand and art or science is that experience is still a knowledge of the singular or singulars. Why art or science is a knowledge of the what universal. Yes. Okay.

[42:26] Oh, yeah, something to do with okay. And then the second difference he pointed out is that experience is only a knowledge that it is so. By art or science, as it is perfected, is a knowledge of why it is so. Okay. That's interesting the way he proceeds to those two because he reasons from the first difference, right, to the man of experience sometimes succeeding better in doing something than the man of art or science.

[43:00] And the reason he gives is that what you do is always singular. Yeah. And so the man of experience is closer to the singular, and so the man who knows universal but doesn't know the singular so well, you might make a mistake because of that.

[43:19] And so I take example, you know, of how my wife was in the hospital there giving birth to the babies. They give them a certain after they come out and something a certain dose of something, you know, to kind of relieve their discomfort and pain, right? You know, they gave her the standard dose. She got you know these violent headaches from it. So then, when she gets in for the second child, she knew that that standard amount they give everybody was not right for her.

[43:47] So she said, "Just give you know, maybe give me half that amount, or whatever. It was half or something, and that would relieve her discomfort without giving her headaches. " So she, in a sense, was a better doctor or nurse of herself than the doctor or the nurse, right? See, because she knows herself, and it's not woman who you're trying to make comfortable, but this individual woman, right?

[44:11] Okay. And same way, you might you know, in psychology, as an example, right? You might not know all the kinds of depression, you know, and all the universal kinds of things that the psychologist would know, but you might know your own son or daughter or your own friend. And know what to say or do or suggest when they're a little bit down and out. You see. Yeah.

[44:45] So you might be a better psychologist for your son or some friend, right? Than the psychologist, right? Okay. But then it goes on to argue that art of science is superior because it knows why, and experienced really knows that is so, right? Yeah. But then I say you could kind of guess at that point that as you go forward, you are going in the direction of the what universal and towards the cause.

[45:13] So you might guess that at the end of our knowledge, where you have wisdom, you are going to have the most universal knowledge, right? And you are going to go as far as you can go at knowing the cause. you'll know the first cause. and you eventually find that out. That's what wisdom is. But that's also why wisdom can cast light upon the axioms, because

[45:36] the words in the axioms are especially the most universal words. like whole and part, and wisdom is the most universal knowledge. So those are the key words of wisdom too. So when wisdom or when the wise man sees if those words are equivocal by reason, he sees the need to distinguish their meanings, right? And so that helps them, you know, in wisdom, but also helps him to what understand the axioms more distinctly than the average person does, right?

[46:10] And also to defend them against objections that are based upon mixing up those senses, So again you realize that there's something kind of unique about wisdom, huh? Actually, when Thomas when Thomas grades these three virtues of looking reason, he puts of course wisdom on top, but he puts natural understanding above reason out understanding. Interesting. They say because natural understanding depends. I mean, reason out understanding depends upon natural understanding, right?

[46:42] Hmm. More certain, but wisdom in a sense is put on top because it perfects the whole. Yeah. So. Now there seems to be a real likeness in the supernatural order that St. Thomas says, like with the gift of understanding, we're able to penetrate the mysteries of our faith, which become the first principles of our supernatural knowledge. And wisdom perfects those first principles and the gift of knowledge; those two things, but the gift of knowledge doesn't seem to be perfectly tied in with this natural.

[47:24] Well, no, you've got to be careful about those words, you know, what they mean, you know, because the gift of the Holy Spirit is something different, but yeah, there is some connection among you know why the words are used, right? Yeah, they seem similar. I mean, so wisdom is going to be more concerned with the divine, right? That gift of the Holy Spirit. Yeah. That's why it's attached to what charity, right?

[47:46] Uh huh. Because the conformity of your heart with God by charity enables you to have a certain what experience of God, right? Right. And that's that, and it gives you a certain wisdom about God that the saint would have, huh? Okay. Why science is more tied up with with the creatures, huh? So why not? But the thing you have to be careful about is is is too that when you get to theology, say, or even to the faith, excuse me, you are getting a partaking of God's knowledge, right?

[48:28] And God's knowledge is one, huh? Yeah. So God's knowledge is is both what is primarily looking knowledge, huh? Because it is primarily a knowledge of himself, but it's also what eminently practical too. Oh yeah. See, but the United God in the way they're not here, so yeah. Excuse me, Doctor Burquist. Yeah. Can

[48:57] you possibly go back to um what you are saying? I mean, I guess maybe the other two brothers really went over this a lot, but the whole equivocal by reason, and you kind of went down to no. Okay. Let me erase the board. You can please show that. Thank you. I try to draw it, and it looks wrong.

[49:26] So. This is a division of of name, yeah. Said of many things, huh? Okay. Okay. Now, when I say many, I don't mean many as opposed to few. I mean many as opposed to one. Okay. Okay. Yeah. So it might be just two things, right? Okay, but more than one. Now, name said of many things

[50:01] with the same meaning in each case, right? Same. Yeah. Or with other meanings, right? I borrow the Latin words for that. If a name is said of many things with the same meaning in mind in each case, right? Yeah. Then it's being said univocally. Okay.

[50:34] If it's being said of many things with other meanings in mind, then it's being said what equivocally. Okay. But now, when you examine those meaning meanings, sometimes they have no connection. No connection. It just happened, however. It's at the same name was said of both, right? Like the word "bat," for example, of the baseball bat and the flying rodent, right? Okay. But sometimes there's a connection on the meanings, huh?

[51:08] Like, for example, the word "understanding" we had earlier in there, right? So, to distinguish by reason and by what chance, huh? Now, take an example of that, huh? Take the word "bat," for example, said of the baseball bat, right? Instead of the flying rodder, huh? I said the baseball bat, you know, and the flying rodent, flying mouse, as the Germans call it, flying mouse. Why should they both have the same name?

[51:48] No reason, really. I don't know, I took the dictionary. yeah. Okay, it just happens, right? Okay. Okay. It's like I have two students with the same name, right? Did someone look at you two guys say, "Hey, you got something in common with them? Okay. Yeah. Now, what about the word "see"? Instead of the act of the eye, right? And then instead of imagining, right? And then later on of understanding.

[52:14] Yeah. Is there? Is a reason, right? Sure. Why we say that, right? There's likeness between them, right? Now, what Aristotle's okay. Now, now there's another distinction that's very much like this, but you got to be kind of careful here. When we speak of a word as being what equivocal, right? Yeah. What that means is that it has many meanings, right? Okay. But even a word that is equivocal and has many meanings, it could be said univocally of many things.

[52:56] Okay. Let me give an example of that. If I say the word "bat" of three baseball bats here, yeah, then the word is being said univocally of those three, isn't it? Okay. See. Same meaning, right? Yeah. Well, if you just take the word "bat" from the dictionary, right? Yeah. You'd say it's equivocal. It can, you know, they give you one meaning of the word "bat," the baseball bat.

[53:15] meaning, the five rodents, maybe others, some other meanings are all I know. Yeah. Okay. You see that? Okay. Now, what Aristotle discovered was that

[53:29] the words used in the axioms, right, and used especially in wisdom, and therefore because of the universality used in some to some extent everywhere, like whole and part, he discovered that all those words were equivocal by reason. All the words. That the words used in the axioms, and especially in wisdom, right? Yeah. But because of universality, right, of them, to some extent in every science and art, right.

[54:03] Hmm. He discovered that those words are equivocal by reason. Hmm. That they have many meanings, but not by chance. Hmm. And so, what he attempted to do was to distinguish at least the central meanings of those words. Yeah. And therefore, he helped us in wisdom because you've got to use those words especially in wisdom, right? He helped us in all the sciences because they all use to some extent those words, right?

[54:35] Hmm. He's going to help us to understand the axioms more distinctly, right, and to defend them. Ah. So he killed three birds with one stone. So, so this is all the words of wisdom and the axioms, just those. Yeah, yeah, yeah. To some extent, they're used everywhere. Say. Okay. Say, would that? What about all the words of natural understanding? Is that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Natural understanding is of the axioms, yeah.

[54:59] Okay. Yeah. Now that's the cause of the most common error in our thinking, particularly those axioms misunderstanding. Yeah, yeah. The most common mistake in thinking is comes from mixing up the senses of a word, right? But Aristotle helped us to avoid being deceived everywhere by these words, and being deceived about the axioms by these sophists who use these. Yeah. And and and wisdom to proceed orderly. Yeah.

[55:27] Now you know I read the two famous statements here. I say, which of these statements is these statements true or false? If a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise. True or false? I

[55:44] don't know. It seems it's true, isn't it? I would say it's false. Okay, let's see. So I see. In other words, but now the next statement: If a man doesn't understand the words he uses, then he is not wise. True or false? That's true. Yeah. See, because wisdom doesn't consist chiefly and ultimately in knowing the meanings of words. No. No. No, obviously not. So that's why I say if a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise.

[56:23] That's not true. You know, that's not what wisdom is chiefly about. That's even not the perfection of wisdom, right? Okay, it's knowing God really. Yeah, yeah. I'd say if he doesn't even understand the words he uses, then he's not wise, right? You see, right? In fact, in fact, in fact, as I say, you know, if you understand plain geometry, then you understand solid geometry. True or false?

[56:48] It's not necessarily true. No. Okay. So it's false, right? Yeah. You know, but if you don't understand plain geometry, then you don't understand solid geometry. Okay. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. It's beautiful, you know. you know how Augustine saw through Faust right? You know, He realized that, He couldn't judge whether what Faust was saying about God and heavenly bodies was true or false, right? But he discovered that Faust didn't know the liberal arts.

[57:23] Oh. Because you can't, you can't be, you know, wise if you don't know these things. Oh. Right. So I remember about C. Deontay, what if Augustine didn't know the liberal arts? Right. You know what C. Deontay said his way to do? You see? Well, he was the Manichaean. Yeah, yeah, he was the

[57:45] great match of the Manichaeans, right? And he came there, and Augustine, you know. Talk to him, and then he begins. Begins suspicious of the man, right? Yeah. Augustine was underwhelmed. with it. Yeah, yeah. See, but but those is why I say what the modern philosophers they say, they say they're talking about a lot of things. You know, sometimes it's hard to to see exactly, you know, the mistakes that they're involved in, right?

[58:09] You see, but one thing else about the modern philosophers they don't know how to use words. So I say, I say, if a man doesn't understand the words he he uses, right, then he's not wise, right? The fact that Aristotle doesn't understand the words he uses is not enough to say he is wise, right? But if these guys don't understand the words they use, they can't be wise.

[58:34] You know, it's not this is the end all, the be all. It obviously isn't. But you don't even understand the words you're using. It's very interesting because the modern philosophers are so they're so into words in general, right? I mean, they're so focused on that's all there is. They don't even understand those. Yeah, yeah, yeah.