De Anima (On the Soul)
132. Summa I q.83 a.1: Is Man of Free Judgment? Reason, Contingency, and God Moving the Will
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/132-summa-i-q-83-a-1-is-man-of-free-judgment-reason-contingency/

[0:00] It's just cost suppressive, but doesn't really do that, you know. It's just cost suppressant. Well, none of those things seem to work, you know.

[0:15] So we're all set to go. So, name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. God our Light and Light, guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, ordinate luminous images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angel doctor. Pray and cross. Help us to understand what you've written.

[0:47] See if this surprisingly is a tickle in my throat. I get. Had my medical checkup last week, so you know. Any problems? I got a stuffy nose. I mean, wake up in the night, so. Give you some other stuff here. I get you doing some good, I guess, but. Absolutely recommended. No, not this. Just from my own, just from the store, but but some kind of stronger pill.

[1:21] I don't know. And then one asks about free judgment, huh? Free will. And about this, four things are asked. First, whether man is of free judgment, huh?

[1:41] Secondly, what is liberum arbitrium? Whether it is a ability of power, or an act, or a what habitum? Just like when you talk about conscience, Thomas asked the same question, right? Is conscience the name of the of a reason, or is it a name of an act of reason? conscientia. And third, if it is a power, which is going to conclude from the second article, whether it is an appetitive power or a knowing power, right?

[2:26] Of course, he's going to conclude it's an appetitive power, even though that way of naming it might seem kind of strange, right? Because judgment is obviously an act of the reason, huh? And fourth, if it is an appetitive power, whether it is the same power as the will or some other power, okay? So we better get the first two articles. This, this day, Grace.

[2:56] To the first, thus one proceeds. It seems that man is not of free judgment, huh? Or free will. For whoever is of free judgment or free will, does what he wants to do, right? That man does not do what he wants. For it is said in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter seven, verse fifteen. And this is Saint Paul himself speaking, now, right? Not the good that I will do, I do that, right?

[3:30] But the evil, right? The bad thing that I hate, that's what I do, right? Well, that's Saint Paul himself saying that, right? Therefore, man is not of free judgment, huh? That's a kind of interesting text, huh? Just the way just that. Therefore, man is is is not liberi. Yeah, he doesn't have free will. Yeah, but it's actually in the genitive there, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Okay.

[4:03] Yeah. He's not possessed of, you might say, a free judgment, right? Yeah. Okay. Okay. A man of power, right? What does that mean? Man of of wealth. It's a man who has power and wealth, right? So a man of free judgment, yeah. All right. Yeah. The genitive is kind of interesting. It has a lot of different meanings, huh? And of, you know, his house.

[4:36] Moreover, and this is. Kind of definition that Aristotle gives a liberum there in the first book of metaphysics. The free is what is a cause of itself, right? sui causa well Aristotle's kind of contrasting there the what free man with the slave, right? And the free man is for his own sake, right? And the slave is for the sake of the master, right? Okay, so this is often quoted as definition.

[5:03] What therefore is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, huh? This is a very interesting thing, huh? For it is said in the book of Proverbs, chapter twenty-one, the first verse. The heart of the king is in the hand of God, in the power of God. And whoever he wills, he what turns the heart of the king, huh? Okay. You can see how someone could you know say, hey, that means we're not free, right?

[5:36] Yeah. My heart is in the hand of God. He Turn it to good or to bad, right? So am I really free, huh? And then this text from the Epistle to the Philippians, chapter two, verse thirteen. It is God who what operates in us both to will and to perfect what we will, huh? Therefore, man is not a free what judgment, huh? Did you forget the second one, or do do you have a different order?

[6:09] Oh, let's get the second one. Okay. Okay. Excuse me. Moreover, whoever is or has free judgment, right, free will, belongs to him to will and not to will, right? Or it's in his power to will, right, and not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not true of man, right? For it is said in the Epistle to the Romans, the ninth chapter, verse sixteen.

[6:44] It is not of the one willing to will, that is to say, nor the one running to it to run. Therefore, man is not a free what judgment, huh?

[6:59] Okay. So the second one is saying that man doesn't have his his freedom, right? Apparently. And the third one is saying it's in the hands of God, right? Huh? Okay.

[7:15] Moreover, whoever has free judgment or free will is the Lord of his own acts, huh? But man is not the Lord of his own acts, because as is said in the tenth chapter of the Prophet Jeremiah, the way of a man is not in his power, right? Nor of a man that he what in the power of man that he direct his own what steps, huh? Therefore, man is not a free judgment,

[7:51] huh? So there you have the first four objections. At least one, sometimes two, texts from Scripture, huh? In each one of them, huh? What did the other two texts say?

[8:09] The the reading of the sacred page is the soul of theology. Okay. Now the fifth objection is taken from Aristotle, whom he calls by antonomasia, the philosopher. Moreover, the philosopher says in the third book of the that's Nicomachean Ethics, such as each one is, so does the end seem to him,

[8:39] huh? But it is not in our power to be such, huh? But this is something in us from what nature or by nature, right? Therefore, it is natural to us that we follow some end, and therefore it's not from free what will or free judgment, right? Now, as by nature, the objection is saying, by nature, I'm disposed a certain way, right? Yes. And therefore, this seems desirable to me.

[9:13] You're by nature disposed in other ways, so something else seems desirable to you. And therefore, I'm not free. But now, against all this is what is said in the book of Ecclesiasticus. I guess they call it Sirach now sometimes, don't they?

[9:38] God from the beginning constituted man and left him, meaning man, in the hand of his own what counsel, right? And the gloss says that is in the freedom of his own what judgment, right? So there, using the word in man, right? Man, you know, is left in his own hand, right? Rather in the hand of of God, like up in the third objection there, that the heart of the king is in the hand of God, right?

[10:13] When Aristotle distinguishes the eight senses of in, the seventh sense of in is I've got you in my power. Yeah. And sometimes we'll say a little more picturesquely that it's out of my hands, right? Okay. Okay. Which should mean it's not in my what power? Power, yeah, yeah.

[10:46] So the sed contra is again from Scripture, right? Saying that what man does and so on is in his hands, right? But up in the third objection, it seems in the hand of God, right?

[11:06] Yeah. You know, just glosa interviniaris, what is that again? that they're referring to? Well, it must be a famous what they had, I guess, with the Bible would be what little excerpts of the Church Fathers, right? Okay. And these became had considerable authority, you know. And sometimes they identified, you know, glossa St. Augustine, right? Okay. I mean, in some cases they weren't fully what identified, right? So, or they lost, you know, who the who the original one was.

[11:41] So, it was a very common thing that they have the. Gloss was kind of explaining the text, on. Okay, Something like you have in the later Catena Aurea, you know, the golden chain, where Thomas is supposed to take certain what little nuggets from church fathers, you know, that illuminate that passage. And I know you really need sometimes is a couple sentences, huh? You have the same thing like in Cornelius Lapidae.

[12:08] It's not as good as Catena Aurea, but Cornelius Lapidae, you know, it's kind of a nice thing to have if you have a set of that, because then if you you know you're puzzling about the passage from Isaiah or somebody else in the Mass today or something like that, then you can go to Cornelius Lapidae and maybe hear a little bit of what the church fathers say.

[12:26] At least you have all these different, you know, places where the church fathers may have touched upon that. And so you just need a couple things, you know, that they say that kind of illuminate the text and and satisfy to some extent your desire to to understand that text, huh? Okay, thank you.

[12:47] No, Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that man is of free what judgment, huh, or free will. Otherwise, in vain would be counsels, right?

[13:04] Exhortations, right? Exhortation comes last. We want to urge, right? We urge them to do something. I give the students introduction to philosophy. What I call Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason. What is a man? His chief good, and market of his time be but to sleep and feed, a beast no more. Sure, he. that such large discourse looking before and after. Gave us not that capability and godlike reason to fust and us unused.

[13:40] Me, that's the best exhortation, you know, to use your reason, right? But with the seven wise men, of Greece according to legend, they met at the Oracle of Delphi. they put up the words, "gnothi seauton, "Know thyself, " and what? Nothing too much, huh? Those were what brief exhortations, huh? Of course, very common scriptural exhortations in in many books, huh?

[14:14] Precepts or commands, right, huh? To do something, I suppose. Prohibitions, right, huh? And awards and punishments, right? All these things would be out the window in a sense if man was not of free judgment, huh?

[14:28] Okay. So we're kind of starting from that as as sign that it is so, right, huh? Okay, that man does have this, but then he's going to go on to show how this is. So he says, for the evidence of this. It should be considered that some things act without judgment, right? As the stone moves downward, huh? And likewise, all things, what, lacking knowledge, huh?

[15:04] So the tree grows without judging that it should grow, right, huh? And the leaves grow, and the branches up towards the sun, and the our roots down towards the what, water, and so on, right? But it doesn't have any judgment about these things, huh?

[15:22] Then some things act by judgment, but not by a what, free judgment, huh? As the what? Yeah, that's the irrational animals, right, huh? Okay. So the woman. Says you brute. That's not a. That's an insult, huh? Okay. Sometimes we use the word in English, huh? The word beast, right? Yes. The beast is an, you know,

[15:54] animalia bruta, huh? Yes. It's interesting. Other expression we have of brute in English. There, we speak of brute memory. Oh. Say. What does brute memory mean?

[16:10] Memory of sensation. Yeah, but I think it has the idea a distinction between brute memory and what is called recollection, right? Okay. You see, when we say, you know, what were you doing yesterday at three o'clock or something like that, right? And I can't just like that remember it. If I can remember it, that'll be brute memory. Okay. If I say, let's see, I have a twelve thirty class.

[16:36] Yeah, so I get out at one thirty, and then went back to my office, and so and so showed up and had a cut. Oh, yeah. And then we went down and had a beer. You know, oh, now I remember what's going on, right? Okay. See, it's a little bit recalling, a little bit like reasoning, huh? Sure. This is first. You see, and so brute memory is kind of like what?

[16:57] Just a direct, direct, you know, but not kind of. Sure. I remember one thing, remembering something else, which resembles reasoning, right? Yes. And Aristotle has a book on on memory and reminiscence, or memory and recalling, huh? Yeah. Where he talks about that, how you know, memory is something the other animals have too, right? But recalling is like almost reasoning with your memory, huh? You see. Animals don't have that.

[17:23] No, no, no. Okay. So he says some things act by judgment, but not by a free judgment, as the beasts, the brute animals. For the ovis, what's that? The lamb or the? Yeah. Sheep. Judges seeing the what? Wolf, right? Okay. What's that? Was a wolf at the origin of Rome or what?

[17:56] yeah, yeah. but in rome in uh Julius Caesar, you all remember how on the feast of Lupercal I thrice presented him a kingly crown, huh? Ah. Remember that? That Caesar refused, but Lupercal. I wonder if that was a phase, you know, a feast, you know, celebrating the the wolf and its rule. Not the wolf. So seeing the wolf, huh? Yeah. He judges him as something to be fleed, right?

[18:23] Yes. But by a natural judgment, right? Right. And not by a libero or free, right? Because not from what colatio. colatio means literally bringing together, right? okay. A lot of times I'll see it like an Albert the Great and so on. You speak of the reason as being collativus et discursivus, right? And usually, there's a colatio before there's a discursus, right? Yeah. So, for example, the two main kinds of discourse are reasoning and calculating, right?

[18:58] Huh? But before I calculate, before I say add, subtract, multiply, or divide, I have to bring together two numbers, right? And that's a colatio means, right? Before I can syllogize uh reason necessarily to conclusion, I have to bring together a couple statements of which I can draw a conclusion.

[19:21] So, and so I'm often comparing the cat there in the house with us, you know. But only the cat does that, huh? You know, compare the cat and the human being.

[19:40] Because not from a colatio, but from a natural what instinct, right? Yeah. He judges this, right? Hmm. And is like and it's similar in each judgment of the brute animals, huh? Yeah. But man acts by judgment, right? Huh? Yeah. Because through his knowing power, he judges that something ought to be fled from or pursued, right? Hmm. But because this judgment is not from a natural instinct in some particular thing to be done, but from a certain what colatio, right, to bring together a reason.

[20:24] Therefore, he acts by free judgment, right? Being able to be born into diverse things. Okay. You know the primary reason is because reason is bringing together something what universal, right? With the singular, right? So you know the stock example is that of the woman there, and I'm bringing together. Well, adultery is a sin. This is adultery. Therefore, I'm not going to do this, right? But this is pleasant.

[20:56] The pleasant is to be pursued. Therefore, right? You see, you've got that freedom to what apply many things, right? And apply things imperfectly, right? To and judge that, right?

[21:16] Okay. Be nice to get some more sleep so. I think I'll skip mass this morning or something, right? Right. Hmm. Okay. Now he says, "Reason about contingent things, right? Things that can be or not be, right? Huh? Has a way to opposites, huh? And this is clear." In dialectical syllogisms and in rhetorical what persuasions, huh? Okay.

[21:55] Excuse me. Mean mean what the two the two persons can come to opposite conclusions based on the same. Well, see in dialectical syllogisms and the rhetorical persuasions, you can argue on both sides of a question, right? And so you have a certain freedom then, right? Huh? So

[22:17] the dialectical ones are more in in universal matters and rhetorical in particular matters, but in in politics, political philosophy, and so on, a lot of times you can see reasons on both sides, right? And we talk which kind of government is better and so on. You see reasons why this government is better or that kind of government is better. Did be in the sense of just what we're doing here now, or when he puts out the?

[22:51] Yeah, yeah, we saw that in the first part. I mean, this always begins a little bit dialectic, right? You have a sed contra, right? So you can just see, you know, some parts of scripture might, you know, seem to indicate one thing, and then the other ones the opposite of that, huh? Okay.

[23:09] So particular, operable things are certain contingent things, okay? And therefore, about them, the judgment of reason has itself to diverse things is not determined to one, right?

[23:27] And to that extent, uh is necessary to say that man is a free judgment from the fact that he is what rational, right? Huh? That he has reason, huh? Universal reason. I know it's myself, you know. I I sit down there at the house there, you know, and I got a shelf full of books there, right? Well, I I've read most of the books there in the shelf, huh?

[23:53] But they could all be reread for many reasons, right? Huh? And which book should I be reading right now? You see. Well, I can I can see a lot of what good reasons for for reading each of them, right? But the reasons that I have to read this book would prevent me from what reading that book, right? You see, sure. See, and is there, you know, a book in most cases here that I that I must be reading now?

[24:27] Yeah. Huh? Must we be studying this right now? Could we be studying logic or studying ethics or studying theology or studying scripture, right? Or right? You see. Is it something contingent about that, right? And I can see reasons for studying one, reasons studying the other, right? But maybe not a reason why this is the only thing you should be studying right now. Nothing else. You see the idea?

[25:06] Yeah. Maybe relax a little, but Shakespeare something, huh? Yeah. You see, rhetoric is divided into three parts. But the main parts in rhetoric are what: political rhetoric and the courtroom rhetoric. Of course, in the courtroom, the one lawyer is trying to prove he's guilty, the other guy is not guilty, right? Yeah. And Maybe something can be said on both sides, right? And of course, in politics, you usually have people for and against a particular course of action.

[25:49] And there's more than one way to skin a cat, as they say, right? And so, there's only one way to do something, right? So, which is the better way to do it?

[26:01] And when I when I come home at night, there is I can turn down South Street to go to my house. I go a little further down, go up over the hill, or I can go further down to Walnut Street to come around, right? Which one should I do?

[26:18] Well, South Street, there. I mean, if the red the light is red, I can turn and have to stop him, right? I want to go to one of the other ways further down, right? The way that turns green, huh? You see? Okay. Maybe one of the ways is a little shorter or something, right? Or another way is is what requires less turns, and I can think as I travel along.

[26:41] I don't have too much attention where I'm doing. Yeah. Okay. So I mean, there's all kinds of little things to consider, right? But is there only one way that I must go home? Sometimes you get tired going the same way all the time. I go, yeah, go a different way, right? That's the way these things are, right?

[27:05] Okay. What does he say? But what shall we put on? What shall we eat? You know. Okay. Everybody always tells me, you know, the the old days, you know, the the wife would say, you know, oh, what we have for dinner? And the man says, well, can you have meaty meaty potatoes, or you know?

[27:36] There's like a contingent about these things, right? Huh? Yeah. Okay. Now, perhaps most interesting thing here, though, is some of these objections that we have to take up now, huh? And let's repeat the first objection here. Whoever is whoever has free judgment or free will, right, does what he wants, right? But the man does not. But man does not do what he wants, huh? For it is said in Romans seven verse fifteen.

[28:14] For not the good that I wish, right, do I do that? But the bad that I hate, that I do, right, huh? Okay. Thomas says to the first, therefore it should be said, that it has been said above. The sense desiring power, right, which means the ability to feel the emotions and so on, right? Although it obeys reason to some extent, right? Nevertheless, can what fight against it?

[28:46] Right in something, right? By desiring that against something against that which reason what dictates, right? Huh? Okay. So adultery, say, can be pleasant to the senses, right? Huh? And therefore there can be what some desire for this, right? Huh? And therefore, one's emotions are not entirely what subject to his will, right? Okay. You have the example there, Saint Benedict, right, with the loose woman around the place, they're trying to drag them back, and what jumping in the bramble bush or something, right, to distract himself from from being this temptation, right?

[29:35] Huh? As if one doesn't have entirely control over his what emotions, huh? Okay. And this is the good, right? Thomas says that man does not do what he wishes. What good to not what has sense desire? but he was sharing his distinctly sense desire to not have sense desire against reason, right? Yeah. As the gloss of Augustine there says, right? The the gloss and identify it as the gloss of Augustine, huh?

[30:12] Oh yeah, okay. Okay. Now, what what I think it's making more clear in the text there, the context of Paul's place there, the Augustine and Thomas see that, huh? That he's talking about how the you know our Lord said the spirit is willing, but the flesh is what weak, right? Okay. And therefore the flesh is not what entirely obedient to the will and the reason, right? As you would want it to be, right?

[30:42] Huh? Okay. So you don't want your emotions to be in revolt against your reason, right? Anything, but to some extent that they are. Okay. And therefore,

[30:58] ah, that's what Saint Paul is talking about there. You see that? Okay. Yeah. Now, second objection: whoever has free judgment or free will in him or in his power, it is to do, I mean, to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not of the man, for it is said, this isn't but is out in the power of man, huh?

[31:31] For it is said in Romans nine verse sixteen that it is not of the one willing, nor the one running. But it goes on to say, but of what? God having mercy, right? Okay. Now, Thomas answers that. huh To the second, it should be said that that word of the apostle. Notice how the word apostle is being used by antonomasia for what? Saint Paul. Yeah, and Thomas, you know, elsewhere, you know, he's talking about Scripture.

[32:04] He notes how Saint Paul and Peter identify themselves as apostles in their epistles. I guess the other ones don't. And that they are; those two are called apostle apostles by what? By Antonio antonomasia. And I mentioned, you know, I notice how our Holy Father John Paul II there he often referred to Peter and Paul as the princes of the apostles, right? Okay, so there's certain preeminence there, especially as far as going to Rome and so on.

[32:42] But means Peter, of course, was the first pope, and Paul, Paul is the apostle of the Gentiles, right? Okay. To second, therefore, it should be said that that word of the apostle, meaning Saint Paul, should not be understood as if man does not will and does not run by free judgment, right? But and this is something that's going to come up in the later objections, right? But because free will for this is not sufficient unless it be moved and what aided by God, right?

[33:21] Okay. So this is kind of anticipating something that will be in the later objections, right? Okay. That I can't use my will unless I'm aided by God and moved by God, right? Yeah. But God is not going to move my will

[33:44] in a way that is contrary to the nature of my will. So God is not going to move my will so that I would be what forced to will something, right? Because that would be contrary to the very nature of the will. So God moves my will so that I freely will something, and that's most unusual, right? But this is the very nature of the divine providence, and and the power of God that not only what he wills takes place, right, but it takes place in the way he wants it take place, right?

[34:24] Sometimes by necessity, sometimes by chance, sometimes freely, right? Sometimes by force. but whatever he wants to take place. Takes place, but it takes place in the way he wants it take place too. See, his will doesn't extend; his power is not limited to what the thing taking place, right? But extends also to how it takes place. Whether it takes place by necessity or by chance, right? Or by luck.

[34:57] Whether it takes place naturally by nature or by what free will, right? Right. And God moves everything in accord with His nature, and that's why wisdom is said to you know move from end to end sweetly, right? Because in accordance with the with the nature of the thing in question.

[35:20] That's why it's very hard for us to understand, right? People are always thinking, you know, that if God moves us to will something, that therefore we're not freely willing it, right? Okay, but He's moving the will in accordance with the nature of the will. Freely It's interesting, huh? But somewhat hard to understand Okay.

[35:49] Now, the, third objection, huh? What? Yeah. Different senses say to move You know Well, he's not moving us the way we would move. He's not moving free will the way you or I would move a ball. Yeah, because this is no, this is no freedom over what's being moved, right? Right. You see. So we're still not free to move. Yeah, But what you want to say is that he's moving it in accordance with his nature, right?

[36:25] Right. So it's the nature of the will to have this freedom, huh? And to will freely, right? Certain things. So when he moves the will to will, right? He doesn't go against that freedom. Yeah, yeah. Does he persuade us normally? Well, it's not just that, because because the angels can do that too, you know. Mm-hmm. Another man could persuade you, see, but God is moving you inwardly, right?

[36:53] Mm-hmm. Okay. So that's something you know that that we study when we study divine providence, huh? In fact, I was reading about this morning again in in the third book there, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? Where Thomas will point those things out. He gives reasons why, huh? Nothing moves without God moving it, right? Okay. But his moving these things is not opposed to their natural way of operating.

[37:26] He moves all things in accordance with their nature. In fact, he's given them the nature that they have, right? So he moves them in accordance with their nature. And so he moves the will in accordance with the nature of the will. So he moves it, what? To freely choose something, right? Okay. That's very, very, you know. I think you know, apart from God Himself, obviously, huh? You know, divine providence is going to be a very what?

[38:00] Splendid thing to understand much more than we do understand right now. Yes. And how dependent we are upon God, huh? You say like this is not a clear question, but

[38:18] it seems maybe like a difference of. Again, this part of the day on clarifying this question, like if we were to move a ball or push something or have to flip this table over, yeah, you know that's more like co-action. Whereas God moving us, you know, that's not a case of co-action, obviously, because. He's moving us, but it's like a different. It seems like a different kind of movement.

[38:43] It's not a violence, you know. It's not a violence. No, no, no. We're always free. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, what you have to remember is you see that God is the source of our very existence, right? Sure. And so God is more within me, in a sense, than I am within myself, right? And that's why He can move things inwardly, right? And not what force them, right?

[39:13] Yeah. Because He's Himself the source of that very inward power that we have, right? Are you talking about you know the the nature of a thing, or talking about the will within, right? God is within the nature; He's the source of the nature; He's the source of the will, right? So He can move these things inwardly, right? Which is not force is always an exterior thing, huh?

[39:39] Yeah. Will we speak of different ways, different types of movement, being moved or moving something, in say the Summa Contra Gentiles? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But the thing I want to say is, you know, you can use the word "movement" in general, and but not limit it to that—you know, one particular kind, right? Sure. Because I mean, some things are moved by something outside of them. Sometimes things are moved by something inside of them, right?

[40:09] And God is is more inside these things than what they are inside themselves, huh? Okay. And so God can move these things, even nature and will, right? Is it inward and not something extrinsic? Okay. Let's look at Thomas's words here on the third objection. Moreover, the free is what is a cause of itself. It is said in the first book of metaphysics. But what is moved by another is not free, right?

[40:46] Okay, see, there's a contradiction there, right? Huh? Okay. If I'm free, right, I move myself, right, to to choose this or or not this, right? But what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, right? For it is said, and He has a text in the Old Testament: "The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and wherever He wishes, He what turns it, right?

[41:15] " So you're going to have to thank God for moving you to freely choose Him, right? And as is said in the Epistle to the Philippians, it is God who what.

[41:41] Does in us or operates in us, accomplishes in us to will and to what perfect it. But we will. Therefore, man is not of free judgment, right? Let's look at Thomas's reply here, right?

[41:58] To the third, it should be said that free will is the cause of its own motion, right? Because man, through free will, moves himself to what doing something, right? It is not, however, of the necessity of liberty, that it be the very first cause. cause of itself, huh?

[42:26] That what is free be the very what first cause of itself, right? It has to be in some sense a cause causa sui, a cause of itself, right? Of what it does, right? But doesn't have to be the what first cause, yeah?

[42:44] Just as neither, in order that something might be the cause of another, right, is it required that it be the first its first cause, huh? Okay. But you're not making an analogy there. It's something easier to see, right? So, if I'm

[43:05] if this well, let's start. If this paper is moving the book, right? It truly is pushing the book, isn't it? Yeah. Yeah. And it's not opposed to us pushing the book that it's being moved by what me. It's not the first mover, right? Okay. We're saying the same thing now, even though the what our free will is moving itself, right? Huh? That doesn't mean it has to be what the first mover of itself, right?

[43:40] Okay. For God, he says, is the first cause moving both natural causes and voluntary causes, huh? Okay. And he can be that because he's a source of both of their what even being, right? Okay. And he's a source of what they are, right? Okay. And he's conserving them in existence, right? And so on.

[44:13] And thus, and just as he says, then in natural causes, by moving them, right, God does not take away from them that their acts be what natural, right, They're still from an intrinsic cause. So, in moving voluntary causes or wills, he does not take away, but that their actions be what voluntary, huh? But rather, he makes this in them, okay?

[44:52] And that's like I was saying. For he does in each thing according to what is its what. Yeah, it's what is proper to it, appropriate to it, right? Huh? Yeah, he moves each thing in the way that's appropriate to it that fits what it is, right? So he moves the natures of things, right,

[45:14] to cause something naturally, right? And he moves the wills to cause something, what, voluntarily or even freely, right? Okay. That's really kind of marvelous that God, God's power extends there, you know. Yeah.

[45:32] So he's not only responsible for something taking place, but that takes place naturally or voluntarily, or that takes place by. Necessity, or by chance, or by you know, and his causality is that potent, right?

[45:53] It's hard to understand, though, right? But see, this comes under the more general, you know, consideration that you have, like in the Summa Contra Gentiles, even earlier here, when you take up divine providence, right? Okay.

[46:16] Now let's look at the fourth objection. Whoever has free will is the lord of his own acts, but man, it seems, is not the lord of his own acts, because, as is said in Jeremiah ten, verse twenty-three, the way of a man is not in his power,

[46:38] nor is it in the power of a man that he directs his own steps. Okay. To the fourth, he says it should be said that the way of a man is said not to be in his to be in the man to be in his power. That is to say, as far as the carrying out of his what choices, huh? Okay. What's the word for choice there in Latin?

[47:05] Electio huh That's where you get the word election in English, huh? Some people say they don't have a choice, but that's what it means—election, right? Yeah. But Shakespeare used that word there, right? You know, since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, yeah, and could have been distinguished for election hath sealed thee for herself, right? Yeah. Still the same choice again. Use the Latin word for for choice, huh?

[47:30] What What about that? So, so you talk about the the carrying out of what one has chosen, right? Huh? Okay. And that's often said said by Shakespeare too, right? Huh? That the beginning of our action is in our own power, but the ends are not, right? Huh? And and I am sure everybody has seen that, right? The best laid plans of men and mice, huh? Oft go astray, huh?

[47:57] In which a man is able to be impeded, right? Huh? Willy nilly, right? Is that what it means? Dolat, dolat, huh? That's that's how they translate it, I think, isn't it? Yeah, yeah, willy nilly, yeah. You can do this willy nilly, whether you want to or or or don't want to, right?

[48:17] Yeah, yeah. But no, she goes on. Choices, however, are in us, right? Huh? Nevertheless, supposing the divine what a, right? Huh? Okay, because our will has to be moved, right, to choose, right? Huh? But it's moved by God to choose. Say. So he's not taking away choice. See, he's not moving us to necessarily will something. He's moving us to choose something.

[48:52] Okay. But the but the carrying out of what we choose is not in our power, right? Okay. So what's then the just when he uses this free judgment, could he have used the word free choice, Electio Well, let's say that the next article because I think the next article, um, uh, goes. You're going to something of the way of naming, right? Okay. Okay. And it always touches me first come, you know, because a lot of times I translate liberum arbitrium as free will, right?

[49:41] In English, right? Right. But it's not really the Latin words, right? Arbitrium is more the idea of judgment, right? Yeah. Just like when you go to arbitration, as we say, right? You can somebody's going to judge now between the the parties. Um, but free will presupposes, right, that use of reason, right, whereby you have not only judgment but a certain freedom in your judgment, right? Now you go back to those words of of Hamlet there, right?

[50:17] This is what he says: "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, her election has sealed thee for herself, right? Now, what does he mean there? When was his soul mistress of her choice? Ah,

[50:47] choosing him as friend or no? No. Distinguishing. Yeah, when he had the use of reason, right, whereby he could distinguish between men, right? Okay. And he goes on to give the reasons why why he chose Horatio as his friend, right? Right. Give me that man that is not passion slave, right? Okay. Okay. Um, so he can distinguish between the man who's a slave of some passion and this man Horatio who's not the slave of any passion, right?

[51:18] The man who's fortune, you know, who's taking good and bad fortune with an even keel, right? You know, many things he says about him, right? So, but notice the way Hamlet speaks. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice and could have been distinguished, right? That's when her soul became mistress of her choice. When he had the use of reason to the extent that he could what distinguish among men and see that this man would be better to have as a friend than that man, right?

[51:47] Or maybe this man would be good to have as a friend. That would be bad to have as a friend, right? You see? Do you want a coward as a friend? See, you want a coward as a friend? You can't trust him with your wife, your sister, your daughter, right? You want a thief for a friend, right?

[52:08] You know, There's this thing there in Basel's life with Johnson, you know, where they had some dinner guests, you know, and he's got these, you know, free thinking ideas. Nothing wrong with stealing, you know. And Johnson saying, you know, well after he leaves, he says well, count our spoons. he says. In those days, you know, silver was kind of expensive, you know. It's going to run off one of your spoons or forks or something, right?

[52:36] So that's why you know before the so-called age of reason, whatever that is, right? You should say seven. I was a kid, you know. That's kind of you know it's kind of arbitrary in a sense. Because some people maybe developed a little bit faster, but we don't speak of the little child as what maybe you know two or three as as fit to go to confession, right?

[53:02] See, is it not really what yet have choice in the full sense, right? See, so what Hamlet is saying here: since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, right, as if his soul was that mistress of her choice would be was what very small, right? And that was before he could have distinguished, right? But once he got to the point that his reason developed, that he could see the differences among men, right, and see what's good, what's bad, and what's better and worse, right?

[53:36] Then he has what you know able to choose, right? Then his soul was mistress of her choice, right? Then it was causa sui, right? See, but mistress. I mean, use mistress because soul is feminine, right? You know, Latin, right? She's very close. But as he speaks of being the dominos, right, right, being the master, so to speak, of of your choice, huh? Yeah. But you have to have the use of reason, right?

[54:08] And so, if I go crazy one of these days, right, you know, lose my mind, so to speak, right, then I'm no longer what responsible, right? What I'm doing, right? You see, don't know what I'm doing, right? I don't. I'm no longer master of my choice or mistress of my choice. My soul is no longer right. You see. Okay.

[54:35] So it may be that that free will would be there only. I mean, free will means what? The ability to choose, right? But you don't really have that ability until you have liberum arbitrium, until you have the use of reason, whereby you can what make some kind of a judgment, right, as to what is good or bad or better, right, in pure things, huh?

[55:07] Students are selecting their courses for next semester, right? So I have to advise a few students, you know, they don't know anything what they want, but but you see the kind of contingency, right? You know, student, you know, first he's thinking maybe to take this course, and then something else occurs to him, you know, I just want to take that course, you know, or you know that sort of thing.

[55:28] Okay.