De Anima (On the Soul)
134. Free Choice and the Will (Summa I, Q. 83, aa. 3–4) and an Outline of How the Soul Knows (QQ. 84–89)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/134-free-choice-and-the-will-summa-i-q-83-aa-3-4-and-an-outline/

[0:00] any updates? Say, like maybe on the pope or you know, doing or. Not anything. Just just a bit. Just a few days ago, didn't you have to interrupt something? But that's he done it before anyway, man. He doesn't know to finish speeches sometimes. Yeah. Delicate doctor, and help us to understand all that you've written. In the Father and the Son and Holy Spirit, Amen. Now, whether librium or arbitrium, huh?

[0:37] Free judgment, as it were, is a de a desiring power, huh? To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that free judgment is not a power that desires, but a knowing power.

[0:55] For Damascene says that with the rational follows what the free judgment, huh? But the rational or reason is a knowing power; therefore, free judgment is a knowing power.

[1:20] Moreover, free judgment is said, as it were, free judgment, right? Okay, two different words of Latin: arbitrium and iudicium. But to judge is an act of the what? Knowing power, right? Therefore, free judgment is a knowing power. What's the definition of judgment, by the way?

[1:51] To divide or separate. To separate the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge. Okay. So in geometry, you may go back just to the axioms, right, or the postulates, but eventually you go back to the senses ultimately, huh? So it's a separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge.

[2:25] But one beginning depends upon another one, right? So that's why we express our judgment sometimes by saying that makes sense or nonsense. Or a man of good sense is a man of good judgment, because the senses the beginning of our knowledge. Moreover, to free judgment especially pertains choice, but choice seems to pertain to knowledge, because choice implies a certain comparison of one to another, and that's that proper which is proper to the knowing power.

[3:09] Therefore, free judgment is not a what? Free judgment is rather a knowing power, huh? Okay. But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics: the choice is the desire of those things which are in our us, which are in our power. But desire is an act of the appetitive power; therefore, choice.

[3:39] But liberum arbitrium is that by which we choose; therefore, liberum arbitrium is a what? Power of desiring, right? Thomas says, "I answer that it should be said that it is

[4:06] proper to, or appropriate to, or private to free judgment." uh choice. Choice is private or appropriate to free judgment. For from this we are said to be a free judgment, that we are able to receive one, having refused the other, which is to what? To choose.

[4:38] And therefore, it is necessary to consider the nature of free judgment from choice. Now, to choice, something runs together from the part of the knowing power and something from the what? Appetitive power involves both, right? On

[5:06] the part of the knowing power is required counsel, right? By which one judges what should be preferred to another. From the part of the appetitive power is required that by desiring or by wanting is accepted that which is judged by counsel. And therefore, the philosopher no less a man than the philosopher himself, Aristotle, in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics, subdubio, right? He leaves it into doubt, whether choice is more principally pertaining to the appetitive power, the power of desiring, or to the knowing power.

[5:53] For he says that choice is either desiring understanding or understanding desire. But in the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, in this he more declines inclines toward there be a what? A desire that is

[6:20] built on understanding, right? Calling choice a what? A counselable desire, right? A desire that is result of taking counsel, right? And the reason for this is because its own object, choice's own object, is that which is towards the end. It's a means to an end, right? But this, however, as such, has the definition of good that is said to be useful. When, since the good as such is the object of desire, it follows that choice is chiefly an act of appetitive power.

[7:08] And thus, free judgment is the appetitive power. You just follow the argument there, right? He's saying that choice is what characterizes what liberum arbitrium. There's still a problem with the name, but maybe that will be cleared up. And that the choice is of the means to an end, right? And of course, the end is the primary object of the will, because the end and the good are the same, and so the what is desired or what is a means to the end would seem to also come under the same power, right, as the one that desires the end, desires the means.

[7:53] So it seems to be more a question of an act of the will, a desire, but one that presupposes what the taking of counsel. Now, so need that for two of Shakespeare's words there, right? When Hamlet says to Horatio, "Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, her election has sealed before herself, so and could have been distinguished, right? That's the what the comparison he's talking about, right?

[8:31] And you could compare this man and see that he's not passion slave, and other men are a slave of one passion or another passion, right? And so he chose this man who was free from being a slave of some passion as his friend. So he's going to what? That's he's going to ask him to observe the king, right? He has a play within the play, right? And wants to see, you know, what the reaction of the king is when he sees the very way he murdered the brother, right?

[9:07] According to the ghost, when nobody apparently knew how the man had died, right? So he might be a little bit kind of shocked, right? Of course, he has to go and leave. The stuck and deer go run.

[9:29] Now, the first one Damascene is simply pointing out that liberum arbitrium, this ability to choose, is something that is in the rational creature, right? And that's not contrary to what we said, because we're saying that the the desiring powers, like the will, follow upon the knowing powers, huh? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the appetitive powers follow the apprehensive powers, the grasping powers, the knowing powers, and according to this, Damascene says, right, with the rational part.

[10:11] At once there follows what free judgment, huh? Okay, do you follow that? He's saying that Damascene says this is something found in those who have reason, right? And Thomas says, "Well, that's true, because the will, the ability to choose, follows upon having reason." Okay.

[10:39] Now the second one here, which is more about the word itself, to second it should be said that judgment is, as it were, the conclusion and the determination of counsel.

[10:55] Now the counsel is determined first through the position of reason, secondly through the what acceptance of desire. Whence the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics that judging from taking counsel, we desire then according to counsel, huh? And in this way, choice itself is said to be a certain judgment, from which is named free judgment. I mean, it's a little forced to us, maybe, huh?

[11:36] In but because to call the act of the will there judgment there is kind of kind of a little stretch there, right, huh? But that's that's perhaps this is perhaps something idiomatic in a way in Latin, huh? My French teacher used to say when he explained a French idiom, you know, he says, "Don't fight it," he says, "just accept it." That's what you said in French, he says.

[12:06] I'll say it's exactly the same thing here, but I mean, it seems it seems a little bit stretched here, doesn't it a bit? Um, but. Do you know? Are those just synonyms, or is it? Well, see, I notice that sometimes we use words like the word "heart," for example, right? You know, we say "learn something by heart." What does that mean? Memory. Yeah, their heart doesn't have the idea of love like a duchy does, right?

[12:36] Yeah. But the word "heart" there is something what within, right? Okay. The heart of the matter, right? There is something in the very center of the matter, so to speak, huh? So learn something by heart. There is to is to internalize it to make it part of your memory, right? Okay. And so, there, there heart means memory, right? Well, that sounds kind of strange, huh? If we said "core," you know, can mean memory, right?

[13:01] You see, but there it is had that sense, doesn't it? Here, see, yeah, yeah. I'm sorry, I kind of lost track of exactly what you're referring to as far as idiom in the Latin. Well, that librium arbitrium should be called the arbitrium. There should be should mean what the will's acceptance, right? Okay. As if you should call that a judgment, that seems kind of kind of strange from the way we speak in English, right?

[13:37] Yeah. But I say maybe the way we speak of the heart might seem strange to somebody else, right? Okay. So I'm saying there are words like that, right? So, okay, so are you saying then that you know when we see liberum, arbitrium, just know that it's it's without making too much of it, understand that that he means free will has that. Yeah, yeah, or yeah, that it refers to choice, that judgment there rather than to the act of reason, right?

[14:06] The kind of acceptance that the will has when it follows the the judgment the reason has made, huh? Okay. All right. Thank you. But it also, you know, points out something about the connection between our ability to choose and the fact that our judgment can be what varied, huh? Because we have these universals we can apply, and

[14:33] and you kind of see that, you know, people, you know, are in favor of abortion, so on, huh? You know, they can apply other universals they want to, right, huh? Okay.

[14:43] Um, I remember when when the thing came up there with Ginsburg there when she was up for nomination there. Now, for her, the idea was simply, you know, well, obviously, you have to have have this because simply, woman will be equal with men, you know. That's the kind of universal she's applied. Woman should be equal with men, right? Well, obviously, if they have a passing relation there, right, huh?

[15:07] The woman is left unequal to the man because she's left pregnant, right? And so she's got to have the right to, you know, that's just being a free judgment, right? Or somebody's also saying,

[15:25] you know, well, they'll do it anyway. See, so we want to have it safe, and you know, and you saying so? I mean, that's that's what the the mind can do, right? You know, the will can

[15:43] take any way that something is good and take it as being good. Now, the third one was talking about what this collatio, right? And of course, Thomas says, well, that's a collatio that pertains to what the counsel that is before the choice, huh? Okay. To the third, it should be said that this collatio, which is implied in the name of choice, pertains to the preceding counsel, right?

[16:18] Which is of what something of reason. For the appetite, although it is not collativus does not bring together things. nevertheless, insofar as it is moved, right, by the knowing power that does bring things things together, conferente, right, it has a certain what likeness of collation, right? Insofar as it chooses one thing before what another, huh? Okay. So just like if I have have a headache and I want to get rid of the headache, and then I want to get rid of the headache, I want to take aspirin, and then I have to go to the drugstore to get aspirin, right?

[17:06] Well, then I want to go to the drugstore, right, to get aspirin because I want to take aspirin. I want to take aspirin so I can get rid of my headache, right? So it's a kind of a Something a likeness a discourse in my will because of my what reason right it sees the connection between going to the drugstore and getting rid of my headache through the aspirin okay but no you could say in the same way in Shakespeare's words there since my dear soul was mistress of her choice and could have been distinguished right so isn't distinction more the act of what reason than of the will right but the act of reason is presupposed to the act of the will huh and the

[17:52] distinction that reason sees between Horatio and other men is behind his choice of Horatio as a friend rather than some other man as a friend okay so you make the same point that Thomas is making here huh

[18:13] but in a way his his will is is acquiescing in the distinction that the reason what sees huh okay let me go on to the next one and then if we have a little time left after we can look at the deduction to eighty four you know so we'll

[18:35] that's a fairly short article to the fourth one proceeds thus it seems that free judgment or free choice the ability to choose is not another is another power from the will for Damascene says in the second book of the Orthodox Faith that other is thelesis right other boulesis huh these attempts to what Latinize two Greek words right okay thelesis over is voluntas which means simply what the will right or the act of the will that is regard to the end or the good huh and boulesis which comes from the Greek word for bule, which means counsel, right Mm-hmm.

[19:25] So bulesis seems to what be choice or arbitrium Librium is in the word for choice huh because boulesis according to him is the will which is about something as it were about one thing in comparison to what another right therefore it seems that Librium arbitrium is another power from the what will huh

[20:02] I think I think voluntas there is used maybe to name the act rather than the power right but we'll see what Thomas says anyway okay moreover the powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is an act of free judgment, is other from the will, as is said in the third book of Nicomachean Ethics, because the willing is of the end. Choice is about those things which are for the end.

[20:41] Therefore, Librium arbitrium is another power from the what will. Moreover, the will is the appetitive, is intellectual appetitive power. But on the part of the intellect, there are two powers, as we saw: the agent, right, the acting upon, right, and the possible, right, the undergoing one.

[21:13] Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual ability to desire, there ought to be another power besides the will. And thus it does not seem to be except, and this does not seem to be any other than free choice or free judgment. Therefore, free judgment is another power besides the will. But against this is what Damascene says in the third book himself, that Librium arbitrium is nothing other than the what, than the will, huh?

[21:52] So Thomas says, I answer: it should be said that the appetitive powers are necessarily proportioned to the what? Grasping powers, huh? He uses that word grasping all the time for the what? Knowing powers, right? But that word grasping brings out that what? Judgment. That the thing known is in the knower, right? See, why love is more in what? More the love is in the thing loved. I left my heart in San Francisco.

[22:26] The song says, right? Christ says, where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? Augustine says, is more is more ubi amat quam animat, huh? It's more where it loves than where it animates, right? So the will is said to be more, and love is said to be more in the thing loved than the thing loved in the love. Although that's true in some way too.

[22:51] And in the case of knowing, it's more what the thing known is in the what knower. So grasping brings it out, right? When I grasp something with my mind, just as when I grasp something with my hand, it's contained in my hand or contained in my mind, right? See, but grasping doesn't seem to indicate the perfection of the will. Grasping sounds like like being to desirous of material goods of this world, right?

[23:21] To be grasping, huh? See, but that's the perfection of the of the knowing, right? To grasp something. Sometimes they distinguish between what grasping and judging, right? But judging presupposes grasping, and that's why you know my complaint about the modern philosophers. You know, what what does Heidegger mean by being? Right, takes us a long to grasp what they mean. You have very little time left over to judge whether it's true or false.

[24:00] I always tell when I was teaching St. Mary's College there for three years before I had my doctorate, and this guy in the department there was trying to figure out what Heidegger meant by being. When I got out there, and 3 years. later. When I left, he was still trying to figure out what he meant by being I mean, now when when Thales says, you know, water is the beginning of all things, that may or may not be true, but at least you know what he's saying, right?

[24:25] And you can examine whether this is true or not, or to what extent it's true. So the percentage is all wrong. You have to spend most of your time trying to grasp what the guy is saying, right? And you have very little time, therefore, to judge whether it's true or false.

[24:48] Okay, answer. It should be said that the appetitive or desiring powers are necessarily proportioned to the grasping powers, to the knowing powers, huh? For just as on the part of grasping or intellectual grasping, we have the understanding and reason, so on the part of the appetitive powers, we have what voluntas and liberum arbitrium huh? I know it's intellectus implies what just understanding, right? Huh? But reason implies knowing one thing through another, right?

[25:33] That's why Aristotle defines reason as as being discursive, right? Huh? Okay. And likewise, voluntas simply refers to one's willing the good, the end, huh? But liberum arbitrium is willing one thing for the sake of something else, right? So liberum arbitrium or choice seems to be like what reason, right? Okay.

[26:05] And this is clear, he says, from the relation of the objects and the acts. For intelligere to understand, right, implies a simple what taking of something, right? I understand something. Whence

[26:24] those things are said to be understood properly, which are principles, huh? Which are the beginnings, huh? And so in Greek, Aristotle calls that simply nous, right? The virtue that knows the what principles, the axioms, like the whole is more than a part, right? In Latin, they call it simply what intellectus, right? In English, we call it simply understanding, although I tend to call it natural understanding.

[26:53] Which, without a bringing together of statements, right, are known to themselves. But to reason is properly to arrive from knowing one thing, right, to knowledge of a what of another, right?

[27:14] Whence properly about conclusions we reason, right? Conclusions which are made known from some kind of principles or beginnings, huh? So, likewise, he says on the side of the of the desire of the desiring power, velle, okay, to will implies a simple what? Desire something, right? Whence the voluntas, the willing, is said to be about the end, right? Which is desired for its own sake. But to choose is to desire something on account of what?

[27:57] Getting something else, right? Whence it is properly of those things which are towards the end, right? That are means towards the end. Okay. Now he goes on with the analogy here. Just as the principle has itself in knowing things, the conclusion to which conclusion we assent on account of the principles, right? So also in the appetitive things, the end has itself to those things which are what?

[28:36] For the end, right? Which are desired for the end, huh? That's a very common proportion, right? That Aristotle uses, right? He'll say that the

[28:50] the end is to the means, something like that, as the principles are to the what? Conclusions, huh? Yeah. See, it's a very common proportion that Aristotle has, huh? So the end is like the principle in the the will. So just as reason from knowing that a whole is larger than one of its parts, huh? It comes to know, for example, if you look at the theorem that if these what angles are equal, these sides will be equal, right?

[29:33] We come to know that conclusion about this through the whole being larger than the part, huh? And so, likewise, here we come to desire the means through what? Desiring the end, huh? Okay. So just as a now is the principle is a cause of our eventually coming to know the conclusion to the principles, so our desire of the end is a cause of our eventually coming to desire the means that seem to be suitable to that end, huh?

[30:07] Okay. Now it's going to be the same power that knows the principles and the conclusions, huh? And that's going to be the same power that's going to desire the end of the means. But let's see how Thomas develops that, huh? Let's go back to the secret there, the one we just read. Just as

[30:37] the beginning or the principle has itself in in knowing to the conclusion, to which conclusion, right? We assent on account of the principles, right? So, likewise, in the matter of desire, the end has itself to those things which are towards the end, which are desired on account of the end. Do you see that?

[31:06] Whence is manifest that just as intellectus, understanding, is to reason, so willing is to the what? Power of choice. That is to liberum arbitrium huh

[31:24] But it's been shown above that's of the same power to understand and to reason, right? Just as it pertains the same power to rest and to move, huh? Especially in the ancient physics, right, where the body, right, because of its weight, it went down, right, and when it gets down to the bottom here, it what? Rests. The same thing.

[31:53] So to reason is like to to move, right? Huh? To understand is the word standing indicates, right? In English, it's like the rest, huh?

[32:05] So by analogy, therefore, all sorts of the same power to will and to what? Choose, right? On account of this, the will and free judgment are not two powers, but what? One, huh?

[32:28] See the argument there? Going back to the fact that we said that the understanding and reason are the same thing, but we have the two names because of the two what? Acts, huh?

[32:57] Okay, now the first objection was the one based on thelesis and boulesis, right? As I mentioned, those words can, especially they're translated voluntas and liberum arbitrium. You might think voluntas there is the what? The power, right? Called the will, right? And liberum arbitrium is something else, right? But they actually. You name you have the same name there for the power in that act because that's a simple act of the power, just like you have the same name for the power to understand, understanding, and the act of understanding.

[33:34] So Thomas says, to the first, therefore it should be said that Thelesis is distinguished from Boulesis, not on account of a diversity of powers, right, but on account of a diversity of what, of acts, yeah. Now the second objection here,

[33:55] moreover, powers are known through acts. The second objection said, right, but choice, which is an act of free will, is other from the will. Okay. And Thomas says to the second, it should be said that election, and Voluntas ides ipsum vale right? That just somebody's understanding that sense of the act, right? Certain diverse acts, right? But now, as voluntas could also be used to name the what?

[34:29] The power, right? Yeah, power. Okay, we should have both of these acts, right? Just like understanding could, right? Yeah. When Aristotle is distinguishing election voluntas there, he's taking voluntas in the sense of the ipsum velle, right? To will, right? The end, okay? Yeah. So Aristotle says, "To will the end and to choose the means for the to achieve that end are different acts, son. Okay.

[34:59] But nevertheless, these different acts pertain to the same power, just as to understand and to reason belong to the same what power. Now, the third one he simply points out that the intellect is compared to the will as a mover, right? And therefore, it's not necessary in the will to distinguish between the what agent and the what possible, right? But the two of them what are necessary for our understanding, right?

[35:37] But the forms were one mover of the will. Okay. That was simple enough. Yeah. Maybe after the break we can we can look at the next at least at the proemium here, you know. Sure. Okay. Yep. Okay. Now this here begins the third part of this on division. If you go back here, I think to introduction here, question seventy-five.

[36:10] He says. He says after the consideration. Let's go back to seventy-five before we look at this again because it's the type where we are. He says after the consideration of the spiritual creature, which would be what?

[36:30] This is the proemium to question seventy-five into this whole section on the so on. He says, "Yeah, question seventy-five. You need a figure or marker we got there for eighty-four. Yeah. Okay.

[36:48] So back back to seventy-five. Seventy-five. He says after the consideration of the spiritual creature, which would be the what? Souls. The angels. Oh. Okay. And the corporeal creature, which would be you know everything below us, right? We're not to consider about man. Who is composed from the spiritual and the corporeal? Okay, that's kind of interesting because that's the order you have in in the Psalms of Praise, huh?

[37:23] You know, in a way, you have the angels praise God, and then you have the the beasts, yeah, the beasts and and things that sort. And then last of all, men praise as God, right? Yeah. Okay. Yeah, you have that in the in the Psalm of the three young men the furnace, and you have it in the Psalm like I don't know one forty seven something like that.

[37:44] Yeah. Yeah. You see a lot in theology that division, right? Yeah. Um, it go from you know the angels to what the material below man, and then to man, and that's what you have in in Genesis two if you read it with Augustine's understanding, huh? Okay.

[38:11] Now, consideration of the angels is much more lengthy than the consideration of corporeal, but a substance. But nevertheless, both of them are considered before you consider man, who's kind of kind of composed of the two, right? Okay, and that's why man is said to be a little what, microcosm, some microcosm by the philosophers, even right? Yeah. And the Arabs would say that he's on the horizon between the material world and the immaterial world.

[38:39] Yeah. And okay, but no, that's a theological order, right? I say because in in philosophy you'd study man and the soul before you'd study the what angels, right? And that's why we're studying this without having studied the angels because you're doing this as kind of a follow up for our philosophical study of the soul, right? Okay.

[39:07] And first, he says about the nature of man himself, right? Secondly, about his what production, right? And we're going to skip the part in his production, but we're going to talk about the nature of man, right? Okay. But the nature of man, it considers or it pertains to the theologian to consider the nature of man on the part of the soul, right? Not over on the part of the what body, huh?

[39:36] Except according to the what relation which the body has to the soul, right? Yeah. Okay. Okay. So you got to be kind of careful, like you this title given up here to this part, de homine, right? Yeah. It's really more de anima. Yeah. Right. You see. Okay. Read Thomas. Although you can say it about man in some sense, but but you're considering man primarily from the side of the what.

[40:06] The soul, right, and the body very little. So that's why it resembles, in a way, the consideration of the soul in Aristotle's book on the soul, right? Then he goes in to talk about the body in the later books, right? But he considers the soul in a kind of of almost separation from the body there.

[40:29] And therefore, the first consideration is about the soul, right? Now he's going to divide this treatise on the soul, which goes up to what eighty-nine, I guess. And because, according to Dionysius, in the eleventh chapter in the Angelic Hierarchy, three things are found in spiritual substances like the soul, namely essence, right, or nature, or the what it is, the virtus or the power, right, the abilities, and the operation, right.

[41:00] First, we will consider those things which pertain to the essence of the soul. Okay, and that's what we did in seventy-four and seventy what? I mean seventy-five and seventy-six, right? Okay.

[41:16] Secondly, those things which pertain to its power, huh, or powers, right? And that's what we just what finished today. Okay, seventy-eight through eighty-three. Third, those things which pertain to its operation, and that's the what? Eighty-four. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So notice that, huh? He's going to consider the nature of man and production the protection of man, right? Okay, we're not going to talk about the protection of man in this part of our thing, right?

[41:53] Okay, but that first part is divided into three parts, and now we're going to begin the what third part, right? Yeah. But he's going to talk about just the acts in particular of the what intellectual part, because the acts in particular of the will and so on, and the acts of the emotions in particular pertain more to moral theology, right? Which is in the second part, right?

[42:16] Okay. So let's turn now with that review a little bit of where we are to the beginning now of this what third part of the part on the soul here.

[42:32] Consequently, he says we're not to consider about the acts of the soul. They mean the acts of the soul in particular, he would say, right? As regards the what understanding powers and the appetitive powers, huh?

[42:49] Now, why those powers of the soul, right? Rather than the digestive power that's there, the power to walk around or something like that. Because it's not connected to the body. immaterial. Well,

[43:14] I see theology considers everything in reference to God, right? And so, it's only the intellectual powers and the will, right? They can have God as an object, huh? Yeah. Okay. But you could say, nevertheless, you could say though that the appetitive powers, even the the lower ones, the irrascible and concupiscible, can be the subject of human virtue, right? Like courage and and temperance and so on, right?

[43:45] So that's another way of saying why he talks about these. These are the subject of the what human virtues that you take up in moral theology, huh? The virtues of reason and the what moral virtues, huh? In the same way, in in ethics, huh? In ethics, all the virtues Aristotle talks about are either in the what the reason itself, right? The understanding, or they're in the appetitive powers, right?

[44:12] huh? And some like courage, let's say, in mildness, are in the irascible appetite, huh? And ones like temperance and maybe intrepidity and so on are in the concupiscent appetite. And justice is in the will, right? And then the intellectual virtues, of course, are in the understanding or in reason, huh? Okay.

[44:45] Okay. So he says, in theology, we have to consider then the acts the of the understanding power and of the powers of desire, right? But the acts of the appetitive power pertain to the consideration of what moral science, huh? And therefore, in the second part of this work, we will treat of them, right? In which we consider about moral matter, what we call moral theology in some cases.

[45:16] Okay. So now it remains to talk about the what acts of the intellectual power. Okay, and you'll see he's going to be more complete in a way than Aristotle is, and he talks about the acts of the intellectual powers, right? Okay. So we're going to meet what he meant in Aristotle, but some other things besides that, right? Okay.

[45:41] Now, in the consideration of these acts, we will proceed in this way. For first, we will consider in what way the soul understands when it's joined to the body, right? When it's in the body, right? Huh? In this life, in other words, right? Secondly, in what way it understands what Separated. separated from the body, huh? Okay. And that's going to be in question what eighty nine, it says, huh?

[46:14] Okay. So eighty four and eighty five and eighty six and eighty seven, eighty eight, right, are going to be dealing with the soul's knowledge while it's in the body, right? And eighty nine, the knowledge when separated from the body. Aristotle doesn't talk about that second, does he, in the De Anima? And if he's going to talk about that, the place to talk about it would be in the what metaphysics, okay, in wisdom, right?

[46:48] But in theology, there you don't have that distinction, right? Okay. Now the first consideration will be what? Yeah. Also, usually divided into two or into what three, right? Huh? For first, he will consider in what way the soul understands bodily things which are below itself, right? Secondly, in what way it understands itself and the things which are in it, and that's in question eighty-seven in the Tolle, okay.

[47:33] Third, in what way it understands the immaterial substances which are above it, and that's in question eighty-eight, right? Okay, that's pretty clear now. So in eighty-four, and eighty-five, and eighty-six, in those three questions, you are going to consider how the soul knows things that are below it, bodily things, right? And then in eighty-seven, how it knows what itself, and then eighty-eight, how it knows the things that are above it, like the immaterial substances, like the angels, okay?

[48:14] But all of that is in this life, see. And then all that was divided originally against what eighty-nine, which is about its knowledge separated from the body.

[48:34] Now, concerning the knowledge of corporeal things, right, to which these first three article or first three questions are addressed, three things occur that should be considered, right? First, by what it knows them, right, or through what it knows them, right? A pair can be through or by. Secondly, in what way and in what order, right? And that's the question eighty-five. Question eighty-four is is by what it knows them, right?

[49:15] Third, what it knows in them, right? Okay, And that's gonna be 86, huh? So again, that's divided into three, right? Okay. So it's gonna be very, very complete what he's going to talk about there, right? So pretty much covers it. Yeah. Yeah.

[49:50] Okay. Now let's look just at the the first eight questions here, so you get a sense of what he's doing here. Whether the first article is going to be whether the soul knows bodies through the understanding, right?

[50:15] The second is whether it understands them through its own nature, or through some what species or forms, huh? And if through some forms, which you must be going to answer in the second article, whether the species or forms of all understandable things are naturally innate in it, in the way that Plato thought, right? And and some other moderns thought too. Okay, and if they're not innate, as he's going to probably conclude there, whether they flow into it from some what separated immaterial forms, like Plato thought from the forms themselves, maybe, or Avicenna thought from the from the angels and so on, huh?

[51:06] Okay, then our fifth is undoubtedly something suggested by texts of Augustine, right? Whether our soul knows all things which it understands, ah, whether it sees them in the what eternal reasons, huh? Because Augustine says that, right? And people say, what does he mean by this, huh? Is this the Illuminational ideas? Well, it's almost like he sees them in God Himself, right? Okay. And that's not really what Augustine means, according to Thomas, but people sometimes, you know, take it that way, huh?

[51:43] Now, the next three articles here are much more close to what Aristotle would and what we learned in Aristotle, right? Whether it acquires the understandable knowledge from sensation, right? Okay.

[52:03] Of course, Aristotle talks about that in the *Proemium to Wisdom*, right? How sensing comes first, and then memory of what we sense, and then the collection of many memories, which is experience, and then we separate out the universal. That's where our understanding begins, huh? Okay. The seventh one now: whether the intellect is able and act to understand through intelligible forms which it has within itself by not converting itself to what phantasms, huh?

[52:39] And of course, you remember what Aristotle said, huh? That the soul, even after it has the understandable form which it understands, it turns to the images, right? To consider what it wants to consider, right? So even after I know what a triangle is, I want to think of what a triangle is. I will imagine a triangle, right? And so I will consider what a triangle is in that image, so to speak, that I have of a triangle, right?

[53:12] And then whether the judgment of the understanding is impeded through the. Impediment in the sensitive powers, right? Okay. So, if I, you know, can't remember what a triangle looks like, can understand what a triangle is, or if I can't imagine a dodecahedron, can understand what it is. But they're more serious, you know, injuries, right? That can happen, huh?

[53:50] Okay. Let's look a little bit just at the articles in eighty-five. Won't go into the articles today, but. Notice that first question was about that by which the soul understands, right? Okay.

[54:10] Now the second one here is about the. mode. or way and the order of understanding, right? I'm sorry, lost you. We're just right here at the beginning of eighty-five now. Eighty-five. Yeah, yeah.

[54:28] Then he says, "we ought to consider about the way and order of understanding, and about this eight things are asked. " First, whether our understanding understands by abstracting forms from phantasms.

[54:49] Secondly, whether the understandable forms abstracted from phantasms have themselves to our understanding as what is understood, or as that by which it understands. And Thomas is going to say, as that by which it understands.

[55:09] Third, whether our understanding naturally understands before the more universal. Fourth, whether our understanding is able to understand many things at once. Fifth, whether our understanding understands by putting together and dividing, and there he's thinking of the statement, right? Where you put together things in a affirmative statement, or you divide them in a what negative statement? Huh?

[55:41] Six, where the understanding is able to err. Yeah, well, it does know how to err, but um, and this is for you, brother, right now. Say, whether one is able to understand the same thing better than another one understands it, right?

[56:03] Okay. And eight, whether our understanding knows before the indivisible than the divisible, right? Of course, you see, even in geometry, they know the what indivisible by the negation of the divisible, right?

[56:21] Well, we say, you know, the body is has length and width and depth, right? Right. What is the surface? What's got length and width but no depth? So there's one negation there, right? What about a line? What has length but no width or depth? Two negations, right? And then a point has neither length nor width nor depth. So, or even what you could define as points, which has no parts, right?

[56:46] It starts with us. Yeah, yeah, but that's because our knowledge starts with our senses, and our senses know things that are composed. So something that's altogether simple, we know by the negation of composition. So this just gives you a little idea of what these first three articles questions are on, right? I appreciate the preview actually. Yeah. Now, question eighty-six here. Then ought to be considered. What our understanding knows in material things, and first of all, does it know singulars?

[57:24] huh Well, you know Boethius says a thing is singular when sensed, but universal and understood. When I see this glass here and I feel this glass, it's a singular glass, right? But understand what this is—that's a glass. I'm understanding something universal. The question is, does the reason know the singular?

[57:53] Whether it knows infinite things, huh? Whether it knows things that are what contingent, things that are not necessary, and whether it knows the future.

[58:07] Okay. Now, in eighty-eight is the second part of the what knowledge of the soul in this life, right? But the knowledge of the soul with respect to what itself, right?

[58:29] So, knows it. This is question eighty-eight. Excuse me, eighty-seven. Then, one ought to consider in what way the understanding soul knows itself and the things which are in itself, and about this four things are sought. First, whether it knows itself through its own what nature, which is the way the angel knows himself, right? But not the way our soul knows itself in this life. Secondly, in what way it knows habits existing in it?

[59:05] How do you know you have geometry in you? How do you know you have um actual understanding? How do you know you have the knowledge of the soul? In what way the understanding knows its own what act?

[59:26] I understand what a triangle is, and I know that I understand what a triangle is. I know that I know that I know what a triangle is. I know that too. But how do I know it? And in what way it knows what the act of the will? Okay.

[59:47] Now eighty-eight would be what? How it knows things above itself, right? But in this life, then he considers in what way the human soul knows those things which are above itself, namely, immaterial substances, huh?

[1:00:12] And about this, he asks three things, or three things asked: whether the human soul. In the state of the present life, right, is able to understand immaterial substances, which are called angels, to themselves, and Thomas will say no.

[1:00:35] Whether is able to arrive at some knowledge of them through a knowledge of material things, and Thomas will answer yes. Of course, the churches said even you know we can know God to some extent through what material things, right?

[1:00:52] Okay, and then this very strange opinion you have in the Middle Ages: whether God is that which is first known by us, and Thomas will say no. But there are those who are saying that, right? Since you'll meet him today, you know, Franciscan who'll say that. It's

[1:01:09] kind of strange position, huh? Okay, now all that was divided against what? All that that we just went through is what knowledge of the soul in this life. Yeah, and that's divided against eighty-nine, right? Which is knowledge of the soul separated from the body after death, right? Huh? Okay, and notice how that's last, huh? Because that's that's known to us, right? Okay.

[1:01:45] Then we ought to consider about the knowledge of separated soul, and the first thing one asks, one of the eight things one asks, is whether the separated soul, whether the soul separated from the body, is able to understand, right? It's going to understand in a different way. We'll see, huh? Secondly, whether it's going to understand separated substances, can understand your great angel, right? My teacher Kasurik used to say, you know, when you first understand your angel, you're going to say, "This is God," you know.

[1:02:18] Yes, no, no, I'm not God. He's up much higher than me. But he's going to be so terrific, you know. You know, this must be God. I mean, you've never seen anything as magnificent as your guardian angel,

[1:02:33] whether it understands all natural things, whether it knows singular things, that's a problem there because you don't have the senses anymore, right? See. And something Thomas is very much interested in: whether the habits of science here acquired remains in the separated soul. Some people thought you'd at least it's gone, you know. So, whether one can use the habit of science here acquired? See.

[1:03:08] Seven. Whether local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul, right? What does he mean, local distance? Well, the fact that you know something might be at a distance from you, okay? But notice that the soul is not in place. Maybe the local distance will make no difference, huh?

[1:03:32] And whether the separated souls or the soul separated from the body know those things which are what are done here, right? Okay. What he doesn't take up here, of course, is the big vision, right? Because that's taken up in a different place, you know. But knowledge of God. But these are things we all want to know about, right?

[1:03:57] I know. Could have just watched "Touched by an Angel" and found it all out. What? There's a stupid question. Yeah. Yeah. So. sometimes you sit back and. You say um

[1:04:18] how is this whole treatise divided here? This whole treatise on man, chiefly from the point of view of his soul. How is this whole treatise divided into two or three parts? The whole treatise. Just close your book and just see if you can see. It's just divided into two or three, right? And the treatise as a whole is divided into what? Three, we saw basically. No, the treatise as a whole is divided into two, but we're not going to do the second part.

[1:04:55] Oh. Yeah. Of generation. The first is on the nature of man, right, or the nature of the soul, right, and that takes up through eighty-nine, as we saw, and then the production of the of man, right, the first man. Okay, that's question ninety. On okay, so that was into two, right? Okay, now the first part was divided into what? Three. Three. According to what Dionysius said, right?

[1:05:22] You can see the nature, the power, and the operations, right? Again, you got to be careful about that because you can't understand the nature without understanding the powers in some way, and the powers without the acts, right? So there are maybe more details you might say about the powers and details about the acts that come in the second, the third part there, right? Okay.

[1:05:51] And we just completed how many these parts? Two. Yeah. Because questions seventy-five and seventy-six are on the nature of the soul itself, right? And then seventy-seven to what? Eighty-three. Was it today we did? Were about the what? Powers of the soul. And now eighty-four through eighty-nine will be about the acts, but he points out that the only acts we ought to talk about in detail in theology are the acts of the intellectual powers and the appetitive powers, right?

[1:06:30] Because these are the powers in which the virtues or the vices are found. Okay. But the appetitive powers, the acts, the appetitive powers in particular, will be considered in the second part because they pertain more to moral theology than to, you know, speculative theology. So he's going to take up just the acts of the what? Understanding, in particular, right? Okay. In in these eighty-four through what eighty-nine, right?

[1:07:03] How's that divided? Eighty-four through eighty-nine into two or three? Two parts, yeah. Because he's he's going to divide them into the acts of reason. Or the understanding in this life, right? And then that eighty nine, I guess it is, huh? The acts in another life, right? When the soul is separated from the body, right? You know, the first part is divided into two or three. Yeah, and it's kind of easy to see because it's talking about what is below the soul, right?

[1:07:47] Material things, and that's what three questions we saw, and then. So, how it understands itself, and what is in itself, yeah, and then how it understands what is above it, right? Okay, and it's just the first one I think that has three, has more than one question, you know. I mean, you know, question, I mean, questions have articles, but I'm talking question as he uses the term, right, but there are three questions for the first one, right?

[1:08:19] And so you may expect that it's going to be divided into three, and it is into three, right? So what's that first division? Eighty four, eighty five, eighty six. How it knows corporeally. Yeah, by what it knows, right? And then that's eighty four, I guess, right? That eighty five would be. What it knows singulars We don't get lots of details, but that's a breakdown of the third one.

[1:08:52] What it knows, right? See, but then in what, the way, and and the order in which it knows, right, would be the middle question. What eighty five, eighty five? Yeah.

[1:09:11] So, I mean, I remember this always, but you know, when you when you read it again, you know, you can review it and know it at least for the time being, right? Yeah.

[1:09:24] I notice myself, you know, you go through some of these divisions, and then you turn. You have to write something yourself, right? You know how you tend to be more orderly in the way you write it.

[1:09:38] It's. I was mentioning that treatise on the on the Eucharist. You know that the pseudo Thomas, huh? Oh. And he takes the words, you know, that our Lord says, huh? You know, take and eat, right? And this is my body, this is my blood, and so on. And he divides it into three purposes, right? And you know, one is do this in memory of me, right? Another is a sacrifice, right?

[1:10:14] This is my body. This is my blood, right? It's an offering for you, and so on. Yeah. And then take and eat that it's food, right? So he divides it into three, right? I think it's kind of interesting, you know, the way he divides it, and then you know he'll elaborate each one of those, you know. But it's always usually into two or three, right? We have found our lives.

[1:10:37] I've never heard of it before. No, I'm going to prepare a text for you for of that, you know, the pseudo Thomas, yeah. But it's kind of interesting, you know. But takes a long time to do it because when you get from those machines, you know, it's all you know, it's all broken up, you know, with those terrible things, you know, those lines, and then and nothing's capitalized, and you know, so so it takes a long time to work on it, but you know, maybe at the end of this year I'll have it ready for you.

[1:11:04] Work on it on and off, and I get a little time, you know. But it's it's a nice little text, you know. Wow. But uh.

[1:11:14] Does it seem like a sermon, or what? Well, I think it was like like conferences or something like that. There's about thirty two of them. Oh. You know, so maybe they were conferences, or you know, like a kind of a you know, not a retreat exactly, but something like that, you know. But I don't know. who it would be. It might be, you know, Thomas of Anglia.

[1:11:39] Do They think it might be a Dominican, or they're not even sure of that. I don't know what they they think of it exactly, you know. But I mean, it's it's in that you know the one that

[1:11:52] my son in law had, you know, that they had the text of Thomas, right? It's on there. That CD, if you have that. Oh, the Opera Omnia Yeah, yeah. It'd be in the in the in the Vivès edition. I think they have the. I used to call it the blue edition. It. Used to always be blue in the library, and I'd see it, but but it's in there, you know.

[1:12:12] They have some of the ones in there, you know, too, on the on the canonical epistles, you know, but they're not considered by Thomas. The only ones we have by Thomas are the epistles of Saint Paul. But people, you know, who are you know good scholastics and who have read Augustine and so on, and know you know what the church fathers have said about these things, right?

[1:12:37] So, but but anyway, here the order is pretty simple to see, right? Isn't it? You come right down to it. I think if you bear in mind a little bit the order that he's proceeding in, then you it's more interesting, you know, and you can kind of see the whole context, you know. So we'll try to do the first two articles at least of this of this question eighty four, right?

[1:13:08] But long we don't forget today, you know. Yeah. It's not entirely even sure, but I suppose since I've gotten interrupted, what might we be doing for Thanksgiving week? Since it's two weeks from today, Thursday. Yeah, we can't we can't be in Thursday. I'll be having turkey, turkey, turkey. I'd be out to choose between you, and turkey, you know. No, my my my son and Paul's coming with his wife, and uh their uh four little ones, right?

[1:13:44] I got to bring. I got to bring in the the little announcement they sent out. You know, like the last one born was Lucy Marie, right? The kind of announcement of of her birth and her baptism. I'll show you how they do a nice job of it. I mean, much much more artistic than anything I ever did. you know the kids were were b, they were. I remember when Paul himself was born.

[1:14:05] I mean, you know, it's really a nice little. I reckon it's really really a nice little thing that they have. they have a picture of Saint Lucy, you know, and Oh, neat. you know. They have a picture of the children, you know, with the baby and so on, and they have a little prayer. Yeah, you'll see it. I mean, it's very, very nice, very nice thing that they did.

[1:14:23] So it's kind of a... sitting there in the house, I look and say, that's really nice. Yeah. I already have to get all this artistic ability, you know. to must have to know a computer and so on. They did that themselves. They must have done something like that. Would you want to meet that week at all, or just? Yeah, we can't meet that week. I don't think we'll meet next week.

[1:14:44] Okay. Yeah, but two weeks from now would be Thanksgiving, I think. Right. Yeah. Yeah, then we would take up the Thursday after that. Okay. Yeah. Um, after the exam schedule, that doesn't come until December, you know. Okay. I mean, it's the latter part of I think December 10th to 11th is the last day of class, but you know, December