De Anima (On the Soul)
120. Summa I, Q.79 a.13: Conscience as an Act; Studiousness, Figures of Speech (Antonomasia, Synecdoche, Metonymy), and Emotions Ruled by Reason
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[0:00] Okay. To the thirteenth, one proceeds thus: It seems that conscience is a certain power. You know, we all use this word conscience even today, don't ya? And so Thomas has to take up what does this what does this really mean? Conscience, right? Is this some other power that's hidden inside of us that is, you know, or what is it? Well, conscience is going to be most properly an act, right?

[0:31] Okay. But we'll see what the objections say first. For Origen says that conscience is the what? Corrector of the spirit, I guess, huh? And a pedagogue, right? As a companion of the soul, by which it is separated from bad things and adheres to what good things, right?

[0:56] Or maybe spirit to us is what? Not in the genitive there, but it's a spirit that is a corrector of us, right? I think it's referring to the holy guardian angels. Yeah, well, we'll see what Thomas. But spiritus in the soul names some what power, or it names the mind itself. It names the what immaterial part of the soul, or rather, the part of the soul that has powers that are not in the what body, right?

[1:25] Huh. Has understanding and will. Be renovated in the spirit of your what mind. Yeah, that's right. Sometimes it means the imagination. That's another power we have. Whence an imaginary vision is called spiritual, right? Huh. Mm-hmm. It is clear through Augustine, the twelfth book in Genesis, to the letter. Mm-hmm. Therefore, conscience is a certain power.

[1:58] Moreover, nothing is the subject of sin except some power of the soul. But conscience is the subject. of sin. Sin, for it is said in the Epistle to Titus, I guess, chapter one, verse fifteen, about some things, that their mind and conscience are what stained, shall we say, huh? Or the other translation, inquinatae. Defiled. Yeah, defiled, stained. Yeah. Therefore, it seems that conscience is a power. Moreover, it is necessary that conscience be either an act or a habit or a power.

[2:41] But it is not an act because then it would not always remain in man. You lose conscience, and you're not thinking. Nor is it a habit, huh? For then conscience would not be one thing but many, because through many habits we are directed in things to be done. Right. Therefore, conscience must be a power.

[3:13] But against this is that people sometimes what set aside their conscience huh Mm-hmm. You find Shakespeare's characters sometimes talking about that. You know, anybody wants to to prosper this world, right? He'll set aside his conscience. You know, when he's urging somebody, you know, to do some some action that's going to be financially rewarding, but is not a good thing or a just thing to do, right? Mm-hmm.

[3:37] But one doesn't set aside a power. Therefore, conscience is not a power. So Thomas wants me to kind of clear up how this word is is used or should be used. I answer: It should be said that conscience, properly speaking, is not a power but an act. And this is clear both from the what

[4:03] the ratio of the name, right? Huh? From the structure of the name itself, you might say. And also from those things which, according to the common way of speaking, are attributed to conscience.

[4:16] For conscience, according to the what, proprietate vocabuli So he's saying there, right? Mm. Yeah. If you examine the word itself and its structure, right, con, which means what? With, right. Mm-hmm. And scientia, with knowledge, right? Huh. Okay.

[4:40] What implies the order of knowledge to something, right? For conscientia is said. He should the Latin to see what he's saying here. Cum alio scientia, right? Huh. Okay.

[5:01] There, but the application of science to something comes about through some what act, right? Whence in the very let's say structure of the name, it is clear that conscience is a what act. Mm-hmm. He's not speaking of it as being what an ability, right, or even as knowledge as such, right? Being habitual knowledge, but it's with knowledge, right? Right. It's like something where you're doing something with knowledge, right?

[5:34] And therefore, you're applying the knowledge that you have to something. Okay. And therefore, it seems to name from the what privateness of the speech itself, right? For the word itself to be naming an act, right? More than a habit or a power, huh? Mm-hmm. The same thing appears in those things which are attributed to conscience, for conscience is said to what? To testify, to bind, to instigate one to do something, or to what?

[6:15] Accuse one, right? Or remordere huh? What it means is what? To bite again, huh? Okay. Or to reprehend. We often speak of what in English? My conscience bothers me about this, right? Okay.

[6:39] But all of these, he says, follow upon the application of some knowledge or science to those things which we what? Do, yeah. Okay. So we might recall the Ten Commandments or something even more particular than that, right? Huh? And then we wonder about something we've done, right? Huh? Okay. And our conscience is bothered, huh?

[7:17] Which application takes place in three ways, huh? In one way, according as we recognize that we have done something or what? Not done it, right? According to that of Ecclesiastes seven verse twenty three.

[7:39] But your conscience, right, knows that you've what? Spoken badly of others, is it not? And according to this, conscience is said to what? Testify, right? You've done something, right?

[7:59] Not done something. I've killed a man, right? Okay. I haven't paid my taxes. I haven't studied for the exam. In another way, is applied according as to our conscience, we judge something ought to be done or should not be done, right?

[8:36] And according to this, conscience is said to what? Instigari, huh? How did you translate that? To initiate something, huh? Or ligari which would probably be to bind, right? Okay.

[8:58] Thou shalt not commit adultery, right? Thou shalt not steal, right? Thou shalt not bear false witness, huh? But honor your father and mother, right? Huh? Okay. We might use the word "bind" in both senses, maybe actually English. I'm bound to honor my father and mother, right? Yeah. But I'm bound, you know, by the, you know, commandment not to steal or commit adultery or to bear false witness, right?

[9:43] The third way is applied according as the conscience we judge that something that has been done, right, has been done well or not done well, right? Huh? Okay. Kind of funny the way the word "factum" in Latin sometimes takes on the sense of what not something made, like "facture," right? But but a deed, right? Yeah. And

[10:10] and we kind of generalize the word, but that's the word "fact" means really originally, huh? Something like English word "what deed," right? Huh? Indeed, that is so. In fact, it is so. They

[10:32] make a kind of adverb out of "indeed," there, right? And we apply it to even things other than deeds, don't we? Indeed, two is half a four.

[10:45] Kind of shows the the use of the word going back to the practical. And according to this, conscience is said to what? Excuse, right? Huh? Or to accuse, right? Or to what? Actually, means to bite again, huh? Remordere. R. E. Is again to bite again, huh? Torment. What? How do they translate? Yeah, yeah. Well, since it is that, yeah. Because I never thought of this. Yeah. I said, "Rushing Irving has a story of the Italian man.

[11:23] There, he's he killed somebody under other fit of passion, you know. Kind of a kind of a horrible story, you know, the Italian revenge stories, right? But the guy was he was all engaged to this girl, right? They love each other very much, and they're about to get married, right? But before they can get married, he's called back to his hometown because his father is in ill health, right?

[11:50] And so he goes home, and he's writing the girl, right? This other guy is inter intercepting the letters, right, and changing them, right. And finally, you know, he tricks the girl into thinking that the young man has died, right? And so he picks her up in the rebound and marries her. The other guy comes back, and you know, he's expecting, you know, enough happiness in the union with the girl.

[12:18] And in some of the discussions going on, and should have patiently stabs the guy and kills him. Well, then, you know, he's he's being tormented. You know, he can't he can't

[12:35] live with himself, so to speak, right? And of course, of course, when when Irving first meets the man, the way he writes the story, of course, he knows the man is suffering something. So he's looking over his shoulder, so just make like, and when the police go to tap him, you know, and so on. But finally, he he he decides to turn himself in. You know, he he writes a letter with our friend to tell him what had happened. You know, but they try to go back and confess to the crime and do what they want to do to him, but he's being bitten by his conscience, huh?

[13:11] I forget as one of these novels of of Charles Dickens, you know, where a man has committed a murder, and it's a little different there. But

[13:21] he's the body has not been found yet, right? And and he's constantly thinking, you know, about is he going to see the newspaper? You know that they found a body, or someone say, "Hey, did you find out that body?" You know, he's trying to keep himself guarded, you know, to be calm when the news is announced, right? But it really kind of makes you kind of see the the situation of a man who's done something like that, and he would want to repeat such a an act, you know, in such a similar situation.

[13:54] Now Thomas admits here, though, in the last paragraph, that sometimes we apply the name to the habit to habit, right? Because, however, habit is the principle or the source of an action, right? Sometimes the name of conscience is attributed to the what first natural habit in the practical reason, namely synderesis that we talked about here in the previous one. See, these two articles are together, right? Huh?

[14:21] Because conscience, properly speaking, names what an act, right? Huh? Yeah. Where you're you're by this natural understanding in the practical reason, you see that something should be done or something should not be done, right? Huh? I should honor my father, mother. I should not steal. Um, but sometimes the word conscience, you know, is almost used as a what synonym for that synderesis, right? Huh? Okay. Okay.

[14:58] As Jerome says in the gloss of Ezekiel, there huh he calls synderesis what conscience there, right? I think we tend to use that. What do we mean? Usually, say conscience in English. What do we mean? Yeah, we usually think of the rule. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[15:23] But see, a lot of times when he says somebody has no conscience, you know, what do you mean by that, Fossey? You don't mean he doesn't have that syndereesis there. He naturally has that. Using it or applying. He's not applying it. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. See, and as he sets aside that act, right? Huh?

[15:45] See, when a man chooses something, you know, to steal some money, or he chooses adultery, something like this, he doesn't choose it because it's unjust and wrong, right? Huh? Right. You see, he's thinking it's being pleasant, or it's going to increase the money in his bank account, or something of this sort, right? And so he he doesn't apply the knowledge that he has, right?

[16:11] It's a bit like you know when you have a kid who's a bully or something, you know, and you try to make the kid realize, now what would you do if someone did this to you, right? And so, and you're trying to make him apply some knowledge he does have, right? He's not applying. And Basil calls it the what? Naturale iudicatorium huh And of course, in my footnote here it gives the Greek words of Basil, huh, criterion, right?

[16:43] Which is to be translated by iudicatorium physikon right? huh? Because physikon means natural in Greek. Physis in Greek means nature, huh? So it's this natural judgment, right? Reason as nature, but reason as perfected by synderesis or synderesis itself. And Damascene says that is the law of our understanding, right? For it's customary that cause and effect are named what? To each other, huh? Or by each other. Do they give Damascenes?

[17:25] Mm-hmm? Do they give Damascenes Greek words? Um, no, I guess it's the reference here to De Fide Orthodox. Oh, maybe he did he write in Latin? Well, it'd be in Greek, I would think, wouldn't it? That's my thought. Yeah. It's an MG, huh? That's. Oh yeah, that would be Greek. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[17:52] Yeah. The one from Basil's MG too, yeah. Okay. The first objection. I'm taking the words of origin there. The word spirit there. The first, therefore, it should be said that conscience is called spirit, according as what? Spirit is placed for the mind, because it is a certain what? Saying, right, dictamen of the mind, huh? Okay. Did you ever read Shakespeare's famous play, "there, Richard III? That's the play that St.

[18:42] Thomas More is the one of the sources, huh? St. Thomas Moore wrote a life of Richard the Third, right, huh? And the Richard the Third there. On the night before the final battle, there at Bosworth Field, there he has a dream, and all the people he's killed and murdered, right, are coming back and saying, "We're praying for your opponent, right? " It was Henry Tudor, the founder of the Tudor dynasty, and

[19:13] so it's a famous words there. Conscience makes cowards of us all, right? You see, at night time, when you're kind of, you know, cut your guard down, the dream there, right? You realize what he's done, right?

[19:30] Richard loves Richard. That is, I am I. He says, "Okay, Richard loves Richard. That is, I am I. " But does he really love himself when he's done all these evil things,

[19:42] right? So this is looking back now to what he said in the last paragraph, right? That sometimes the conscience is used not for the act itself, though that's what most properly means, right? But the habit of natural understanding, right, or reason itself, right, which has that act, right, because sometimes causes and effects, he says, are named from each other.

[20:27] Now, to the second, it should be said that's the one about the conscience being what stained, or you had translated it different than you stained, defiled, yeah. He says, "Staining is said to be in conscience, not as in a subject, but just as something what known is in the in knowledge, right? "

[20:54] Insofar as someone knows himself to be what stained or defiled, huh? But the use of the words there. huh? When you speak that way in English, you might speak that way sometimes, huh? It's going to say you've got a bad conscience. You see that Sure. Yeah. Yeah. Actually, conscience is good, isn't it? Right, because I'm conscious of something bad in me, right? Right.

[21:58] Am I doing anything to correct myself? You know. When I was explaining Shakespeare, a large discourse, right? Well, the discourse itself is said to be large, right? That's one way of understanding it. The discourse is long. Another sense is that the object of discourse is large. Okay.

[22:31] Okay. Okay. The third one is saying, well, is necessary that conscience be either an act or a habit or a power, but is not an act because then would not always remain in man, nor is it a habit for there. are. Many habits; it then not be something one, because there are many habits that direct us in acting. Therefore, it must be a power. And the third, he says that acts, although they always what, remain in its do not always remain in itself or by itself.

[23:18] It remains nevertheless always in its cause, right, which is the power and the what habit, right? For the habit from which conscience is informed, although there are many habits, nevertheless all of them have the efficacy from one first habit, which is the habit of first principles, which is called synderesis Whence, as I said in the part of the article, in particular, this habit is sometimes called what conscience, right?

[23:54] Okay. So the Ten Commandments, all of them, for most of them at least, would seem to belong to what synderesis huh? It's interesting, huh? In the book called the Topics in English, but it's a book about places. Aristotle's book about dialectical reasoning, right? He has a place where he's talking about what dialectical problem is, and he excludes some things from being dialectical problem. And he gives a couple examples there.

[24:43] One is, if a man is in doubt whether snow is white, he says he doesn't need an argument; he needs sensation, right? Okay. He says, if he's in doubt whether he should honor his father. father and mother, he says, right? He doesn't need an argument. He says he needs punishment. He'll be whipped. Yeah, Who says this? Aristotle. Oh, see, that's kind of interesting, right? Yeah. Because he takes honor your father and mother as something that everybody actually knows, right?

[25:18] And so that if you don't, you know, if you're if you're questioning that, right, then you know it's not the question of your ignorance, but of your being a bad person. And therefore, you're in need of being punished. It's kind of striking, right? Yeah.

[25:36] Interesting too, in terms of another commandment, there adultery, right? When Aristotle's talking about the moral virtues in the ethics, and he says he shows that moral virtue is in the middle, right, between two extremes, right. One which is too much, one is too little, and so he defines moral virtue as a habit, right, existing in the middle, right, towards us is determined by right reason and so on.

[26:08] But then he goes on to point out that there is no mean of the extreme. Okay, now what does that mean? Well, somebody might come and say, "Well, if you do something either too much or too little, you know, then it's okay. " So, if I am drinking wine, let's say, right? If I drink too much, that's bad, right? I drink too little on the occasion, right?

[26:40] Let's say that could be bad too, huh? But now, what about getting drunk? Say, well, you apply the same thing there. If I get drunk too much, that's bad. If I get not not enough drunk, that's bad. If I get drunk just the right amount, well, no, no, see, because to be drunk already involves in the meaning of the word, right? That you've gotten to excess, right?

[27:10] You see, okay, okay. The same way, you know, you take murder. Is a virtue to neither murder too much nor too little, but just the right amount? You see, no. So Aristotle saying, "You say, you know, to murder, you are already involving an extreme, right? Okay, so there is no mean, " he says, "of the extreme that would be virtuous, right? " But the example he gives is that of adultery.

[27:38] He says, "Is it as an obvious example, right? That any adultery is is is wrong, right? It's not a question of not committing adultery too much or too little, just the right amount, but any of it, right? " See, so it seems that you know Aristotle kind of knows the Ten Commandments, you know, especially the the ones referring to your neighbor, right? Huh? Starting with honor your father and mother, right?

[28:09] That he's not going to argue about that, right? He's going to say you just need punishment for that. Here he says, you know, any adultery is bad, huh? So, was he in an environment where there is a lot of adultery? Do we know anything about that time? Well, I may not know if it's moralist in our time. There is, you know, just because we had a president who's been adultery.

[29:01] Now you can use these words more correctly, maybe than you used them before. So, what? Listen, what the great Heraclitus is saying, though, he says

[29:16] wisdom is to speak the truth, right, and to act in accord with nature, right, giving ear there too, right? So he's kind of saying that there's something natural whereby we're supposed to not only judge the truth, right, but also judge what we should do or not do. We have to admire those fragments that we have from Heraclitus, you know.

[29:47] So, much wisdom in them. Heraclitus likes to sometimes, you know, speak in a paradoxical way, huh? Because his fragment begins with, he says, "Moderation is the greatest virtue, " right? And you say, "Well, one time I gave a lecture, you see, on that, and I said, well, Now, this is paradoxical because the Greeks would all regard what courage as a greater virtue than what moderation, and even justice as a greater virtue than moderation.

[30:26] '" So how can you know he's saying something that seems to be what false and contrary to what we'd say, right? I say it's said in a sentence. Right? He says moderation is the greatest virtue, and wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accordance with nature, giving ear there too. Well, all three of these things—wisdom, and nature, and truth—they're all said to be what modest.

[30:58] Like what's his name says, Kent there in King Lear. All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more nor clipped, but so. Or in Hamlet, or stiff not the modesty of nature,

[31:22] Like. was it Macduff says there in Macbeth, modest wisdom plucks me from credulous haste, signifying that these three key words are wisdom, nature, truth. They're all characterized by what modesty, by moderation.

[31:47] Of course, the virtues that dispose us for the life of the mind are virtues like humility, which are kind of modesty, right, and. Studiousness, which is kind of moderation of the desire to know,

[32:04] mildness, which is important the life. of the mind. Okay, now he's going to start going into the desiring powers. Now, so we're looking at question eighty here, articles one and what two next time, okay? And then you'll go into the sense powers in particular. I mean, the sense desire powers, and then you'll go into what the will after that, and then talk about free will, the judgmental.

[32:37] Okay, and then starting at eighty four, he'll be going into the acts of reason in great detail, right? But the acts of the will and the emotions in great detail. He leaves that to the second part where he takes up moral matter.

[32:54] So, I guess we got a lot of interesting things here. to. learn About yeah yeah now what does studiousness all entail that you well studiousness studiositas is the name of the virtue that moderates the desire to know moderates the most people don't think of that because they're thinking the fact that students are lazy right but man has a natural desire to know right and that desire to know has to be ordered and moderated huh so you don't go and spend your time on unimportant things huh

[33:36] that's the sense of people do for most part huh yeah you know what's his name Saint Albert the Great there you know I'm sure you used to have a little passage from Albert the Great there in one of his books where Albert says you know if you study these lower things for some other reason than to be able to study God right you have a perverse attitude towards knowing right unless he says you'd be forced to it by some kind of what necessity right huh okay so I mean the doctor might study the body for the sake of what necessity of health yeah but in terms simply of wonder right if you're pursuing knowledge out of wonder simply to know right

[34:24] well there are some things that are very important to know before you can know God right they're very necessary to know before you can know God and yet it takes a long time to understand those things right and if you don't concentrate upon those things just let yourself study anything you're not going to ever get to a knowledge of God are you yeah

[34:48] and then I could go and I was talking to a historian here from Worcester State three years ago you know and he's talking about how you go to a you know a convention of historians right yeah what's your what's your field huh well he says American history then, you know you know which which which century right right right you know you don't think American history stays some century right Yeah yeah you say you're in the 19th century well which decade is it yeah that that you're that you're you know and if you to the 1880s and say well and what what aspect of the 1880s has been your field of concentration

[35:37] There's a joke about this you know, we're learning more and more about less and less oh so eventually we know everything about nothing I mean but no you can spend your your life studying the 1880s right sure you see and

[35:59] Again, I could I could spend my life reading novels, right? No, it's amazing how many novels coming out every year, right? Sure. And all these detectives, you know, whodunits, you know, they're all these different detectives that they invented, you know. Well, maybe we should read a little bit of this, maybe maybe Sherlock Holmes or something like that. But you can't read all these guys, you can spend the rest of your life reading whodunits, right?

[36:30] You see, and I'll never get to know God by reading whodunit, right? And so, I mean, there is certain you have to moderate your desire to know those things. Yeah. I mean, you might might read a little literature there to relax, sure. Maybe Shakespeare is a little more than relaxing, but. Then

[37:03] we have to do things in the proper order, too. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you know, I was talking to you about just something, you know, like synecdoche, right? You know how important it is to understand what synecdoche is, right? How many people talk about the Bible without, you know, reflecting on the fact that they're speaking antonomastically, and and and why this is called the you know the book, right?

[37:40] Most people don't even haven't even heard the word antonomasia, have they? Nope I never heard. it until I came here. But the word Bible, the word Gospel, the word Christ—they're all what examples of speaking antonomasia. Does that start with an A or an O? Yeah, I'll get it on the board here. if I can make myself clear here

[38:10] See, you might want to find it in a small dictionary, like my collegiate dictionary. You won't find it there. Maybe a big one. If you go to the library, they have the the Oxford Dictionary of English Language in several volumes. That's the kind of the ultimate word, I guess. Well, you're going to see the word antonomasia there, right? Yeah. And you'll see also there antonomastic. you see, which should be the adjective form.

[38:39] Yeah. And you'll see the word antonomastically. Right. Should be the the adverbial form, I think, on the adverb, right? Uh huh. Now, in Thomas Aquinas, I'll see. I, you know, the antonomasia at the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles. He's talking about truth. antonomastice that'd be the adverbial form in Latin, right? Um antonomasia there is, of course, the word you're going to use the most.

[39:17] And what is Antonomasia, right? It's either giving the the general name to one particular, right? Or it's giving the particular, in place of the general, right? Okay,

[39:43] what's his difference now? Let's see. Okay, so if I say that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of Living God, Christ means actually anointed, right? Okay. Now, as Thomas will explain, the word Christ is being said, or anointed, to use the English word, is being said of Christ by way of Antonomasia. Can you explain how in the Old Testament you'll quote certain passages, but kings and priests, especially, but also sometimes prophets, were anointed, right?

[40:20] Okay. So Christ is a king and a priest and a prophet, but he he's he's a king of kings, right? He is the teacher, right? Yeah. He is the priest of priests, you might say, right? Sure. Okay. We sometimes think of a Catholic priest as a altar priest, right? Okay. The Christ is, you know, you read Epistle to the Hebrews right? Priest of Christ. you see, he is the priest, right?

[40:50] So this common name that anointed, right, is said of Christ in particular by Antonomasia, right? Is the anointed one, okay? But now, if I say, you know, about somebody, he's a Romeo or a Casanova, right? Right. Or a Don Juan, or sometimes

[41:16] they call somebody a Hamlet. You know, he's if he's what kind of hesitant, slow to act, something like that you know? Yeah. You take someone who kind of stands out, right? And so we've been hitting the ball at the ballpark. You know, here's Babe Ruth, right? Yeah. Okay.

[41:47] But more commonly there in Scripture, let's say, you have the one where the what the name of the general is applied to particular. Now Plato talks about that. He doesn't use the word Antonomasia, I don't think, but he talks about this way of speaking. In the symposium, right? Or the Greek word, the Greek word example, poet, right? It comes from the Greek word "poiein," which is the common word to make.

[42:16] So a poet means what? A maker. And Ben Jonson the English dramatist his little thing on poetry, he alludes to that, right? Okay. For some reason, among all makers, the Greeks admired the what? The man who made epics, or you know. Okay. As higher than, and because we kind of think of that, we think Shakespeare as being more outstanding than a cook or a carpenter or a housebuilder or something like that, right?

[42:45] You know. So he's called the maker. That's what it means, the poet, right? And then because in the symposium we talk about love, so we tend to call the romantic lover a lover. Right, huh? If you're a lover of wisdom, we don't call you a lover, right? Okay. But but lover, we tend to use that for manic love. Somehow, this people stand out by their their absurd behavior and so on.

[43:17] So it kind of deals with the universal whole. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, it's no, it's you're you're giving the name the universal whole to the part, right? Right. Or vice versa, right? Okay. Now, synecdoche um is the other kind,

[43:35] Synecdoche. You'll find this word in the beginning. It's, D O C H E. Now synecdoche is with the other kind of whole, the more known kind of whole and part. The composed whole in its part, right?

[43:57] So he's a brain, huh? Okay. Or I've seen times you know this guy comes in you know that all he does is is kick the ball right. And then we're meant to kick the field goal or to kick the? Yeah, yeah, yeah. kick the extra point after touchdown. Yeah. So you might s- call him they call they call it the toe, right? They call it the toe, right?

[44:18] You never miss it, right? Do the toe, grow. See, so you call somebody a brain or or the toe, you're thinking, right? So you might call somebody a bicep, you know, or something like that, you know, because he's he's always working out, you know, and he's you know, high biceps, you know. But it, you know, you want to emphasize for some reason that part, right? Yeah. But the most famous example in scripture is when when Saint John says, "And the Word was made flesh," right?

[44:48] Okay. Instead of saying that he became man, right? Right? He was made man. He says he was made flesh. Do you want to say, well, why why do they emphasize that part? Because that's not the best part, of us isn't it? But he went all the way down to flesh, right, to the bodily part, assuming even that. The heretics, you know, they misunderstand that, and they say, "Well, some of them say that the word became flesh; it even turned into flesh."

[45:20] Which of course, is, um, one serious mistake. But others- others say they didn't have a human soul in place of the soul was the word, right? Saying that I guess Arius and people like that. So they misunderstand the figure of speech being used there, right? Okay. Now you know Thomas will often say, "Some scripture will say, you know, you know, talking this to you, all flesh must come, right?

[45:49] " Say, but other times, you know, it'll cause cause souls, right? You know. So there's certainly a reason why we emphasize this part, right? And I suppose to you know just to say to you all flesh must come, I suppose we emphasize the the fragile part of man, right? The fact that man is mortal and so on, right?

[46:11] But but that's a synecdoche, right? Where where it's to say man, you say flesh, right? And that's the same synecdoche, the same word there in the Gospel of Saint John, right? Yeah. There's another one you went over that I don't sure I understand totally either. Metonymy. Yeah, yeah. You see, metonymy. You know, we don't really have a um, a good treatise of these things. Metonym, and the name of the figure of speech would be metonymy.

[46:48] And here we have a name for the figure of speech plus the name for the name itself, called a metonym, right? Here we just have a name for the figure of speech. Okay.

[47:02] Now I think the metonym and metonymy is used for both giving the name of the cause to the effect or vice versa, right? But also the container and the contained, transferring one name from the other. So you know, if we say

[47:30] let the earth bless the Lord, right? Sometimes I understand as a metonym, right? Meaning those in the what on the earth, right? Bless the Lord, right? Or we speak of this is a wicked place. Well, the place is not wicked. But those in the place are wicked, right? Or we say this is a bad time, right? I had a bad time.

[48:01] Well, the time itself is not bad, right? But the events contained in this time were bad, right? Okay. White House spoke I think you gave that example. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The White House announced today, right? Meaning the man in the White House, right? See, you see the White House. you have what? antonomasia Oh yeah, well. White House means the what? President's house, right? Yeah. See, Even though I live in the White House, myself, right?

[48:41] Hmm. But if you know, if you turn the radio on and said, you know, the White House was bombed today by terrorists, you sure wonder what happened to my house? You know, I got a White House too, you know. Yeah. You know, they wouldn't be saying that, though. See, everybody would understand that they mean the president's house, right? My answer. Okay, Well, when you say the White House announced today.

[49:01] You got another figure of speech because the House didn't say anything, but the man in the House, right? What about cause to effect? Yeah, yeah, that famous words there in Hamlet. there, I mean, in Romeo where, he says, "Loving hate or hating love," right?

[49:25] Well, you know, you know, the the love could be a cause of some kind of hate, can't it? See? Right, well, if I love the girl, and someone else loves her, so we're in competition, right? I hate, you know, or if I love my country, I might hate the country that is the enemy of my country, right? So it's a a hating love, and saying you know the effect of the what cause or vice versa.

[50:09] Oh, okay. I think you gave scornful pride too last time. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The poets use these things a lot too. You see in the rhetorician. I think some of these names came in from the rhetoricians, that's why they're not named so well. You know, Philosophers didn't name these things the rhetoricians did. There's no treatise on metonymy. You know, there's nothing written about this thing. Well, I mean, you'll see Thomas sometimes in in the scriptural commentaries.

[50:42] You know, he'll mention this is a metonymy, right? Yeah. So you get a little bit of the doctrine of that, you know. You find in the rhetoricians sometimes there's a discussion of these things, but it's not though, is that perfect, you know.

[50:59] So, I mean, you can learn, you know, the doctrine about metonymy and synecdoche in Thomas's scriptural commentaries. Oh yeah Yeah, But you probably should have learned it when you first read poetry, right? I seem to vaguely recall. running across it See. Shakespeare's first sonnet. There, he says, "From fairest creatures we desire increase, right? That thereby beauties rose might never die. " I mean, what's he saying there?

[51:38] That beauties rose. He's talking about human reproduction, right? huh? From fairest creatures we desire increase. huh? Okay. That thereby beauties rose might never die, but he's talking about what? You know, he's trying to urge somebody to to marry, right? Huh? Because their beauty is not going to last, right? And therefore, we've got to what? Reproduce it, right? Huh? Okay. So,

[52:19] he's talking about human beauty, but he's calling it beauty, right? Well, that's a metonym, right? If we say about the girl, she's a beauty, right? Mm-hmm. And we're talking, we're applying the what? The common word beauty to human beauty, right? Okay. Then he speaks of beauty's rose. He's kind of doing, in a sense, the reverse, isn't he? You know, as if the rose is is beauty. Yeah.

[52:50] You see, but but it's not a particular beautiful thing, right? Okay. But but it it's very striking the line, right? From fairest creatures we desire increase, thereby beauty's rose might never die, as as the riper should by time decease his tender heir might bear his memory.

[53:14] My my my daughter, my wife ran across this little baby picture of my daughter, you know, Ria, and so she put it up there on the bookcase, there next to Ria's own first daughter, you know. Yeah. And because the light is there, you know.

[53:34] So beauty is the perfection of youth, Well, well, yeah, that that's that's another point Aristotle's making there in the ethics there when he's talking about pleasure, but pleasure perfects operation the way beauty perfects youth, right? That's another point he's making here. And Shakespeare seems to have a double, a double, antonomasia there. he speaks of beauty's rose, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[54:03] Because beauty is a metonym for human beauty, right? And rose is a metonym. I mean, excuse me, is antonomasia and and from the general, right? For the particular, and then but rose is the reverse, right? From the particular to the general. Yeah. yeah.

[54:29] Shakespeare does these things so spontaneously, you know. it's kind of hard to catch up with him, you know. When we were looking before at memory, and we saw how memory was a habit, and not. No, power. We talked about memories of power before, right? The four inward senses, right? Okay, I'm confused now. Yeah, you know, you have four inward senses there. One was called the common sense, right?

[55:10] Which is like the common terminus of all the outward senses, and this is how we know the difference. We sense the difference between sweet and white. The outward senses can't do that. Right. Because the sight doesn't know both, and the sense of taste doesn't know both, right? Yeah. But but the common sense, and then the imagination, in the way he's using the word, right, retains what the common sense has apprehended, huh?

[55:39] But there's another power, which in the animals is called the estimated power, but in us the cogitative power, a little higher thing, which perceives something in the sensible that you don't sense. So when an animal. You know, sees that something is to be eaten or to be avoided, or it's an enemy, right? Okay. I was mentioning that little cat, you know, that that seemed to react to the to the belt, right?

[56:04] Because it seemed, yeah, you know. And the bird that recognizes twig is something to be used, right? To build its nest, right? Is useful for its nest, right? That's that's the estimative power, and then the memory, which what? In his use of the word, there, right? Remembers, yes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It retains that, right? Now, can that grow? I mean, because now there's stuff, you know, instinctively estimative power, but there's also things that they we learn, like the dog, you know, if you you know you kick it or someone's, mean you know it remembers that.

[56:42] Yeah. Yeah. Would that be a form of almost like expanding this estimative power? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But maybe you were referring to the intellectual memory with the passive intellect of being a habit. We just saw article seven. That's what we just did. I thought we had the question that it wasn't memory wasn't another intellective memory. Oh, oh, oh! yeah, oh I see what you mean the memory, yeah, the reason yeah, yeah, yeah.

[57:12] " that's true. yeah Okay, I was talking about the sense of power, yeah. Yeah, so that's the power. Yeah. Yeah. Then this one, but this one, because there's a question with Augustine, because there seemed to be some that thought Augustine was saying that that was. Yeah, Thomas, you know, doesn't understand Augustine that way, right? Okay, but but I was I what I was thinking of it. It seems like you could see the confusion of when we're talking about between habit and power.

[57:41] Yeah. Um, if because we saw the habit was a perfection of a power. Mhm. Um, so you could see how it could be confused as a power. Yeah. Yeah. Mhm. Um, but that's kind of interesting now that we think of it, though that the two memories—one is a power, and one's just one's a. Okay, perfection of a power. The habit feels like a disposition of the power, right?

[58:13] Whereby it's disposed well or badly to the nature of the thing or to its act. I do it. Yeah. Let's see. I'm now. I'm trying to think now. Why would the sense memory be another power instead of something? Well, he went back to the character of the body. See that what is, uh, what receives easily, right? In material things, doesn't retain well, right? What retains well doesn't receive well, right?

[58:47] Oh yeah. So he sees a difference there in the. This particular reason that almost seems like reasons involved. I mean, yeah, it is. There's influence there, yeah. The same with getting the emotions. You see, the emotions in us are what are

[59:31] by nature they're apt to obey reason to some extent, right? Say, okay, but they have to be habituated to obey reason to to be perfected. You see, and therefore the emotions in us are more are more elevated than they are in the other animals, huh? So the particular reason, kind of the our reason directs our estimative power to come up with conclusions. So yeah, yeah, you can see the influence of the universal reason on it, yeah.

[1:00:00] Oh, I thought it was just like you see the influence of the will and reason upon the emotions, huh? So when we talk about particular reason, we're not limiting that totally to a sense power. It partakes of reason. Yeah, yeah. The same with the emotions. See, the emotions are something bodily, but they partake of reason. Ah,

[1:00:22] listen to Mozart's music. You can see how he represents the emotions as partaking of reason. I kept wondering how the general 18th century does that. Romantic period doesn't do that so much. Romantic doesn't want to accept the the emotions should be ruled by reason, you know. Aristotle, you know, makes a very subtle distinction there that the reason should rule the emotions as a father rules his son, not like the master rules his what slave, huh?

[1:00:59] So you see, the son has something to do, something to say about what he should do in life, right? And the father has to listen to the son, right? At the same time, he has to direct the son. The slave doesn't have any choice of what he does, right? Just does what the master tells him to do.

[1:01:19] So does that mean sometimes we should give in our reason and have hot fudge sundaes and that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you see, you see, the father is ruling the master. The master is ruling the slave for the good of the master. Right, the father is ruling the son for the good of the son.

[1:01:35] Okay, and so the the rule of reason over the emotions is for the good of the emotions. And people whose emotions are not. Moderated and directed in some way by reason, they're emotionally what distraught, you know.

[1:01:59] You see, it was you know, either emotional sense they're not pleased, right? You see, distraught, you know, people get all jagged from their emotions, all

[1:02:17] kinds of ways, emotionally upset in various ways, huh? Mm-hmm. I told you I was traveling to Quebec there one time, right? Went through Maine, you know, and the route to President Kennedy they called it, you know, it was a lousy road. between that to President Kennedy It had potholes and everything. like that. I was driving along kind of slowly because you know I was putting the brakes on something all the time.

[1:02:48] This French guy behind me, you know, he got impatient, you know, so he goes roaring by me, you know, and he kicked up a stone, you know, and I could hear it when it hit the side of the car. I knew it. left. a Mark, It was a new car, you know. So I didn't. Next time I stopped, it's McDonald. You know, it was Mark there, you know. I'm a philosopher, I'm gonna get excited.

[1:03:06] about that. Like, like, uh you know, like excited about that, anyway, you know. One time I was driving to Assumption, right, and it was kind of this. The way the road had been set up before it changes now, but it's kind of a basically a cross or a cross. And the guy in front of me was hesitating, you know, you know, because waiting for a turn to go through, right?

[1:03:32] And so I'm behind him, like this, you know, like that. So I can see this car coming behind me. This young lady and I can see her. I don't think she's gonna, you know. I brace myself. bam! She hit my car. Oh, enough to push me into the car in front of us. Oh, so you got three cars now. Oh, lined up, and they couldn't actually drive their cars after this.

[1:03:53] I was still able to drive my car and drive them down to a place we could call for help, you know. Then I proceeded to my to school. The car nicked me all the way. Oh no! So I went and taught my classes as usual, you know. I'm not always that calm, but what can you do about it, you know? Yeah. Voluntary excuse. Voluntary excuse. For the first time, I went to the hospital, you know, for the first baby, right?

[1:04:25] So it took me a few hours, right? You know, I had to go out there and teach a couple classes and come back. Just going in to deliver it when I got back to the hospital. So, but

[1:04:39] of course, my cat died. My little boy there, and so noon time, my mother, let me stay home. not go back to school. Her brother Richard came home and said, "Nonsense! I'm telling him stay home because a cat died." My mother felt sorry for me. My cat got run over. Oh, cat ran

[1:05:03] over. That's bad. Yeah. Doctor Burkes, I'm just wondering about a little sentence from a novel years ago, and I understand it's it's it's a quote. I think you made mention at some point. It's just it loved to happen. Is that from one of the Greek fragments or one of the? It loved to happen. That's one quote. It's one little quote from from one of J. D. Salinger's novels where they have all these.

[1:05:37] It's from Franny and Zooey, where they have all these. There's a place in the in the family house where they put up quotes. I thought it was Heraclitus or one of those guys, and I thought you mentioned at some point there's some philosophical principle or speculation, what have you, about that it loved to happen. But there's a way of speaking sometimes where. You know, you say it doesn't want to do this.

[1:06:02] You know. Yeah. Yeah. but There is that? yeah. See, that's kind of obscure way of speaking sometimes. Yeah. Oh, I. I thought maybe it was. Yeah. Well, it has more objective meaning, but you know, using the word "non-vult, you know, doesn't wish. Yeah, understood. I. I mean, no. Yeah, I don't know. It's just it's in my mental collection of question marks.

[1:06:38] Like we say, you know, nature doesn't want to be disordered. You know. Yeah. It's not wanting in that sense. Right. Nature can want something else. You know. Nature abhors a vacuum. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's a way of speaking. Yeah. But no, see, but we might say even, you know, if you have the wrong nut for for a bolt, let's say, right? We'll see, it doesn't want to go, right?

[1:07:04] It doesn't. Yeah. Yeah. Or we're trying to put a square peg in a round hole, you know, it doesn't want to go, right? No.

[1:07:14] But Aristotle is a way of speaking, and when he speaks of matter desires form, right? What does that mean? See. Yeah, that's interesting. And of course, you know, Averroes himself. This is speaking like a poet. You shouldn't be speaking this way. And but we do speak that way, right? We do see. You mean that the matter is adapted to this form, right? Vice versa, right? And we do use that way of speaking, even when we talk about our, like I was just saying, the square peg, it doesn't want to go, right?

[1:07:54] You know. The practical man will speak that way, you know, Sure. Because it's not made for that nut, you know. You see. And you're forcing it, you know. We say you're forcing it, right? It doesn't want to, see. You're forcing against its will. Yes, we're. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You're forcing somebody to do something you didn't want to. So we say you shouldn't force it. You know, it's not.

[1:08:19] Right. It's not. You will see that in the practical meaning. You know. Take this thing here. You know, I've been running around this thing that probably see that that too high. You know, the the screw came out and lost it, and the kid this one here and this is too long for that, you know. But it's kind of you know. Finally got in there. It's held now for several months now, but but I mean something got in there, you know.

[1:08:44] Something, but I said, "Hey, the screw's coming out." No, no, it's in there. It's placed