De Anima (On the Soul)
142. Summa I, Q.85 a.1, Replies: Two Kinds of Abstraction, Plato's Error, and Common vs. Individual Matter
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/142-summa-i-q-85-a-1-replies-two-kinds-of-abstraction-platos/

[0:00] Otherwise, the juxtaposition here are kind of long. Whoever, whatever understanding understands the thing other than it is is false, right? But the forms of material things are not abstracted from particulars, whose likenesses are the images. If, therefore, we understand material things through abstractionist forms from images, there will be falsity in understanding, right? This touches upon that central question of philosophy that we talked about before, eh? Is it is the mind false in understanding singulars universally?

[0:49] My false in understanding you as a man. You are a man. It's just in different modes. In understanding you to be a man, I don't understand what you have that's unique, do I? Because he's a man in the same sense that you are a man, right? So you can say my knowledge of you is incomplete, but I know you to be a man, right? But is it false?

[1:18] Okay. So I'm understanding you, who are singular, to be a man, which is something universal, right? I'm not. The mistake would come if I said that the universality of man belongs to you. Then I'd be false, right?

[1:42] Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that to abstract happens in two ways. In one way, by way of composition and division. Now, here he's thinking of statement, right? If you look at Thomas's *Peri Hermeneias right? He always quotes Aristotle in the second act. They're talking about putting together two things, like we say, man is an animal, right? Or dividing or separating them, we say, man is not a what stone, right?

[2:14] Okay. In one way, by way of composition and division, as when we understand something not to be in another, right? Or to be separated from it, right? Okay.

[2:30] So when I say man is not a stone, I'm kind of separating man and what stone, right? Okay. In another way, by way of a simple and absolute consideration, as when we understand one, considering nothing about the what other, right?

[2:57] Now, to abstract by the understanding those things which are not abstracted in the thing, by the first way of abstraction, is not without falsity, right?

[3:17] Then you're making a false statement. So what's the example? What would an example about be? Well, if I say, for example, that man is not an animal, right? Okay. Well, then I'm being false, right? But if I understand animal without understanding man, is that false? No. See. So that's the second kind of. Separation, right? Okay. When I say man is not an animal, in one way I'm separating man from animal, right?

[3:50] When I understand animal, understanding nothing about man in particular, right? That's another kind of separation, right? So, where's my mind false in that second case?

[4:03] No. I always ask my students, what is a perfect number? You know, you know, because Augustine and Thomas, when they explain why God made the universe or said to make the universe in six days, right? They always point out that six is the first perfect number, right? Well, my students don't know what a perfect number is, right? But they know what a number is. Are they false in knowing what a number is, without knowing what a perfect number is in particular?

[4:39] No. But if you were to say that a perfect number is not a number, then you would be false, right? Okay. But to abstract in the second way by the understanding, things which are not abstracted secundum rem, does not have falsity, as appears manifest in sensible things.

[5:17] For if we understand or say that color is not in a colored body, right, or that it is separated from it, there will be falsity in opinion or in speech, huh?

[5:32] But if we consider the color and its properties, considering nothing about the colored what apple, I guess it is, or that what we thus understand also express in voice, this will be without falsity of opinion and speech, huh? For apple is not of the definition of color, right? And therefore, nothing prevents color to be understood, understanding nothing about what apple, right?

[6:12] Likewise, I say that those things which pertain to the definition of the species of any material thing, for example, a stone or a man or a horse, are able to be considered without the individuating what principles, which are not of the definition of the species. And this is to abstract the universal from the what particular. Or the understandable form from the images to consider the nature of the species without a consideration of the individual principles which are presented by the images.

[6:57] This is not to say that it is without them, right? But to understand it without them. You see the difference between the two, huh?

[7:11] That's where Plato's making a mistake, right? Because he's saying what a man is, what a dog is, what a cat is, outside of our mind exists by itself, right? Right. Separation from this man and the next man and the other man. Aristotle says no. It's only in the mind that it exists in separation.

[7:35] Therefore, he says in the De Anima that the soul is the place of. Plato's. forms, not in the world by itself. When, therefore, it is said that the understanding is false, which understands a thing other than it is, it is true if otherwise refers to the thing understood. For then the understanding is false, when it understands the thing to be other than it is.

[8:09] Whence false would be the understanding, if it thus abstracted the form or species of stone from matter, that it understood it not to be in matter, and this is what Plato did, right? As Plato laid down. But it is not true what is proposed if otherwise is taken on the part of the one understanding, for is without falsity that other is the way of understanding of the one understanding and understanding than the mode of the thing and what existing, right?

[8:48] That's where you're asking that simple question, right? Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are, right? And Plato seemed to be answering what? Yes. But Aristotle, no, right? Okay. That we can understand.

[9:08] Definitely. Ah. One thing sometimes without another, even though it doesn't exist without the other, right? Okay. I can understand what's common to all you people. Ah, without your individual differences, right?

[9:31] Um, even though what is common to all of you doesn't exist outside my mind without your individual differences. Okay. Okay, and the reason for this difference in the way of understanding from the way of the thing is because the understood is in the one understanding in an immaterial way, in the way of the understanding, and not materially in the way of the thing what understood.

[10:10] Okay. So the form of the individual object really exists in our mind, but in a different way. Yeah. It truly exists. But um, it's able to be understood, right? Say, but you people have in common is able to be understood. Without your differences, right? But outside my mind, it doesn't exist without your what differences. I

[10:53] wanted to go back to a simpler example there with the senses, like we were doing before. Go back to say sugar or something like that, right? We say sugar is both white and sweet, and both of those are together in the sugar, right? But the eye can know the whiteness of the sugar without the sweetness,

[11:15] and the sense of taste can know the sweetness of the sugar without the whiteness. Now, is the sense of sight mistaken in knowing the whiteness of it without the sugar? No, that's the second thing he was talking about, right? But if I said that this white thing is not sweet,

[11:40] then I'd be false, right? Okay. If I separated white and sweet in that way, or vice versa, you know, if I tasted it sweet and I tasted without tasting the whiteness, and I say this sweet thing is not white, if white and sweet were separated in that way, It would be false, right? But to know the sweetness of the sugar without knowing at all its whiteness, right?

[12:09] Like a blind man might know it, right? You could say it's an incomplete knowledge of the sugar, right? But is it a false? If I say Saddam Hussein is a man,

[12:29] that's not all that can be said about him. Or Hitler was a man, and I'll tell you about Hitler. Well, he was a man. I haven't said all that can be said about Hitler, but is it false? See.

[12:48] And I can know what Hitler has in common with Saddam or even in common with John Paul II, right? See. But what a man is doesn't exist in separation from what's unique to Hitler or Stalin or John Paul II, for that matter. You see.

[13:14] But if I said what a man is is without all those individual differences of Hitler and the Pope and so on, then I would be what false, and I'd be with Plato there in my world of forms. Okay.

[13:35] You see, the reason why people get you know answer no to that question, or yes rather that question, is because they're not thinking of those two different that distinction that Thomas has made here, huh? And

[13:51] truth means that you are saying what is in things is in things, right? And what is not in things is not in things. And that's what you do when you form a statement. But here, this other business, you are understanding one

[14:10] without that in which it is. Let's say, right? Okay. In the same way, mathematics, when I understand a cube, right, the shape of a cube can be understood without ice, without wood and plastic, anything else. You might have a cube, right?

[14:28] Not that there is a cube in the world that doesn't, isn't either wooden or ice or some other material cube, right? But I can understand cube without them, and therefore there can be a science of the cube in which wood and anything sensible like that doesn't enter in. But if I say that there exists a cube that is that is not material, right? Then I'd be with Plato and I have a mathematical world corresponding to mathematical sciences, as well as this world of forms.

[15:04] So Plato is kind of a three-decker universe. There you have the sensible world corresponding to our senses, and then the mathematical world, and then the forms. Aristotle says, "No, no, our mind is knowing these things in separation, but they don't what? Yeah, in separation, yeah. How is this mathematical world different from the world of forms? Well, in the mathematical world, there is still individuation, see. So there are many individuals of the same kind.

[15:36] Okay, sure. In the mathematical world, there is only what a man is, only one what a. But in a sense, Plato is giving us a hint, though. If there was immaterial things, right? Okay, each of them would be what it is, and there wouldn't be two of the same kind, right? Okay.

[15:57] So, in a sense, he's giving us a introduction in a way to something about the the angels and about the material substances like that. That's why it can only be one God, too. It's

[16:20] a lot to think about here. Thomas is saying. See the way the way Marx proceeded, huh? Marx took the fact that in experimental science, huh? We experiment, as I say, we make something, right? And then he said, "This is the only way of knowing, right? Which the moderns are apt to do, right? So we know only by what making. Well, then the next step is to say, then we know only what we make,

[16:59] right? And then the next step is to say, we're the beginning and the end of all we make. So we are the beginning and the end of all we can know. So we are the alpha and omega, right?

[17:16] That's the basis of what I mean. That's what it means, dialectical materialism. That's well, it's what way Marx, was part of it, yeah, yeah. But dialectical materialism means is that matter is the beginning of everything, right? Which is an old opinion, right? But then that everything develops out of matter by the clash of opposites, and that's the dialectical. Method of Hegel, right? And so he took it over from Hegel, right?

[17:51] Of course, he thought he was standing Hegel on his head, right? Hegel was standing on his head, he thought, because Hegel had made thought first, right? And then, you know, thought produces matter eventually, right? It's a synthesis. But

[18:11] in the mind, there is the same knowledge of opposites, right? And so what Marx did was to transpose into matter what you have in the mind. And so he had opposites together in matter, like they're together in the mind. But of course, if they're together in matter, they'd be struggling with each other, right? And so what that means basically is a struggle of opposites, right? Of course, that's partly in the idea of evolution too, right?

[18:45] That there's a struggle going on in nature, right? So Marx dedicated Das Kapital, I think it was, to Darwin, and they still have Darwin's copy of it, you know, somewhere someplace, yeah. Dedication to him, yeah. He thought he was kind of doing. Well, then you see when you apply this to human society, you take what's most material in human society, technology mode of production, and you try to explain everything else as growing out of that.

[19:15] I used to joke, you know, when I was a student in Quebec, you know, we'd go swimming in the afternoons, see? And you'd come out of, you know, the classes maybe five o'clock or something or six, and you'd be kind of shivering to get out there, sitting, you know, your body temperature goes down, you sit like that. But you go there and you get your trunks and you take a hot shower and then you swim and then take another shower and come on here, you know, feeling like a button your coat and walking up the hill.

[19:42] But but there'd be a sort of hesitation before you jump into that cold water, right? Yeah. And I used to joke, you know, this is how speculative philosophy began, right? That people, you know, we're not engaged doing things, you see, and you're kind of Marx's explanation of the origin of of of uh Thales who started this by saying, water is the beginning of all things, right? Okay.

[20:05] Jump in. Gotta be getting somewhere. That's where Marx interpreted some of these, you know, philosophy and theology, you know, in the speculative sense, you know, as somebody just, you know, didn't get his hands dirty and sit around doing nothing, you know. So he started having these daydreams, huh? That's all he did too. Yeah, I know. I know. He's got

[20:31] a lot of contradictions in people's actions than what they think. And the second one here now is you have to define material things by matter, right? And here you are abstracting from matter. So how's that going to work, right?

[20:51] Now, to the second, it should be said that some have thought that the species, the nature of an actual thing, was form only, and that matter was not a part of the species. And according to this, in the definitions of natural things, matter would not be placed.

[21:17] And therefore, it ought to be said otherwise that matter is what twofold: matter in general or common matter, and what designated matter, right? To point to or individual matter. Common matter has, say, flesh and bone. Individual has these fleshes and these bones that you can feel yourself, right? Okay.

[21:49] So the understanding therefore separates the species of a natural thing from sensible matter, individual sensible matter, right? In other words, I leave out in my definition of man your flesh and your blood and your bones, and my flesh and my blood and my bones are left out, right? And John Paul the Second's flesh and blood and bones are left out of the definition of man, right? But I keep in general the idea of flesh and blood and bones, the understanding of what a man is.

[22:24] Okay, so it's separated from individual matter. So the understanding therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from individual sensible matter, but not from what common sensible matter. Just as it abstracts the species of man from these fleshes and these bones, which are not of the definition of the species, but are parts of the individual, and this is brought out in the seventh book of wisdom, metaphysics.

[23:06] So my flesh and my blood and my bones are not of the definition of flesh and blood and bones, are they? And flesh and blood and bone can be understood without the flesh and blood and bones of Duane Burquist. Okay. Even though the flesh and blood and bones don't exist in the real world, without the flesh and blood and bones of Duane Burquist or or you or some other man, right?

[23:37] But the species of man cannot be abstracted by the understanding. From flesh and bones in general, right? Okay. But the species, mathematical species, like circle or sphere or cube, right, are able to be abstracted by the understanding, not only from what individual sensible matter, right, but even from what common, right?

[24:10] But not from what they sometimes call intelligible or imaginable matter, right? Meaning this extension, right? But only from what individual, right? Understandable matter. I'm sorry. What's the distinction between the common and this intelligible common, common intelligible? No, no. She's talking here now about mathematics, right? Right. And mathematics, you can separate sphere and cube, not only from this ice cube, right, and this wooden cube, but from

[24:52] even anything sensible, right? Any sensible matter, right? In general, you can separate it from. Okay. But you can't separate it from what they sometimes call intelligible matter or hyle noete matter, right? Which maybe could be more clearly stated as as imaginable matter, right? But you can't separate it from what extension, right? Part outside of part, right? So when I imagine a triangle or a sphere or cube, it is part outside of part, right?

[25:30] Okay, it's extended, and so that extended matter is called intelligible matter, right? Imaginable matter. Okay, okay. But again, when I understand what a triangle is or what a sphere is, I separate it from individual understandable matter, right? Okay. Now this is the problem that that we mentioned before in in in, in Locke and in Berkeley, right? You know, Locke is trying to understand

[26:07] the general idea of triangle, right? Okay. Now, is the general idea of triangle? You'd say it's got three sides, right? Well, are those three sides equal or unequal?

[26:26] It doesn't matter him. Well, he doesn't know what to say, so he says it's both and neither. Okay. It does. Any. Triangle you imagine in your imagination, right? It's an individual triangle, and the sides will either be equal or unequal, but they won't be both, right, or neither. But when I understand what a triangle is,

[26:57] I understand the three lines, right, in what a triangle is. But are those lines understood to be equal or unequal? Well, you abstract from their being equal or unequal, right? Okay, and the proper answer would be to that question would be that in the definition of triangle in general, those three lines are able to be equal or unequal, right? But they're actually neither, right? Okay. Okay. And so he's kind of confusing The universal idea of triangle that the reason understands right from the triangles with the he's mixing up with the triangles that you imagine which must always be either equal or unequal right okay so he ends up by saying well then it's all none of these

[27:58] and then Berkeley said doesn't make any sense so there aren't any universal ideas but you see if you've gone through geometry and you know if you take you know a theorem like the interior angles of a triangle equal to right angles huh and one way you can show that is by drawing a straight line through one vertex parallel to the what opposite side right and if you know the the parallel theorem you know that the alternate angles are what equal right so this same to that and this to that that's that's what the parallel theorem says right and the theorem says the alternate angles equal so if this equals that and this equals that and this obviously makes up the third one obviously the three

[28:49] angles equal to two what right angles right but when I understand that I'm understanding that to be true of what not equilateral triangle not isosceles, but any triangle right okay it makes no difference whether I imagine a equilateral triangle and make the demonstration or not right because all I'm doing is drawing a straight line through one vertex parallel to the opposite side and whether these three lines are equal or just two of them or none of them makes no difference as far as the demonstration is concerned right because the demonstration really takes what is common to what triangle that has three sides and therefore you can you know draw a straight line through one vertex right parallel to the opposite side right and to abstracts

[29:41] whether the sides are equal or unequal or not right and so if you've done geometry you have an experience of your mind as understanding the universal and therefore separation from the individual one

[30:04] but any triangle that you would draw in the continuous would be either equilateral or have just two equal or none equal right okay now imagination is still a bodily thing and therefore it still has part outside of part right

[30:29] so Plato is kind of assimilating the natures or the species of natural things to the species of mathematical things huh okay. Sometimes he'd assimilate the species of geometrical things to arithmetical things, right? So you'd say uh

[30:55] point is one and a line is two and a surface is three and a body is four. Okay, Which adds up to ten. One plus two plus three plus four.

[31:17] Okay. So let's go back to the end of the paragraph. Mathematical species are able to be abstracted by the understanding from sensible matter, not only from individual sensible matter, right? But also common, right?

[31:42] But not, however, from common understandable matter, but only from what individual understandable matter. A sensible matter is called bodily matter, according as it is subject to what sensible qualities, to hot and cold, hard and soft, and others of this sort. But understandable matter is said to be substance, according as it is subject to what quantity. Huh?

[32:20] Is manifest, however, that quantity is within substance before sensible qualities. Whence quantities, as numbers and dimensions and figures, which are terminations of quantities, are able to be considered without sensible qualities, which is for them to be abstracted from sensible matter. But they cannot, however, be considered without an understanding of substance subject to quantity, which would be to abstract them from common understandable or imaginable matter. They are Able, nevertheless, to be considered without this or that substance, which is to abstract them from what individual understandable matter.

[33:17] Some things are able. There are which are able to be abstracted, even from what common understandable matter, such as being, one, ability, and act, and others of this sort, which are also able to be without any matter, as is clear in the material substances. And those things are considered in wisdom, right? Wisdom is about being and one and built in act and so on. And because Plato did not consider what has been said about the two ways of abstraction, where you understand one thing without understanding another, right?

[34:00] And where you say one thing is not another, right? Because Plato did not consider what has been said about the twofold way of abstraction, all things which we say are abstracted by the understanding, he laid down to be abstracted in things, in reality. Okay, so the mathematical things that are abstracted by our mind from sensible matter, he made in things in reality outside of our mind, existing by themselves separately, right?

[34:33] And the same way with the what universals, right? They correspond to our definitions, right? They are separated universal from the singular in our mind, but he made them separated in what reality outside of our mind. huh? So that's to apply it to the second objection. Now, the third. Moreover, in the third book about the soul, the objection again, it says that the images are to the understanding soul as colors to sight.

[35:23] But sight is not abstraction of some species from colors, but through this that the colors are pressed upon the sight. Therefore, neither does understanding happen through this that something is abstracted from the images, but through this that the images act upon the understanding or press something upon it.

[35:47] Thomas replies to the third. It should be said that colors have the same way of existing, in so far as they are individual bodily matter, as the what power of sight, right? And therefore, they are able to press upon the sight their own likeness. But images, since they are the likenesses of individuals, and exist in bodily organs, do not have the same way of existing that the human understanding has.

[36:25] And therefore, they are not able by their power to be impressed upon the possible understanding, but by the power of the agent intellect, the acting upon understanding, there results a certain likeness in the possible understanding. From the conversion or turning upon of the agent intellect over the phantasms, which is representative of those things of which there are images, solely as far as the nature of the species,

[37:02] and through this way, intelligible forms are said to be abstracted from the images. Not, however, that there be the same what form and number which was before in the phantasms, as if that afterwards comes to be the intellect, the possible intellect, to the way in which one body takes from another body and transfers to another. So you're making in a sense a likeness, like what is in the images, right?

[37:30] Okay, but like it only in a universal way. Now notice it's made more... Clear when you go back to the order which our knowledge develops, because what comes first is sensing, and then memory of what we sensed, right? And then we collect many memories of the same sort of thing, and then we have an experience of that, right? So as a child, you know, there's a dog in the backyard, and your mother says, "See the dog?

[38:04] " That's the first dog you've seen, maybe, right? And another day, you know, she says, "You see the dog, right? " Okay. So people are pointing out the dog, and so you maybe remember something of what you saw the other day, right? So you have a bunch of memories of dogs gathered together in one into one experience of dogs, right? And then the age intellect, right, separates out what those many dogs have what in common, right?

[38:41] And that's the beginning of what understanding, right? And so Boethius always is quoted as saying, "The thing is singular when sensed, right? Or even when remembered, right? Experienced, but universal when you begin to what understand it, right? " Do you remember this

[39:13] story about Helen Keller and how she first, I guess, what their teacher there? I guess the big breakthrough was with water, because the teacher kept pouring water on her hand at the pump and kept saying water, water. Finally, she grasped that that sense and that just opened up her world for her. She was able to start learning how to communicate.

[39:43] Okay. Now, someone wanted to define what a Shakespearean sonnet is, right? On his own, what would he do? Yeah, you get a book of Shakespeare's sonnets, and you'd read them, and the individual sonnets, right? And you start to compare them, right? And then you start to notice what they had. It seemed to become the same length, you know. And then if you examine more closely, you'd see that this is 14 lines and that is 14 lines, and then you know you might start to notice things about meter and so on, right?

[40:21] Until finally, you'd see that a Shakespearean sonnet is a what likeness of thought and feeling in 14 lines of iambic pentameter divided into three quatrains with alternate rhyming. and completed by a couplet. That's common to all of them, right?

[40:42] Except there is a couple there where Shakespeare kind of plays on the Italian sonnet, where the first two quatrains are answered by the third quatrain, and coupled together. In the Italian sonnet, you have what an octet of eight lines answered by a sextet of six lines, right? When the Shakespearean sonnet or the English sonnet, you have three quatrains that are kind of completed or summed up or something by a couplet, right?

[41:15] Sometimes he'll put the four with the two, kind of the way the thought goes, right? It's amazing, though, how the guys who write what 154 of those things, all in the same what, 14 lines, huh? It's

[41:43] kind of like like like that discipline of having to put in 14 lines all the time, right? I see the modern poet would think, oh, you know, it's confining oneself, you know, but actually it's forcing him to express himself better, right? It's like it's like Mozart's respect for the musical forms, you know, and how very rarely he departs from what's expected, you know. I mean, like you keep the minuet, you know, Beethoven would go on the scherzo or something instead, but Mozart stays at the traditional form, but then he can bring out so much, you know.

[42:25] Okay, to the fourth. Okay, Aristotle does compare the agent intellect to the light in the eyes, right? But it's not in every way similar, right? Thomas will point that out here. To the fourth, it should be said that images are illuminated by the understanding, by the acting upon understanding, and again, from them, through the power of the agent understanding, intelligible forms are abstracted.

[43:14] They are illuminated because just as the sensitive part, from its conjunction to the intellectual part, is rendered more what powerful, so the images, from the power of the agent understanding, are rendered

[43:37] able that from them. Understandable intentions can be abstracted. Now the agent intellect abstracts intelligible forms from the images, in so far as through the power of the agent intellect, we are able to take into our consideration the nature natures of the species without the individual conditions, by the likenesses of which the possible intellect is but informed. As we've been saying here, right?

[44:14] So what's our little prayer? We say, "Strengthen the light of my mind, order illumined my images. " Right. The fifth one was going back to what we'd seen before, that we don't understand without turning to the images again, right? And Thomas will point it out now. To the fifth, it should be said that our understanding both abstracts intelligible forms from the images, in so far as it considers the natures of things in general, right?

[44:53] You see that you know most clearly in a simple science like geometry, right? Where I realize I'm considering triangle, you know, universally, right? In that demonstration there, right? the demonstration lays out anything about whether the sides of the triangle are equal or unequal. right

[45:11] it really says that you can draw a what line through a vertex, any vertex of a triangle, parallel to the opposite side, right? And then you can demonstrate that the angles will have to be equal to two right angles.

[45:29] So the fifth, it should be said, that our understanding both abstracts intelligible forms from the images, in so far as it considers the natures of things in general, and nevertheless it understands them in the images because is not able to understand even those things of which it abstracts species except by what turning to the images, right? Okay. So if I want to see to go back to proportion, if I want to see the color of your clothes, right, I have to turn towards your clothes, right?

[46:05] Even though my seeing the color of your clothes is in my eyes, not in your garments, huh? Okay. But I still can't see the color of your clothes without turning towards your clothes, right? Okay. So likewise, I can't understand what it is as something sensed or imagined, right? Without turning towards the image of that thing in my imagination, right? So my imagination is affected, then my what thinking is affected, right?

[46:40] Just as if your clothing is taken away from this room, it affects my seeing the color of your clothing, right? Even though my seeing the color of your clothing is not in any way in your clothing, is it? Not taking place there. I mean, is the subject taking place in my eye, right? But my eye is seeing the color of your clothing, right? So it's got to turn towards your clothing, right?

[47:07] If I want to see your face, I have to turn towards your face, right? So the object of our reason, if it was something abstracted, if something existed out there in separation, then we wouldn't have to what turn towards the image, right? But the what it is is something sensed or imagined. So we have to we imagine the thing, right, before we can understand the what it is is something imagined,

[47:38] right? Very subtle, Mr Berquist So we better say the next two articles for next time. Okay. My other students meet me on Thursday night now, so I got they come fairly promptly. You know, they go home eat dinner before they they can arrive at seven o'clock. So what do you do with them? Well, actually, now we do the Dharma. Yep. Yeah, yeah. What are they?