De Anima (On the Soul)
144. Aquinas' Replies on Universals: Two Orders of Nature, Whole and Part, and the Mistakes of Descartes, Spinoza and Hegel
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[0:00] Now, let's go back to the first objection about the universals being before and being because they can be without particulars and so on. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the universal is able to be considered in two ways. In one way, according as the nature universal nature is considered together with the intention universality, which belongs to the mind, right? And since the intention universality

[0:40] as one and the same thing, having a what relation to many things, insofar as that comes about through the abstraction of the understanding, right? Mind separating. out what, many things have in common, right? Is necessary that in this way, the universal be what? Posterior, right?

[1:04] Once in the first book about the soul, it is said that animal universally is either nothing, or it's after the singulars, huh? So to begin with, there were individual men out there or individual dogs, and then your mind compared these and separated out what they have in common, and then the universal began to be, right? In your mind, right? After the singulars, right? Already were.

[1:34] But according to Plato, who laid down that the universals subsisted by themselves in a world of their own, the world of forms, right? According to that, this consideration, the universal would be before the particulars, right? Which, according to him, do not exist except by partaking of these universals that subsists, which are called the what? Forms, huh?

[2:06] In another way, one can consider the universal as regards the nature itself, the nature of animality or of humanity, in so far as it's found in particular. And thus it should be said that there is a twofold order of nature. One according to the way of generation and time. According to which way, those things which are imperfect and in potency are before. And in this way, the more common is before according to nature, which manifestly appears in the generation of man and animal.

[2:46] For first is generated animal, then man, as is said in the book of the generation of animals. So notice, huh? If you take the fertilized egg, right? The human being, fertilized egg. What first appears in the fertilized egg?

[3:07] The life of a man, thinking, reasoning. The life of an animal, sensing, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touch. But first appears growth. Yeah, cell division, growth, right? What we have in common, not just with the animals, but with all the plants, right? Okay. And then starts to appear the what? Sensation. Yeah, and finally the understanding, right? Yes. Okay. So in the order of generation, the imperfect and the more common comes first, right?

[3:44] Okay. But. There's another order, which is the order of what, being better or being more perfect, right? The order of perfection of the intention of nature. And this way, act, being actual, is before according to nature potency, and the perfect before the what, imperfect, right? And in this way, the less common is before according to nature than the more common, as man before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop in the generation of animal, but intends to generate eventually what, a man.

[4:29] Okay. So he admits one sense of being before by nature, right? The way in which some things are before according to matter, right? And therefore, they're before in what generation, right? I forget how much we did back there. In we studied the definition nature, didn't we? Sure. And Aristotle will go on to to say that nature is said of both matter and form, right? So sometimes what is before by nature is taken according to matter, and that sense the imperfect, right?

[5:21] And the more common would be before by nature, right? And then sometimes by form, and then the perfect or the complete is before by nature. So he seems to be admitting in one sense it's before by nature, right? But not in the other sense, huh? And what is before in the sense of what, more actual, more distinct, is after in our knowledge, isn't it? Okay. Of course, Aristotle argues that form is more nature than what matter, because by matter you have a natural thing and ability, but by form you have actually a natural thing.

[6:08] Okay. So if nature is that by which something is natural, form is more nature. Just like you could say in art, right? Statue is more its shape than it is the marble or the wood. Okay. So what is before according to form? What is more perfect? More complete, is posterior for us,

[6:36] and therefore we know the confused before the distinct, right? Which is more actual, and before according to nature, nature meaning form, huh? Very subtle, huh? A lot to think about here. That's what he means by the intention of nature,

[6:55] the form. The objection is going back to what Aristotle said. See, let's go back to Aristotle right here. Try to put a very simple way.

[7:07] Aristotle distinguishes between what is more known to us and what is more known simply. Or he has several expressions: more known simply, more known by nature, right? But means more perfectly known, huh? More fully known. He says not the same thing. What's more known to us and what is more known?

[7:39] Now, just give a simple way of seeing that. You give me this glass of dry red wine to drink, and you say, "What are you drinking, Mister Burquist?" Right. Now, when it's when I when it's known to be Cabernet Sauvignon from Napa Valley, nineteen seventy-three, right? The wine is more known, isn't it? Now, it's known to be a dry red wine, right? Which is more known to me?

[8:08] It's a dry red wine or this Cabernet Sauvignon from Napa Valley, nineteen seventy-three. That's the drawing. Yeah, it's more known to me, and I'm more certain about that than I am that it's that, right? But when it's known to be Cabernet Sauvignon from Napa Valley, nineteen seventy-three, then the wine is more known, right? More fully known, more perfectly known. So what is more known, more fully, more perfectly known, is less known to me.

[8:40] Is it? And so they really differ the two, huh? Okay. Now, perhaps the simplest way to see the reason why they should be right. Why what is more known to us is less known, and what is more known is less known to us.

[9:07] Well, the reason for that is that we go from ignorance to what imperfect knowledge. And from there towards a more perfect knowledge, right? So for us, the imperfect comes before the perfect. Now, knowledge and known are relative to each other, aren't they? So what corresponds to imperfect knowledge is something less known that is to say, imperfectly known, What corresponds. to. Perfect knowledge is something more known, perfectly known, right?

[9:52] So, since imperfect knowledge comes for us before perfect knowledge, what is more known to us is really less known, and what is less known to us is really more known. Okay.

[10:15] Aristotle will apply this to two main things. We know things more in a confused way than we know them what distinctly. But they are more known when they're known distinctly than when they're known in a confused way. But they're more known to us in a what confused way. I'm more sure that I'm drinking red wine than I'm drinking carbonated soda.

[10:46] And if I'm, if I know that, that's more known. To me, than that it's Napa Valley 1973. Do You see okay? And the other thing it applies it to is the fact that we tend to know the effect before the cause, right? And so every time we ask why, we know the effect without the cause. But is the effect fully known when it's known without the cause? Well, we know the effect more by itself than in the light of the cause.

[11:25] But it's fully known only in the light of its cause. So we go from darkness to light, huh Okay. And therefore Aristotle compares us to the bat, and he thought that the bat flew at night time because the light of the day was too bright for him. But things are more visible in the daylight, right? But to a man coming out of a dark room, the things that are more visible are less visible.

[11:54] He can see better with not so much light. Can you lay that out more? I never could understand that one. So he has the proportion as what now? The bat, what? What he says as the eyes of the bat are the light of day. Okay.

[12:19] Assuming that the bat flies at night because the light of the day is too bright for it. So is our mind to the things which are what the most understandable of all.

[12:31] It's like in Scripture, you know, where it says that God dwells in light inaccessible. He's too bright for us. He's too understandable. Okay. So this is the reason he gives why we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly, and that's the reason why we know them in general before we know them in particular. You know, the more universal before the less universal.

[13:09] But if you take particular in the sense of singular, which I know by the senses, then singulars come before any universals. But among universals, the more universal before the less universal. Okay.

[13:26] So I say to students, you know, if you're going to classify the vegetation on campus, all your knowledge would start with your senses, and with a knowledge therefore of this individual tree, this individual bush, this individual blades of grass, and so on, right? But as you started to To classify it to get the universals on, who would come first? The difference between Kentucky bluegrass and other kinds of grass, or the difference between tree and grass?

[14:00] Let's say, yeah, you'd see the difference between tree and grass before you see the difference between different kinds of tree or different kinds of grass, right?

[14:12] You see the difference between wine and beer before different kinds of wine, different kinds of beer. Of course, another reason for that is that the difference between wine and beer is greater than between different beers, and so it's easier to see, right? What you see, is more universal when you see wine and beer than when you see Cabernet Sauvignon, Noir, or something like that. You see.

[14:49] So he's talking here about actuality in your knowledge, right? And therefore, it's posterior, right, in our knowledge, the more actual. And of course, that's what you usually mean. You say, according to nature, because nature is more form than matter, so you are speaking more of of actuality, right? Our knowledge is going from ability to act.

[15:18] You find out later on that something is knowable to the extent it is an act, and God is pure act, so God is most knowable, but not to us.

[15:31] You see something like that, especially at the beginning of our life, in regard to love, right? Something is lovable because it's good, right? And so, the better something is, more lovable it is. But to us, the sensible good is more lovable in the beginning than the understandable good, right? So I love candy before I love wisdom, right? But is candy more lovable than wisdom? No, wisdom is a much greater good, right?

[16:01] Or, I love the private good before I love the common good. But the common good, being the good of the whole, and the whole is greater than the part. Common good is a much greater good than the private good, right? So what's more lovable to me in the beginning is is the less lovable.

[16:22] See. The child might like the little drawing in his child's book more than that great painting on the wall, but there is really more to be seen in the painting on the wall, isn't there? So what is more seen by the child has less to be seen. There's less to see in it. Okay, that's true of any kind of education because you're what developing something from the imperfect to the perfect, huh?

[16:56] You know when you go to the 5BX plan there, the Royal Canadian Air Force 5BX plan, and I was in, Canada. Well, you've got to start at your own level, right? Now if I can do five pushups and no more, I started five pushups, right? Okay, but is five pushups as productive of strength as twenty would be? No, but I can't start with twenty because of the weakness of my body, right?

[17:23] It's the same when lifting weights, right? And if you try to lift a weight that's too much for you, you could actually harm yourself, right? So though the heavier weight is productive of more strength, it's not for you, is it? You got to build up to that, right?

[17:40] What is more knowable is less knowable to you, and in the beginning of the education of your heart, what is more lovable is less lovable to you.

[17:54] What is it St. Bernard of Clairvaux there? the four stages of love, and I said the first stage, you know, you don't love God at all, you know, and then you what love God for your sake, then you begin to love God for His sake, and finally you love yourself for the sake of God, which is hard to realize, he says, in this life, you know. You see, first I just love myself, right?

[18:25] I don't love God at all, and then I run into problems and difficulties, right? So I turn to God, but not loving God for my sake. But then as I turn to God and many times for help, I get a little familiarity with God, and I say, hey, he's you know he's something lovable apart from what he does for me, right? And then I finally realize I'm only lovable for the sake of God.

[18:53] So my love is is growing, right? When I love God for the sake of me, I'm not very lovable compared to God, right? But He's lovable because of of my lovableness. I turned him in desperation, right? You know, you know.

[19:18] I remember as a child there, the man across the street there, you know, he he was diagnosed with cancer, you know, and all of a sudden the whole family is going to daily mass, you know, just like that, you know. So it's kind of natural turning towards God when misfortune strikes you of some sort or other, right?

[19:38] Of course, in that case, God becomes lovable. Because you are lovable, right? Well, because you're the less lovable, much less lovable than God, right? Huh?

[19:54] So you're more lovable to yourself than God in the beginning, right? If you're loving God for your sake, yeah. So what is less lovable is more lovable to you. See, that's because of the defect, the weakness of your heart, right? So you have to develop this.

[20:15] But more broadly, you can see that too. That we love the sensible good before the understandable good. I love the girl for her looks than because she's a good person, right? But she's more lovable for being a good person than she is for her looks. But to me, in the beginning, because of my starting with my senses, she's more lovable for her looks than for her her good character.

[20:44] So I love more, but it's less lovable in the beginning, right? I love candy before I love wisdom. Better better now because it's just died off.

[21:09] the last time I came up here I was sleepy on the way up. I said, "Yeah, I was stopping for some candy just to kind of perk myself up." But I resisted the temptation, you know. and then I get all worked up here when I teach though, so I would mix me up, you know.

[21:24] But but he was as a child. I loved candy and didn't love wisdom, right? So what was less lovable? Maybe candy was more lovable to me. I've come a long way, huh?

[21:43] You see, a businessman too, he may start to you know do things, get on committees, and do things in the city, right? And at first, he finds it helpful for his business because he becomes known and respected for what he does, huh? But you see, these businessmen they acquire a taste of doing good for the city, and even when they they retire, sometimes they continue to do things for the city, right?

[22:04] So they now acquire a love of the common good, right? So the heart has been what educated, right? To love what is more lovable.

[22:18] Let's look at the second objection here now about the composed things, right? To the second, it should be said that the universal that is more common is compared to the less common as a whole and as a part, right?

[22:40] And this goes back into the fact that the word whole and part are what equivocal, right? Okay, and you've heard my sophistical argument, haven't you? About the salary? No,

[22:56] I say what is a man? See, Well, a, man's an animal, right? But he's not just an animal, right? He's an animal that has reason, right? So animal is only a part of what a man is. Okay, they all agree to that, right? And they say, yeah, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? Therefore, what you said is only a part of man includes more than man.

[23:26] So sometimes the whole the part is more than the whole. See, I'm playing in two different senses of the word "whole," right? And if you stick with one kind of whole and its part, the whole is always more. The universal whole is always said of more than one of the particulars under it, right? And the composed whole. Always is composed of more than one of its parts.

[23:53] Okay. So notice, when I say animal is a part of man, I mean animal is a part of the definition of man, and definition is a composed whole. But animal is not the whole definition of man. Something more has reason, right? But when I say animal includes besides man, dog, horse, and so on, I'm thinking of animal now as universal whole, and it's said of more than man is said of, it's said of more than dog is said of, right?

[24:24] Okay. So the universal whole is said of more, right, than one of its parts, and the composed whole is put together from more than one of its parts. So Thomas is pointing out here how the universal can be a whole and a part.

[24:44] As a whole, according as in the more universal, not only is contained in the what in potency the less universal, but other things, right? As under animal is not only man, but also what horse and dog and elephant, right? As a part, according as the less common is contains in its definition, right? Not only the more common, but also what others, right? As man is not only an animal, but also what Rational is my example there.

[25:22] Thus, therefore, animal considered by itself is before in our knowledge than man. But man, at least in a confused way, is before in our knowledge, than that animal is a part of his what definition, right? Okay. That's a very subtle thing. He makes that same point in the commentary on the beginning of the physics, right?

[25:50] And the way he puts it there is, he says, animal is known before man, right? But man is known in some way before animal is known to be part of man's definition.

[26:02] Okay. But then he's thinking of animal as a part of man's definition, and man is known in a confused way before the parts are spelled out, right? Okay.

[26:22] The third objection: The defined comes And our knowledge before the parts, of the definition. We name something right before we can define it. huh? Okay. But the more universal are parts of the less universal, are the de are parts of the definition of the less universals.

[26:46] But then he's going to give that solution, I think. To the third, it should be said that some part can be taken in two ways. In one way, absolutely, according as it is by itself, and thus nothing prevents one to know before the parts in the whole, as stones before knowing a house, right? In another way, as they are parts of some whole, and thus it is necessary that before we know the whole, then the parts.

[27:19] For before we know the house, it is certain. For before we know the house, it is in confusion. Before we distinguish its what particular parts. You see, distinction he's making there, right? I might, you know, you've got a horn, right, or you've got a clarinet, whatever it is, and you play your horn for me or clarinet for me, right? Okay.

[27:46] And then I go and I hear the symphony orchestra playing, right? I don't recognize that among the instruments playing is a what? Clarinet, right? You see the difference there? One case, I'm knowing clarinet. I could know clarinet all by itself, right? Without hearing every every symphony, right? Okay. But when I hear a symphony, I hear it as kind of a confused thing. Before I distinguish the actual instruments being what.

[28:20] Used, right. Do you see that? Yeah? Okay. Ah, you might taste some herb, right? By itself, right? And then someone uses it in some recipe, and when you're trying to know the ingredients in a recipe, right, when that salad dressing or it is, right, you might not recognize that that herb is in that salad dressing, right? Because that would be a more distinct knowledge of the salad dressing to be able to pick out the ingredients that are inside of it, huh?

[28:58] Okay. Thus, therefore, it should be said that the things defining something, absolutely considered, are known before than the thing defined. Otherwise, one would not make known the thing defined through them. But according as they are parts of the definition, thus they are what. Known afterwards, huh? For first we know man in a certain confusion, before we're able to distinguish all the things which are the definition of man, huh?

[29:40] Okay. So I ask the students, what is a perfect number? Arithmetic. Six is a perfect number. Eight, twenty-eight is a perfect number. What's a perfect number? They can't define a perfect number, can they? Okay. Now, eventually we we we break perfect number down into the parts of its definition. It's a number equal to the sum of everything that measures it. Everything that measures it evenly, right? Okay.

[30:19] So six is measured by one, two, and three, not by four or five. And one, two, and three add up to six. Four is measured by one and two; they don't add up to four, right? Okay. Now, did the student before I gave the definition? Do you know what it means to be a number? Yeah. And he knew what it meant for somebody to measure something evenly, right?

[30:47] He knew what it meant to add up numbers and so on, right? You knew all those things by themselves, right? Otherwise, I couldn't have used those to make known what a perfect number is.

[31:01] But he might have known in some imperfect way what a perfect number is before he could spell out the definition, before he knew these were parts of the definition. Okay. Okay.

[31:26] Thus, therefore, he says the things defining, absolutely considered, are known before than the thing defined. Otherwise, they would not the thing defined would not be made known through them. But according as they are parts of the definition, thus they are known afterwards, right? For first we know man in a certain confusion, before we know how to distinguish all the things which are the definition of man. Okay.

[32:05] I've got these different kinds of tea, and I might recognize one tea and another tea a little bit, right? You make some combination of those teas, and I might not be able to pick out those.

[32:19] So that combination of them, I would not be able to know distinctly right away, would I? So in that sense, the combination is known in a confused way before its parts are distinguished, even though the parts might be known absolutely by themselves before I made the combination.

[32:43] Same with wine. Sometimes they combine different grapes. You might know these grapes individually by themselves, and not recognize them in this combination. Okay. Now

[33:00] the fourth objection about them being principles, right? The universal, according as it is taken with the intention of universality, is in some way a principle of knowing, in so far as the intention of universality follows the mode of understanding which is by abstraction from the singulars. But is not, however, necessary that everything which is a principle of knowing be a principle of what being, as Plato estimated.

[33:37] Since sometimes we know the cause through the effect, and sometimes we know the substance through its what accidents, right? So the effect is the beginning of our knowing the cause, but it's not the beginning of the cause. It's the cause. It's the beginning of the effect. The origin of the effect, right? Okay, that's where we know God, right? We know him through his effects, right? Okay, so the effects are the beginning for knowing God, but they're not the beginning of God.

[34:07] God is their beginning. The same with substance and accidents. Whence the universal thus taken, according to the position of Aristotle, is not the beginning of being, nor substance, as is clear in the seventh book of metaphysics. If, however, we consider the nature of the genus of the species, in so far as it is in the singulars. Thus, in some way, it has the notion of a formal principle, right, with respect to singulars.

[34:44] It's by human nature that I am a man, right? Right. For the singular, for it is singular on account of matter, but the definition of the species is taken from the form. But the nature of the genus is compared to the nature of the species more in the way of a material principle, because matter is what's common, right, and form is what distinguishes. Because the nature of the genus is taken from what is material in a thing, but the definition of the species from what is formal, just as the ratio of animal from being having senses, the ratio of man from what understanding.

[35:31] And hence it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species, not to the individual nor to the genus, because the form is the end of generation; matter, however, is an account of the form.

[35:48] It is not however necessary that the knowledge of just any cause or principle be posterior quoad nos, since sometimes through sensible causes we know what unknown effects. Sometimes the reverse, right? Sometimes we do know the cause, right? But for the most part, we know the effect before the cause.

[36:09] Main science where we don't is in what mathematics, right? Okay, you know, I'll just take a simple example in class. Straight lines intersect, right? You know that these are straight lines intersecting, although before you know that these angles must be what equal, right? Now, why must those two angles be equal?

[36:49] This is just again. No, it's because and because means the cause, being, right. Because the lines are straight. Let's give these a name. See,

[37:09] because this is a straight line meeting a straight line, right? A plus x must equal two right angles, right? Because this is a straight line meeting a straight line, b plus x must equal two right angles. Huh? The rest is just the axioms: quantities equal to the same, equal to each other, and equals is a fact. The results equal. But it all follows from the fact that the lines intersecting are straight.

[37:43] So I'm going here from the cause, the straightness of the line, to the effect of that equality of those angles, right? Okay. But everything's on the surface here, and this is superficial geometry, plane geometry. But superficial means on the surface, right? But when you see a tree growing, right, it's hidden to us, right? Why it grows, right? Okay. When you see things, stone fall into the ground, right?

[38:16] It's hidden to us why it falls to the ground. So the effect is usually more known to us. It's more known to us what somebody does and why they did it, right? And so we often maybe misjudge, you know, why people did something, right?

[38:36] Sometimes they don't know themselves why they did it. We certainly don't know why they did why they did this. So you said in mathematics as an exception, the cause is more known. Yeah, That has a very bad effect upon Descartes and Spinoza, right? Oh yes. And later on Hegel. Oh yeah. Because they're so impressed with mathematics, right? Mm-hmm. And they're so accustomed to mathematics. Mm-hmm. Maybe they have you know somewhat you know good imagination for mathematics, but they want to proceed everywhere like they do in mathematics.

[39:14] Mm-hmm. And therefore, Descartes wants to proceed from the cause to the effect. You see that when he tries to prove that nature exists because God exists. But just the reverse, right? It's the existence of nature that is obvious to us, and through nature we have to prove that God exists. He wants to take God's existence as being obvious and use that to prove that nature exists. Okay.

[39:47] And Spinoza goes even further, right? You know, Spinoza's great work there is called *Ethica*, about the whole universe, not just ethics. But the actual title of the work is *Ethica More Geometrica Demonstrata*. And he says in there one of his axioms is that the order in thoughts is the same as the order in things.

[40:15] Now, to some extent, there's some truth in there, right? That my thought about the cause here, I think that those lines are straight before I think that the what? Angler, right? So when I go from the cause to the effect, the thought of the cause is before the thought of the effect, just as in reality the cause is before the effect. But is that true usually in our knowledge?

[40:42] No, usually we're asking why, because we know the effect, we don't know the cause, and therefore we're reasoning backwards. As far as the order of what cause and effect is concerned, and even Sherlock Holmes says that to Watson, right? We have to reason backwards, and Watson says to to Holmes, "What do you mean? We have to reason from the effect back to the cause." Okay. So it's just the reverse of what Spinoza says, right?

[41:17] I think very great mistake, but in a sense, he's trying to generalize what we saw in this example here, or those kind of examples, where you can go, you know, from cause to effect, right? The same way you make a triangle, right? See, it's more known to me that I've made a triangle here, and that I've made angles equal to two right angles, and so I go from the cause to the what effect, right?

[41:50] Okay. But that doesn't characterize our knowledge as a whole. That's really contrary to what our knowledge is usually. Now you see, Spinoza is followed then by Hegel, right? And so Hegel takes the most confused notion in our mind, the most general knowledge notion in our mind, which is what being, being, and he identifies this being, which is said of everything,

[42:25] being, which is said of everything that is, anywhere whatsoever, with the one who said it in Scripture, "I am who am." He identifies the most confused, in a sense, imperfect thought of our mind, the most universal thought of our mind, right?

[42:45] With God, he's identifying what is first in our mind with what is first in reality, following what the influence there of Spinoza, right? So it starts with Descartes and then Spinoza, you know, gets even more, makes it makes an act to rule it, you know, and then the rationalist Hegel picks up on that. And now, as I mentioned, Thomas—I've mentioned many times—I think in there, after Thomas shows that that God is "I am who am," right?

[43:23] He has a chapter devoted to refuting the idea that the the common being, right, is is what we mean by God, right? He has a chapter in the Summa Contra Gentiles in the first book, precisely refuting that mistake, right? And of course, one argument is that the. The being that is common to all things, that is set of all things, exists only in the mind, right? Only in the mind that it's separated out to all things.

[43:57] So it's obviously not God, right? And of course, the being that's common to all is divided into being a substance and being accident. shows these are not God too. But that's a mistake that Spinoza and especially Hegel is making on, so did Hegel's so-called logic.

[44:19] But Aristotle, the order in our knowledge, you see, and the order in things is for the most part contrary. And the effect is usually before our knowledge, and the cause afterwards. And therefore, the cause of the cause even afterwards, right? And therefore, the first cause is the the last known, right? And so the whole whole philosophy is ordered to knowing at the end the first cause, which turns out to be God, right?

[44:58] But Aristotle comes to the first cause, God, there by reason in the last books of the what twelfth book of the wisdom. So what is the beginning of things is the last thing we learn in philosophy.

[45:22] Heisenberg, the great physicist, says, "Huh? When we when you study reality, says we never start at the beginning. That's well said, right? In other words, where we start is not the beginning of things.

[45:38] And in the the ethics, Aristotle recalls these things here, because in ethics we know more that something is so than why it's so. We have to find out why it's so. But Aristotle says Plato was right. He says to ask, are we on the way from the beginning? He says, or are we on the way to the beginning?

[45:59] You know, and in geometry we might be on the way from the beginning, right? But usually we're on the way to the beginning, huh? Yes, sir. And notice water in our knowledge, for example, comes before hydrogen.

[46:17] That's why we name hydrogen from water, hydrogen generates water, right? But hydrogen is in our knowledge before proton. Proton got its name from the Greek word for what first? Was that first in our knowledge? Of these three, hydrogen, I mean water, hydrogen, proton. Water is first in our knowledge. Proton is last in our knowledge. But they called proton first because that was the first material particle that had most of the mass of the atom.

[46:51] But it's not first turn knowledge; it's last turn knowledge. You see, so it's just the reverse, huh? That's reflected, I say, in other kinds of knowing, good right?

[47:08] What does Augustine say? Too late have I come to know thee, you know. Too late has he come to really love God, right? So he's come to love

[47:19] late, last, but it's more lovable, right? He realized that, right? Yeah. He's loved things that are far less lovable, infinitely less lovable, right? Before he's loved God.

[47:46] There's a lot to think about this whole thing here. Yeah. Descartes, he got mixed up in this business of confused and distinct. Because he identifies, look at the rules that Descartes has: the four rules to direct the mind. He identifies certitude, sureness, with what is clear and distinct. Right. And Aristotle would say no.

[48:13] What's sure for us is more the confused than the distinct. Now, having made the identification, Descartes is making that fundamental mistake. Kind of identifying a certitude

[48:34] with clarity and distinction. Then, as I think I pointed out before, Descartes gets into two kinds of mistakes. Sometimes, when he's very certain about something, he thinks I must know it clearly and distinctly. Everybody's heard of the cogito, right? Yeah. Okay. And it goes back actually to to Augustine, huh? But Descartes uses it. He says, "I can't doubt that I'm what thinking, right? Okay, and then I think, therefore I am, right?

[49:12] So he's very sure that he's thinking, right? But does that mean he knows clearly and distinctly what thinking really is? I'm very sure that I'm alive. Does that mean I know clearly and distinctly what it is to be alive? Say. So that's one mistake he makes, right? When he's sure about something, he thinks he must know clearly and distinctly what it is.

[49:41] Aristotle would say, "No, you're more sure about the what? Confused, okay? Then the other mistake he makes is that when he has something clear and distinct, like something mathematical, right? A mathematical picture of the natural world must be what? The truth is so clear and distinct.

[50:10] Louis de Broglie, there, the father of wave mechanics, saw the mistake of Descartes. He says nothing is more misleading than a clear and distinct idea. You know, one example I saw is just a student says, "Huh? Everybody is sure, I think, that there's a difference between men and women. They really are different. But now, when you try to say exactly what the difference is, you know, you find some difficulty, right?

[50:42] Okay, you're more sure in your vague knowledge, right? You're confused knowledge, right? That they are different. than."Exactly, distinctly what the difference is. Okay? And people disagree as to exactly what the difference is, but agree that they're different. They really are different, that's for sure.

[51:17] Even grandkids used to do it to the little boys and little girls. They're different, different creatures. I don't know if I want to try to, you know, but it, you know, it'd be difficult to spell out exactly what the difference is, but it is quite different.

[51:38] It's amazing how, how soon these little girls, you know, want to decide what they're going to wear. Oh. Every day. Yeah. You can't dictate what they're going to put on today. Uh-huh.

[51:52] I don't even care that much, I don't think little boys care that much what they put on, you know?