De Anima (On the Soul)
152. How We Know Our Habits Through Their Acts (Q.87, a.2): Faith, Charity, and the Principle 'Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis'
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[0:00] We do next. Come interesting. You know, when Thomas speaks of when the Suma's divided into questions, you say, "Well, gee whiz, it's actually many questions under each question, right? " Okay, but I like to say that Thomas knows how to articulate the question, right? Make it distinct, huh? That's what he does under each question. He articulates it, but if it actually gets a number of little questions.

[0:28] To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that the understanding knows the habits of the soul through their very what essence or nature. For here, here's that that guy, the troublesome guy again, Augustine. For Augustine says, in the thirteenth book about the Trinity, huh?

[0:51] Not thus is seen faith in the heart in which it is, as the soul of another man, right, is seen from the movements of his body. But one holds it by the most certain science, huh? And the conscience cries out, huh? Thomas, we'll say by the way, you you can know, huh, in the strict sense that you have faith, huh? But you can't know in the strict sense, huh?

[1:18] That you have charity, huh? Although you can have, you know, probable conjecture, he says, right? Okay. Augustine seems to be saying the same thing here.

[1:31] Therefore, the habits of the soul are not known through their acts, but through themselves. Moreover, material things which are outside the soul are known through their likenesses of them which are present in the soul, and therefore they are said to be known through likenesses. But the habits of the soul are already present through their very nature in the soul. Therefore, through their own nature or essence, they are what.

[2:05] Known, right? You don't need it like this. The objection is saying, huh? Because the habit is right there. Moreover, this is the famous thing: "Propter quod unum quodque tale et illud magis account of which, that more so. Okay, you've heard me expand on that. That principle.

[2:36] When the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. Can we expound that? I think so. Yeah. Yeah.

[2:53] Okay. Well, I always start with very simple examples. If sweet is said of sugar and my coffee, of my coffee because of the sugar, which is sweeter. Yeah. And if wet is said of water and the dishcloth, but the dishcloth because of the water, which is wetter. Yeah. Okay. And as salty is said of salt and your French fries, I don't have any more. But of the French fries because of the salt, which is saltier.

[3:34] Yeah. Okay. Then you see, we go into these more interesting applications of that in philosophy, huh? If the conclusion of an argument is known, right? Conclusion of a syllogism is known, and the premises of the syllogism are known, right? But the conclusion is known because of the premises, right? Yeah. Which is more known to us? Yeah. Of course, if the premises were not more known than the conclusion, you wouldn't try to prove the conclusion through the premises.

[4:10] Or, what about end and means? Huh? If the end is desired and the means are desired, but the means are desired because of the end, which is more desired?

[4:25] Yeah. Yeah. So if I desire, say, medicine for the sake of health, so I desire both medicine and health. Right. But I desire the medicine for the sake or because of the health, right? Which do I desire more? Yeah, I'd be pretty crazy to desire medicine.

[4:49] Um. Okay, and there's a famous application of it by Aristotle there in the second book of Wisdom. Huh? He says, "If true is said of the cause and of the effect." But of the effect because of the cause, which is more true.

[5:12] Cause, yeah. It's interesting, right? And therefore, the first cause would be most true, right? Which is God, right? Amazing, he saw that. Okay. Now the guy is trying to argue from that principle here, but he misapplies it as we'll see in the reply to the objection. But other things are known by the soul on account of the what habit, right? In the understandable forms. Therefore, these are known more by themselves by the soul.

[5:47] But against all this is that habits are what the beginnings or the sources of acts, just as powers are the beginnings or sources of acts. That has been said in the second book about the soul. Before the abilities or powers, by reason are the acts and their operations. Goes back to principle you had there, right? We had to investigate the operation before the what power, right? Because the operation is known before, right?

[6:21] The object before the act. Therefore, for the same reason, they are before the habits. And thus the habits are known through their acts, just as are powers. So, how do you know the guy's got the habit of playing the piano? He's acquired this habitual state of getting down, playing the piano, right? Okay.

[6:51] I bet they have it. Speak English. Not too much speaking Latin, but a little bit of that too. I answered ought to be said that habits are in a way a middle between pure ability and pure act.

[7:13] But it has been said before that nothing is known except according as it is an act. Thus, therefore, in so far as the habit falls short of perfect act, it falls short from this that it be known to itself. But it is necessary that it be known to its own what act.

[7:39] Whether someone perceives himself to have a habit through this that he perceives himself to produce what the act which is proper to that habit, or when someone inquires the nature and the what reason for the habit from a consideration of its act, that same distinction he made before talking about. The soul knowing itself, or knowing the understanding knowing itself, right? Can know that it has this understanding, but can also investigate the nature of the understanding through the act.

[8:13] Okay. And the first knowledge of a habit comes about through the presence itself of the habit. But now, notice that he's going into what that means. Because from this fact that it is present, right, it causes the act, right, in which it itself is immediately what perceived, right?

[8:41] So now, it's in Quebec. They said you're not really learning French until you're dreaming French. When you said dreaming in French, then you know you picked up some French, right? I never dreamt in French, though. Your French is a little different.

[9:03] But the second knowledge of the habit is through a what? Studious investigation, just as has been said above about the mind in the first article, right? Okay. So you can know that you have a habit, right? Because you experience the act, but to know the nature of that habit would require you to make a careful investigation of it, starting from examining the act.

[9:33] Just as we're saying about the understanding, right? That I have a mind and understanding, a reason, right? I know because of my thinking, right? But in order to know the nature really of my reason, I'd have to make a careful investigation of the nature of thinking, huh? What kind of a power it is that understands something universal, or what kind of a power it is that understands something immaterial like truth?

[9:58] Is that a body that understands what truth is? Is it a body that you know receives something universally? Does quantity receive something universally, or no? So you take a studious investigation starting from the act to know the nature of the power, right? But to know that you have such a power, right? You perceive when you perceive the act in yourself, right?

[10:28] Even Descartes knew he had the ability to think, but didn't know really what thinking was as much as he thought he knew. But he was. Okay.

[10:39] Now, to the first, huh? The reply to Augustine's text there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although faith is not known through the exterior motions of the body, right? In other words, if you see somebody genuflecting and so on, you might assume that he has faith, but he might be doing this in bad, bad faith, right? Not have the faith, huh?

[11:08] But is perceived nevertheless by the one in whom it is, right? Through the interior act of his heart, huh? For no one knows himself to have faith except through this that he receives himself to what believe, right? Okay. So you find this strange, but assent of your mind to things that you don't fully what understand, right? So you assent to there being three persons in God, right?

[11:40] Even though natural reason cannot what reason this out, huh? Okay. So you you perceive that firmness of your own assent to these things, huh? And that's how you know you have faith.

[12:01] He kind of gave a very good explanation of faith there. You know, his own faith in a sense. That he had it when he was giving a course of the five ways, you know, the five ways in the proof of existence of God. But he gave us kind of a fatherly talk, you know, before he went into the five ways. He started with the difficulty of understanding the five ways, and we saw that as the course went on, you know.

[12:30] But he says he he believes in God's existence more from what his mother told him than from his study of the five ways, right? And although he thinks he could demonstrate the existence of God, right, he would not be so presumptuous as to say so, you know. But in terms of himself, having the faith and his certitude that he did have the faith, right, was because he saw the firmness of his own assent to these things the church teaches.

[12:56] Even though he doesn't have evidence for them, right, like you have for the, you know, right triangle or something, and. Okay. He couldn't explain the firmness of that assent any other way than by saying that he he had virtue of faith. Yeah. Okay.

[13:30] In the case of charity, it's harder to do because I can I can be a friendly guy, you know, unlike other people, you know, and be very social, right? And therefore, not be altogether sure whether my love for the people is simply something natural or something what supernatural, right?

[13:56] Now, the second objection was saying, "Hey, we have to have a likeness of these things outside the soul in order for them to be in the soul, right? " But the habits are already in the soul, right? Okay.

[14:12] But and this is going to be in both the second and the third objection. This distinction he makes here. To the second, it should be said that the habits are present in our understanding, not as objects of understanding, right? Why? Because the object of our understanding, according to the status of the present life, is the nature of a material thing. This has been said above. That the object of understanding is the what it is as something sensed or imagined.

[14:43] If the object was not the what it is as something sensed or imagined, then interfering with the imagination with the brain would not interfere with what? Thinking would it? Okay. That's a sign, right? That is the what it is as something sensed or imagined.

[15:05] But they are present in the understanding as that by which the understanding understands. Okay, that's important to see, right? They can become an object for understanding, right? But then they have to be what investigated through their act and so on, and come to know them by a discourse.

[15:34] Okay, so something can be present in the understanding as that by which it understands, right? Without being yet the object of understanding, right? Because it isn't what it is; something sensed or imagined, and has to be investigated from those things. See, I am convinced from my study of geometry that I understand universally what a triangle is, and then I can reason from that that what understands universally what a triangle is is not the imagination which knows only singular triangles that I picture in my imagination, still with the conditions of quantity and the body.

[16:24] Right. Even if you say, you know, I I know my my reason or my habit as the beginning, the principium, as he says in Latin here, the beginning of this act, right, the source of this act, the act proceeds from in some way, right? Okay, my playing the piano. I don't that's an example of me, but my playing the piano proceeds from this habit I've acquired, right?

[17:09] Okay, or my speaking English, huh? Proceeds from this habit, actual knowledge that I have of English, I guess. But even the idea of a beginning, Aristotle takes up the word beginning there in the beginning of the fifth book of wisdom. The first meaning of beginning is here is the beginning of the desk, and the sense in which my reason is the beginning of my thinking, right, or the source of my thinking, is a much later sense of beginning, right?

[17:44] And I have to see that later sense of beginning by kind of what likeness and yet difference from the sense in which this is the beginning of the desk.

[18:00] Remember a guy coming up to me when I was in college. Burke, what do they mean by first principles? Well, first principle is just a Latin word for beginning. So first beginnings are right not. Oh, okay.

[18:12] But this is the first meaning of the beginning, beginning of the desk, beginning of your property out there where the curb is or something, right?

[18:28] Then later on, you have the sense in which the foundation of the house is the beginning of the house. Then you come to the sense in which, you know, the agent is the beginning of things. It

[18:46] was only gradually you come to see this sense of beginning, right? In which we would say that my understanding is the beginning of my thinking.

[18:56] But you first get the idea of beginning as that from which something proceeds. A point is the beginning of a line. So, to the third, it should be said that when it is said, on account of which each other is that more. See how brief and Aristotle are that's what Aristotle says in the Posterior Analytics.

[19:37] That on account of which each that more. So as the Saxon is saying, when the same is said of two things, but of one because of the other, it belongs more to the cause, right?

[19:54] When it said, "Propter quod unum quodque illud magis has truth, " if it is understood in those things which are of one order, as in one genus of cause. For example, if it be said that health is an account of life, right? It follows that life is more what desirable, right? I want my health so I can live, right? Well, then I must want to live even more than to be healthy, right?

[20:24] But if one takes things which are of diverse orders, it would not be true, huh? Would not have the truth. If I say, for example, that health is an account of what medicine.

[20:38] Now, medicine is a cause. Now, not in the sense of what of the good of end. When I say I'm healthy because of medicine, I'm talking about the efficient cause, right? The mover, right? And that doesn't have to be better, does it? Okay.

[20:59] It does not therefore follow that medicine is more desirable, right? Because health is in the order of ends, medicine is in the order of what efficient causes, huh? But if you wanted to put them in the same order, you'd say, "Hey, medicine is a means to health, right? " And then it's clear that health is more desirable than what medicine, right? Okay. But when you say that medicine is a cause of health, it's not the cause of health being desirable, is it?

[21:33] Rather, health is a cause of medicine being desirable, right? But medicine might be a cause in some other sense of health, namely, efficient or mover, right? Producer. Thus, therefore, if we take two things of which both are as such in the order of objects of knowledge, then that on account of which another is known will be more known, as the principles of the premises are more known than the conclusions.

[22:01] Like I was saying earlier, right? If I know the. The premises, right, and through them I prove the conclusion, right. Then the conclusion is also known. But the conclusion is known as an object because the premises are known as an object. Therefore, the premises must be even more known than the conclusion. Okay, but then it's in the same order, right?

[22:28] What about what about that? Called the coffee and the sugar, the sugar and the coffee. Is it is it because well, sugar is then also an exemplary cause or something? I mean, because sugar sugar causes. Well, I was saying they're both sweet. Say, the coffee and the sugar are both sweet, so they both have that quality, that object, right? But one of them has the sweetness because of the other.

[22:54] Therefore, the other must be more sweet. But they're in the same order of. Yeah, of sweet, both sweet. In sweet, yes, yeah, yeah. So see, you're changing the order because the habit of like I had the habit of geometry, right? The habit of geometry is not what I know, but that by which I know, right? Okay. While in the case of premises and a conclusion, both the premises and the conclusion are what I know.

[23:32] Okay. Although I could also add to that that I know the conclusion by the premises, right? But the premises themselves are also known. Or if I know something by my habit of geometry, it's not by knowing what that habit of geometry is that I know this. You see. Okay. In fact, the average person who knows some geometry doesn't know what the habit of geometry is. You see, Thomas would say that the habit of geometry is an order of understandable forms.

[24:10] Oh. It's not by knowing that geometry is an order of understandable forms that one knows the conclusions of geometry. No, one knows the conclusion of geometry is ultimately through the postulates and the axioms, right? So the postulates and axioms are more known than the conclusions of geometry, and the earlier theorems are more known than the later theorems.

[24:39] Because the later theorems are known through the earlier theorems being known first, right? Okay. But we don't, in that sense, know by the habit of geometry the theorems. That is to say, we don't know the theorems by knowing what the habit of geometry is. So it's not in the same order, is it? Okay.

[25:02] You see that? Yeah, it's a good point to see. So the guy is misapplying the principle, right? Propter quod unumquodque tale, illud magis right. You're talking about things in the same order, right? Okay.

[25:31] But a habit is not in the order of objects insofar as it's a habit, huh? Nor, on account of the habit, do we know things as an account of a what object known, right? But rather as an account of a disposition or a form, by which the knower knows, and therefore the ratio does not what. Argument does not follow. You see the what the problem is?

[26:14] Take Thomas's example there, the medicine and the health, right? The guy says, "Well, you are healthy because of the medicine you took, huh? Okay. "

[26:40] But on account of which, more so, right? Right. Therefore, medicine, being the cause, is more desirable than what healthy, right? Okay. But I've mixed up two different orders, haven't I?

[27:03] In the order of in, in the order of desirable, health is before medicine, right? Okay. In the order of mover or maker, in this case,

[27:27] let's say I have to take a medicine to restore my health, right? Okay. So I take the medicine before I'm healthy, right? Again, right? Before I become healthy. So in that order, the medicine

[27:46] is before the healthy, huh? But before, in the sense of a maker, right? Okay. But he's trying to argue here that the medicine is more desirable than health, right? Okay. Now, if you put them both in the order of healthy, I mean, excuse me, of desirable things, right? Okay, you say my health is desirable, and taking this medicine is desirable, right? But why is taking the medicine desirable?

[28:21] Well, then it's because of the health, right? So health is the cause of the medicine being desirable. The medicine might be the cause of your being healthy, but the medicine now makes the healthy to be healthy desirable,

[28:40] right? See, so you see in two different orders there, right? The order of efficient cause and the order of end or desirable. Well, now in this article, he's talking about

[29:01] an order in objects. known. Okay. Now, in some cases, there is no order between objects known, right? Like, for example, I know what a triangle is, and I know what tragedy is, huh? Aristotle defined tragedy for me, right?

[29:29] But my knowledge of one doesn't help me to the other, does it? And now, what about my knowledge of what a square is and my knowledge of what a cube is?

[29:48] I can know what a square is, without knowing what a cube is, but not vice versa. So it's an order among them, right? Okay. And in geometry or in any science, reasoning now of knowledge. When you know a couple of statements and you put them together and draw a conclusion, right? Well, they're both in the order now of objects known, right? The premises or statements you put together were known, right?

[30:23] And then you put them together, you do the conclusion, and the conclusion now became known, right? Okay. But I came to know the conclusion through the premises, right? So the conclusion is known because of the premises. So the premises then are what more known, right? Okay. But you talked about

[30:51] my knowing geometry now habitually, right? I have a certain habit of geometry, so when I want to think about the triangle and the parallelogram, I tend to some extent anyway think about these things and demonstrate some of these things, right?

[31:08] Is it by knowing what that habit is that I know these theorems in geometry? No, it's not a cause. It's not in the order of objects known, there is it? No, no.

[31:27] So I know the conclusions through knowing the premises. I don't know the conclusions through knowing what the habit of geometry is. You see that? Okay.

[31:44] In the same way, if I say, you say the same thing about about my mind, right? Do I know the conclusions of geometry? Through my mind.

[32:09] Well, I know the conclusions of geometry through my mind, in the sense of through an ability to know, right? But do I know the conclusions of geometry through knowing what my mind is as an object? No, no. And you know, up at the trivium in the school, we give them Euclid, you know, to learn some Euclid, right? Some professors are more enthusiastic. You know, one summer I set out to teach little children, some little children around the neighborhood geometry, right?

[32:41] So we sat out under the trees, and the boys persisted, but the girls wanted to go in and make cookies, so let them go in and make cookies instead. Okay, but even little children, you know, can take an interest in geometry, right? Sure. And and learning, right? But they're not yet ready to understand what what reason really is. But that's not we suppose could, right? They will be using their reason, right?

[33:06] Sure. They have the ability to understand, right? Which is their reason, right? So by their ability to understand, you can say they understand geometry, right? But it's not by understanding what the ability to understand is that they understand geometry. It's not by the ability to understand as an object to be understood, right? That they understand what a triangle is or what a quadrilateral is or square is, right?

[33:36] My little children came home from kindergarten now, and they had a piece of paper with a circle on it and a triangle and a square, and they tell you what this is. This is a circle. This is a square, right? Well, using their mind to some extent to know this, right? But not as an object known, right?

[33:58] You see, see the idea. So it's not in the same order, right? Yeah. Okay. In the order of objects known, right? See that. With the word beginning, huh? You know, this is the beginning you know first. You know other beginnings. I liken this that first meaning, huh? And the further you go in these meanings, the more distant you become from the first meaning, huh?

[34:40] So Aristotle begins from from the point as the beginning of the line, or the line here is the beginning of the table, right? And then he goes to

[34:51] where you might begin, right? Because you might begin, where it's most handy for you to begin, right? You're not sitting at the beginning of the table, right? At a table. But then he goes to the sense in which the foundation of a house is the beginning of a house, and the keel is the foundation of the boat. And so on, and then he goes to the sense in which what the mover or the maker is the beginning of things, but notice the mover or maker is not a in the thing that he moves or makes, is he?

[35:23] So you're moving much further away than the foundation of the house, right? Okay, and then he goes to the beginning in knowledge, right? That's the fifth sense, right? So I mean he's moving further and further away from that first sense, but there's a likeness all the way up to the beginning in a knowledge, huh? See what we call the the definitions and the axioms and postulates of geometry, they're the beginning of geometry, just like this is the beginning of the table here.

[35:55] There's some likeness there, right? But proportional likeness, and just as the table begins here and goes down there, so geometry begins with the axioms and the postulates and goes all the way down to the Pythagorean theorem and beyond, right? And so you know sometimes we use the expression pursue a line of thought, right? See it goes all the way back to the first meaning, right?

[36:29] That you know the point is where the motion begins and you go down the line, right? The line of thought, right? So we understand those senses of beginning that are even immaterial by a likeness back to the beginning that is sensible, and it's usually tied up in these words with the continuous and time and common sensibles, right?

[37:02] You talk about act, As Aristotle will point out in the ninth book of wisdom, the first meaning of act is motion, and yet it's at least actual things almost except for prime matter.

[37:21] And I was in Quebec, you know if you go to the movie theater, in those days you still have the news, you know the news wheel. But in the French theaters say Les actualités! this is actual, what's going on, right? You see? So you go all the way from motion to God who is pure act, right? That word act is moved. you see in the study see in the study of Book IX, it's carried over, it's carried over from motion to to form, huh?

[37:55] It's carried over from motion to operations and so on. You can see that when Shakespeare defined reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, discourse comes from the Latin word for running.

[38:16] So we speak of reason as going from one thing to another. So something like motion, right? In reason, but it's not exactly the same thing, right? I can go from here to Mars now. probably, too, right now in my mind, right? Talk about Mars and the red planet and so on. The canals on Mars, you know. When they first saw those canals, they thought, "They They thought they saw canals."

[38:42] and they looked at the canals They had their first telescopes, you know. Oh, this is civilization, right? So the Egyptians had, the Mesopotamia had, right? Irrigation.

[38:56] They're hoping to find water up there. you know, we better stop here. That's a wonderful principle, though the kind of which each thing, or so right. You know, I imagine, you know, I told you the story about Hilary, Saint Hilary of Poitiers. He was a pagan philosopher, right, Greek philosopher, right, and then he converted, right. He was a great defender of the Trinity and so on. Thomas quotes Hilary the most after Augustine, right?

[39:36] But anyway, if you read Hilary's book, there, he describes how he came in the occasion of his coming in, right? And he picked up the Bible, say, he ran across the Bible, he opened it up and he read, you know, Moses there talking to God and, you know, I have to tell them who sent me. What's your name? And he says, I am who am. And he was struck by that, say.

[40:04] And this was a motive of credibility for him as a philosopher, right? Okay. But when Aristotle talks about being there in the second book of Wisdom and Truth, right, he says that the order in being and the order in truth is the same. And he brings in this principle, propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis, and then he shows that the cause is more what true than the effect, right?

[40:31] So Aristotle picked up, you know, the Old Testament and said, I am who am. In the New Testament, I am the way, the truth, truth itself. then he would have seen the connection, right away. That the one who is who is is truth itself, right? He has the fullness of both, right? Would have been a motive of credibility for for Aristotle, right? Aristotle, like all the great Greek philosophers, and they all agree, the greatest of the Greek philosophers, that either God alone should be said to be wise, right, or only God in the in the full sense, you know.

[41:13] So that if one could partake of the wisdom of God, that would be superior to the wisdom we could get by our natural reason. And and so when Thomas takes up, you know, the nature of theology there in the first question, the summa, and the first questions there after the prologue to the sentences of Lombard, huh? You'll say that it's wisdom, right, and wisdom in a higher sense, even than the wisdom that we call metaphysics, our first philosophy, huh?

[41:45] Because you're partaking in God's own what wisdom, huh? And Aristotle says either God alone should be said to be wise, right, or only God in the full sense. But the other gets it said before him, right? You know the the Plato's last work, the Laws. You know, begins with He's saying, "Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things." And he says, "No, no, no, God is the measure of all things."

[42:17] You know, I think that's very well said. And Boethius, he he makes use of that in the in the Consolation of Philosophy. But Heraclitus had said similar things, right? He says, "As a child is to a man, so is a man to God. As an ape is to a man, so is man to God." So in comparison to the ape, man is wise, Homo sapiens. To be popularly translated as the wise ape, but compared to God, man is an ape.

[42:56] So you see that idea of the inferiority of man's wisdom, huh? And you go back to Pythagoras, was supposed to have coined the word philosopher. You know, the one to call him wise because of his great discoveries like the Pythagorean theorem and so on.

[43:13] He said, "Don't call me wise; God alone is wise." What shall we call you? We'll call me a lover of wisdom. You got to call me something. So there's a humility there in the in the origin of the word philosopher. But you see that same humility in the great philosophers like Heraclitus and and Empedocles you see it in Empedocles And you know they'll say, you know, you know, stick by me and you'll learn not more than mortal wisdom is capable of.

[43:46] You know, and that that humility was lost. You see, in the modern philosophers, especially as they moved away from Christianity, they became, you know.

[44:00] Well, I mean, you know, Hegel puts you know you know philosophy above theology, right? Theology is kind of poetry, you know. And Feuerbach, who comes right after Hegel, he has this first little work called The Essence of Christianity, where he argues, you know, that that's just a poetic way of saying, you know, that man is God. And and but his arguments are very weak for that, right?

[44:27] Then Marx takes over. Engels takes over. So you have a real a real pride there in these guys. Best you can say for them is they're not lukewarm like a lot of people in the modern world. I mean, they go all the way, you know, and try to replace

[44:52] God with man. You know, there's a tremendous difference between the modern philosophers there and the ancients, you know. But sometimes they seem to give themselves away, you know, like. I always quote these words of Jean Paul Sartre, you know, the atheistic existentialist, where he says, "We're not atheistic in the sense that we would exhaust ourselves by trying to prove he doesn't exist. You know, it's even harder, obviously, to try to prove he doesn't exist or to prove that he does exist.

[45:23] But, but, atheistic in the sense, it makes no difference to us whether he does or does not exist. Actually, seems kind of crazy, you know. I can see a person having some doubt about the existence of God, but to say it makes no difference whether he does or does not seems to be like like it's will, right? In Marx, when he's identifying man with God, following Forabach in his Preface to his doctoral thesis, he, he says Prometheus.

[45:53] You know, he takes Prometheus as a symbol, and but Prometheus is not in doubt in Zeus; he's revolted against God, and now he's being punished, right? But he's, you know, the first martyr of philosophy, Prometheus. But in a sense, he's almost saying, you know, that it's voluntaristic, huh? I will not serve, you know. In sooth, I hate all the gods. He quotes, you know, the words of Prometheus there in Aeschylus.

[46:23] It's kind of funny, You know, there's a publishing firm called Prometheus Books, and sometimes I get there, you know, unsolicited. You know, I get all these things coming in the office every week. You know, it's kind of funny, you know. there are all these rationalist books, you know, but they take Prometheus as their symbol, right? Yeah, and I think Shelley did too, huh? Shelley, Shelley's, you know, very perverse, huh?

[46:58] He's an atheist, yeah, the English poet. Yeah, Dr. Burke, could you go back? I didn't quite get on your Aristotle's terse, you know, version of the Proctor quote. How does he render it? I don't think it was. Yeah, okay, I'll expand it here as I say. Yeah, I actually put it

[47:24] this form too. I expanded it this form. I say, when the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them, because of the other, okay. Yeah. Okay.

[48:07] Then, you know, one of them is the cause of it belonging together, right? Then it being the same thing belongs more to the cause. Okay.

[48:33] Now, let's say I always go to simple examples, right? Wet is set of water and the sugar and the coffee. Yeah, yeah, it gets kind of the idea. Those simple ideas, right? Okay. Yeah. Okay. But now, say let's take an example here from love, right? Okay.

[48:54] Sometimes we love somebody because we love somebody else. So, I mean, if I love someone who has children, right? I am going to have some love for his children. Children, right? But because of him, right? Right. Okay. Now, if I love your children because I love you,

[49:17] whom do I love more? The parent. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Or take charity now, right? Charity, in strict sense, you are supposed to love your neighbor as well as God, right? Yeah. But you love your neighbor because of God, right? Because of God. Yeah. So, whom do you love more? God. Yeah. Yeah. You see. Now, as

[49:43] when Aristotle is in logic, he's talking about the premises of a syllogism and the conclusion of a syllogism, right? You argue that the premises must be more known to us than the what conclusion, right?

[50:00] But notice again, known as being said here of the premises and the conclusion, but the conclusion is known because of the premises. Therefore, the premises are what more known, More known, right? It would make any sense if they were not more known that you'd use them to prove the conclusion. Sure. And that would be saying they are equally unknown. That's what he

[50:26] says. And then, when you get into ethics, right, you talk about the good, especially, and then you say, "Well, if I desire this for the sake of that,

[50:44] then this is desirable because that's desirable, right? " And therefore, which is more desirable, the end, right? If the end was not more desirable than the means, you wouldn't be desiring the means for the sake of the end, would you? Sure. Um. The same thing with the mover, right? You see, if you say, like with the kids, sometimes you know, they play with a stick or something.

[51:14] Who's moving that? Right. You know. You see that piece of chalk. Who's moving that piece of chalk? Did me or this racer? Who? Yeah. But the racer is moving it because it's being moved by me. Right. So who's more the mover? You are more the mover. Yeah. I see. Yeah. I might make a few examples. I say, you stand on the edge of the cliff there, and I take a pole and push you back, and off you go, right?

[51:47] Okay. And I didn't touch the guy. I didn't touch the guy, right? Yes. You should chop up the the pole. That's the one that pushed him over, right? But notice, huh? Um, we're both movers, right?

[52:07] But the pole. Pushes you off only because of me, right? So I am more responsible than the pole, right? If you have a train, right, the engine is pulling a bunch of, you know, wagons. Well, the one wagon is pulling the wagon behind it, right? But it's doing so only because it's being moved by the engine, right? So the engine is is is more a mover than the rest of the wagons that move only so far as they are moved, right?

[52:37] So you can apply it in every science, right? To natural philosophy, when, you talk about the mover, right? That's just one place we do it. In logic, when you talk about