De Anima (On the Soul)
121. Aquinas on Desire (ST I, Q.80, A.1–2): Why the Soul Has a Power to Desire, and Why Sense Desire and Will Might Be the Same Power
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[0:01] solidly. But it didn't want to go exactly, you know. I think it's every the right one for that. But sometimes you you know you you wreck the threads or something, you know, but it doesn't want to go, see.

[0:21] Yeah, there is a car. Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds. Ordina luminar images and rouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:53] Okay, we have to question eight here. So we do one article and take our little break, and then do the second article like we, our custom Sure. So Thomas says a little proemium and says which he's going to introduce these group of questions. Then he says we're not to consider about the desiring powers, huh? Okay. Now, petty to us, we get our word appetite in English.

[1:24] Originate names what desire, okay, and then it gives its name sometimes to that whole ability to desire that includes besides the desiring, loving, and enjoying, and hoping, and many other things, huh? Um. I think it's interesting that we name our heart. we want to use the word heart as kind of a name for this kind of power. We name it from desire rather than from love, huh?

[2:02] And why is that, huh? Well, go back to Ulysses there and Troyes and Cressida, Shakespeare. He says in the famous speech there on fashion, he says that things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs.

[2:30] I always use that at the beginning of philosophy of nature because I say we're going to talk about moving things, changing things. We're going to talk about the first thing you think about. The first thing you think about is something you can sense in the world around you, and then I bring in this statement: "But things in motion sooner catch that and what not stirs." So, if you want to get somebody's attention, you wave or move in some way, huh?

[2:55] If you want someone to not see you, you're in. To not move, you won't be noticed so much, huh? Um. Now, I think you see that in other things too, besides the original there. Um.

[3:17] In the newspaper, right? If there's a revolution in some. Country around the world, a noteworthy change. There'll be in the news right away, won't it? Say, okay. Or if the leader of some, you know, kingdom is overthrown or assassinated or some, some big change takes place there in the in the rule, right away you get knowledge of that, right? So, in a sense, motion or change is what captures the attention of us at first.

[3:53] Now, you're an animal with reason, huh? And what act is so characteristic of reason that it gets its name from reason? Reasoning, huh? But reasoning is a kind of what? Motion. Motion, yeah. Now, there's other acts of reason that are not like emotion, like understanding. But it's the one that is like emotion that kinda stands out. Yeah. You may recall Shakespeare's definition of reason as reason, huh?

[4:28] Its ability for large discourse, looking before and after. But discourse comes from the Latin word for what? Running. And so it names an act of reason. that's like a motion from one thing to another. If you take these three fundamental acts there in the heart, that I like something or I love it, right? I desire it or I want it, or I enjoy it or I take pleasure in it.

[4:58] Which one is most like motion? A kind of seeking. Love. Huh? Desire, right? Desire. Because desire is kind of a what? Emotion towards a good you don't have. Okay. And notice, huh? Um, hunger and thirst, right? They have a name, don't they? But hunger and thirst are what? Very common desires, huh? Okay. Okay. Does the love of food have a name?

[5:37] Does the enjoyment of food have a name? I can't think of one offhand. Can you? Yeah. Okay. But the desire, the wanting of food, huh? Has a name. Hunger, right?

[5:50] Huh. Ah, the desire for water, huh? Has a name, right? Hmm. Um. Even in philosophy, does the love of wisdom have a name? But the desire to know has a name. Wonder, right? Of course, we name things as we what? Know them, right? So,

[6:26] the existence of a name for some things and not for others is a sign, right? That the named is more what known to us, huh? But again, and say go back to this more general point: that desire is more naming something from its what motion, huh? Okay.

[6:50] Um. Later on, I'm getting a little ahead of myself here, but eventually you'll meet in the next question, huh? If you look at the second article there, the next question there, the famous distinction of the emotions or the power for emotions into two, right? And in Greek, they were called epithumia and thumos, but in Latin, the concupisable appetite and the irascible appetite, right? Okay. But concupiscence names what sense desire?

[7:29] Desire for what is pleasing to the senses. But anger is a kind of desire too. It's a desire to get even, a desire to get what revenge, huh? Okay. And these two stand out because they're kind of, what Strong, right? We've, got this old old cat there at the house, and she drives us crazy because when I get in bed, you know, maybe at four in the morning or five in the morning, go, you hear this awful sound out there?

[7:57] I guess the neighbors didn't hear it. At least my wife is getting a little embarrassed, you know. And here's here this cat, and even after I put the food in the dish, I'm going to take it out and put it get her on the back thing there. You open the door, she's meowing until I get the thing right down on the ground there. I said, see, I've got the whole neighborhood.

[8:15] I said they're trying to sleep. But notice how that hunger is very what noticeable, right? But also, if an animal gets angry, that's very noticeable, huh? Do the kind of strong emotions, huh? So we tend to name those two faculties or powers of emotion from just one of the in one case six emotions that are there can be there, and the other one of the five emotions, huh?

[8:45] But the ones that are more like emotion and have this kind of a strong exterior manifestation, huh? Okay. And Shakespeare, I know how he how he puns, kind of that in one of the plays there, where, he says they're in the very wrath of love, because the likeness between the two, huh? Yeah. And there was a likeness between the virtues too: the virtue of temperance or moderation, which restrains, you might say, sense desire, and mildness, the virtue that what restrains anger, In both cases, you have emotion.

[9:26] That more often goes wrong than excess, right? Okay. So it's interesting that that this power, which includes not only the ability to desire, but the ability to love, the ability to enjoy, the ability to hope, the ability to despair, the ability to fear, and so on, right? But this ability, or actually more than one of them, we'll see, because the will is involved there too. But they're called the what?

[9:58] Desiring power. Desiring powers, huh? A lot of times they'll translate. You know, Thomas used the word appetitus in Latin, huh? And it's desire now, not naming the act, but although it could be used that way too, but it's naming the what? The power, huh? But it's named from the act that is not the only act of that power, but the one that kind of stands out, huh?

[10:20] Okay. And I say that's directly analogous to. To our reason being named from the act as like emotion reasoning, see, rather than the act as like rest understanding. Okay.

[10:42] So it says then we're not to consider about the desiring powers, huh? As you see in Latin, they use appetitus sometimes one word to name this kind of a power. Sometimes in English I say the heart, but you know, I think it's pretty common. But in about this, there are four things that I'd be considered. First, about the desiring power, in what? genere. Okay.

[11:13] Secondly, about what? Sensuality. Now there he means what? Sense desire, right? Huh? Emotions, the feelings, or the passions, right? It doesn't necessarily by sensuality. It doesn't mean necessarily lust or disordered thing, but it just named from the senses, huh? Okay. And then about the what? Will. Okay. You see, we have the will in common with the what? Angels and God, because the will, like universal reason, is something immaterial, and so the angels and God have a will.

[11:53] But then we have sensuality or sense desire, emotions or feelings in common with the what? The animals, huh? Okay. And people have at first a hard time distinguishing between, say, the love which is an emotion and the love which is an act of the what? Will.

[12:19] Yeah. And four about free judgment. That's why they say in Latin. We tend to say free will, but they name this free will from the fact that the judgment is free. And we'll see that when we get there. It's interesting, huh? The way they name it in Latin, huh? Okay. Probably when they translate that, they probably translate free will, huh? But that's not exactly what the Latin words say.

[12:46] They say what? Free judgment, huh? Okay. Interesting. Yeah. Because the judgment that the animal has of what is good or bad is kind of determined. See. But we, we, you know, have a certain freedom in our judgment, and that's partly why we're we're free, huh? Mm-hmm. That's just because we have in our will we have universal reason, huh? And reason, you know, it's kind of interesting, huh?

[13:19] There's nothing in this world. No matter how good it is, that you couldn't consider it to be bad in some way, because no matter how good a thing is, right, it prevents you from doing something else that might be good, right? Studying prevents you from what? Doing something else that's good, like eating, right? Praying prevents you from doing something else that's good, like studying, maybe, or from eating or something, right?

[13:44] Or sleeping or something, right? So there's nothing so good that we couldn't, in some way, right, think of it as bad, right? And vice versa. So there's, you know, an ability there, right? So universality there to make a free judgment. Now today we're just concerned with the first of these four. Yes. And it has two articles, so we can just do this question eighty. Yeah. Now, first, whether the ability to desire, huh?

[14:22] Knows in Latin, just calls it appetitus, right? Okay. Whether the we're not to lay down that the ability to desire is some special power of the soul,

[14:37] and then secondly, whether the desire, the ability to desire, should be divided into the sense desire, right? The desire that follows upon having senses, right? And intellectual desire that that follows upon having what? Reason or understanding, right? Okay, but it should be divided into them as into different or other powers, huh? Okay.

[15:10] So when I teach, you know, the love and friendship course, after I talk about what love is, then one of the two main distinctions I make among love, the fundamental ones, is the love which is an emotion, and the love which is an act of the will. Yeah. And it's hard for students to understand the difference there, right? Okay. Because they think simply of the emotion at first, right?

[15:35] Yeah. Yeah. But the love of wisdom, I don't think, is an emotion. Okay. So let's look now at the first article. To the first, thus one proceeds. It seems that the ability to desire is not some special power of the soul, distinguished from the other powers, huh?

[16:01] For to those things which are common to animate, which means things that have a soul, right? They're for living things, and inanimate things, things that not have a soul. For those things which are common to both, one should not assign some power of the soul, right? But to desire or to want, the English word is to want, is common to living or animate things and inanimate things.

[16:30] And he quotes the first definition of good, which Aristotle touches on in the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The good is what all what? Yeah, what all want? Therefore, desire is not a special power of the soul, right? I notice now you go to a nursery and you buy a plant sometimes, and they give you little advice as how to take care of the plant, right? And they'll say it wants a lot of sun or wants a lot of water, right?

[17:02] Sure. And you know that's kind of a natural want, right? Yeah. Okay. Of course, we sometimes even carry it over to our mechanical things. If you're trying to put a square peg into a round hole, we say it doesn't want to go. It doesn't fit. Okay. So, in some sense, wanting or desire, right, is said even in what things that don't have knowledge, huh? Like the animals and man, huh?

[17:37] Yeah. Aristotle makes a strange remark there that matter desires form, huh? And of course, he's using the word desire there in kind of an extended meaning, huh? Sure. But he means that matter is ordered to form as it's what it's good, it's perfection, huh? Isn't this sense somewhere about I don't know if it's referring to gravity or about things wanting to go to the earth? Yeah, they have a tendency towards something, right?

[18:06] Okay. So, in that sense, you have desire. Things have a tendency towards what is good for them, right? huh? And even an inanimate thing resists being what cut up, right, or being broken up, right? No. Split.

[18:23] Yeah. So. So that's the first objection. So, inanimate, because the plant would fall inanimate, no? Well, you could, yeah, yeah. I'll just take as a clear example, but sometimes you know we we think of the animals having a soul more than the plant, and that's shown by the word animal, right? Yep. Okay. And you can see in the body of the article, Thomas is kind of taking animatis there for the things that have some kind of knowing, at least the senses, right?

[18:53] Okay. Okay. Although in English we tend to use the word animate for for the plant as well. Yeah. Okay. It means literally animate has a soul, right? But the life is, as Aristotle said in the *De Anima*, life is hidden in the plants, huh? Hidden in the plants. And in the first book about the soul, Aristotle recounts what his predecessors say. They investigated life from sensation and from moving around.

[19:19] With something which is the animals have that the plants don't have. Second, moreover, powers are distinguished by their objects. I remember that thing you were interlining. We distinguish powers by their acts, and the acts by their objects. Right. So, from first to last, we distinguish the powers by their objects. But it's the same thing that we know and what desire. And Aristotle speaks of that in the De Anima, there, right?

[19:55] Yeah. That the food is both known and what desired, right? Yeah. And so, it's the original cause, there, Okay. Therefore, but yeah, okay. Therefore, the desiring power ought not to be another power from the what grasping or knowing power. He often calls that the what apprehensivam right? Now, why does he call the knowing power, the vim apprehensivam, the grabbing or the taking power. Why is he called that?

[20:40] What's the difference? Would this well? Why is not the intellect or something? What? Why is not the intellect? Yeah, but but in general, why is knowing power said to grasp?

[20:56] And the desiring power doesn't. It's more outgoing. Yeah. Because you have it, then you're taking it in. Okay. Okay. You understand? I think the analogy. You know, you grab it. Yeah, you're trying to get the thing into your senses or into your what? Mind, right? Huh? So the thing known is more in the knower than the knower and the thing known. But in love, it's just the reverse.

[21:27] Oh. Yeah. I left my heart in San Francisco, right? My heart's not in it, huh? Love goes out to the thing itself, huh? Yeah. And this is what Aristotle shows in the sixth book of wisdom that the good is in things, huh?

[21:45] Why truth is primarily in the mind. Yeah, that's good. So when you try to know something, you're trying to get into your mind, huh?

[21:57] Truth is primarily in the. Yeah. That's why when you see grasp something, it's contained in your hand, right? Yeah. So when your mind grasps something, it's contained in the mind. Yeah. Or you speak of love more in terms of what giving, right? Huh? Yeah. I used to ask the question. I say, is it good to lose your mind? No. What about losing your heart? Is that good or bad?

[22:25] Depends on who you lose it to. Who you lose it to? Yeah, yeah. That's why we say that, though. See, huh? You speak of keep your cool, right? See, keep your mind, right? Don't say keep your heart necessarily, right? No, that the secondarily, truth is in things, in the thing itself. Well, no. See, you can see it in the case of our mind. Clearly, the truth is found in statements, right?

[22:54] Ah. And sometimes I ask students, I say, where do you find truth? You know, you dig in the ground, you find it in the ground. You know, some countries, you know, got more oil in the ground or more coal or whatever it might be, or more gold or diamonds, right? Do some countries have more truth in the ground? No, there's no truth in the ground at all.

[23:13] If you find in the ocean, you swim there, you bump into a piece of truth. If you go through the air, the airplane, do you know there's a nice big chunk of chunk of truth there? See, no. I tell you, find truth in the same place. In general, you find falsity, and that's in statements, huh? Yeah, the two halves of a contradiction, huh? Yeah. You're sitting and you're not sitting, and one of those is going to be found truth, and the other is going to be found falsity, huh?

[23:42] But the statement is what in the mind, okay? So truth is primarily in the mind, huh? See, it's not until my mind affirms or denies something of you, yeah, truth or falsity. You are white, or you are not white, or you are black, you're not black, or you're sitting, or you're not sitting, or you're standing, or you're not standing, right? That has something true or false when I affirm or deny something of you or something else.

[24:09] So truth is primarily in the mind, but in general knowing, you're trying to get something in the mind, huh? See, if if I remember you when I leave here, I've got your what? Oh yeah. Shape and so on, right? Color in my what knowing powers, huh? Yeah. Okay. But love is the reverse, huh? This is this this is the reason why that if you love something bad, that's bad, right?

[24:41] But if you know something bad, that's not bad, right? Oh yeah. Because love goes out to the thing as it is in itself. That's why I can't love health and sickness at the same time. If I love health, I can't love sickness. But if I know what sickness is, that doesn't prevent me from knowing what health is. In fact, knowing what health is helps me to know what sickness is.

[25:15] Knowing what normal blood pressure is helps me to know what abnormal blood pressure is, right? But in things, one excludes the other, and because the heart or love goes out to the thing itself, you can't love the opposites, huh? If I love virtue, I don't love vice, do I? You can't love both at the same time. But I, in ethics, can know both of them, right? And knowing one helps me to know the other.

[25:43] But loving one doesn't help me to love the other, does it? Okay. See, loving virtue prevents me from loving vice, and loving vice prevents me from loving virtue.

[26:01] Excuse me, Doctor Burquist. Yeah. I forgot this has the same paragraph as you, potencia and vim. What's up, vim Well just another Here it's, vim? Well, just another. Here, it's it's more or less synonymous for potentiary, huh? Okay.

[26:17] The vim, the power, in a sense. Okay. Now the third objection. Yeah. Moreover, the common. Is not distinguished against the private or particular, right? But every power of the soul wants its own what, or desires its own desirable, namely the object that is suitable to it. Yeah. Therefore, with respect to this object, which is the desirable in general, we ought not to lay down a power distinct from all the rest, which is called the desiring power.

[26:54] So every, you know, you might say that the ear wants to hear, right? Huh? And the eye wants to see, right? And the stomach wants to digest. And the heart wants to pump blood, right? So I speak of the ability to want that's apart from all these other powers, right? Okay. So they're all good objections, huh? We'll see how Thomas answers them when they get to the reply, huh?

[27:22] I've often, you know, thought of, you know, you give them one piece of paper just objections, right? And stew for a while, and then you give them the body of the article a day later or something, and then a day after that you give them the the answers, right? Huh? I did the one once in love and friendship. There towards the end, I took this article of Thomas the Summa where he says that he asked whether to share it to his friendship.

[27:50] huh? I just gave him the objections to it, say, and I'll stew. Okay. But against all this is what the philosopher, the philosopher, I guess that's the guy called what? Aristotle. What's the name of that terrible name for that figure of speech? Antonomasia Antonomasia yeah, yeah.

[28:18] It's the way Christ is named by Antonomasia, the way the Bible is named, the way the White House is named. Okay. Mm. Very common. But the name is not very common. Yeah. But but the thing is common, right? Yeah. But that that figure of speech is common. Okay.

[28:42] But against this is that the philosopher, in the second book about the soul, he distinguishes the genera of powers. He distinguished five genera of powers. Remember that? And this was one of the five genera, the desiring power, right?

[28:59] And then he also brings in a second great thinker there, Saint John Damascene, right? In the second book, yeah? The Fide Orthodoxa, right? Mm-hmm. Kind of a summa. You might say St. John Damascene, right? Kind of a. not as complete as Thomas' Summas, but famous work. He was, what a great fighter against iconoclasts, wasn't he? Yeah. And other things, yeah. So Damascene, in the second book of the De Fide Orthodox Faith, distinguished.

[29:31] The what, desiring powers, from the what, knowing. And viras and vim must be the same what, noun, right? Yes. But viras is the what, plural, plural, plural. Okay. Okay, I answer. Thomas says that it is necessary to lay down that there is some desiring power of the soul, right? Now, for the evidence of this, Thomas says it should be considered that some inclination, right, follows any what, form, right?

[30:20] Now notice, huh If you contrast matter and form. Going back to philosophy of nature, When Aristotle points out that you know nature has two meanings, matter and form. But which is more nature, matter or form? Do you remember that point? Form. Form. Yeah, and the reason for that is that by matter you have a natural thing only in what ability. By through form you have one in in act right?

[30:48] Yeah. Okay. So it's through its form that a thing is actually what it is, right? Mm-hmm. And following upon what a thing is, there's something that it what does, right? Something it's inclined to do, huh? Like fire is inclined to burn, right? And he gives that example there from the ancient physics, just as fire from its form is inclined to what go up, as we'd say, right?

[31:23] And also is inclined to this that generates another like itself, huh? So this is going to be a general thing huh That following upon form, there's some kind of a what tendency or some kind of a what inclination, right? Okay. And then he's going to point out that knowing things, things that sense or understand, right, have a form, and that the things that don't know are lacking, right?

[31:58] In addition to their natural form that makes them do what they are, right? They're able to receive, as we learned when we studied those knowing powers, the forms of other things, right? Yeah. Okay. So not only if you take this this book here, right? Mm-hmm. It has its own color, which is green, right? Okay. But now my eye, right? I got what brown eyes, right? Okay. In the same way that this book is green, huh?

[32:30] Okay. But my eye is also receiving the color of your clothing, which is black, right? And it's receiving the the more or less red of the fire engine, or I mean the fire extinguisher over there, right? And I'm receiving all kinds of colors in my eyes, right? Isn't it? So that's the difference between the knower and the thing that doesn't know, right? This glass that doesn't know it has its own what shape, huh?

[33:01] Mm-hmm. But I can receive the shape of you, the shape of the desk, the shape of the chair, shape of the statue, shape of the cross, shape of the clock, right? I'm receiving the forms of all kinds of things, right? Okay. So if it's true in general that there's some kind of Inclination or tendency following upon form, right? Then, and it's true, in particular that those things that know, right, have forms in a way that's their own, right?

[33:35] In addition to the way that everything else has a form, right? Well, then there is going to be an inclination, right? Because of that, that's unique to them, and that inclination is referring to the act of this what, desiring power. Okay, and that's also the reason why, when you get to the second article, there will be a distinction between the what, ability to desire following upon what, sensation, right, or sensing, which we call sensualitas That's why you called it before because it goes back to the senses, right?

[34:11] Or following upon the ability to what, understand, huh? Okay, and that would be the difference between the emotions on the one hand and the what, the acts, the will, huh? Okay.

[34:30] So he starts off then, as you say, with this general beginning that there is some inclination, some tendency towards something following upon any form that you have, right? But then there is a special way in which things that that know have a form. A form, however, in those things which partake of knowledge, he says, is found in a what higher way, huh? Than in those things which lack what knowledge, huh?

[35:08] For in those things which lack knowledge, there is found only what form, determining each thing, right? To its own what private being, its own private nature, might say, right? Which also is the natural form of each thing, huh? Okay. The form is responsible for what it is, huh?

[35:38] And a natural inclination follows upon this what natural form, which is called what natural desire, right? So the plant, let's say, huh? Okay. Once it has the nature of this kind of plant, it might want to grow towards the sun, right? Yeah. Or grow down into the soil towards the water, huh? Okay. Okay. So a certain inclination to a certain what to go in some direction, right?

[36:14] Okay. Because of what it is, huh? Okay. But in those things having knowledge, huh? Okay. Each thing is determined to its own natural being, to its natural form, but nevertheless, it is also receptive of forms of other things,

[36:37] just as the sense receives the forms of all sensible things. So my ears receive the sound of the trumpet and the sound of the violin and the sound of the human voice and the sound of brakes and so on, right? And the understanding of all things that are understandable, the natures of these things. And then he refers to what Aristotle said in the third book on the soul.

[37:05] If you recall that, after he'd taken up the senses, right? After he'd taken up the reason or understanding, and thus the soul of man is in some way all things, right? Yeah. By sense and by understanding, yeah. So if I have the definition of a triangle in my head, you could say I have the nature of triangle in my head, don't I? If I have the definition of a tree or a plant of some sort, I have the nature of the tree or the plant in me, right?

[37:39] Mm-hmm. But the stone has only the nature of stone in it. See? Yeah. And the stone is only the color of stone, right? But I have the color of the sunset and the color of all kinds of things in my what? Eyes, right? Huh? So my eye, through my eye, in a way, I have all colors, and through my ear, all sounds, right? And through my nose, all smells and tastes and so on, huh?

[38:06] So in some way, I'm all things, huh? In which he says, in some way, then things having knowledge approach to a certain likeness of God, huh? In whom all things pre-exist in a simple way, huh? As Dionysius the Areopagite, Pseudo-Areopagite, whatever he is? Yeah, says, right. Okay. I think I was mentioning how in Scripture sometimes God says to, I guess, he says to Abraham he says to Moses, you know, follow me, and I will show you every good.

[38:44] And Thomas says, "it is himself. I show you myself, right? So in a sense, God is everything, but in a very what simple way, right? Huh? But things that have what knowledge, right? And man more than the beast because he's got understanding as well as sensing. He has a certain likeness, right, to God. Um, they're more like he's more like God, right? Those that have knowing, than those that don't know, right?

[39:12] But why are those that know more like God? Well, not only because they know, but because in some way they are what? By knowing they are all things in some way, do you see that? Yeah. Okay, that's really kind of amazing thing to see. It is, yeah. And if

[39:34] you realize your superiority, right, to things that don't know, then a fortiori you can see the superiority of God. Okay. Okay. Just therefore, Now he's going to tie the two together, right? Yeah. The idea that that upon every form there follows some kind of inclination, right? Right. And then the fact that the things that know have forms in a way that's unique. Right. Okay. Well, then they also have corresponding to that inclination or a desire, right?

[40:18] What are they? In addition to that natural desire that all things have for what is falling upon their Nature. Thus, therefore, as forms exist in a higher way, in those things having knowledge exist in a higher way above the way of natural forms, right? So also it is necessary that in them there be a what inclination, tendency above the way of the natural inclination, which has been called, as we said before, a natural desire, right?

[40:56] And this superior inclination pertains to the desiring power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire those things which it grasps, right? And not only those things to which it is inclined from its what natural form, right? Thus, therefore, this is the reason why it is necessary to lay down that there is some desiring power of the soul, right? Do you see the force of the argument then?

[41:32] Yeah. What the the natural. No, no. In most cases, in an argument like in a syllogism, yeah, all you need is two to get one, right? Two statements to get a what third, right? So that's why we compare the syllogism sometimes to adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing, because you need just two numbers to get a what third number, right? And so very often in strict reasoning, you need just two statements.

[42:05] That's all syllogism has, regular syllogism, to get a third one, right? So what are the two kind of key statements here? Well, one is the statement that there is some kind of of tendency, some kind of inclination following upon any form, right? Yes, I think I understand that part. Yeah. And the other one is that things that know, right, have in a higher way forms. Yeah. Than the things that don't know, right?

[42:35] Yeah. The things that don't know have only their natural form that makes them to be what they are, right? Yeah. Now things that know also have their natural form that makes them be what they are, right? But then in addition, they are able to receive the forms of other things, huh? And therefore, they have forms in a way that the non-living things or non-knowing things do not have, huh?

[43:04] So you put those two together that there follows inclination upon every form, and these have forms in a special way, right? Then they have a special kind of what desire, right? Which is different from the natural. form? From what? From what? Yeah, from what the other things that don't know have, right? Okay. Okay. And that's going to. Directly answer the first objection, right? Because the first objection said that you shouldn't be laying down some special kind of ability in the soul that's shared by things that don't have a soul, right?

[43:40] And don't know. And he answers that first objection. It should be said to the first that to desire is found in things having knowledge in a way above the common way, by which it is found in all things, huh? Through their natural form. And therefore, necessary, huh? To determine some power of the soul for this act, right? It's got some ability for for a desire that is not found in the things that don't sense, or don't know.

[44:15] Do. You see that that objection as a sense falls directly. The reply to it falls directly from what you've seen there, right? Now the second objection goes back to something else, and you know, in some cases, you see it's it's easier to to tell apart, huh? The

[44:39] the powers by their objects because the objects are no way the same thing like color and sound, right? Color is not a sound, and sound is not a color, right? That's clear. But in some cases, you have the same thing that's an object of two powers, but it's not an object of two powers in the same what? Same way, right? Okay. Now he has something like that with the senses there when they know the same object, right?

[45:11] Yeah. So I could know the shape of the top of this glass, right? If I had my eyes closed and just gave me the glass and I felt it, I can know it through touch, right? Uh huh. But I can also know it through the color of the glass, right? Uh huh. So the shape of it is not known in the same way, right? It's not an object of the eye touching the same way, is it?

[45:34] Or the shape of the table here, I know it through this brownness or what we're going to call this color here, right? The color extends this far and then stops, then you know, okay. But I could also know it through what? Not through color, but through hardness. Hardness. Right. You see. Okay. So it's possible that the same thing might be in some way an object of two different powers, yeah.

[45:59] But it's not an object of two different powers in the same way, huh? Right. Okay. And for example, truth, right? Truth is an object for the mind as such, but since truth is as something good, could be also what an object of desire. Okay. Kind of subtle there, huh? Okay. And it's especially true when you get to the powers that are very universal, like the will and the two intellects we talked about before.

[46:34] Okay. Because the one intellect is active and the other is passive with respect to the same thing. Yeah. Okay. What is the um for this for this natural form? Um, what would be the power that is connected with the inclination? Well, it just follows upon the natural form, the inclination to that, huh? So once something has the nature of this tree or this plant, it might tend to what?

[47:08] Grow towards the sun, right? Or. So then, that would be the growing power. Well, yeah, but the inclination there would would be. Well, it's kind of getting into the third objection a bit, which was okay, yeah, okay, okay,

[47:25] um. It seems to them, you know, that the heavy body, once it has heaviness, right? Yeah. It naturally tends towards the ground, right? Yeah. Desires to go to the earth. Yeah, yeah, but but you know, desire there is is is being used. The word is becoming equivocal here, right? Yes. But equivocal by reason, huh? Okay. Okay. He was just asking: Is that the generated power? It's one of the five general powers that does that, right?

[47:56] Wouldn't it? Yeah, that's getting a little bit into the inclination that each power has to its own object, right? And that's not a separate one, huh? Okay. This is this. If you go to the third objection here now, okay. We don't distinguish the common against the the private, right? Huh? Okay. So notice, if you yell in my ear, I tend to hear you. Right. You know, if you wave your hand in front of me, I tend to what?

[48:24] See you, right? Yeah. Now is that tendency your an act of this kind of power that he's talking about here? Say, if you put food in my stomach, I tend to what? Digest it, right? All right. Okay. Uh huh. You see that? Yes. Um.

[48:47] So every power you might say has a tendency to its own act or its own object, right? Mm. And the question is, why then, in addition to the tendency that each power has for its own object, right, or own act, why say there's a ability to desire, a ability to tend towards something, in addition to that, right? Hmm. They'd be like saying, you know, in addition to dog, cat, and horse, there's an animal, just animal.

[49:16] It's not dog, cat, or horse, but just animal. You don't divide the common against the private, do you? There's two kinds of number: odd number, even number, and number. Doesn't make sense, does it? You don't divide the common against the private, right? Right. We could divide human race into men, women, and human beings. No, no, no. That doesn't make sense, does it? No. You don't divide the common against the what?

[49:47] Private or particular, do you? Okay. No. So the third objection is saying you're doing this. You're saying that that that isn't it true? The third objection is saying that each power of the soul, right? Yeah. All these other powers of the soul than the one you're talking about here, claiming to talk about here, don't they all have a tendency towards their own act, their own object? No.

[50:15] If you're laying in bed in the morning and someone's you know cooking bacon or something, right? You know, this guy used to work with the package. store uh I told you that I used to have on on Labor Day, or was he would cook bacon and eggs and everything on the grill outside, and they have his children over and the families and so on. And every time they get to sleep, you know, it's pretty pretty hard, and they smell this.

[50:42] Oh, it really smells good coming up. You see, so you have a tendency to smell something that comes into your nostrils, don't you know? See, you naturally do that. The same way, if if I blink a light in front of you, you know, the cop does or somebody, you tend to see that light that's blinking in front of you, don't you? See, if somebody yells at you, you tend to hear that, right?

[51:02] Now, is that tendency, the tendency he's talking about here, this genus of power, this ability to desire, tend towards things? See, if what you meant was simply what's common to all those, right? Yeah. You wouldn't give that as a separate power of the soul from all those, huh? Maybe like saying, you know, we've got the ability to see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and the ability to sense.

[51:29] That's a that's a separate ability, the ability to sense, from all these. Would you? No, you wouldn't say that. You wouldn't divide the common against. that's what the objection is saying, right? Okay. So what you have to see is that this ability to desire that is one of the five genera of powers of the soul, right? Huh? Yeah. Is not simply talking about what's common to all the other powers, insofar as they all in some way or other tend towards their own act and their own object, huh?

[52:02] Object. Okay. Because so like the natural power again, huh? So notice the reply that Thomas gives. To the third, it should be said that each power of the soul is a certain form or nature, and therefore it has a natural inclination to something, right? Okay. So my eye naturally tends to see. It doesn't naturally tend to hear, does it? Hmm. I wave my hand in front of your eyes.

[52:30] You don't tend to hear it, do they? If I snap my fingers, right? Your eyes don't tend to to hear that, do they? But they do tend to see it, right? Hence, each desire is right its object, right? The desire is the object which is suitable to it by a natural desire, by a natural inclination, by a natural tendency, huh? Okay.

[52:57] But in addition to this, there is the what? Unless he calls it the animal right desire, right? Huh? From anima, thinking now of animal and what it has that the plant doesn't have, namely knowledge, right? In addition to this, there is the animal desire following what.

[53:22] Knowledge, now, right, following apprehension, okay, by which is desired something not for that reason that it is suitable to the act of this or that power, as seeing

[53:41] the power, I guess, to seeing and the power to hear to hearing, but because it is suitable simply to the animal as a whole, right? Okay.

[53:55] To what? What's something simply suitable to the animals as a whole? Yeah. Yeah. What kind of thing would that be? What suitable? Suitable for me to eat, right? Yeah. Okay. Okay. And not just to my stomach to digest, right? Just because it looks good or tastes good or something, but because, yeah. Okay.

[54:21] Okay. So that's a subtle thing there. Sometimes they call this. Used to be in the old textbooks, elicited appetite, right? Is that just a natural? That, It's they call it elicited appetite, right? It's not a desire that just follows upon what you are, right? Okay. But you have to have some kind of knowledge, right? Reasoning for. not necessarily reasoning it could be sensation too, right? Okay. Okay.

[54:47] But then it follows upon that desire, huh? Okay. You think you know. So this is saying then that there's a kind of power, but it's going to be divided into a number of particular powers, right? But a kind of power to desire that is different, right, from the natural desire of any other power of the soul, right?

[55:24] Because it's not following simply upon what something is, but it's following upon what knowing in some way. Hmm. Trying to figure out. I don't know if I got to see the the big picture on this or whatever. You know why this reply? You know when you when you gave that thing about this thing, you don't divide common against particular. So, for instance, man, woman, human being. Yeah.

[55:58] If by the ability to desire, you know, here you meant nothing other than right. Ah. What's common, right? Instead of right. Every other power, right?

[56:18] That every other power has some kind of what natural inclination to its own act, its own object, right? You see. We're only talking about that. Yeah, then you wouldn't give it as a separate genus of powers, would you? See? Okay. See? You're talking about the fact that my eye tends to see. Yeah. Right. You see? And and something grab you know things in motion, so to catch the eye, what that stirs, right?

[56:46] Huh? So something in motion passing in front of me tends to what get the attention of my eyes, right? Huh? So I'm inclined to see that thing moving in front of me, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Of a strong smell, right? You know? Yeah. I walk into some place with a strong smell, whatever is good or bad. If it's bad, it's a strong smell. But I mean, I tend to what?

[57:12] My sense of smell tends to what? To smell this. To know it in some way and desire something. Well, no, no, no, no, no. You're just saying it tends towards its own what? Act or object, right? Huh? Okay. But the same thing, my my digestive thing, right? I put food, you know, I chew up my food, I swallow it, and then my what? Digestive organs, right? Right.

[57:39] They start to attack that food and break it down, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Okay. So, ah, you could say they naturally tend towards their own what? Object, right? Right. They naturally tend towards their own act. You could say, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Well, that tendency towards of each power towards its own act or its own object, um, you would distinguish from from all of them, right? What's common to all that?

[58:11] What's said of all that, right? Yeah. See. But it goes back to the fact that this special kind of tendency, this special kind of our power to want, um, that's a separate genus, you might say, of the powers of the soul, right? Huh? This is something that follows upon what? Something other than actual form. Yeah. Okay. And it falls upon the form that you received in what?

[58:51] Yeah. Knowing, huh? Okay. Falls upon something outside you. So the desired object, like you said, is is not the power; it's it's the thing that it apprehends. Yeah, and it's interesting how you know food is the object of what the digesting power, right? Huh? But hunger is a desire for what food, right? Huh? But it's a desire for food falling upon some sensation of that food, right?

[59:47] Yeah. So I'm laying in bed. I don't desire bacon, but someone's cooking bacon. I smell it, and all of a sudden I what desire bacon, right? That's something different from the tendency that I have to digest bacon once it's in my stomach.

[1:00:07] Say. You know, you know, anybody had a spastic stomach? Yeah, I guess it's kind of overactive stomach. I guess I don't know. Yeah. So they have to, you know. In the old days, in Lent they had to be released from the fast, right, because they had to keep what food kind of in the stomach, and they went for they fasted the way the normal laws of fasting were in those days.

[1:00:36] They'd have stomach troubles, right? So the confessing would release them from the from the obligation to fast. I know a guy with a spastic stomach getting his cut up. The old days, and you had to fast, too. You know, he he'd go to movies like that. He he'd eat a hot dog and he'd get a big tub of buttered popcorn. He'd say, "Dwayne Holmes for me, " you know.

[1:00:57] I just can't eat. But I mean, but because the stomach kind of tends to go into operation, right? So you start digesting yourself eventually. I don't know. Oh, really? Yeah, I guess so. That's why I have to eat several times a day. Well, I guess that is some kind of yeah, some kind of full reactive thing. Actually, this guy It happens when you eat hot dogs with popcorn.

[1:01:22] But actually, this guy got it. He was in a seminary where he was being prepared for a missionary. And and they really you know were preparing to be a missionary. You know, I mean, I mean the bread would come out with the flies in it and everything. You know, and he came out with a spastic stomach, so they kicked him out because he couldn't take the the regimentation or the the tough life of being a missionary, huh?

[1:01:48] And we have a piece there. Assumption there is not assumptionist, but but he was a missionary down South America. You know, you can track some kind of you know. I know not the nervous one of those things, John, and he had to be sent back. You know, and he went back to school. But you know, once in a while, a couple times a year, he gets a re-tackle, a fever.

[1:02:11] I don't know what it is, something from South America, anyway. So, so, oh yeah, yeah. So this is something different, huh? Than than this here, this here is following upon knowing in some way, huh? Okay. Yeah. And so when I I am hungry, I am desiring really the object of my stomach. Actually, my stomach wants to act upon. Yeah. But the

[1:02:47] plant doesn't have any knowledge of that, right? It just naturally tends towards the water and so on, right? And soaks things in, kind of automatically, right? But not as a result of knowing them, huh? See, there's a difference between the the plant there sending its roots down towards where the water is, yeah, and and you stopping off at the tavern to get a drink because it's a hot day or something.

[1:03:17] You see the idea? Yeah, yeah. Example. We should take a little break here, and then we'll go to the second article. Sure. Yeah. Yeah. Article two, right?

[1:03:30] Whether the sense desire right and the intellectual desire are diverse powers, huh? As I mentioned before, appetitus could be used for the very active of this for the desire, right? Huh? But appetitus here is being used for the what the power, the ability to desire, right? Huh? Okay. And they call and they distinguish two abilities: desire, one that follows upon the senses, right? So you call that the sensing desire, right, or sense desire, and the other following upon the understanding, huh?

[1:04:19] Okay. So as he figured out the difference, between, what we would call the the will, the voluntas, as we call it in Latin, but the will, and then the ability that we have for what emotions or feelings, huh? Okay.

[1:04:44] The first objection is saying, "Well, sense and understanding are accidental to what desire, right? " For powers, he says, are not diversified by accidental differences,

[1:04:59] but it happens to the desirable that it be what grasped by the sense or by the what understanding, huh? Therefore, the sense desire and understandable desire are not diverse what powers, huh?

[1:05:19] And the third objection is saying, so I could I could have this desire for food. It might be because I know I need food. It might be because I smell it, right? And accidental whether I eat the food because I smelled it or because I realize I need food to maintain my strength. He says it's accidental, right? Accidental to the food. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. So you shouldn't distinguish it by what's accidental to the desirable.

[1:06:01] Moreover, the knowledge of the understanding is of universals. Now we saw that before in the De Anima, and by this it is distinguished from the what sense powers, yeah, sense knowledge, which is of what singulars, huh? But this distinction has no place on the side of the desiring power or on side the desirable, for sense desire. Is a motion from the soul to things. Now, notice what he's saying there, right?

[1:06:35] That's the opposite of knowing. Knowing is a motion from the thing into the what? Knower, right? But desire is a motion from the soul to the what? Thing. I left my heart in San Francisco. I'm going out towards the what? Thing. huh? Rather than trying to put it inside me, right?

[1:07:10] Now, Boethius had said, and to take the famous quote that we're always giving, huh? A thing is singular when sensed, right? Universal and understood, huh? Okay. So when I see this glass, right? It's a singular, individual glass, isn't it? But when I come to understand what this is, that's a glass. I'm understanding something universal, right? But notice that distinction between is being singular when sensed, universal when understood, is a distinction that takes place inside of my knowing powers.

[1:07:50] Outside here, there's only a what? Individual, singular glass, huh? You see that? The same way, huh? This chair. When I see this chair or I feel this chair, I'm seeing an individual, singular chair. I'm, but when I understand what this chair is, in other words, when I understand what a chair is, I'm understanding something universal. Because what a chair is is common to all chairs, isn't it?

[1:08:23] But objection is saying, okay, but that's taking place within the knowing powers because that's where knowing takes place when the thing gets into knowing powers, huh? So when it gets into the senses, it's still singular. But when it gets into reason, whose object is what it is, it's now universal. But desire is is not putting things into the heart. It's a heart going into the thing, right?

[1:08:49] And the thing out there is only what? Singular, right? Okay. Um. So he says that's what he said. But this distinction has no place, huh? On the side of of desire, huh? For since desire is a motion from the soul to things, not the reverse, right? Which you have in knowing, and things are what? Singular out there, right? Every desire seems to be for a what? Singular thing, right?

[1:09:25] Therefore. The intellectual desire, understandable desire, ought not to be what distinguished from the sense. That's interesting objection, huh?