De Anima (On the Soul)
124. Q.81 a.2: The Concupiscible and the Irascible — Two Powers of Sense Desire
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[0:00] What has been called what sensualitas in the previous article, or could be called sense desire, right? The ability to desire following upon sense, right, is going to be divided into two different powers, huh? And this division was made by what Plato and Aristotle first, but in the sed contra he referred to two doctors of the church, right?

[0:33] Okay. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that, Andos, he says, I call it sense desire, but if you want to. use the word desire, there is appetitus to name the ability to desire, right? So he's saying that the ability to desire—that's what appetitus means—following upon sense, right? Okay.

[1:00] It seems it is not distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible, right? As in, to diverse what powers, right? For the same power of the soul is of one contrariety, as sight is of white and what black, right? Or the sense of taste is of sweet and of what bitter, right?

[1:31] But what is suitable and what is what harmful are contraries. Therefore, the other belong to the same what power, huh? Since, therefore, the concupiscible power regards what is what suitable, right? Okay. Of course, concupiscence means you know it's something that is pleasing to the senses, right? So even desired, right? Okay. But irascible is dealing with something that is what harmful, right? Now you're you're sticking a pin in me or something, right?

[2:06] But then get angry, right? Because you're you're nocivum, you're you're harming me, right? You're hurting me, right? Okay. You're stepping on my toes, and I tell you you're on my toes, and you say so what? So I get angry, right? And shove you off, say, okay. So if these two things are contraries, then it seems that they should be the same power, right, of the soul

[2:34] that includes both the concupiscible and the irascible, right? Now Thomas is going to point out that they're not really contraries here, huh? Okay. And there's a contrariety in the concupiscible, right? Yeah. True contrariety, yeah

[2:51] Now? The second objection. Moreover, the sense desire, the ability to desire, fouling upon the senses—that's what that phrase means, right? Okay. We get the word appetite from what appetitus, right? Yeah. So just like our word appetite seems to name desire, right? Okay. Okay. But then the ability to desire is given the same name, right? So appetitus is used in Latin a lot, not to name desire, but the ability to desire.

[3:25] Okay. So we're not so accustomed in English to use the word desire to name the ability to desire, I don't think. I see. So if you translate this as sense desire in English. You might misunderstand it, right, and think you're talking about the desire rather than the ability to desire, right? So, in this context, I sometimes might define this or translate it as the sensitive ability to desire.

[3:59] But even that could be somewhat misleading. So, it's the ability to desire that follows upon sense, huh? Okay. So he says, such a desire is or power is not except of what is what agreeable or convenient, suitable to the senses. But what is suitable according to the senses, what is agreeable to them, is in fact the object of the concupiscible Therefore there is no there is no ability to desire falling upon. station that would differ from the concupiscible.

[4:41] Well, this is an interesting objection because the irascible, you see, moves us to do things that are not agreeable to our senses. Okay, so if I fight you over that piece of meat,

[5:00] this fight may be, you know, painful and, you know, you see. So I don't seem to be what moved to fight you immediately because this is agreeable to my senses to fight you. Right. See, or vice versa, if I'm you want to eat me for your dinner or something, huh? And I'm running as fast as I can. Well, this may not be pleasant to be running at that speed and trying to get away, huh?

[5:30] I see. But you got to realize that the irascible is in some sense a higher power than the concupiscible. In one sense, huh? That involves some kind of knowing more than just the outward senses sensing something as agreeable to them, huh? Or disagreeable, huh? And that'll come out in the reply to the objection, huh?

[6:05] Moreover, hate is in the irascible. Now, this is actually not true, but the objector is saying that, right? Why? Well, it seems so because Hieronymus has Jerome, I guess. Yeah. Jerome says, in commenting on Matthew 13, we possess in the irascible a hatred of our what vices, huh? Okay. Now, notice you can see that confusion kind of rises. Huh? You heard the time when Thomas Aquinas himself say is tempted, or his brothers, I guess, or somebody tried to break him down, right?

[6:43] So he has some kind of woman there, right? Huh? Right. When Thomas is said to have, you know, grabbed the poker, whatever it was, the lay, you know. Yeah. And the woman fled, you know, his wrath, right? And as she left, he's supposed to, you know, burn a cross over the the door, right? Huh? And then that's when he received, you know, some kind of a special grace from God, right?

[7:04] You know, so he was not bothered by sensuality in this. Well, was this anger or hatred of of vice here in Thomas? What was it? You see, you kind of mix stuff together, right? Yeah. You see, so that's that's part of the the confusion here, right? Okay. But hate, since it is contrary to love, is in the what concupiscible, right? Therefore, there is the same what power for the concupiscible and irascible.

[7:38] Okay. But in a sense, the anger, in a way, what arises from the hate or from the disliking, right? Yeah. Okay. I hate it when you're sticking me with pins, right? And therefore, you know, anger rises, right? Okay.

[7:58] Now, against this is what Gregory Nyssa says, and in the footnote of the edition, it says that Thomas has got the wrong guy. It's Nemesius's son, but another father is. And Damascene, right, laid down two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible. Well, in Plato and Aristotle, you have the Greek words would be thumos for the irascible and epithumia for the what concupiscible. And thumos in Greek can have the sense of anger, right?

[8:42] Can have the sense of boldness, right? Um, epithumia is more the sense of sense desire, the desire for the what is pleasing to the senses, huh?

[9:00] Okay. No. Now Thomas's reply here: I answer that the ability to desire following upon sense is one power in genus, right? You know what a genus is, right? A genus is a general kind of thing, right? That has particular kinds of things under, right? And so every genus has at least two particular kinds under, right? So number is a genus having under it, let's say, odd number and even number, right?

[9:31] Okay. Or triangle is a genus having under it equilateral, isosceles, and scalene triangles, right? So he's saying the ability to desire following upon sense, right? What he calls the appetitus sensitivus, right? Is something like a genus, right? And under it we have two different powers, huh? Just like sense is what a genus for the sense of sight and the sense of hearing and the sense of smell and so on, right?

[10:02] Okay. But the sense is divided into at least five particular kinds, isn't it? Five species, right? But this ability to desire following upon sense is divided into two kinds, right? The concupiscible and the irascible. That's what Thomas is saying. That he's going to try to manifest that. Do you see that? Yeah. Yeah. Okay. I mean, this is a very common thing. They have a genus divided into species.

[10:31] Yeah. And we divide government into monarchy and oligarchy, democracy, and every science. Divides usually some kind of general kind of thing into particular kind, right? The sonnet is divided into the what English sonnet and Italian sonnet, huh? Drama is divided into tragedy and comedy, and maybe some other kinds in between, right? Okay. Yes.

[10:59] In English, you know, we sometimes use English word for species, which is form. So we might say that democracy is one form of government. Okay. Okay.

[11:13] Now, to the evidence of this, Thomas says, "Sir, it should be considered that incorruptible natural things, right? Not only is it necessary that there be an inclination to pursuing those things that are what suitable or fitting to you, right? And to what refuse those things that are what harmful, right? Huh? But also, it is necessary to have an inclination to resist what might corrupt you, right? And to resist things that are contrary, huh?

[11:50] Which put some impediment to in the way of the things that are suitable, right? And that infers some kind of what harm, right? And now he gives an example from inanimate things, huh? Just as fire, huh, has a natural inclination, not only that it recede from a lower place, right, which is not suitable for it, and that it tends in a higher place that is suitable for it, but it also resists things that corrupt and what impedes, huh?

[12:32] Yeah. We could take the rock, right? The rock would tend towards the ground, the suitable place of the rock, but it's going to resist being broken, up. Broken up, yeah. Okay. Because, therefore, the ability to desire falling upon sense, petitus sensitivus, is an inclination following upon some what sense knowledge, right? Some sense grasping. Yeah. Just as a natural desire, right, is an inclination fouling upon the what natural form, it is necessary that there be in the sensing part two what powers or abilities to desire.

[13:17] One by which the soul simply is inclined to pursuing those things which are suitable according to the sense, and to refusing those things that are harmful, and this is called the concupiscible So, whereby you move towards what is agreeable to your senses, right? Yeah. And move away from what is disagreeable to your senses, okay.

[13:42] Others, okay, this is the second one. Yeah. By which the animal resists those things that are attacking it or fighting against it, right? Ah, which ah fight against the things or prevent the things which are suitable, right? And that infers some kind of harm upon you. Mm-hmm. And this power is called the what irascible, right? Mm-hmm. Whence, it is said that its object is something that is arduous or difficult.

[14:17] Yeah. Because it tends towards this that it might overcome the contrary things, right? Okay. Okay. And rise above them, right? And he says these two inclinations are not led back. To the same source, huh? Because sometimes, huh, the soul involves itself in sad things or even painful things, right? Okay. Against the inclination, concupiscible Yeah. So that, according to inclination, irascible, it might what? Attack. The what? Or fight against the things that contrary, right?

[15:08] Yeah. See, and what's what's the thing that they say was it was it Saint Benedict right was was suffering from temptations of the flesh right and there were a lot of loose women appearing around and he's supposed to have jumped in a bramble bush or something like that with the thorns. Okay. See now now now see here here he's trying to he's going against the sense inclination of the what pleasure the desire for pleasure yeah yeah okay yeah um

[15:43] whence also the passions of the irascible seem to be repugnant right to the passions of the concupiscible. for concupiscence when aroused diminishes what anger right huh and anger aroused diminishes what concupiscence huh ut in pluribus right okay so the man the woman sometimes are in a an agreeable thing right and then they're not really angry with each other right huh and then they get angry about something and they don't want to make love or something right this is the common example of what he's talking about there right huh okay um

[16:34] and it shows that these are kind of two different powers right that one yeah okay the activity of one diminishes the what other right huh okay

[16:45] ah why it diminishes anger yeah never thought about that you're playing a rough game of tackle football there you know huh may not be too pleasant to the senses getting knocked and tackled and so on you know but you're trying to what trying to beat these other guys right you're really trying to get even with them right or something for the in fact they won the last game last year or the you know they stopped you from winning the tournament I mean the yeah conference or whatever it might be huh there you go million dollar contract yeah People saying to fight on, right?

[17:38] Even though they're getting painful, suffering pain. Kind of drive behind the man, right? Hmm. That's curious. That the activity one diminishes the other. That would suggest that they go back to one source that's feeding both. We mentioned earlier that they don't lead back. to the same source. Yeah. Yeah.

[18:14] But no, you seem kind of a contrariety, though, in the sense in there, in there. Is is is in in general in the soul when one power is very active, right? It kind of what shuts down others. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You know, it's like when I was a little kid. Sometimes you know, where dinner is, he's very hungry, and dinner is not get ready or something or delayed for some reason.

[18:44] But you get him interested in something else, and then he forgets his being what hungry. You know, it happens to us sometimes too. Sometimes. Yeah. So it shows you got kind of two different powers, right? Here. Yeah. That's the kind of example I think he's thinking of.

[19:02] Um. Okay. Ah. So you could knowing this, you could almost use this to pacify people. Our anger, giving candy. That's what you say. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Ah.

[19:20] We see. You see, in the in the rhetoric there, Aristotle talks about the emotions that are used in the courtroom. And two emotions that are very relevant to the courtroom are anger and pity, huh? Pity. Hmm. So if you're on trial up there, and I'm feeling kind of angry towards you, what you've done may seem, you know, more than it is, right? And or what you should be punished, I may want to punish you more than you should be punished, right?

[19:53] But then, if I start feeling pity for you, see, then what you've done may not seem as bad as it is, and I might let you, I might let you off with less punishment than you really should have, right? And a pity is a kind of what

[20:12] sadness, right? Oh, okay. And therefore, it's going to be the concupiscible appetite, right? But anger is what. Concupiscible Irascible, right? See. And so they get in the way of each other, don't they? Huh. See. That when I'm angry with you, anger in a sense is a desire to what get even, a desire to punish, huh? So then, feeling anger that gets in the way of my feeling pity for you, huh?

[20:42] Absolutely. But if I start to feel pity for you, that kind of what diminishes the anger. You see, people sometimes you know sometimes people get angry at somebody and they and they start hitting them and so on, and then they realize they've hurt them, and then they start you know feel sorry for the person or something like that, huh? And give them a hand up or something, you know?

[21:09] And as the pity diminishes, the anger, huh? Ah, so they just they just try to move you to one of those emotions depending on if you. Yeah, Aristotle says it's like warping the ruler before you use it, huh? I think the idea the idea Aristotle is saying is if you warp a ruler, you won't get the proper length of the thing, will you? Yeah. So if I'm angry with you, what you've done will seem, you know, bigger than it it was.

[21:38] If I feel pity, what you've done will seem less than it is, right? I don't get an accurate measurement, right? Yeah. Same. So Aristotle says you shouldn't you know allow these things really in the court, but yeah, but but they are, you know. So if a priest is giving a homily, if he wants people to do some action, he wants to get angry, maybe. But if he wants to maybe help some people, he would stir pity.

[22:02] Yeah. Yeah. Okay. I was telling the story about that guy you know who had the spastic stomach, a friend of mine. Yeah. And he was doing the strict days of the Lenten fast, right? Which I was observing, but he was excused by his his so he'd go to the movie or something, and he'd he'd get a hot dog or two, and then he'd get a big tub of buttered popcorn.

[22:47] See, see, twenty year old is what we make it all. You know, I popcorn. Well, see, if I laugh it or get angry about it, I'm going to kind of forget the fact that I'm hungry, right? It's going to diminish my desire for this, right? His confessor should have told him in conversation to give up movies for the day.

[23:10] It's like we sit down to eat a meal and we're both hungry, you know, and then we get some some kind of terrible angry spat with each other, right? And I get up and I leave without even finishing my meal, right? And I'm hardly aware of the fact that I'm what. Yeah, you see, it happen in human situations, haven't you? Sometimes people get angry and they kind of don't satisfy their hunger, don't satisfy their desire to eat, and they kind of forget it, right?

[23:38] It's like their hunger is diminished, huh? Because been It's a place that's been taken by by the anger. He says it is clear from this also, and this is maybe another point being that the irascible is as it were the fighter for right, and the defensor of the concupiscible. When it rises up right against those things which impede one from the pleasant things or suitable things, right, what the concupiscible desires, and the things that what infer harm, right, rise up against those too, the things that the concupiscible refuses.

[24:24] A little bit like the army there, which Plato compares it to the city, fighting for the common people, right? So the common people are protected in their pursuit of pleasure, right, by the army, huh? And they're protected from those who would harm them, right, and inflict pain upon them by the army, right? Well, it's like that with the concupiscible, right? I mean, the irascible. It's like the defender and the fighter for of the other,

[24:59] okay? And then he draws a conclusion on this. And an account of this fact that it's the fighter for, right? All the passions, right? All the emotions, right? In Latin, these word "passiones" what we'd call what emotions, right? In French, it there too, you know, Descartes has a treatise on the passions of the soul, right? Emotions. And an account of this, all the passions, all the emotions of the irascible, start from the passions of concupiscible, right?

[25:33] And they what terminate in them? He gives an example of that. Just as what anger arises from some what sadness, right, or pain, and in in inflicting revenge, it ends in what joy, huh? You see? An account of this also, he says, the fighting among animals, which involves what anger and so on, are about things that are concupiscible, pleasant to the senses, right? And he often refers what Aristotle says that the animals fight over food and over sex, right?

[26:20] So you see it all the time in the animals, right? You throw a piece of meat between two hungry dogs, and they're going to be fighting over the piece of meat, huh? And sometimes they'll fight over their mate, or who's going to get the female, huh? So that the the desire for what is pleasant there

[26:41] is at the origin of the what passions or the emotions of the irascible. That's always true with anger, or when anger sometimes be a slight. Yeah, but that that causes in sadness or pain, right? Insulted, huh? Then it'll be a physical pain, exactly. Yeah. Okay. But it's certainly something that at least imagination sees, huh? Imagination.

[27:18] The first, therefore, it should be said that the. Notice the first objection is saying what? Isn't it the same power about contraries, right? Well, you do have contrariety then the concupiscible appetite, right? Yeah, yeah. Which is that of what is convenientes? He says, and inconvenientes, but might be more more than suitable or unsuitable, something what agreeable. Or disagreeable to the senses, huh? Yeah. Okay. But the irascible is not, you know, immediately about what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, but to resisting what fights against, right?

[28:03] Yes. Yeah. Something that it's fighting against something that is. Something's getting in the way of the suitable, right? I'm not that left in this section, right there.

[28:29] Now, the contrary is what is agreeable, what is disagreeable to the senses, and your liking or disliking, loving or hating, right? There's a contrariety that you have in the concupiscible, but in the irascible, it's not the contrary of that, but now something else, right? That's getting in the way of of what you you you want, or that's getting in the way of your avoiding what you want to avoid.

[28:59] Now, the second objection is saying, "Well, isn't the ability to desire following upon senses, isn't that just limited to what is agreeable and disagreeable to the senses?" And Thomas said, "Well, no. There are also inward senses, and we talked about those a bit before, didn't we?" The second, it should be said, therefore, that in the what

[29:25] knowing powers, the grasping powers in the sense part of the soul, there is what we call the estimative power, right? Which is perceptive of those things which do not

[29:44] change the senses directly, right? Okay. Thus, also in the sense desire, there is some desiring power. There's some power desiring what is not suitable according to the pleasure of the senses, but according as is useful for the animal for its defense, and this is irascible. Now notice what he's saying there. He's saying that

[30:13] the irascible involves what something more than just the outward senses, huh? Involves what one of the inward senses. Okay. Now, the simple example Thomas often will take is is that the sheep might run away from the wolf, right? Is it because the shape of the wolf is painful to his eyes? No. Not like the fire, right? Burning, earth, you see. But when he sees that shape. This inward sense recognizes this as an enemy, something to be fed from.

[30:52] Okay. Okay. And again, when when the mother animals say, "You know, my recognize your young, right? Something to be fed, right? Okay. " Now, I was I was giving the example. Remember one time they talked to you about that. I met my politician friend, saved this little kitten there, found a little kitten, we started playing with it. What the snake? Yeah, yeah, we had the belt right, yeah, right, and the cat was playing with the belt, and you know, then finally took this belt that was kind of striated, you know, and looked a bit like a snake, right?

[31:27] And it catches it, you know. You can't you can't hold it. You know, I'm trying to avoid it. Right before I was playing with all the other belts we used, but seemed like that was kind of an undeveloped vis estimativa, right? You see, the cat saw that somehow as a what enemy, something to be feared, right? So, in some sense, the irascible is a higher power. It seems, huh?

[31:51] Yeah. Then the concupiscible, at least, it involves a higher sense power, right? Then the concupiscible necessarily, what? Huh? Yeah. And therefore, it's a little bit more closer to reason in some way, huh? Because you're doing this not as immediately pleasing or immediately disagreeable, but because it's a means to getting what is desirable, right? Or avoiding like a means to avoid what is painful, huh? Yeah. And therefore, it seems almost like reasoning, doesn't it?

[32:28] Yes. So an older cat with a more developed estimative power wouldn't have been would have played with it or something. It wouldn't bother them. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean they would not recognize it as a you know make mistake of recognizing it as an enemy, right? Okay.

[32:47] It seems to be where sometimes we think maybe animals can think when they can do that kind of stuff. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's it's really this kind of an automatic thing with them, right? Yeah. Yeah. It's not discursive. Yeah. And it's by nature. You see, the thing they notice about these little birds that are pursued by the big birds, that they crouch when you know after they're born, if one of these birds flies over, right?

[33:15] Well, they have no experience, right? So yeah, and see, we have to be what taught everything from looking right across the street, you know? Yeah, yeah. All these other dangers, right? But but they have inborn, you might say, right? A judgment about these things. They're doing a particular action without knowing the universal. Yeah, yeah. yeah. But they know

[33:43] they're limited to what is you know. Their enemy, right, or their friend, or something of that sort, huh? You see, and they had the universal mind directing them, yeah, somehow, yeah, yeah.

[34:00] I guess you know they say these animals when they're going to be slaughtered, you know, for to be used by us, you know, they kind of, you know, kind of dumb going in there, right? You see, but the but the but they would be they wouldn't be dumb with respect to their natural what enemy, right? Oh, but then they seem to have right inborn a judgment that this is something to be avoided.

[34:31] That's why you know when you go back to Shakespeare's definition of reason, there, huh? Its ability for large discourse, right? Of course, large um is

[34:43] very important to see the difference between us and other animals because they're limited to just certain things. Have I talked to you about those insects? You know, yeah, the wasps. Yeah, the one that would squeeze the head of its victim. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. Have you heard that? It's been a while. No, just just a thought You know, there's one insect that Fabre describes. You know,

[35:07] yeah, a entomologist. But an insect that would take another insect and squeeze its head enough to paralyze it, but not so much as to what kill it. Yeah. And then would go and dig a hole. Yeah. And would seem to run back and forth until the hole was big enough to contain the body of the victim. Okay. And then would get it by the antenna and drag it over to the hole and drop it in.

[35:34] And then would deposit its eggs upon it. And then would cover it up. And when the little ones hatched, right? Yeah. They have a supply of food there ready for their first period of life. It's a long story. Yeah. Now you see yourself. Did they have a mind or reason that could figure out? Yeah. That you don't want to kill the thing because then it'll corrupt Yeah.

[36:00] And you want to paralyze it if you have to squeeze it this much and no more, right? And he was trying to, you know, take his pliers and try to, you know, get the same insect and try to squeeze just enough to paralyze it, and very hard to get just exactly the right touch, right? So it does one thing very well, right? See, but then he noticed that he always pulled the victim by the antenna.

[36:21] So. When he's over, you know, finishing up the hole, he took his little scissors and cut off the antenna. Right. And he came back, you know. Nothing. Now there's a million one other places to grab on. Yeah, yeah. And but in frustration, goes back and fills up the hole without the victim. Interesting. Well, if it could figure out all this thing about squeezing the head. Yeah. You could figure out there's a million one other places to drag it by.

[36:49] And you know, I always say to the girls, I say, you know, our cavemen, you know, predecessors, you know, once they hit the woman over the head and drag her by her hair, you know, back to the cave? Yeah. But if the hair came out, they could certainly figure out that you could pull her by the leg or something. You know, at the thing. Dumb as they were the caveman, right?

[37:07] Yeah. You see, but this thing doesn't have a mind, right? Of course, the first thing that that, Anaxagoras says in the great fragment about the mind is that the mind is what unlimited, right? Yeah. There's something infinite about the mind. So what you see these other animals, they can do one thing or a few things very well, but they're like they're programmed for that. Limited, yeah. And they get them out of that thing, and and they're kind of lost, you know.

[37:35] Interesting. Okay. One thing I notice, you know, I've been around cats a lot, huh? And the cat knows that I'm on their side. I mean, I feed them every day, I pet them, and so on, right? But if I get a little bit aggressive with them, you see, you know, kind of you know, like that, you know, you know, they kind of react, you know, like I'm, you know, really an enemy, right?

[37:57] And you really get kind of tough, you know. And they can't quite realize this is still a game I'm playing like that. You see, you know, they're just kind of reacting that way. Mm-hmm. Uh...

[38:13] I know it's true. if you look around the corner at a cat, huh? it'll... Because you see the cats facing each other out down, down, down in the thing, and uh, uh, you see two cats facing each other. you know, it's kind of interesting. to see the way they go to kind of uh, certain bodily gestures, you know, that, you know, that uh, be interpreted somehow.

[38:40] The other one too. Yeah, Who's talking about me? Now, to the third, it should be said that hate, simply speaking, pertains to the concupiscible. But by reason of the fighting which is caused from hate, right? It can pertain to the irascible. It's like saying that what the irascible there is an effect of the hate, right? Yeah. Okay. Ah. So associated with. Yeah. Yeah.

[39:30] So Shakespeare, you know, often you know the way he speaks, you know, he'll use the effect of one thing as an adjective of the other, right? Okay. Oh. Yeah. So hating envy or something like that, right? Or he'll say something like, you know,

[39:54] loving hate. A hate that proceeds from some love, right? You know, in the wars there between the the Capulets and the Montagues, huh? At the love of their excessive love of their own household, right? Leads them to hate the other ones, huh? Okay. So would the irascible be then a species of the concupiscible No, not a species, no. but as he said in the body of the article, the emotions of the irascible arise from some emotion of the concupiscible Start.

[40:26] from Because it's the fighter for them, right? And then they can terminate in something if you have victory, right? Huh? You see. Okay. So I want something, right? I want the girl, but you want the girl too, so we have a fight, right? That's involving the irascible, anger, right? But it could also involve boldness, which is another emotion, right? And so, but I overcome you, right? And now I have victory over you, and now I what?

[41:02] Rejoice, right? Because I'd like the, you know, army or the country rejoices after they've won the, the war, the battle. Okay.