De Anima (On the Soul)
128. Summa I, Q. 82, Art. 2: Does the Will Will Everything of Necessity? The Last End, Particular Goods and the Vision of God
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[0:00] the feast of the Holy Angels, Guardian Angels. Do you have that same calendar? We don't, but we. I mean, we're probably not right, so we. We invoke them always when we start here. We have to. Name of the Father and the Son and Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly.

[0:27] Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that's written. Name of the Father and the Son and Holy Spirit, Amen. So up to Article Two here in Question eighty-two, I believe. Yes.

[0:48] The second one proceeds thus: It seems that the will of necessity wills whatever it wills. For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of Divine Names that the bad is aside from the will. Just

[1:11] the will always wills something good, right? From necessity, therefore, the will tends towards the good proposed to it, huh? The second objection: the object of the will is compared to it as the mover to the movable.

[1:34] In fact, in general, the the heart, whether you mean the. Emotions or even the will is a power that is what undergoes, that is acted upon by its object, just as the reason and the senses are acted upon too.

[1:55] Ah, but the motion of the movable necessarily follows upon that of the mover. Therefore, it seems that the object of the will of necessity moves it, huh?

[2:13] Moreover, just as what is grasped by the senses is the object of the sense desire, so what is grasped by the understanding is the object of the intellectual understandable desire or ability to desire. As we said, appetitus means there right, which is called the what voluntas, the will.

[2:37] But what is grasped by the senses of necessity moves the what the sense ability to desire, right? For Augustine says, on the commentary Genesis to the letter, that the animals are moved by what they see. That's true about the cat, huh? The dog.

[3:00] Therefore, it seems that what is grasped by the understanding of necessity moves the will. Now, that's based upon a what proportion? This third argument, huh? And Thomas will be pointing out that the

[3:16] object grasped by the senses and the object grasped by the understanding are not to their respective powers exactly the same. But we'll see that and get to the reply.

[3:34] Well, the first two objections are looking at the will itself, kind of. But against all this is what Augustine says: the will is that by which one sins and lives rightly, uh. And. Thus, it has itself two opposites. Therefore, not of necessity does it will whatever it happens to what will. Now, Thomas is going to

[4:04] reply to this. I'll sit there. Yep, just gonna hit this thing. My sniffles down, so for posterity. Your nose problem wouldn't be because of the dog at all. Would it? No, no. I've had it the last few days here. As you say, okay, it might be psychosomatic because of correcting exams. Yeah, it might be because of the chill here.

[4:26] Psychosomatic means what? Psyche affecting the soma, which is the body. So it might be that that is. Okay, I answer that it should be said that the will does not, from necessity, will whatever it wills. For the evidence of which, it should be considered. And I'm making a comparison here, right? That just as the understanding naturally and from necessity, huh? Sometimes you'll call those, put those together and say, by natural necessity, right?

[5:05] That the understanding naturally and from necessity adheres to the first what beginnings, huh? Okay. So likewise, the will to the last end, as has been said already, huh? Now, that's a common comparison we've seen before, right? That the end is to the will, like the what axioms and the kind of obvious beginnings there of our knowledge are to the understanding.

[5:36] We make use that comparison for many reasons to benefit many things. He says there are some understandable things which do not have a necessary connection to the first principles or beginnings, and that would be, for example, contingent propositions, right?

[5:57] Like, for example, it happens to be true that Berquist is sitting now, right? Or you are sitting now, huh? And can does that have a necessary connection with the statements that it's impossible to be and not be, and a whole is larger than its part, and so on? Does it follow necessarily from those that I will be sitting here now? No.

[6:19] And therefore, he says, for the removal of such propositions, right? It doesn't follow that one is removing the what first principles, huh? In other words, I can hold on, right, to the whole being larger than the part and other things of that sort, whether I accept or reject the statement that I'm sitting, huh? That you're sitting or some other contingent thing, huh? Okay.

[6:49] But some statements, some propositions, are what necessary, which have a necessary connection with the first beginnings, and these are what we call demonstrable conclusions, huh? Like the conclusions in geometry that you have that follow necessarily from things that are seen to be necessarily true, and the removal of the first beginnings would follow from the removal of such things, huh? So if I denied one of the conclusions of geometry, I'd have to go back and deny one of the beginnings, huh?

[7:27] Because the conclusions of geometry follow necessarily from the what beginnings of geometry, okay? Yeah. And he says now he makes a distinction here. And to these, the understanding of necessity assents, right? To those things that follow necessarily from the beginnings, huh? When, huh?

[8:01] The necessary connection of the conclusions to the beginnings is known, right? Through the deducing, the deduction of a demonstration. A demonstration, as you may recall from logic, is a what? Syllogism, right? Making a what? Know the cause, and that which it is the cause, and cannot be otherwise, huh? But if you recall, a syllogism is logic, huh? It's a speech or an argument in which some statements laid down. Another follows necessarily, right?

[8:40] Yeah. So if the premises or the beginnings, from which you syllogize, are also necessarily true, and seen by the reason is necessarily true, and then sees that this necessarily follows from that, then it's necessarily ascends to that conclusion, huh? Yeah. Okay. Yes. If it doesn't see them as following from them, then it could what possibly reject it, right? Okay. So if you talk to somebody, say about some theorem that's somewhere along in geometry, but they've never gone to the demonstrations, and they haven't even maybe heard that Euclid or somebody else had demonstrated it, right?

[9:20] Yeah. And you ask them, "Is this so?" They might say, "Oh, maybe I don't know," and they might be wishy-washy about whether it's true or not, huh? Okay. I mean, if you heard the Pythagorean theorem and had never heard the demonstration, or even heard that Pythagoras had demonstrated it, you would, you might think that maybe isn't so, right? Okay. Or that famous theorem that I can book two, you know, where you can have what the same perimeter but more area, and even less perimeter and more area, and people might, you know, tend to eject that.

[10:01] You have some other thing like that in arithmetic where you'd say that the the sum of two numbers can be greater than the sum of two other numbers, but their product be less. And someone who doesn't really have a mathematical mind might say, "Well, that doesn't seem right to me." If a if a plus b are greater than x plus y, wouldn't a times b be greater than x times y?

[10:28] Kind of think that, wouldn't you? Yeah. You see, and so you might even think something false, huh? Because you don't see necessary connection with things that you do know necessarily to be true.

[10:45] But no, it's but it is not ascend from necessity before it knows necessity of the connection with the beginnings, right? To demonstration, huh? Before the demonstration has been what seen, right, or understood, right? Then it doesn't necessarily adhere to those conclusions, huh? Not until you see that that follows necessarily from that.

[11:12] And incidentally, you have something like that in in theology and in the faith too, don't you? Because sometimes a person on some matter that has not been defined by the church, right? He is what mistaken about it, right? Huh? That doesn't make him a heretic, right? Okay. But maybe in the course of time they realize that this position there contradicts something that follows from the what. Articles of faith, and at that point he would be starting to be a heretic if he wanted to adhere to that.

[11:47] Okay, but before he sees that connection, right? Then he could quite innocently maybe think that, right? Okay. Well, now he's going to make this comparison, right? He's going to say, just as there are some things that reason always necessarily sees as true, everybody sees them to some extent. Other things, right, have no necessary connection with those, right? And yet, other things do have necessary connection, but it has to be pointed out the necessary connection by demonstration.

[12:28] So likewise, he's going to have those three things in the will, right? The will necessarily wills the last end. You necessarily want to be what happy. You don't necessarily and you necessarily refuse the idea that you want to be miserable and wretched. Okay.

[12:47] Now there are some things that are not necessarily connected with being happy, and so the will is not going to necessarily will those, right? There are other things that may be necessarily connected with being happy, but before you see the necessary connection, you suddenly don't necessarily what will those, huh?

[13:10] So he says, likewise, huh? From the side of the will, right? There are some particular goods which do not have a necessary connection with what beatitude, huh? Because without these, one is able to be what blessed, right, huh? Okay. So do I have to put a tie on today? I think I necessarily willed to put a tie on today? Not one with a pattern. You see? You know?

[13:48] Well, I don't see necessary connection between my being happy today and and having a tie on, huh? It seems to me kind of indifferent to my happiness, sir. Is he right? So do I necessarily will to put a tie on today? Maybe to put this particular tie on, right? Sometimes my wife gives me a choice between this tie or that tie. These two will go, you know.

[14:10] I can't always take the other tie, you know. And so either tie will meet her stringent requirements of matching things, you know. But she gives me either one is acceptable. In case I don't necessarily will one or the other, do I? Okay.

[14:33] So he says there are some particular goods which do not have a necessary connection to beatitude. Because without these, one is able to be blessed, huh? And the will does not inherit these things of necessity, right? It doesn't will them of necessity. But there are some things having a necessary connection to beatitude, huh?

[15:03] Those are the things by which what man adheres to God, right? In which, in whom alone, our true beatitude consists, huh? Okay. Now, sometimes people will think you don't have to believe, right? Right. If people think that, huh? But if you can't

[15:32] love God without believing, right? Well, then you might say, "Hey, well, then believing is also necessary, huh? " Okay. Or some, in fact, you could love God without loving your what neighbor or something of that sort, right?

[15:51] Um. You know, you might think, "well, I can love one man and not love another man? " Right? So I can love one man all the time. Why can't love God, loving my neighbor? Say, but maybe later on you say this is necessary, right? In order to achieve the end,

[16:15] okay. But nevertheless, before one has the what certitude, huh, of the divine vision, huh, the necessity of this sort of connection, ah. Excuse me, I must be not right. But nevertheless, before right, through the certitude of the divine vision, the necessity of this connection is demonstrated, right? The will does not, from necessity, adhere to God, huh? Nor to those things which are of God, huh? So there might be some people in the world today, right, who don't see adhering to God is necessary for their happiness, huh?

[16:59] And therefore, they don't necessarily will to adhere to God, huh? Okay. Now, what does it say there in St. Paul? Huh? Without belief, it's impossible to please God. Remember that. That's an often quoted text when you talk about the necessity of faith. Yeah. But there might be some people who don't see that necessity, right? Huh? And therefore, they wouldn't will to believe as if this was something what necessary for their what beatitude, huh?

[17:27] Even though, in fact, it is necessary, huh? But he says the will of someone seeing God, huh? Seeing the very essence of God, on the very nature of God, seeing God as He is, or face to face, he of necessity adheres to God, right? Huh? Yeah.

[17:49] Just as now of necessity we wish to be what blessed or happy, right? See, but when we see God face to face, we realize only in this do we find our real happiness, our ultimate happiness, our last happiness, huh? And then when you see God face to face, you cannot not will, Him, huh? You see, It's, it is clear, therefore, that the will not from does not will from necessity everything that it what will, son.

[18:22] Okay. Nassau Thomas is kind of manifesting that by a likeness to what you see in the reason, Reason yeah? Is there Any question about that? The body of the article, there. Can I just uh review the basic points again. So there's, you said something about. No, see three points, right? Yeah, he's pointing out three things in the understanding, right? And then, likewise, three things in the will. But in the understanding, he's pointing out that there's some things that reason necessarily adheres to, huh?

[19:10] And it can't really deny them. You can deny them in words, right? But you can't really what, in your mind, think they're not so, huh?

[19:22] And these things are the very first beginnings of our knowledge. What they call the what axioms, huh? Okay. Greek word for worthy, right? Okay. Other things, huh? May or may not have a necessary connection with those what things that the reason necessarily accepts, huh? Now those things that have no necessary connection with that reason doesn't necessarily think one or the other, right? Okay. So George Washington was the first president of the country.

[20:02] George Washington was not the first president of the country. I could think either one, right? Okay. But other things have a necessary connection with the things, huh? But you may or may not see, right? Necessary connection they have with it. In the case of the reason, that requires a what syllogism called the demonstration, huh? Whereby you see necessary connection. So those other things you may or may not be what

[20:38] able to assent to, and not assent to, or in some case you may you may have to assent to them because you see this follows what necessarily, right? Okay.

[20:51] Now the basis of the comparison is that the knowing that the will wills something of necessity, but what it wills of necessity is the last end, but in a kind of confusion, right? Happiness, huh? Okay. Um. Without maybe knowing exactly what happiness consists in, right? What's required for happiness, huh? But the idea of some kind of a what perfect good, right? Huh? You see that even in the novelist.

[21:20] Did you ever read Vanity Fair by Thackeray? That's kind of his his greatest novel, we know, but the name Vanity Fair would suggest something, right, about the the vanity and the imperfection of happiness in this life, right? At the end, you know, he says, you know, close up the box and puppets, you know, I mean, like the characters in the in the novel, and he says something like this.

[21:44] It's not exact, quote, but it's fairly close. Who in this world ever gets what he wants? He says, or he says, having gotten it is satisfying. You see, so we're not exactly sure what happiness consists in. So, when I was a little boy, I thought my father, you know, was very foolish. He didn't fill the refrigerator with soda, orange and grape, root beer, and so on, because with his money he could afford to do that, and he could drink soda all day long and be a happy man.

[22:17] Well, now fortunately, my father didn't fill the refrigerator with soda, but if he had, I would have discovered, right, sooner or later, right, that this is not entirely satisfying, right, that there is something missing still, right, even though the refrigerator is full and you can drink as much soda as you want to all day long. Um. So you go through life, you think, you know, if I could only get to that.

[22:44] So when I was in high school, I thought I got kind of interested in the life of the mind. Say, oh boy, wait till I get to college, right? But then you realize there's some, you know, problems in college. It's not all what you think it's going to be, and then you think, well, gee, it's just when I get I get to graduate school that I can really concentrate on philosophy like I want to do, and so on.

[23:02] But there's some problems in graduate school too, and say, well, now when I'm out of teaching, then I can really do the life of the mind. but there are exams to be corrected, other things to be done, and you realize that things are not, then you're a little bit discouraged now, because I was correcting one of the exams here in the philosophy of nature. Of course, we we talk about Anaximenes who said that air is the beginning of all things, and he's influenced by life because there tends to, you know, in the early Greeks and Homer and so on, to think of the soul as being air.

[23:34] Yeah, and the ancient person kind of imagines it as being air, say, and of course, in the course of my lecture, there I happen to mention how in Genesis, huh, it kind of expressed the infusion of the soul metaphorically, at least, by God breathing into the what clay, right? Well, anyway, on this answer, he's he's talking about Anaximenes, and he says, and and comparing Anaximenes with Thales, who said water was the beginning of all things, right?

[24:07] And so he says, Adam breathed into Eve air. He didn't pour water into her. The way that came about, Wasn't Adam breathing into Eve? it was God breathing into the clay, the soul of what Adam, you know, but some of these things make you laugh, but other things make you want to weep, you know. Sometimes, you know, the way they they understand or misunderstand things, they should say so.

[24:38] So you're pursuing a happiness. But you're not exactly sure in what or or where you're going to find that happiness, huh? See, and you don't realize maybe fully that it's only in God you're going to find this full perfect happiness, son. So you know you often quote the words of Augustine that was made as for thyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee, right?

[25:04] But very often our hearts are restless more or less, huh? They're resting, or trying to rest in something that doesn't give you rest, something that can't satisfy you, huh? And so

[25:18] until you you really see that this is the only place your happiness is, you don't necessarily will be, son. But it's only fully when you see God as He is that you realize that He is the what satisfaction of all your desires, huh? That He is your real happiness, huh? Okay.

[25:40] Now there are some things that are not necessarily connected with your happiness, huh? Like my example with a tie there, right, huh? Okay. But when I go into the restaurant, you know they give me a menu there, and you know I know that salmon won't contribute to my happiness, That's opposed to my happiness, but I mean there's probably you know it's a good restaurant. There's several things I could eat, and I don't really see one of them as being necessary for my happiness.

[26:04] I could eat something, but I don't necessarily have to eat this meal or that meal, right? So there my will doesn't necessarily will one or the other.

[26:14] And but even those things that do have a necessary connection with my happiness, I don't necessarily will them unless I what see that, right? Okay.

[26:30] Now the first objection was saying that of the as Dionysius says the bad is what praeter voluntatem it's a aside from the will, okay? Now what he's pointing out there Dionysus is that we never will the bad as such, huh? We will the good as such, huh? Now what we will may in many cases be something bad, but we will it either because of the good that is in it.

[27:04] Like I want to drink the delicious poison, not because it's poisonous, but because it's delicious, right? So I'm not really willing the badness, the bad as such, right? Or because it appears to be good, right?

[27:21] My standard example there is the last drink at the party, see? When they say you want another drink, and you say yes, and then after you drink it, you know you don't feel so good, and so on. Excuse yourself, more or less fast, huh? And did you want to drink that last? To get sick to your stomach? No. You want that last drink because it seemed or appeared to be a way of continuing the good time or increasing the good time, and actually it was the way of ending the good time, right?

[27:54] So you didn't will it insofar as it was bad, but because it was good in some way. Now, sometimes it might be a more difficult example, right? Because sometimes people seem to be out to break the law. See, what's a famous story? Is it Dostoevsky there, Crime and Punishment, right? Well, the young man sets out to what? To murder some innocent person, right? Not that he has any against this old woman or something, right?

[28:28] But just to kind of show that he's above the law. See, but there's a kind of a false appearance of good there, isn't there? Right. If all You guys are under the law, obey the law, but I'm above the law. See, I rise above all of you, right? What's kind of perverse understanding, because this is not really the way to rise above everybody else to to murder somebody.

[28:53] Is to go go below most people who are not, you know, murderers, but he's pursuing it under a certain appearance of good, right? Okay. And likewise, say if if you rob the bank, right? Does a man rob the bank because it's unjust to rob the bank? No, no. And I always tell that story of I guess this famous bank robber. that got caught a number of times, and out of curiosity, like the judge says, you know, why do you go around robbing banks all the time?

[29:27] And he said, well, that's where the money is. Don't you know that? But obviously, he's pursuing the good there, right? Huh? Say, or suppose you what you you annoy me, right? Huh? And so I decided to get rid of you. Well, am I getting rid of you because it's unjust and evil to take your life? No, no. That's the way of getting rid of annoyance in my life.

[29:56] So there's some good, however tenuous and however weak it is, huh? That is what moving my will, huh? You see that? Okay. So Dionysius is touching upon that. That's very important to see.

[30:16] Um. Now, how's Thomas going to answer that objection? Right. Of course, the objection is saying, from necessity, therefore the will tends towards the good proposed to it. But you have to realize that the object of the will is good in a universal way, because reason knows the good in a universal way, huh? And good extends to what everything in some way, right? It's one of these so-called what Transcendentals, huh?

[30:52] Everything that is in some way is good, insofar as it is, huh? Okay. And so it's not as if the good is just one thing, right? So I'm going to necessarily will something insofar as it is good, or appears to be good, or has some element of good in it in some way. I see it as good, but that covers what infinity of things, right? Okay. So I'm not willing for that reason any particular thing that I might see as good or might even be good, right?

[31:33] Because I must will something in some way seems good to me, huh? Okay. This when we call good a transcendental. That's this. They use the term transcendental because it transcends the ten genera, right? And fits being as being.

[31:53] It's at the beginning of the De Veritate that Thomas gives a nice distinction of the transcendentals, uh. The beginning of the De Veritate, we can look at that sometime.

[32:06] I'm sorry. Beginning of the what? De Veritate The question is disputata de veritate. yeah. Of course, following Aquinas have a center, right? He gives a distinction between being, thing, right, one, good, true, and and adequate something, right? Okay.

[32:28] It takes a long time to understand, you know, why those are completely universal, huh? I just mentioned that because you got to realize how universal good is, huh?

[32:46] It sounds so many different things and in so many ways, right? But the fact that you always will something under the aspect of being good or appearing good, right, It doesn't in any way necessitate you to go in this or that, right? Okay. This is vice versa. There's nothing in this world so good that you couldn't consider it as bad in some way. Because anything, even like praying, right?

[33:12] Anything you do prevents you from doing something else. Yeah. So praying might prevent me from, for instance, from sleeping. Right. It's good to sleep, right?

[33:22] Studying prevents the student from playing, right? Playing was good. You see, so in some way, I can see everything that you propose. I can see something bad, and therefore I can kind of refuse it, right? Yeah. You see, because it's a universal thing. Okay.

[33:42] Now the second objection. Moreover, the object. Well, let's just look at the reply to this objection. by kind of summaries there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will tends is not able to tend towards anything, or tends towards nothing, except under the what notion of the good, right? Yeah. Okay. But because the good is multiplex, right? And in kind of this is not determined from necessity, or by necessity to just one of these, huh?

[34:15] Okay. So is the bully, huh? See some good in what he's doing? Mm-hmm. Yeah. His appearance. Of superiority to those that he is able to bully without them

[34:38] being able to defend themselves. Now the second objection: the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the what movable.

[34:50] But the motion of the movable necessarily follows from the mover. Therefore, it seems that the object of the will moves it from necessity, just like I kind of move this glass of necessity, right? Okay.

[35:08] Thomas says, "Well, yeah, but the the mover has got to be strong enough to what? Overcome. Yeah, overcome the resistance, right, or overcome the

[35:20] the mobile thing, huh? Okay, so I have a hard time moving this building here, right? Moving that pillar over there. Maybe Samson could do it, but I don't know if I can do it. Yes, sir.

[35:33] So Thomas is going to examine that premise that the mover necessarily moves the mobile, right? To the second, therefore, it should be said that the mover then, from necessity, causes motion in the mobile when the power of the mover exceeds the what power of the mobile to resist. Thus, that its whole possibility is subject to the mover. But since the possibility of the will with respect to what good universally, right, and to a perfect good, huh?

[36:11] Its whole possibility, right, is not subject to some what particular good, right? And therefore, from necessity, and therefore is not moved from necessity or by necessity by that, huh?

[36:29] I want to say by necessity in English, but the the Greek Latin is ek. right? From and therefore is not moved by that from necessity, huh? Or of necessity. Do you understand that kind of replies given to that second objection?

[36:54] You know how sometimes when they when they present you know something they want to sell to you, let's say, right? And they give you certain incentives, you know, like you know to pay the first month, or you don't have to, yeah, yeah, whatever it might be, right? You get a rebate or whatever it might be, you know, but they kind of fill these things in, right? But then sometimes the salesman says, "I am going to make you an offer you can't resist.

[37:19] " Yeah. Well, matter of fact, you can resist it, right? But it's getting what? Harder to resist, right? Huh? Yeah. Okay. But I doubt if the car salesman could give an offer that I could resist. Say. But it's because my will is what. That doesn't exhaust the possibility of my willing, right? That could. I could will nothing more than this car, right? And I could will what?

[37:53] Much more perfect things than the car, right? And and my ability to will is much wider than the car, right? Son. I see. So on the same week or the same day, they'd be trying to sell me a house and a car and computer. Who knows what else, right? Huh? But my will is not what. Exhausted by any one of these things, huh? Its ability to will is not what.

[38:19] Absorbed, you might say, in this in the goodness of the car, the goodness of the house, of the computer, these other things, huh? I can will many other goods, infinity other goods, right? And I can will things much more perfect than this, huh? So this doesn't move my will of what. necessity, huh? Doesn't fill, so to speak, my will, huh? It's like no anything else. But when you see God face to face, right?

[38:46] Then your your will is going to be completely what satisfied, completely filled, huh? A little bit like in Thanksgiving, your stomach is completely what satisfied, and maybe too much, right? And you couldn't want anything more, right? I say, maybe can't eat dessert or something, you know. That's how the Americans on Thanksgiving, right? But you know, what is it? They kind of interesting that they call the heaven sometimes a banquet, right?

[39:20] Say, but it's even greater than the Thanksgiving dinner, right? Convivium, right? This is so much food, right? You couldn't possibly, right? All you can eat, but more. So you couldn't possibly have too much of this. Say, then your your your your what your ability to will is completely what at rest, you might say, huh? You know, completely. Then you necessarily will God, huh? So you don't have to worry about sinning anymore.

[39:50] I used to read it as a little, you know, saying, "you know, sin in the deathbed, you know, ah, shall sin no more, you know, because you all have these little faults and greater faults, and you know, as Saint John says, if you say have no sin, you're a liar, and so on, right? " So the saint realized that even in little ways or whatever, he's sitting up to the last moment almost, you know.

[40:09] But when he gets over there and sees God face to face, then he's not going to. It's going to be completely moved by that object, right? But you don't realize how good God is, huh? And it's hard to understand how good God is, um.

[40:33] I was mentioning how Thomas, the two little helps Thomas gives us, right, huh? He's showing that God and creatures, you know, is no better than God alone, right? You know, and I say, well, one ratio he uses, like the goodness of the creature is goodness of God, like a point is to a line, huh? Not like a shorter line is to a longer line, right? Yeah. See?

[41:00] Because if you add a shorter line to a longer line, you get even longer line, right? Yeah. But you add the goodness of the creature to God, get nothing better. see? Otherwise, God would be under kind of a moral necessity of willing the better, right? It's you know, when you study God's will, you realize that in no way necessarily wills us, right? That it's pure liberality on His part, right?

[41:24] Right. Pure generosity, right? And that's why you know Avicenna's very good there. Thomas always quotes Avicenna, right? Avicenna says God alone is liberal, right? You know, he gives without getting any return, right? You see, and so it's like adding a point to a line; it's no more than line. Or he'll say, you know, it's like a hole in one of its parts, because because the creature just has in a partial way, right?

[41:53] Very partial way, what God has completely, right? So, Dwayne Berquist in the arm of Dwayne Berquist is no more than Duane Berquist, and that's the way. what is God and the creatures good, right? No more than God alone.

[42:14] You know how strongly Christ speaks too. Sometimes you know, speaking of self and human nature, why do you call me good, right? He says God alone is good, huh? I mentioned those ways of speaking. God has, I think, it was both to Moses and Abraham. I think Where he says, "You know, follow me, and I will show you every good." Thomas says, "It est myself. That is myself."

[42:41] So, hard for us to understand, but he's going to completely, in a sense, satisfy our ability to love. Right? In fact, you're going to say,

[42:58] "My ability to love is exhausted by God." Right? You know, it's almost like you're going to be willing like God wills, right? He wills everything else, but willing himself, huh? But you realize, huh?

[43:14] You know, Aristotle says, you know, the soul is in some way all things, right? And and the will, in some sense, is open to all good, right? To perfect good, huh? You realize that kind of infinite capacity of the of the heart to love, but then the only object can really meet the infinite capacity is is the divine goodness, huh? And therefore, Augustine says very well that it was made for this, huh?

[43:43] And Thomas sometimes, when he's arguing about the infinity of God, you know, the same way he applies it to the to the mind, right? You know that our mind is ordered to something infinite, and God is really the only thing that is simply infinite, huh? So God is the only thing that ultimately can satisfy our mind, or something like that, from you know the will, right? It's ordered to something infinite, huh?

[44:15] Even Juliet sees that, huh? A kind of a little clever scene there in the in the. In garden scene you know, where Juliet comes out on the thing she kind of confesses to the stars her love for Romeo, right? And then he comes forward and declares his love and so on. And then she says, she had to take her love back again. See, he says why? So she could give it again, right?

[44:49] To be frank, she says, and frank means what? Free, right? Oh, frank means a freeman. The original meaning of the frank. But then she says, but then she realizes she doesn't have to do that because she can always give him more love, right? And then she speaks of her love as being infinite, right? You can always give more love, right? Okay. With God, you give all your love, and still not enough.

[45:20] That's kind of interesting, you know, the commandment to love, huh? To love the Lord your God with your what? Whole heart, right? Okay, that's what Thomas talked about here, right? You see, God's the only object that can fully what satisfy the heart, right? Okay.

[45:44] His capacity to love, as you might say, is is what the object is proportioned to its capacity to love, right? You know, that doesn't fall short of it, right?

[45:57] As opposed to what the the the, the, Thackeray's saying there, right? Who in this life forgets what he wants? You're having God and dissatisfied, right? You think, you think, kind of joke about Americans, you know, consumer society, you know, happiness is one purchase, one more purchase away, right? I mean, I mean, you know, people they get they get you know better TV set, they put out this digital TV, wherever it is, you know, and computers, you know, and they're always getting a new computer or something, you know, and they're replacing these things, you know, but they they they're never satisfied, right?

[46:30] Huh? Something like that with money, right? The more money you get, kind of the more money you want. huh? I remember seeing an older businessman kind of breaking down almost into tears because he couldn't make another killing, right? Something was stopping him from making another. I said to myself, you know, he didn't need the money, obviously, right? You know, it's just that you know want to accumulate more.

[46:58] I don't know, but you're never satisfied, no matter how much you accumulate. That's about Alexander the Great, you know, weeping that he had no more worlds to conquer, right? But if he had more worlds to conquer, he would not be. Oh, he's Caesar was so ambitious, you know. He's constantly thinking of greater things he could do. As Plutarch says, huh?

[47:19] But okay, so you see the ways you apply them to the second objection, huh? These goods that are only partial and are not necessarily for happiness—they don't have an ability to what move our what heart necessarily, right? There's no such thing as an offer I can't resist, right? But I hear people saying that you know sometimes in the the world, you know, like when a man leaves one company or one institution to go another one, right?

[48:02] Yeah. I remember, you know, the wife of the man saying, you know, to my wife, you know, well, they made him an offer you couldn't resist, So you had to go. I mean, obviously they're giving him a big raise or whatever it is, right? So they can get his services, right? I mean, I've heard that phrase all my life, you know. If it's too good, if you don't know if you can't resist, but but is it, you know, more salary, whatever it is, right?

[48:27] Is that is that enough? No. See, the two you can't resist. Is that kind of a a what? Hyperbole Yeah. hyperbole. yeah. See But you can say when you see God face to face, right? I can't resist you. I can't resist you.

[48:50] Now, the third objection is a little different one. Now, the third one was saying the sense desire, right, seems to be moved necessarily by its object, especially in the other animals, huh?

[49:08] Well, then, I wouldn't be the same thing in the reason and the will, right? He says to the third, it should be said that the sensing power, right, the senses, is not a vis collativa Now, what does the word collativa mean? Means collecting together. Yeah, bringing together. collatio, right? Huh? To bring together, right? Huh? So, when we define and when we reason, what do we do? Not when I reason, I bring together at least two statements, and from them I have a discourse, right?

[49:45] I run to a conclusion, right? When I define, I bring together the genus and the differences, right? And then I see something, huh? When I add and subtract and multiply, I bring together two numbers, right? And then from that, I get a third one, right? So sometimes you see, you know, in logic, you know, I see Albert the great Thomas too, with Albert and Averroes you know, collativus and discursivus That's where he describes our reason, right?

[50:12] Collativus, it brings together things, and then it what sees something else from those things that's brought together, right? So it's discursivus, huh? Okay. We talked about Shakespeare's definition there, right? And how the word discourse means what? It means kind of it comes the word running, right? But when applied to the reason, it can mean not only the reason going from one thing to another, but it's coming to know what it doesn't know through what it does know, right?

[50:40] And that's kind of the discourse that defines reason, huh? And but kind of the beginning of that is just being collativus, right? Just like you need two numbers to get another number, right? Or two statements get another statement, so you have to kind of bring things together, right? Okay.

[51:01] Thomas in the Body article, where you can see the vis collativus of Thomas Aquinas, right, is bringing together the what reason or understanding and the will and kind of seeing them alongside each other, comparing the two, right? We do the diverse things and and understanding something, right, in the comparison of them.

[51:22] So he says the sense power is not a power that brings together diverse things as reason does, but simply, huh? It grasps something one, right? Okay. So the what dog it smells the meat, right? Okay, we

[51:41] were the first cat we had. We had her, had him up at the, the lake there where we were staying one summer, and my mother had cleaned some fish and on some brown thing and put in the wastebasket. You know, the cat had to get the wastebasket. But they, they smell one thing, right? They're not comparing things. Just one thing, and in the wastebasket there was just going to be some fishy or something in that, in that thing.

[52:07] Um, and therefore, according to that one thing, it's moved in a determined way that the sense desires, huh? Okay, but reason is what able to bring together many things, huh? And therefore, for many things, the intellectual ability to desire the will, right, is able to be moved, and not from one from what necessity, huh? And that's the reason why we think that the the newborn baby, right, is not really responsible, right, in the way that someone who has the use of reason and can bring things together, yes, huh?

[52:52] But in a way, you know, the cause of our sinning is our will, what moving towards the good known by reason in some way, but not sufficiently what considered, right, huh?

[53:12] Okay, so when the man robs the bank, right, he thinks, well, this is a way to get a lot of money. This is a way to get an easy street. Right, this is going to be an easy, easy thing, easy hit, and he's not considering the whole thing, right? That isn't just money, and that you know it's unjust and all the other things, right? So his will is is not awaiting a full consideration of what of reason, huh?

[53:42] Okay. Now there's always a quote of Hamlet there when he tells why he chose Horatio as a friend. huh? He says, "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, right, her election has sealed thee for herself, right." And he starts to go into the reasons why he chose him as a friend. Huh? That he was not passionate slave, right? Give me that man that is not passion slave.

[54:12] Well, some men are a slave of their own fear, some of their anger, some of their lust, you know, some of their desire for drugs and so on, right? So reason can compare these men, right, huh? And see their differences and see which man is better to have as a friend, huh? See, and also he said, "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice," well, the soul is mistress of her choice.

[54:38] When she has the what, vis collativa right, and discursiva when it has the power to bring things together and compare them and distinguish them, right, and to reason, right, and then it's what, really able, right, to what, be mistress of her choice, yeah. So a simpler way of saying it now, a lot of times would be that, but therefore, since the will is a blind faculty, it can't do that.

[55:07] It's dependent entirely on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But but yeah, I see. If my will, is too much inclined, let's say to, money or something of this sort, right, huh? Then my will may not wait for my reason to consider whether this is a suitable way of increasing my wealth, huh?

[55:33] Is it? Start repeating that again, please. Yeah, I say if my will, right, yeah, is too strongly inclined to towards money, right, right, and so my reason then is thinking of how to get money, right, and there are some ways of getting money that are what, unjust and questionable, right, in number of ways, eh? Well, my will may not what, wait for a full consideration of reason, but it will what, jump, you might say, right, at any what, suggestion of how you can quickly and clearly, right, get some more money, say, without thinking.

[56:19] In fact, it might be being unjust to somebody else or unnecessarily, you know, robbing, you know, but my doing something else that isn't quite right, yeah. Wouldn't it be the sensitive appetite more than the rational appetite, like especially in saying the, yeah, yeah, you know, instead of yeah, yeah, but but as you said before, though, see, the sense appetite doesn't have control over my members, right, without the consent of the will, huh?

[56:48] See, okay, and I see when Aristotle takes up the virtues and the vices in books two through six, right, of the Nicomachean Ethics, then book seven he talks about some things that are above or below vice. He talks among other things about continence and incontinence, huh? And there he's talking about the man who, um, doesn't have his sense appetite habituated to the good, right, but his reason will are not entirely corrupt, and there's a struggle for him, right, okay.

[57:30] So you left your money around there, and I can take it without getting caught, right? See, now if I have a struggle. You know, to take it. Then I'm not yet, you know, virtuous, right? But not completely vicious either. You see, I'm in a kind of a what middle stage there, right? And so the the and sometimes the reason the will wins out, right? Other times the sense appetite seems to win out, huh?

[58:05] But in that case, you're you might repent what you've done, right? When your passion subsides, huh? You see. Or the man say who's anger has a hard time controlling his anger, right? And his anger really wins out, and he hits somebody or does something, right? And then when his anger subsides, he he he regrets what he's done, huh? Maybe it's too late to make amends or whatever it might be, huh?

[58:29] You see. Or like the man who, you know, the fear overcomes him and he runs away when he should stay. Stay and fight, or stay and defend something, and then his fear calms down. He realizes what a coward he's been, and he's ashamed of himself, and so on. Right? You see. So he's not entirely bad, right? Huh? And that's where Aristotle talks about shame. There, he says that the the man who's really virtuous has nothing to be ashamed of, but the man who's something to be ashamed of, right?

[59:03] He's not totally what. Good or bad, right? See, but the the shame, in a sense, is something encouraging him to be virtuous, huh? Or try to be virtuous, huh? But

[59:23] you're not too sure about yourself in some matter that you tend to be more what? Yeah, or you know, shame more, you know, like in sexual matters, something like that, for example, you know, just talking about these sinful things makes some people blush, right? You know, the part of that that maybe just the you know the bodily constitution of the person now they got to be careful about these things, you see.

[59:48] But but a young person we're apt to blush, right? Aristotle says that's actually good that they blush, you know. Sense, huh? It shows that they have some sense of what's decent, and some sense of honor, and so on, right? See, and you know what happens a lot now with the movies now and things and so on. They kill the shame of the young people, right? Yeah. And shame is is kind of a stepping stone to virtue, but it's not the same, you know.

[1:00:16] But but when Thomas talks about temperance, I mean, in the Summa Secundae Secundae he talks about verecundia, which is shame, right? It's kind of an integral part of what of temperance, huh? Honestas and verecundia, the two parts, huh? But honestas is spiritual beauty, right? But Aristotle speaks of shame as being something a little less than virtue, right? But may be involved in it, huh? He says the the good man would be ashamed if he did something he shouldn't do, right?

[1:00:46] But he's not so apt to feel shame because he he has no inclination to do it really. Okay, so so you you do something bad there, you know? When I when I kill you, I've given into my anger, maybe, or something of that sort, right? When I run away, right? Huh? I've given into my fear, right? Huh? See.

[1:01:11] Um, I think I mentioned how Shakespeare thought that the rape of Lucrece, that narrative poem of Shakespeare, was a very good representation of of temptation, right? See, and how the man is, you know, is is

[1:01:31] has an inner struggle going on there, right? Huh? What's it called? The Rape of Lucrece, huh? It's not a. It's called a narrative poem. Yeah, I mean, it's not a drama. It's not one of the plays, right? In Shakespeare, you have about what thirty-seven plays, and then you have the sonnets, right? And you have the the two narrative poems, Venus and Adonis, and the Rape of Lucrece.

[1:01:54] And Venus and Adonis is more comic, and Lucrece, Rape of Lucrece, is more tragic. But it's a very powerful thing. It's a good study there of of of lust and and sin, but then the what

[1:02:13] the senses, what you know, you ashamed what you've done, right? You know, and the consequences of what what happens, and so on. So it's a powerful thing there, right? But but no, you will have to consent, right, to whatever your body is urging you to, huh?

[1:02:32] Okay. So, in some sense, the man who who rapes, like in this example, or the man who kills somebody out of anger, right, his will has consented to his emotions, right? But but the the the emotions and the senses have a great influence on these things because what you do is in the singular, right?

[1:03:03] Aristotle's always pointed out that what you do is in the singular, right? Okay. I don't kill man. I kill this man right here in front of me, right? And and reason knows directly, as we know from the De Anima there. Reason knows directly the universal. While the senses know the what singular, right? So, in some sense, the senses and the emotions which follow upon them, they're closer to the singular what you do than is the will and the reason, huh?

[1:03:32] And so, if you don't apply the universal, right, or just consider that adultery that says pleasant, right, huh? You know, um, the pleasant should be pursued, right? That's it is good. Then you're not considering sufficiently what this is, right? You're not applying to it the moral law which you understand universally, right? But if your emotions are not habituated to follow reason, right, when they're you know strong in a way that is opposed to reason, then it becomes hard to right in the kind of circumstances to apply your universal understanding to this, huh?

[1:04:18] So you got to take into account that the influence that those things have, because what you do is in the singular. Okay. So he's saying, therefore, because the sense. Power is not collativa and discretivus, right? But it simply apprehends something one, and therefore, according to that one thing, the sense appetites moved in a determined way. But reason is collativa; it brings together many things, and therefore, from many things, many considerations, the what intellectual ability to desire is able to be moved, namely the will, and not from one from necessity, huh?

[1:05:10] So there's many things I can consider about this, huh? Kind of curious if you have more sentences than my text here. I'll just we we really kind of have done it there. Pardon. I was just going over again what we kind of done there, right? Yeah, but sometimes before I for some reason it just seemed like it was more.

[1:05:30] Yeah, there is. I have more words than you. Yeah. That's curious. You got that Spanish edition there, or what? Yeah.