De Anima (On the Soul)
143. Aquinas: The Intelligible Species Is How We Understand, Not What We Understand; Why the More Universal Is Known First
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[0:01] Mostly from Assumption or all over? No, no, not from Assumption. They're older. Yeah, they're graduates, many of. Neat. Saint Thomas, TAC, and so on. Okay. Yeah. Oh yeah, saw in the newsletter one of the new. Name of the Father, Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain luminous images, and arouse us to consider it more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas and Gilly.

[0:33] And help us to understand all that's true. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. The second one proceeds thus: It seems that the understandable forms, species is the word for form, abstracted from the images, have themselves to our understanding as what, as that which is understood, right? Okay. And Thomas is going to hold the other side, right? That they are that by which we understand, right?

[1:13] First objection: The understood in act is in the one understanding, because the understanding in act is the, or the understood in act is the understanding itself in act. In the sense, knowing is what becoming the thing known. Okay.

[1:40] But nothing of the thing understood is in the understanding, actually understanding, except the intelligible form abstracted. Therefore, this form is what is understood in act.

[2:01] Moreover, the understood in act is necessarily in something; otherwise, it would be nothing. But it is not in the thing which is outside the soul, because since the thing outside the soul is material, nothing that is in it is able to be understood in act. In other words, it can be in the understanding, which is immaterial, it remains therefore that the understood in act is in the understanding, and thus and thus is nothing other than the fore said intelligible form.

[2:37] Moreover, the philosopher says in the first book of the Peri Hermeneias that's his second book in logic, the book on what statement, huh? That vocal sounds are the what signs of what the soul is undergone, huh? But vocal sounds signify the things understood, huh? For we signify by vocal sound or by voice what we understand. Therefore, those very undergoings of the soul, which are the understandable forms, are what are understood in act.

[3:21] Now the said contra makes use of a proportion, huh? But against this, the understandable form is to the understanding as the sensible form is to the sense.

[3:36] But the sensible form is not that which is sensed, but more that by which the sense senses. Therefore, the understandable form is not what is understood in act, but that by which the understanding understands. Okay. Now let's take that contra there because that's easiest to see, huh? When I see the black of your garment, right, huh?

[4:06] I don't see the black of your garment until my eye has been acted upon in some way, right? Okay. And that result of your color acting on my eye, right, is what they call the sensible what form, right? Okay. But is that what I actually see, or do I see the black of your outfit? What do I see? The black of your outfit. Yeah, yeah. So he's saying, likewise, right?

[4:39] What acts upon the understanding, right, is going to be that by which it understands, huh? Not that which it understands. Okay. Yeah. Okay. But there's going to be a difference between the understanding and the senses, because what the sense knows is out there. Yeah. But the universal, which is what is understood, you understand universal what something is, which is something universal that doesn't exist out there as universal.

[5:13] Hmm. And therefore, to complete the understanding, you have to form a thought of universal. And in that respect. The imagination is like the understanding, because you can imagine something in its absence, right? I can imagine a a gold mountain now, right? But since there is no gold mountain here, I have to form an image of the gold mountain. In the same way, thought is like that, huh?

[5:44] Because what you understand is that what it is is something you sense or imagine, and that is something universal. But it's not universal out there, see? And therefore, you have to form a thought to complete your what thinking, right? So I can't really think about what a triangle is without forming some kind of a thought about what a triangle is. Just as I can't imagine a gold mountain without forming some image of a gold mountain, okay?

[6:16] Or I can't remember my my wife or my children without forming an image now in my memory, right? Okay, because they're not present here, right?

[6:28] But you, my seeing can terminate in you because you are you are here, and you are singular, right? And the sensing is singular. Okay.

[6:43] I answer that it should be said that some laid down that the knowing powers which are in us know nothing except their own undergoing, huh? For example, that the sense does not sense except the undergoing of its own organ. And according to this, the understanding would understand nothing except its own what undergoing, huh? That is the understandable form received in it. And according to this, then the form of this sort would be the very thing that is understood, right?

[7:25] But this opinion manifestly appears false from two things. First, because those are the same which are understood by us and about which the what sciences are. If therefore those things that are understood were only forms which are in the soul, it would follow that all sciences are not about things which are outside the soul, like dog and cat and tree and chair, right? But only about the understandable forms which are in the what soul.

[8:02] That's the way modern philosophers tend to talk, right? Is that we don't know anything outside of ourselves, we just know what's inside of us.

[8:12] Just as according to the Platonists, all sciences are about the forms which they laid down to be understood in act. Secondly, because. they would follow the mistake of the ancients, saying that everything that is seen is true, and that's sometimes, what you find the modern say too, right? You know, it's true for me, and something else is true for you, and because what I'm knowing is the way something impressed me, and impressed you a different way, so you know something different.

[8:47] Sure. And mine just as good as you, and my impression as good as yours. Of course, true is what is saying what is is and what is not is not. So something can't be true for me and not true for what you, right? Right. Okay. If I'm saying what is is, then for you to say what is is would also be true.

[9:13] You say Berkwist is sitting. You're saying now that what is is, you're true. You say Berkwist is standing. You're saying what is not is, and now you're speaking falsely. Okay Secondly, because they would follow the error or mistake of the ancients saying that everything that is what

[9:37] seems to be so is true, right? And thus, the contradictories would be what at the same time true. You know, it's cold here. Someone says, "No, it's warm." You know, you hear people say that thing sometimes, right?

[9:55] If a potency did not know except its own undergoing about that alone, would it what judge? Thus, however, it seems something to be as the knowing power would be what affected, right? Always, therefore, the judgment of the knowing power would be about what it judges, namely about its own what undergoing, according as it is, and thus every judgment would be what true. If, for example, the taste did not sense except its own undergoing, when someone has a what healthy taste, right?

[10:38] He judges the honey to be what sweet. He truly judges, right? And likewise, the man who has a what a sick or infected tongue, right? Judges the honey to be what bitter, right? Then he would be judging truly true, okay? Because both judge according as his what his taste is affected, right? And thus, it would follow that every opinion was equally true and universally every what.

[11:15] Yeah, yeah, every taking right by the mind. Would it be that grasping or no? Yeah, grasping, you could say. Yeah. So those are two things that would follow if you say that the understandable form is what is known, right? Or that The only thing you know is what by your senses and your reason is the undergoing of that sense, the undergoing of that reason. In my opinion, would everybody's opinion would be equal, like they want to say nowadays, right?

[11:51] And all sciences would be about what ideas or something like that. I mean, what's inside of us? Do you know science about plants or science about dogs or anything else outside of us? And therefore, it should be said that the understandable form has itself the understanding as that by which the understanding understands,

[12:23] which is clear in this way: since there is a twofold action. As is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics, which we'll see sometime when we go to wisdom, right? One which remains in the what, doer, right? As example, to see and to understand, and another which goes forth to an exterior thing, as to heat something or to saw or cut something, right? Now both comes to be according to some what, form, right?

[13:03] And just as the form by which there comes about an action tending to an exterior thing, is a likeness of the object of the action, as the heat of the one heating is a likeness of the thing heated.

[13:22] Likewise, the form by which there comes about an action remaining in the agent is a likeness of the what, object, right? Okay. So when I receive the color of your garment, or I receive your shape, I'm receiving a likeness of that color, right? A likeness of that shape. What, doctor? What? I understand the second part of it, but that I don't understand how this works. That the heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated.

[13:53] How is that? Well, it's going to be hot the thing heated, right? And therefore, be like the fire that heated it. And there's a likeness of the thing heated. But then, okay, maybe just the way the English is. I mean, it's the the likeness of the thing heated. I mean, won't the thing heated be a likeness of the of the heat in the heater? Yeah, you could say both though.

[14:20] Oh, I understand. Whence the likeness of the the visible thing is that by which the eye sees, right? And the likeness of the thing understood, which is the understandable form, is the form by which the understanding what understands.

[14:44] But because the understanding can come back upon itself, huh? Can reflect upon itself, huh? And according to the same coming back upon itself, it understands its own what understanding, right? So I understand what a triangle is, and understand that I understand what a triangle is, right? Yes. And understand that too. Okay. And the form by which it understands, right? And thus the understandable form, secondarily, is that which is understood, right?

[15:25] That's by kind of reflection coming back upon your understanding and the form by which you understand. Right. But that which is understood first is the thing of which the understandable form is a what likeness, namely the blackness and blue, or the what it is of a triangle or something.

[15:51] This is clear also from the opinion of the ancients, who laid down that like is known by what like, huh? For they laid down that the soul through the earth which is in it nourished, right? So Empedocles said, which is outside of it and thus about the others. If therefore we take the form of the earth in place of the earth, according to the teaching of Aristotle, who says that the stone is not in the soul, right?

[16:22] What's his name? We just had that David there. I don't know if you're you know, it's the Samuel there, David. I'm glad. Yeah. So once he gets that stone in his head, does that help him to know what a stone is? No, no, it's certain. It's certain. It's the end of his thinking, right? If he would have lived here, yeah, to think about it. So the the the stone is not itself in the mind, right?

[16:51] But the likeness of the stone, right? The form, in that sense, of the stone, right? Okay. If therefore we take the form of the earth in place of the earth, according to the teaching of Aristotle, who says that the stone is not in the soul, but the form of the stone, it follows that the soul through the understandable forms knows things which are what outside the soul, right?

[17:26] Emmanuel Kant says it's a scandal that philosophers have not been able to prove the existence of external things. What I say the scandal is that they should have tried to prove the existence of external things, huh? And if you're in doubt about there being things outside of you, it's only through your senses that you're going to be convinced that you're in contact with these things outside of yourself, right?

[17:53] Right. So when I was in the modern philosophy class, we have all these modern philosophers who say these things, right? So somebody asked my old teacher, Kasuri, how do you argue with somebody you know who denies the existence of external things? And his answer was, kick him in the ass.

[18:17] And because notice, huh? That was not jocular reply. Is a very accurate reply, right? Yeah. Because if your senses don't convince you, right, and the sense that has the greatest certitude, the sense of touch, you know, where you are more in contact with things, then our reason is further away, right? Our reason knows about the things outside of us through the senses. So, if the senses don't know the exterior things, then reason certainly has no way to know them.

[18:49] Just like you know about my brother Mark, maybe, or my brother Richard, or something like that, only through me telling you about him. Let's say, right. Right. So if I'm not sure that I have a brother Richard, you certainly can't have any way of being sure that I have a brother Richard, can you? You see. And actually, they have an interesting fragment of

[19:11] Democritus, right? Which is written in the form of a little dialogue between the senses and the reason, and reason is trying to convince the senses that don't really know anything, and the senses are replying, "Our overthrow is your overthrow."Yeah, and you know people who do attack, you know, the senses, which are a perfect means of knowing in many ways, right? But they do so on the basis of something else they got from the senses.

[19:42] You know how when you look over a radiator, sometimes you know that the things look wobbly and so on, right? How do you know they're not really wobbly, and that you're you're being you know kind of deceived there, right? Well, it's because you rely upon some other sensation that you have, right? Besides sight. Yeah, or you go and you know look at it some other way, you know.

[20:05] Okay. Okay. You know how on the highway, you drive on the highway, you kind of in the summer, you see kind of like a puddle there and a puddle there, right? You see. And

[20:27] but if you say you were deceived and think there's a puddle there, well, how did you know that there wasn't a puddle there then? To know that you had been deceived, if, you thought there was a puddle there. Well, it must be some other sensation, right? Huh? That you trust, huh? And the most stock example is, of course, when a stick is is stuck in the water, so it's partly in the water, partly outside the water, and the stick looks what?

[20:51] Bent. Bent. Yeah. But you got to trust your maybe your hand going down the stick. You got to trust some sensation in order to criticize other senses, huh? Descartes says in his work, you know, our senses have deceived us, huh? That's true. Sometimes your senses deceive you, right? Um. He says it's the mark of a prudent man not to trust someone who has deceived him. Okay. But my argument against Descartes is that, as he admits elsewhere, even in mathematics, sometimes one is deceived.

[21:31] So sometimes your reason deceives you. Oh. But as Descartes says, it's the mark of a prudent man not to trust someone who's deceived him. So he can't trust his reason either. So he can't trust what? Anything. There's nothing more to say. huh? Mm-hmm. But you know the man who says that reason is not trustworthy, it's his reason saying this, so he. Right. It's self-defeating what he's saying.

[22:11] Now the first objection says the understood in act is in the one understanding, because the understood in act is the understanding in act. We talked before a little bit about knowing how knowing is said to be becoming another as other, right? While retaining your own, okay. So this is taking the idea there. But nothing of the thing understood is in the understanding, understanding an act, except the understandable, except the understandable form abstracted.

[22:48] Therefore, this is what is understood. And Thomas says to the first: therefore, it should be said that the understood is in the one understanding through its what likeness, right? And in this way, it is said that the understood in act is the understanding in act, in so far as what the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the understanding, huh? Just as the likeness of the sensible thing is the form of the sense in act.

[23:24] Hence, it does not follow that the understandable form abstracted is that which is in act understood, but rather that of which it is the what likeness, huh? Okay.

[23:43] In other words, having received in some sense the the likeness of the thing out there, right, the thing in the imagination, having received the likeness of that, then I'm able to understand it, right? Okay. Yeah. So

[24:05] sometimes Thomas will say that when I kick you, right, my kicking is between you and me. But when I understand something, right, that thing is already in some way joined to my understanding by its likeness, huh? Before I what understand, not in time, but before is a cause, right? Okay. What enables you to understand it? Okay.

[24:37] It's because I received in some way a likeness of what's in your garment out there, my eyes there, right? That I'm now, as a result of that, able to actually see the color of your garment, huh? Okay. Because I received your shape in some way, right? Likeness of your shape in my eye, I can actually see what shape you have.

[25:06] The second objection was talking about the fact that the thing out there was what material, right? Okay. He says the understood in act necessarily is in something; otherwise, to be nothing. But it is not in the thing which is outside the soul, because the thing outside the soul is material, right? And nothing as material can be what understood and act be the understanding remains therefore that the understood and act is in the understanding and there and this therefore is nothing other than the understandable form that we have spoken about Thomas says the second it should be said that this phrase understood in act right implies two things

[26:02] the thing which is understood right and this that it is what understood right and likewise when one speaks of the universal abstracted two things understood namely the very nature of the thing and the what separation or abstraction of it or its universality

[26:32] now the very nature to which it happens to be understood or to be abstracted or to which happens the intention of universality does not exist except in the singulars right but for it to be understood or to be abstracted or to be universal is only in the what understanding in this we are able to see through a likeness or something similar in sense for sight sees the color of the apple I guess that's apple isn't it I think it's just generic fruit oh fruit okay sight sees the color of the fruit without its what smell right if therefore be asked where is the color which is seen without smell

[27:25] is manifest that the color which is seen is not anywhere except in the what fruit but that it be perceived without the odor right this is something that happens to the color on the side of the what sight because sight is not able to receive the odor of the fruit is it but only the color right

[27:52] and this happens to it on the side of the sight in so far as in sight there is a likeness of color but no likeness of what smell It would have to be in the nose right

[28:06] likewise the human nature which is understood does not exist except in this or in that man right but that human nature is grasped without the individual conditions of this man and that man right which is for it to be abstract to which follows the what intention of universality. This happens to humanity, according as it is perceived by understanding, in which there is a likeness of the nature of the species, and not of the individual.

[28:43] What differences or principles? Okay. So when I see a number of men, and I remember them, and I have an experience of men, and then I separate out what they have in common, right?

[29:06] And understand what they have in common, right? But it's common to them only in the mind, right? Okay. But what is common to them is something they all have, right? But understood without their individual. Differences, huh? Okay.

[29:31] The same way I understand what a cat is or what a dog is, right? Okay. So universality is something that happens to what a man is when it's understood, because it's understood without the individual differences among the men. Animals and men, yeah.

[30:01] Okay. But the human nature of understanding is the nature of these things outside of me, but understood without their what individual differences, huh? Just as the color of the fruit is known by the eye, without what the smell of the fruit, huh? Or even the feel of the fruit, the fuzz of the peach or something, right?

[30:36] But that's the color of the fruit out there that has an odor as well and a feel and so on. Okay. The third objection talked about vocal sounds are, according to the philosopher Aristotle, signs of those things that are undergoing in the soul and so on.

[31:09] But our vocal sounds signify the things understood and so on. Therefore, the undergoings of the soul are being signified by them. And he says to the third, it should be said that in the sensing part of man is found a twofold operation. One, according to only what a change, and thus is perfected the operation of sense through this that is changed by the sensible. Another operation is what formatio, right?

[31:47] Okay. According as the imaginative power forms for itself an idol or an image, right, of the absent thing, or even of something never seen, like the gold mountain or the glass mountain, huh?

[32:06] And both operations are joined in the understanding, right? For first, we consider the undergoing of the possible understanding. That's the one that understands, according as it is what informed by an understandable form.

[32:26] But being formed by this, it then what? Is able to form. Secondly, either a definition or a division, right, or a composition statement, which is signified through the what voice. Once the thought which the name signifies is a definition, and the statement signifies the composition as a affirmative statement, and the division, as I say, the negative statement of the understanding. You see that in the premium to logic there, right?

[33:02] You'll use the word compositio and divisio in a special way to talk about the second act right divisio in a special way to talk about the second act, right? Because the second act, which I tend to call understanding the true or the false, right? But the second act, you either put together two things, like you say, man is an animal, right? Or you divide two things and say, man is not a stone, right?

[33:24] So he speaks of composition, division. Although those words could have other meanings, you know, or be applied to other things. Of course, it's very clear in the case of the enunciation of the statement that what it signifies is something that our mind has put together

[33:45] in the affirmative statement, or that it's separated in the negative statement. Are there statements out there that are acting upon us? I might read somebody's statement, right? Yeah. But there aren't statements out there like there are, you know, dogs and cats and so on, right? So, what our thoughts, what our vocal sounds, what our words are signifying, are the thoughts we form, right? A? Thought about what something is, or I thought about what is or is not in things.

[34:25] Okay. Rather than that by which we are able to think, but the what thought we form in thinking about something, right? Okay. As I say, think about that. Sometimes Thomas in the premium is talking about the first act, you know, of reason. There he'll call it imaginatio per intellectum. the Arabic philosophers call it philosophers call it, right? Because there's a likeness there, huh? See. And actually, has something in my imagination by which I can imagine a gold mountain, right?

[35:04] Okay. But when I imagine a gold mountain, then I form an image of a gold mountain, okay? And there must be something in the understanding by which I'm able to think about something, right? Okay. But when I think about what a triangle is, I form a thought about the triangle. Mm-hmm. It may be as explicit a definition, maybe more vague, you know. And that's what I signify by my words, right?

[35:29] Okay. So what my words signify. Is what I form when I think, not that by which I think, which is the understandable what form. Yeah. Now, is this thought what I was surprised you didn't use this term here, but maybe it's insignificant. But verbum? Is that just a more generic name? Well, you could say that. Yeah, Because that would come up again when you're in the beginning of St.

[35:58] John's Gospel, right? Right. Because Thomas will go back, you know, to what takes place in us, right? That when we understand something, we form a thought. Yes. Because it's a thought that proceeds from the one who understands, right? Right. And so, when God understands Himself, right? Right. There's something like that, and there proceeds a thought. Right. And this is called the logos, huh? Okay. In the beginning of John's Gospel, right?

[36:30] So it's like it's like in a sense when Augustine when Augustine when Saint John says, "In the beginning, " you know, we translate the beginning was the word, right? Right. And the word was actually Greek says towards God, right? Right. And the word was God, right? The Greek word is logos, right? Right. But logos in Greek means first word, and that's why we translate by word in English.

[36:58] Right. But then, secondly, it means the thought that the word signifies, right? So, really, the sense of John would be to say, "In the beginning was the thought, " and the thought was towards God, and the thought was God. You see, and I was mentioning I was going to give a maybe a talk eventually on antonomasia, right? That figure of speech in sacred scripture, right? Mm-hmm. Now, antonomasia is where you give the name of the general thing to the particular that stands out, or vice versa, right?

[37:48] See, instead of calling him a lover, a romantic lover, I might say he's a Romeo, right? Okay. But then, vice versa, right? I might call the place where the president lives the White House, even though my house is white. Okay.

[38:09] And of course, Christ is named what? The anointed. Yeah, the anointed. Now, kings and priests and prophets were anointed in the Old Testament. Saul, I guess, was anointed, right? And but among all those who are anointed, he is he stands out, right? So he's called the anointing, right? Okay. So you find an awful lot of this. We see when when Saint John says, "In the beginning was the thought."

[38:41] How is he speaking? With that figure speech. Yeah, by Antonio Massia, right? And of course, that makes you stop and think: Why is this the thought? Well, to begin with, this is the only thought that is what a substance, right? Oh yeah. This is the only thought that is a person, and this is the only thought that is God, and this is the only thought that expresses God perfectly,

[39:20] and this is the only thought that. we can go on Stop there, right? Okay. But anyway, this is the thought. Okay. I see the thought in my mind, and of course there are many thoughts in my mind, right? But they're not substances, are they? They're accidents, huh? Okay, they exist only in the mind. You can't, you know, put them by themselves, right? They're not a substance, and therefore they can't be a person who's an individual substance, right?

[39:56] And they're obviously not God, right? And even if it's a thought about God, it's in no way adequate expression of God, huh? Okay. So I think Saint John is speaking, by antonomasia, there, right? Okay. He's saying, of all the thoughts that there are that men have had, the beginning of the world, and all the thoughts that angels have had, right? Okay. This is the thought. Why? No.

[40:31] It's because it's a substance. It's the only thought that is a substance, huh? It's the only thought that is a person. It's the only thought that is God Himself. It's the only thought that expresses God fully. The only thought which says in way everything, because God, in understanding Himself, understands everything else. So he only has that one. Yeah, yeah. You've heard my little playful poem, kind of a poem.

[41:06] God the Father said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man, he said so much. Oh, that's cool. He said so little and spoke so much, and like that, he was a brevity and soul. wit. Well, I got to borrow that from Shakespeare. Okay. But you know, Thomas sometimes when he's talking about the creed and so on, he'll quote scripture. You know, God made a verbum abbreviatum.

[41:40] You know, it's in scripture, and it was appropriate, huh? You've heard my m my little one there, where I take it from. Take an analogy from geometry. Remember that theorem I like so much? The fifth theorem of book two. I was asking the students about yesterday because we kind of jammed a bit. I said, "Can you have a

[42:13] a rectangle with less perimeter but more area? " Remember that. The theorem in Book Five, or I mean in Book Two, Number Five, enables you to see that the square for the same perimeter

[42:38] has always more area, right? Yeah. Than a rectangle with the same perimeter. Yeah. Like four and six, huh? But the perimeter is still twenty, right? But the area has now dropped to twenty-four, right? And as you depart from this more, let's say three and seven, you still the same perimeter, which is twenty, right? But now the area is dropped to twenty-one, right? And of course, if you go back to the theorem in Book Two of Euclid, the difference in area will always be the square of the difference between the sides.

[43:19] So one squared, of course, is one. Two squared is four, and that's the difference, right? And if you go, let's say, down to let's say two by eight, perimeter is still twenty, right? But the area is dropped to sixteen.

[43:40] The difference between five and eight is what? Or five and two, which is one, is three, and the square of three is nine, and that's the difference, right? But then you see it's possible to have, let's say, one with even more perimeter, like say here you got a perimeter of what twenty-four and less what area, right? That's strange. See. They say the crooked geometers in ancient times they sold and bought land by perimeter rather than by, you know.

[44:21] So I give you more perimeter, less what? Area, right? And but notice, you know, another practical thing there. You know, if you're going to fence in an area, I could fence in more area with less fence.

[44:40] And you know the famous Russian story about the guy could have all the land you could run around, right? One day, well, I mean, it makes some difference what kind of a of a path you take, right? I could run less here and get more land. You ran twenty-four, whatever it was. I ran only twenty, and I got more land. See, but it doesn't seem like you could with the with less fence enclose more area, does it?

[45:12] Well, then I make an analogy here. See, and one analogy, of course, is to modern science, to what the father of modern physics, Max Planck, said that the more universal a theory is in physics, right? The simpler it is. We see something like that here, right? Because the square is the simplest of the rectangles, and it has more area for the same perimeter, right? And even more area for less perimeter than the other rectangles, huh?

[45:42] But always more area. And then I make the comparison to words, and I say, words are to what you say as the perimeter is to the what area, right? So just as with less perimeter, I can enclose more area. So Aristotle or Thomas, with less words, says more. Okay, but then the supreme example of that is that God said it all in one word, in one thought.

[46:24] When you study the angels, you see the higher you go up in the angels, the less thoughts they have, but the more they understand by them. So the higher angel, by less thoughts, understands more things and understands better than the lower angel with more thoughts.

[46:46] But you see, they all-fall short of God who understands everything perfectly with one thought and expresses everything perfectly in one thought—that's part of the antonomasia this being the thought, right? Apart from its being a substance and a person, God Himself, right? This thought most perfectly expresses everything—not only God, but everything could be understood by understanding God, right? But in one thought, it is the thought. Wow! I'm going to

[47:25] have one thought tomorrow. It's going to express everything that could be understood by anybody. Anyway, I'm not going to have that kind of thought tomorrow. But God has that thought always, huh? That's kind of a really marvelous thing when you think about it, huh?

[47:47] Okay, so we got through the third objection, I guess, huh? Okay. Thomas will be talking in that premium logic about those those two acts: understanding what a thing is, whereby you form a definition, right? And understanding the true or the false, putting together, separating things, whereby you form a statement, right? And then you'll speak of a third act, whereby you what reason from statements you form to another statement.

[48:22] But in the notes there, I especially developed the the logic of definition there, right? Okay In case we take a little break here. Means that the more universals are not before in our knowledge, because those things which are before and more known by nature are posterior and less known by us. That's a famous thing that Aristotle points out in the beginning of the Physics. Remember that. But the universals are before by nature, for the before is that from which is not converted the consequences, existence or subsistence.

[49:14] That's the second sense of before in the category. If A can be without B, but not vice versa, then A is before B, right? First, I'll give the example, one can be without two, but two cannot be without one, right? So someone might say, "Well, you can have an animal without a dog. You can't have a dog without having an animal." So animal is before in being, right?

[49:41] Dog, right? And therefore, and likewise, the more universal, right, is before the less universal in that same way. But what is more known to us is not more known by nature or before by nature. Okay. Okay.

[50:06] Moreover, composed things are before towards us than simple things. That's why he defined the point as that which has no parts, right? But universals are more simple. Therefore, they come afterwards, as far as we are concerned.

[50:30] And notice when you study the simplicity of God, you show that he's not composed in any way, right? So you know the composed before you know the what simple, right? This guy saying universal is simpler, right? Animal is simpler than dog. Dog involves more things than just animal, right?

[50:53] Moreover, the philosopher says in the beginning of the physics that the defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of the definition. We name a thing and know it in kind of a vague way before we can define it, right?

[51:14] But the more universals are parts of the definition of the less universal, just as animal is a part of the definition of what man. Therefore, the universals are after, as far as we're concerned. Ah.

[51:34] Moreover, through effects we come to causes and principles, but the universals are certain principles, beginnings. Therefore, the universals come afterwards; are known afterwards by us. But against all this is what Aristotle says in the first physics physics that from the universal to the singular, actually from the more universal to the less universal, is what the Greek text means. Okay.

[52:11] In Greek, you have you know a word a little bit like English word particular. In particular, has two meanings in English. Particular can mean what the individual, like you are a particular man, right? Um. It can also mean the less universal. Like we can say that the dog is a particular kind of animal. Oh yeah. Okay. And so particulars, in the sense of individuals, come first in our knowledge because of our senses.

[52:45] But then Aristotle saying that among universals, the more universal comes before the what? Less universal. Okay. And Aristotle uses that the Greek word "ta kath' hekasta two words actually, like we use the word "particulars," right? And sometimes he's using it for singulars. Sometimes he's using it for the less universal.

[53:12] I answer. It should be said that in the knowledge of our understanding, there are two things is necessary to consider. First, that the knowledge of our understanding, in some way, takes its origin from the what senses.

[53:33] And because senses of the singulars, understanding of the universals, is necessary that a knowledge of singulars, as far as we're concerned, is before a knowledge of what? Universals.

[53:51] Secondly, is necessary to consider that our understanding proceeds from potency to act. Right. We're able to understand before we actually understand, right? So we go from ability to act. But everything that proceeds from potency to act, first arrives at an incomplete act, which is in between potency and act. Before it arrives at a what? Perfect act, right? Hmm.

[54:26] But the perfect act to which the understanding arrives is complete science, by which things are known distinctly and in a determined way. But an incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, by which things are known what? Indistinctly, right? Under a certain confusion. For what is thus known, I in some ways known in act, and in some way what in potency.

[55:01] Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the physics that what are first known to us More manifest and more certain for us are the confused. Afterwards, we know by distinguishing distinctly the principles and elements.

[55:20] For it is manifest that to know something in which many things are contained, without this that one has knowledge of each one of them. Which is contained in it is to know something under a certain what confusion right like when I know animal right I don't distinguish dog and cat and horse huh

[55:46] now in this way can be known both a universal whole right in which the parts are contained in potency as also the what integral whole the whole is put together from its parts for both holes can be known in a certain confusion without this that the parts are distinctly what known huh

[56:14] now to know distinctly that which is contained in the universal whole is to have a knowledge of a thing which is less common right just as to know animal distinctly is to know animal in so far as it is animal but to know animal distinctly is to know animal in so far as it is a rational animal or irrational animal which is to know man or to know the lion huh first therefore there occurs to our understanding to know animal then to know man the same reason if we compare anything more universal to something what less universal nothing he was saying there right we're able to know something before we what actually know it right and so when you go from ability to act like

[57:08] when you fill the glass with water right it doesn't go from empty to full at once right but it's partly filled right then gradually it's completely filled huh and so likewise when our mind goes from ignorance from being a blank tablet as he says now nothing actually is written is written it doesn't go to a full knowledge at once right but an imperfect knowledge huh and to know something in an indistinct way is in between not knowing it at all and knowing it fully and perfectly, right and to know the more universal is more indistinct than to know the what less universal to know that my pet is an animal right is not to know as distinctly what my pet is as to know that

[57:57] my pet is a is a cat or a dog or whatever it may be right okay so if we know things in an indistinct way before we know them distinctly then we know the more universal before the what less universal huh yeah

[58:18] for first there occurs to our understanding to know animal then to know man and there's the same reason if we compare anything more universal to something less universal that's going into into your study of definition there right. Because the first part of a definition is what they call the genus, and the genus is something more universal than the what species being defined. Now, if you ask a kid in class, you know, what is a dog?

[58:46] They'll naturally say it's an animal first, right? And then they have to distinguish it from other animals if they can, right? But they begin with something more universal than dog, namely animal. You ask them what is a chair, and they'll say something to sit on. I say, well, so is a bench, so is a saddle. See, so they're starting with something more universal than chair, and they have to add differences to make more particular and more distinct exactly what a chair is.

[59:16] Okay, a chair is something to sit on for one person. Well, that separates it from a bench or a sofa, maybe, but not from a saddle. That's for one person. to sit on too right And so you say, well, it's? Something to sit on, you know, there's a back and legs and so on, right? And you start to separate it and get a more distinct knowledge of it.

[59:39] And because the senses also go from potency to act, just as the understanding, there appears the same order of knowledge in the sense. For first, according to the sense, we judge the more common before the less common, according to place and according to time. According to place, when we see something from a distance, first we grasp that it's a body, or apprehend that it's a body. Then that it's an animal, right?

[1:00:11] And we apprehend that it's an animal before apprehend that it's a man, and it's a man before Socrates or Plato, right? You see something up in the head? I think there's something up there, yeah, yeah. There is something up there, yeah. I think it's moving, yeah, yeah, yeah. I think it's a dog, yeah. I think it's Joe's dog, you know. See, it's like going from the more universal to the less universal, right?

[1:00:33] You see this all the time, you know, when you read the voyages of Columbus or other stories about the sea. You're always seeing something on the horizon, but whether it's a land or a cloud or another ship, or you know. And I always quote, you know, it's a bird, it's a plane. No, it's Superman. What are you seeing at first when you say it's a bird or a plane, or what is it?

[1:00:57] Something flying. Something going to the sky, right? But whether it's a bird or a plane, or actually Superman, it turns out to be. You don't perceive it right away, right?

[1:01:09] Aristotle gives the example in time. According to time, because the boy from the beginning first distinguishes man from what is not a man, before he distinguishes this man from that man, and therefore boys from the beginning call all men fathers. Afterwards, they determine each one. When I was first teaching this at St. Mary's. I. Went to the supermarket one time in the afternoon, and a mother comes by.

[1:01:40] She has a little kid in the cart, and she goes by. He says, "Daddy." Oh, so I kind of started to laugh. Well, I laughed and said, he was some little daddy to some extent, but that kid was confused. Aristotle was proven right. And the reason for this is manifest, because the one who knows something indistinctly is still in potency that he might know the principle of distinction.

[1:02:10] Just as the man who knows the genus, right, is in potency that he know the what difference? I ask him, "What is a Shakespearean sonnet?" Well, usually it gets somebody to say it's a poem, right? That's the genus, right? Now they've got to say, what's the difference, right? What's a poem in fourteen lines? But so is the Italian sonnet. So we got another difference, right? So you know the genus before you know the differences, right?

[1:02:43] And thus it is clear that indistinct knowledge is between potency, right, and act, sort of imperfect act. It is therefore to be said that the knowledge of singulars is before, for us, than the knowledge of universals. Just as sense knowledge is before what the knowledge of the understanding, right? But both in the senses and in the understanding, a knowledge of the more common is before a knowledge of the what less common, okay?

[1:03:28] So you see the basic reason for this, huh? It's because our mind is what in our senses are able to know before they actually know, right? So when you go from ignorance to knowledge, you go to imperfect knowledge first, right? And to know something indistinctly is to know it what imperfectly, right? To know it clearly and distinctively, and know it fully and perfectly, right? So we know things more in indistinct way than distinctly, right?

[1:04:03] And so if you bring me in a glass of dry red wine and you say, "What is this?" I might say, "Well, it's a dry red wine." Will you be a little more precise, Mr. Berquist You know? Well, see, I think it's Cabernet Sauvignon, but I'm not so sure about that, right? Cabernet Sauvignon from where? From Napa Valley, 1973.

[1:04:28] I'm even less sure about that, right? You see, the more precise you try to get me, or give me a glass of beer, right? What is this? Well, it's beer. I'm very sure about that, right? But it's Heineken's or Budweiser something, right? Might be more have to be mistaken, right?

[1:04:49] So as Pierre Duhem says, there's a kind of balance between certitude and precision. The more precise you get, the less certain you get. I always take the example in class. The students say, let's say, pick on some student. how old am I? Well, I don't know. Am I over 20? Yeah. So you sure about that? Yeah. I say over 30? Yeah. Over 40, right? When you get to 50 or 60, they're not too sure what to say, right?

[1:05:20] So the more precise you try to give my age. The less sure you are, right? And you'd be more able to guess my decade than my what exact year, right? Even if you got the exact year, there's still 365 days, so you know.

[1:05:41] Or I say, how much do I weigh? Right in the balance, yeah. But if you try to narrow it down, be more exact, you become less sure, right? And even if you weighed yourself this morning, right? Your weighing machine might not be the same as somebody else's weighing machine, right? So if my weighing machine said 174 and your weighing machine says 175, well, one of them is wrong.

[1:06:12] See? So I'm more sure that I'm between 170 and 180 than that I'm 174, right? Okay. The same way, you know, if I ask, you know,

[1:06:26] which is longer, you know, you know, the light this way or that way? Well, you're very sure it's longer this way, right? That way, okay? Now, if you got out and I say, now, but how much longer is it that way than that way? Not so sure, right? Even if you got out and measured, you say, well, it's seven feet three inches longer, you know. Would you be more sure that it's seven feet three inches longer than it's longer?

[1:06:55] No. No. In fact, different people might get a little different measurement, right? And besides that, the measurement doesn't go down except to a certain thing. So maybe it's actually seven feet three inches and one hundredth of an inch. So seven feet three inches is actually wrong. See? It's actually seven feet three inches and one tenth of an inch or something. So you're still more sure, even after you measured, that it's longer than that it's seven feet three inches longer.

[1:07:32] See the idea? Okay. Same way for my age, right? They're not sure. You say, well, we'll go and look it up in the in the county records there in Minnesota, right? " Okay, get my birth date now. I know when my father died, there were certain records that had two different birthdays for him. I mean, two different years. You know, was it 1891 or was it 1892?

[1:08:01] You know, and see? Of course, the newspaper had it really wrong. because. My father was 65. The newspaper said 55. I can see all his business friends coming down, saying, you know, I can see the question coming, you know, I say, really? Only 55. And so you're more sure about the confused than the distinct, right?

[1:08:27] And therefore, you're more sure about the more universal than the what less universal.