De Anima (On the Soul)
153. Part 1: How the understanding knows its own act, with angels, the letter analogy, Russell's sophism and knowing the will (ST I q.87 a.3–4)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/153-part-1-how-the-understanding-knows-its-own-act-with-angels/

[0:00] more known and less known, right? And in ethics, especially when you talk about, you know, what's more desirable and so on, right? There is a lot of applications to it.

[0:23] So it's a very important, very important principle. The Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand what you've written In the name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:59] The third one proceeds thus: It seems that the understanding does not know its own act. Happens to I think, therefore I am. That is properly known, which is the object of the knowing power. But the act differs from the what object. Therefore, the understanding does not know its own act, just like the eye doesn't know seeing, but it knows color, which is its object. And the ear hears not its hearing, but sound, its object.

[1:34] So he's saying the understanding then knows its object and not its act. objects to say. Moreover, whatever is known is known by some act. If, therefore, the understanding knows its own act, and by some act it knows that, and again that act by another act, therefore, must go on forever, which seems impossible. But

[2:09] I don't see a difficulty in knowing what a triangle is, and knowing that I know what a triangle is, and knowing that I know what a triangle is, huh? It's just I don't want to continue forever because it's kind of not that much to be known. Moreover, just as the sense has itself to its own act, so the understanding.

[2:36] But the sense does not sense its own act, but this pertains or belongs to common sense, as is said in the book about the soul. Therefore, neither does the understanding understand its own act. Of course, if the understanding didn't know its own act, there would be no logic. it is by reason be free to that, because because the understanding can think about its own act, that there can arise the art called logic.

[3:05] That's why when I take the words of the seven wise men of Greece, know thyself, right? I say, well, that's addressed to man, right? The one who's able to know himself but doesn't know himself. But you could say, in particular, it's directed more to the soul than to the body, because the soul can know what a soul is, but the body doesn't know what a body is.

[3:30] But then, in a very special way, it's directed to reason itself, because reason can know what reason is, as well as know the other parts of us. But no other part knows itself. Anger doesn't know what anger is. The hand doesn't know what a hand is. The will doesn't know what the will is. But reason can know what reason is.

[3:56] But against this is what Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity. I understand myself to understand. I answer. It should be said that as has been said before, each thing is known according as it is in act.

[4:20] But the last perfection, of the understanding, is its operation. For this is not an action tending towards another. It's not a making, huh? Which is a perfecting of the thing what made, right? Which is a perfection of the thing done, as building as a what perfecting of the thing made. But it remains in the one doing, as its perfection and act, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics.

[4:53] That's why Karl Marx is in a and Engels in a real difficulty when they make the the highest thing in man is making, huh? Because is making a perfecting of the maker.

[5:09] Not as such, right? Making is essentially a perfecting. Of the what the thing made, yeah. If I make McDonald hamburgers, I'd say all my life, I'm not even learning how to make a McDonald hamburger, right? By making the McDonald hamburgers, right? And but an act like understanding is a perfection of the what one understanding. So, man's last in is his greatest perfection. will have to be in an act like understanding, rather than in an act like making houses or making McDonald hamburgers or making anything like that?

[5:55] And you could say the making of a house is for the sake of the house. Making a McDonald hamburger is for the sake of McDonald hamburger, right? But the understanding is for its own sake.

[6:12] But it remains the one doing as the perfection act of it, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics. This, therefore, is first what is understood about the understanding, namely its own what, act of understanding, huh? Because that's its act, right? Something is known insofar as it's an act. But about this,

[6:45] diverse understandings have themselves in diverse ways. Intellectus there is taken the sense of the power of understanding, right? For there is one understanding, namely the divine understanding, which is its own what, act of understanding.

[7:05] There's no what, composition in God, right? Okay. So there's no distinction in God between his ability to understand, if you want to speak of that, and his actually understanding. They're one and the same.

[7:22] And thus in God is the same what understands itself to understand, and what understands its own what, essence or nature or substance, because his very substance, his very nature, his very essence is his what, act of understanding, huh? There is, however, another understanding, another ability to understand, namely the angelic, which is not its own understanding, huh? As has been said above in the Treatise on the angels.

[8:02] But nevertheless, the first object of its act of understanding is its own what, nature, huh? Its own essence, huh? Whence, although other is in the angel by reason that it understands itself to understand, and that it understands its own nature or essence, nevertheless, by one and the same act, it understands both, because this which is to understand its own what, nature essence, is the proper perfection of its own nature essence.

[8:44] But together and by one act, a thing is understood with its what, perfection. Now finally we come down to us. There is, however, another understanding, namely the human, which is neither its own what, act of understanding, its own to understand, nor is the what, first object of its act of understanding its own nature, but something what, outside. Namely the nature of a material thing, huh? So the child is thinking of his toy, right?

[9:24] And therefore, what is first known by the human understanding is an object of this sort. But what it is is something sensed or imagined, right? And secondarily is known, ah, the very act by which the object is known, and then by the act is known the what, understanding itself. That's the order Aristotle teaches us in the De Anima, right? We know the powers through the acts, and the acts through the what, object, right?

[10:00] So I understand what a triangle is before I understand that I understand what a triangle is, and I understand that I understand what a triangle is before I understand that I have the ability to understand, and I understand the ability to understand before I know that my soul is not entirely immersed in matter. Okay.

[10:24] Um. And through its act is known the understanding itself, meaning the ability to understand, of which it is a perfection, the act of understanding. And therefore, the philosopher says, and that's the De Anima, that the objects are known before the acts, and the acts before the what, powers, right? And something like that takes place in ethics too, where you know the objects of the virtues before the act, and the act before the what, virtue, right?

[11:00] Okay. So to eat moderately is more known to us than the virtue of moderation, right? Okay. Or to act bravely is more known to us than the virtue of courage, huh?

[11:21] So sometimes you don't know whether you have the virtue of courage until you get on the battlefield, right? And then you might find out.

[11:34] You read, you know, even the instructions sometimes to the troops there of George Washington, right, huh? And how you assume you know they're all going to go forward, right? But if anybody should be so, you know, dastardly, you know, to retreat without orders, you'll be shot, right? And you see that happens even, you know, in more modern times, right, huh? That your marine officer is behind you there to shoot you if you don't go forward when you're told to go forward.

[12:04] So you might as well be a dead hero than a dead coward, right? So we don't know how many men really have the the virtue of courage. Now

[12:24] the first objection said that what you know is the object of the knowing power, huh? But the act is not the object. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the object of the understanding is something very what common, huh? Very general. To wit, being and what truth, right? Under which is grasped even the very act of what understanding, huh? Of course, you see, when the Greeks said you can't get something out of nothing,

[13:04] how universal is something? Is there anything that doesn't come under something? So you're distinguishing between something and nothing, right? But anything that is comes under something, right? So there's something kind of infinite about our what mind, huh? Because in knowing the difference between something and nothing, in a way, it's what in general open to knowing anything, huh? And so the first thing you know that you we find Anaxagoras saying about the mind is it's infinite.

[13:43] In the great fragment from Anaxagoras, the first guy to really get into the mind, the first thing he says about the mind is that it's what infinite, right? And as I always say to the student, now when he says the mind is infinite, does he mean like materialists were saying that air was infinite? It's infinite in what extent, huh? Well, he goes on to say later on that the mind's the thinnest of things.

[14:08] So it's not infinite in the sense that it's what spread out like that, no, no. But it's infinite in its what object, right? So it's not limited to color like the eye is, or to sound like the ear, but it can know color and sound. But it's not even limited to the sensible, because it knows the difference between something and what nothing. But then the second thing that Anaxagoras says is that the mind is what self-ruling, huh?

[14:41] And I say, well, what's the connection between the first thing he says that it's infinite, and the second thing he says it's self-ruling? Well, it couldn't be self-ruling if it was not self-knowing.

[14:57] So there's a connection between self-knowing and self-ruling on the one hand. But likewise, huh? If the mind is unlimited, in a way, infinite in its ability to know, and that's shown mainly by its knowing universal. I mean, I even know that no odd number is even, right? An odd number covers an infinity. I'm thinking in a way, in a general way, about infinity things here. When I say odd number is, even, huh?

[15:27] But if the mind is infinite in its object in some way, then it can know not only other things but even know what itself, right? So the connection between the mind then being infinite and its ability to know, and its being self-knowing, and then between its being self-knowing and its being self, what ruling? So it's quite an interesting fragment there we have. Says a lot of other things too about the mind.

[15:56] We did that didn't we one time or what? Thought we did that one time didn't we? With some of you anyway. Did some of those fragments? Oh yeah yeah yeah yeah. We did that. Was that kind of a big fragment? DK-12, you know. Mm-hmm. Where he says all these different things about the mind.

[16:14] So let's go back to the reply here. The object of the understanding is something common, namely... being or thing or something, and true, under which is comprehended also the very act of understanding. Hence, the understanding is able to know its own act, but not first, not first, because neither is the first object of understanding in the present state of things. Just any being or true, right? But being and true considered in what material things?

[16:59] That's very important what he's saying there. From which it goes to a knowledge of all other things. That's what he's saying there: being and truth considered in material things.

[17:15] And I always go to try to kind of explain that a bit. Go back to the observation of Aristotle in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, where he says that it's a common opinion among the Greek philosophers before him that whatever is must be somewhere, and if it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist, right? So they're identifying what is with what is in place, right? And what is not in place is not.

[17:54] Well, to be in place is a property of actual bodies, huh? So they're identifying what is basically substance with bodies, huh? Okay, and that's kind of the

[18:14] common thought of men even today, right? And even you know, you talk to Catholics or Christians sometimes, and they have a hard time seeing that, huh? I think about my soul being separated from my body, right? Is my body going to be here and my soul over there, or is my my body's going to be in some place, some gray somewhere, I guess? But my soul that be in some other place

[18:44] won't be in place, huh? But the point is, when you think, you always use these images, and the images are continuous, so you think that everything is continuous and therefore in some place, and you can't imagine not being in place.

[19:01] But neither God nor the angels are in place, huh? And when my soul is separated from my body, it won't be in place. I find it very hard to for us to think about, huh?

[19:15] And so, in a way, huh? In a way, in in wisdom, where you want to talk about being as common to bodies and to angels and to immaterial things, right? You have to, in a way, ascend from the particular to the general, and you see it very clearly in the book referred to here, in the ninth book of wisdom, because the ninth book of wisdom is about ability and act, and in the first part of the the three parts of that book, Aristotle talks about act and ability as are tied to motion and therefore to material things.

[20:02] And it's not until the second part that he begins to rise above that and shows act insofar and considers act insofar as it can be found even in immaterial things as well as material things.

[20:19] And then in the third part of that book, he brings out the order which enables us to see that the first cause, namely God, will be pure act. But notice, as he goes from the first to the second part, right? He's ascending from what being in the sense of act and ability considered in in rebus materialibus, considered in material things. Okay, that's very important. Now, a lot of these

[20:52] bad Thomists, you know, they'll quote Thomas, who often quotes Avicenna. The first thing our mind understands is being. But they identify that being that we first understand with the subject of wisdom, which is being as being, right?

[21:12] But in the beginning, the begin the being we really know in the beginning is being considered in what material things. And it's not until we have some kind of of proof that there exists something that is not material, right? That our mind would begin to separate being from

[21:39] a body, or to separate substance from body, and see that substance is something more universal, and eventually to see that these immaterial substances are more substances in a way than the bodies are. But in the beginning, we identify what is with what is in place.

[22:00] Okay. Is that what they call that that mistaken idea that the first object of we of our minds is that is that generalized being is that what they call the intuition of being Is it? Well, it could be yeah. I mean, you gotta say when you say that the first thing understood by our mind is being—that something is—it's not that very universal understanding of being that's common to us and the angels, or to bodies and angels, but it's as he says, being considered in what material things.

[22:41] Cardinal Cajetan, you know, the one who has the commentary in the Summa there, you know, his his phrase is at first being understood is ens concretum in quidditate sensibili, right? So it's being concretely in a what? The what it is is something sensible, huh? And they say you just go back to that that book four of Aristotle's Natural Hearing, where he says that the Greeks before him, that was a common opinion, right?

[23:16] Whatever it is, must be somewhere. It's in some place. If it isn't somewhere, it doesn't what? Exist, huh? Okay. So it's very hard for us to rise above images, huh? And when you try to yes, Did Joe song fall into that snare among his other errors? He might have, yeah. I can't remember whether he did or not, but that's kind of a common thing, though. People will, you know, quote Thomas, where a lot of times he'll quote Avicenna, who says that being is what we first understand, and but here he's more precise, right?

[23:53] Where he's saying, huh, what is first understood by us is not just any being or true, but being and true considered in material things, huh? And you see that reflected too in our in our in our statements, huh, about being, because they have a noun and a verb, right? And a verb signifies with time, either past or present or future. So we're thinking of everything as being continuous, like a body in there, for in place and being in what time?

[24:33] And then I think it's the the work is the one on sense and the sensible. Those those little particular works that Aristotle has following upon the book on the soul, where he says, you know, because we don't think without images, right? We always think with the continuous and in time, huh? And so when we finally come to understand, so far as we can, say God, we have to very much know him negatively in this life, right?

[25:03] So we say God is not a body, right? Or when you look at the definition of eternity, huh? The definition of eternity involves perhaps two negations of what's in the definition of time.

[25:23] And two negations about the the now of time. See, and the definition of eternity is tota simul et perfecta possessio vitae interminabilis, right? The all at once, you could say, huh? And perfect possession of unending life. Now, the life of a man, or the life of a dog, or the life of a tree is in time. It's measured by time, right? And it has a beginning in time, and has an end in time, right?

[26:02] Why the life of God has no beginning and no end. So you negate the beginning and the end that life in time has when you speak of the divine life, which is an eternity, and that's put out by interminabilis right Vite A life that has no limit, neither beginning nor an end. But then some people think that that's enough to understand eternity, as if eternity is a kind of an endless time, right?

[26:32] You know, as if you know, you went back the last year and Berquist was still existed. You went back the year before that Berquist was still existed, right? And no matter how many years you went back, Berquist was still existed. Or next year Berquist still exists, and the year after that exists, and and so on. But even if Berquist, went on and on like that, my life there would still be a before and after in my life, right?

[26:56] Because last year is a different part of my life than this year, and it's before the part of my life I have this year, and the next year will be after the life I have now, right? So that's negated too in the definition. In the first part of the definition, tota simul right? Simul is the opposite of before and after. Now, in being tota simul all at once,

[27:22] eternity resembles the now of time, because the now of time has no before after in it. If you take the now in the strict sense, right? What divides the past and the future, but don't include any of the past with the now, or any of the future with the now, then the now is the time in a way like a point is to a line. It's something indivisible.

[27:51] But of course, the now is always other, isn't it? And so Boethius says that the now that flows along makes time, but the now that stands still makes eternity. And so he says, possessio. It's the tota simul et perfecta possessio vitae interminabilis, right? Because there's no what

[28:19] otherness in the now of eternity, huh? Stand still as it were, right? But now, if you imagine the now of time standing still, we'd have practically no life in the now of time, huh? And I always take the example from the fairy books when you're little, you know, where the the terrible witch, you know, casts a a spell upon the court and the beautiful princess and so on.

[28:47] And I can still see the you know the pictures in some of the child books, you know, where the servant is bringing in the thing and he's got one leg up in the air and he's he's there for until the the prince charming, whatever it is, shows up and gives the princess a kiss and everybody comes back, right? So we'd have practically no life at all in the now.

[29:07] What can you do in the now? You can't eat a carrot in the now, can you? You can't think in the now, right? Takes a little time to think, right? But God in that. Now that stands still has a perfect

[29:26] possession of unending life, right? Is perfection of life, huh? So there is at least two negations, right? Of time, of life and time, and two negations of what? Even referring to the now of time. So we have to, in a sense, know God's eternity by what the theologian calls the via negationis or the via negativa. The same way you take up, you know, God's being simple, although grammatically speaking, simple is not negative, but you actually show, like, say, in the Summa here, is that God is not composed, huh?

[30:13] And what he does in the question three there is to what negate six different kinds of composition that are in creatures, right? And then finding the seventh article that there is no composition in God, right? But again, that's via negativa, right? Via negationis.

[30:35] So, so we first know that what it is is something sensed or imagined, and especially if you take a clear example like geometry, where you realize that you're understanding these things universally, and then that's a clue later on to the nature of our understanding, huh? It's immateriality, but you have to know the object first, right? You have a little bit of Euclid, huh? Before you study the De Anima.

[31:14] So it does come under the object, right? But you got to see a certain order, right, in which it comes under that. Moreover, what is known is known by some act. If therefore the understanding knows its own act, by some act it will know it, and that again, that act by another act. This will go on forever.

[31:38] To the second, it should be said, huh? That the very act of understanding of man is not the act and perfection of the nature understood that is material.

[31:57] It's unlike the angels, right? Huh? The angel knows primarily his own substance, right? His own essence, his own nature, and his act of understanding is a perfection of his own substance, right? So by the same act he knows his own substance and the perfection of his own substance, which is his own act. But Berquist huh. He understands what a triangle is, right? And his understanding what a triangle is is not a perfection of what he understands.

[32:29] It's not a perfection of the triangle, is it? It's perfection of me. So, in understanding what a triangle is, at the same time, I don't understand what my understanding, because it's not a perfection of what a triangle is. Perfection of me. You see? So it's not by the same act that I understand what a triangle is, and I understand that I understand what a triangle is. See that?

[32:58] But by an angel, it's the same act by which he understands what he is and his own understanding. It's primarily what he understands is himself. His understanding of himself is the perfection of himself. So he understands himself and his own perfection by the same act.

[33:19] Just like when I listen to Mozart and I hear his music and I hear the perfection of the music, right? By the same hearing, I know Mozart's music and the perfection of his music,

[33:33] right? But when I understand what a triangle is, right? I'm not understanding what is perfection of of me. Triangle is not the perfection of me. Although understanding what a triangle is, some perfection of me. Not greatest perfection, but some perfection of me.

[33:55] So he says, "Ipsum intelligere humana, the very act of understanding, huh, is not the act in perfection of the material nature understood. So that it would be by one, so it would be possible by one act, huh, be understood both the nature of the material thing and the very act of understanding. Just as by one act is understood a thing with its own what perfection.

[34:31] Whence other is the act by which the understanding understands a stone. Much more concrete than me, right? Understanding a triangle, right? And other is the act by which it understands itself to understand a what stone, right? And thus, huh? Nor is it impossible or inconvenient in the understanding for there to be the infinite in what potency, right? As has been said above. Now,

[35:09] Augustine, you know, he he anticipates Descartes. That's not original with Descartes. I think, therefore, I am. And Descartes. I mean, Augustine used it already against the Academics the the skeptics of his time, right? We say you know nothing, right? But even if you doubt everything, you can't doubt that you're what thinking, because you're you're doubting yourself as a kind of thinking. But then you see, if I know that I'm thinking, I can also know that I know that I'm thinking, and I can know that, right?

[35:43] I can know that. So there's an infinity of things I can know. Contrary to academics, can't know anything, right? Not that the biggest things to know in the world, but you can.

[35:58] I used to use a kind of little material likeness of this. You know, it's deficient, like these things are. But I say, suppose you write a letter, right, in which you to somebody, in which you recount something that you read in a letter. Written to you, okay.

[36:28] Now that first letter, right? Could that be about what was in the letter to that person? Okay, but could that go on forever? Or put it another way, could the first letter ever written be about what's contained in the letter? But it wouldn't be the other letters, would there? So the first letter cannot be about what I read in the letter. The first letter must be about something what that was not in the letter, right?

[37:09] You see the little analogy here, see? If I'm writing the first letter, I'm going to write about these things out here, right? Okay. And then I send this letter to you, and you write a letter about what I wrote in my letter to you. And then this could go on forever, right? You could write to somebody, and they could write, but you wrote this letter, right? Okay.

[37:34] But the original letter, which is my letter, right, was not about what's in the letter, but about something outside letters, about the world around us, huh? I write you a letter about what happened, you know, to the people around me, or something like that, right? Happened to Auntie and Uncle and so on, right? Okay.

[37:59] See, when my brothers and I are kind of spread around the country, we'd write to my mother, right? And then my mother would write to us, and she'd say, "Well, Richard sent in this letter, or Marcus sent in this letter, or Dwayne sent this letter," right? So she's kind of the conduit for what's in our letters to get to the other brothers, right? But the original letter would have to be something what that was not about what somebody wrote in the letter, about something that was not in the letter, and then putting it into the letter, right?

[38:33] Well, something like with our mind, right? The first thing we understand is not our understanding, right? You'd be like, "What's in a letter at first, right? " But something like what a stone is or what a triangle is, huh? The what it is is something sense to imagine. But once you understand that, then you can understand your understanding, right? Just like once I receive a letter, now I can write not just about things around me, but about what are the letters you've been sent me.

[39:02] You see that? But notice the mind can come back upon itself, huh? And Aristotle talks about that. There is what they call a relation of reason, huh? Or we say Socrates is Socrates, right? And Socrates is the same as Socrates, right? But are there really two Socrates? No, but the mind takes Socrates twice. It can do that, huh? So I can always say that something is itself, right?

[39:43] So I could say Socrates is Socrates, and then I could say the statement Socrates is Socrates is the statement Socrates is Socrates. And I could go on multiplying, you know, this forever, right? Because the mind can come back upon itself, huh? And this is one kind of infinity that you find in the mind. I can always say something is itself, so I can get as many ones as you want to, huh?

[40:11] Okay, those are kind of like what beings of reason, right? Yeah, very strange kind of being, huh? Not too important in some ways, but it's there, okay? But there are many Socrates only in my mind.

[40:32] Okay, see that? You know, Bertrand Russell tried to argue against the axiom that a whole is larger than its part. You heard his argument? Well Bertrand wasn't like this, he said.

[40:55] For every odd number, of course, so these guys, one is an odd number. For every odd number, you can have a what corresponding even number, double, right? Two, six, ten, seven. You can go on forever here, right? Huh? So, for every odd number you give me, I can give you a what an even number, right? Okay. Well, no, excuse me, that's not the way it's supposed to go.

[41:24] Now you take the whole numbers: one, two, three, four, five, six, and then take odd numbers for them, right? Double each of them. Okay, as you go on forever with all the whole numbers, I can go on forever with what even numbers to match them, right? So therefore, the even numbers are equal to all the numbers. Therefore, the part is equal to the what Oh. Yeah. See?

[41:55] Now it's wrong with the argument, see? Well, is this? Two over here, the same two. Oh, okay, yes. Or is it multiple? multiplied in the way we're multiplying Socrates and then we go? Okay. Yeah, as a being of reason, right? Yeah, yeah. See. So if I say that two is two, I've got two twos now, right? And if I say two is two is two is two, I've got four now, right?

[42:40] And if I say this whole thing is itself, I'm going to have eight, and I can get as many twos as I want to, right? So Charles Peirce said, huh? That's no big thing. I can do that with just two alone, right?

[42:55] Okay. Because you can multiply as many twos as you want to, right? But is this the same two as that one? Yeah. It is. I mean, ultimately, right there, I mean, there's only. Huh? Or are you multiplying them like this, huh? See. In other words, there's a there's a mental multiplication of things, right? So it's not really the same two as when you had over here. And this is not the same as that two, is it?

[43:27] Unless you have two twos, you can't put this over here. Right. Oh, okay. But because of that, you can have many twos as you want to, right? Yeah. Then you're talking to me about this mental being, right? You're confusing two kinds of being, huh? The being maybe of the real numbers and this mental being, huh? And this multiplicity here.

[43:55] That'd be like saying, you know, Socrates is as much as you people, right? Because I can have Socrates by doing this thing over here, right? I got Socrates for you and a Socrates for you and a Socrates for you and Socrates. So Socrates is as much as all of you, or I'm as much as all of you, right? Because Berquist is Berquist and Berquist is Berquist is Berquist, right?

[44:18] And all of that is itself, right? So I get more than enough Berquist to handle all of you and anybody else who's in this building, right? See.

[44:31] Does that make one man as much and even more than all of you? This is what Sophist does, though, right? He attacks an axiom like the whole is larger than one of its parts, right? And the average people can't what solve that, right? Okay. I told you the example, the sophistical one on the same thing that I give in class to see if they can solve it.

[45:05] I say, now, what is a man, huh? Well, he's an animal, right? But he's not just an animal. He's more than that. He's an animal who has reason, right? Okay. So, animal is only a part of what man is. So they all agree to that, right? And then I say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on, right? So, what is only a part of man includes much more than man.

[45:32] Therefore, the part is sometimes not less than the whole, but even more than the whole. Yeah, yeah, they all say. See, what's wrong with that? What's wrong with that?

[45:47] Sometimes the whole. Yeah, yeah, because when I say man is an animal that has reason, that's a definition of man, and a definition is a composed whole, composed of the genus, which in this case is animal, and the difference, which is reason. And the definition of man is always more than just the genus of man, or always more than just the difference of man, right? Okay. But when I say animal includes besides man. Dog, cat, and horse.

[46:22] I'm considering animal now as a universal whole, set of man, dog, and cat, and it's always set of more than man is set of, or it's always set of more than animals set of, right? So if you take each kind of whole in part, the whole always contains more or is set of more, right? Which makes me have two different senses here, right? And the students can't

[46:45] see the distinction of the senses, huh? And so when Aristotle said that, you know, the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up different senses of the same word, You can see that all the time with the students, huh? They think the argument is good at first, huh?

[47:03] Just like I, you know, the word general in particular, you know, it's something like this. Um, when I teach the beginning of the Aristotle's Physics, there, Aristotle shows that we know things in general before in particular, and he shows it by the fact that we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. And to know something in general is not to know as distinctly as knowing in particular.

[47:32] And like to know this is a liquid is not to know it as well as to know it's water, right? And to know this is a theology book is more distinct than just know it's a book, right? Um, but then I argue and I say, but Aristotle says that our knowledge begins in our senses, and the senses know particulars, and it's reason that knows the general or generalizes.

[47:59] So don't we know the particular before the general? Doesn't Aristotle contradict himself? Yeah, yeah, yeah. He's contradicted himself. Well, they can't untie it, I said. But they're mixing up two meanings of the word particular, and two meanings of the word general, right? Sometimes the word particular means a singular, like if I say that you are a particular man. But sometimes the word particular doesn't mean singular at all.

[48:31] It means among universals the less universal. So I might say the dog is a particular kind of animal, right? But their particular doesn't mean an individual, right? That's when I say Socrates is a particular man, right? So when we say the particular comes before the generals, Aristotle or we will say sometimes, we mean singulars come before universals in our knowledge, just as the senses come before understanding, huh?

[49:01] The thing is singular and sensitive, Boethius says, but universal and understood understood. But when he says at the beginning of the Physics that the general is before the particular, general means the more universal. In particular, means the what, less universal, okay. So he's not contradicting himself, right?

[49:27] He's saying the singular comes first, and then the more universal, and then the less universal. But because the singular and the less universal are both called what, particular, and they can't see that difference, then they are deceived by the sophist.

[49:49] Sometimes they give a, you know, second objection. You know, okay, got all that. But if you start with the singular, shouldn't the less universal come before the more universal? Because it's closer to the singular, right? I start with Socrates, and I come to man before animal.

[50:14] But you're forgetting about the fact that our mind knows things in a confused way before it knows them distinctly. And so I take the simple example: if we went out on the campus, on the grounds here, and you're going to classify the kinds of plant life here, okay,

[50:34] and not take anybody's word for it, right? Well, all your knowledge of the plants on this campus or on this grounds would start with your senses, and therefore with singulars, your individuals, right? But now, as you begin to arrive at the universals from the singulars,

[50:55] would you arrive at the different kinds of grass, the different kinds of pine tree, or would you arrive at the difference between grass and tree first?

[51:11] Difference between grass and tree. Yeah, yeah. So you'd see the more universal before the what less universal, and it makes sense too for another reason that the difference between a grass and trees are much greater than between different kinds of grass. And I know myself, and there are between different kinds of trees. And I know just if you take trees in particular, when I was in a botany class, we had to walk around campus with a chart, you know, and trying to classify the trees.

[51:46] Well, the basic distinction among trees was between those that were needleled, pine tree, so to speak, and the broad leaf tree, right? And no one ever confused those two, in my experience. But whether it was a Norway pine or whatever the particular pine was, I don't think I ever did learn the differences between different trees, right? So I know the more universals.

[52:13] Needle and flat leaf thing before I know the difference between oak and and maple and so on or between Norway pine and other kinds of pines, you see. Now, another example is that of alcoholic beverages, right? See. And if you're going to take nobody's word for that, but just sample them yourself, right? All your knowledge would begin with the individual glasses of beer or wine or whiskey that you drank, right?

[52:40] Okay. But now, as you begin to classify these things and to arrive at universals, would you see the difference between Budweiser and Miller first, or between beer and wine first? Would you see the difference between Cabernet Sauvignon and Pinot Noir, you know, or the difference between red between wine and beer first? What did you see first? See? Yeah. So, although you do start with the singulars because of our potency in knowing things in a confused way first, we tend to know the more universal before the what less universal.

[53:22] You're going to know the difference between a dog and a cat before the difference of different kinds of dogs, right? Different kinds of cats.

[53:34] Okay. So, all that's just kind of an aside here, and this is probably the second objection, though, right? Huh? What's interesting, huh? That the first thing we can't we understand cannot be our own act of understanding. But the angel in his first act of understanding understands what his own substance and therefore the perfection of his own substance, which is his own understanding of his own substance.

[54:06] But what I first understand, as Thomas says, is a stone or a triangle or something like that. And my understanding what a stone is is not a perfection of what a stone is. And my understanding what a triangle is is not a perfection of what triangle. If what I first understood was my soul or what I first understood was my mind, maybe the first thing I could understand would be my understanding, because that's a perfection of my mind and of my soul.

[54:32] But it's not a perfection of the stone. It's not a perfection of the triangle. That's a very interesting point he makes there, huh? Okay.

[54:44] And that's why the wise men are right in saying, "Know thyself," right? Because the words, if it's a reasonable exhortation, it must be addressed to someone who both can know himself, right? Unlike the animals, therefore, the plants and so on, but doesn't know himself or know himself very well anyway, huh? Unlike the angels, know themselves perfectly right away.

[55:19] Okay. Now the third objection here was taken from the senses again—that the senses don't know their own act, but another power knows this. To the third, it should be said that the private sense senses according to the change of a material organ from the exterior sensible thing, but is not, however, possible that something material material what change itself, right? But one is changed what by another, right?

[55:56] And therefore, the act of the private sense is perceived or known by the common sense, but the understanding does not understand by a material material change of the organ, and therefore it is not what similar to the two, huh? Okay. In case of material material organ, you have a real what. Acting upon right, and what acts upon something and what undergoes are not what the same, yeah.

[56:36] But I can what understand my understanding and my will can love. its what loving, right? That's an argument from the treatise on charity, right? Whether by charity you can love not only God and your neighbor but also love your loving of them,

[56:55] right? Yeah. Some people are in love with love too. Okay, should we go on or take a break here before we do the next article? Just a short break. What are whistles here, To the fourth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the understanding does not understand the act of the will,

[57:30] for nothing is understood by the understanding except what is in some way present in the understanding itself. But the act of the will is not present in the understanding, since they are other powers, diverse powers. Therefore, the act of the will is not known by the what understanding, right?

[57:55] So how can I know that I love wisdom, right? I don't know the act of my will, huh? Moreover, an act has its what species from its object, but the object of the will is different from the object of the understanding, because the object of the will is the what good, right? The object of the understanding is the truth. Therefore, the act of the will has a different species or form from the object of the understanding.

[58:25] Therefore, it's not known by the understanding. Moreover, Augustine in the tenth book of the Confessions attributes to the affections of the soul the acts of the appetitive power that they are known neither by images as bodies nor by their presence as the arts are known, but by certain notions.

[58:53] Does not seem, however, that there can be other notions of things in the soul except the natures of the things known or the likenesses. Therefore, it seems impossible that the understanding knows the affections of the soul, which are the acts of the will. But against this is what Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity. Understand me to will.

[59:22] Okay. Not if that's correct English, but like what the Latin says, right? Always in English. Understand myself to will. Understand my will. Yeah, yeah. To have that thing. I answer. It ought to be said, as has been said above, that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain what inclination, following upon the form understood. Just as natural desire is an inclination following upon the natural what form.

[1:00:10] So once you acquire what a certain nature, you have a certain inclination following upon that nature, right? In the case of what sense desire and the intellectual desire, which is will, it follows not upon natural form, but a form sensed or a form what understood, okay?

[1:00:33] But the inclination of each thing is in that thing in its own way, huh? Whence the natural inclination is naturally in a natural thing, and the inclination which is the what sensible desire is sensibly in the one sensing, huh? I wonder if that's the reason why we call our emotions sometimes feelings, right?

[1:01:05] Because a feeling what implies there's something sensible about your feelings, right? Have feeling of anger, feeling of sadness, right? You hurt my feelings. Okay, but it's just something what? But my emotions are sensibly, as he's saying here, right? sensibiliter in the one sensing, right?

[1:01:33] You feel in a sense your emotions. Yeah. So I feel sad. I feel angry, right? The anger, the sadness is there in a kind of sensible way, right?

[1:01:52] And likewise, the understandable inclination, which is the act of the will, is understandably in the one understanding, as in a beginning, and as in its own what subject, right? Whence the philosopher uses this way of speaking in the third book about the soul, that the will is in what reason, right? Now sometimes Thomas will qualify that and say, you know, in the rational part of man, right?

[1:02:20] The immaterial part, huh? But what is understandably in the one understanding, is consequently understood by him. Whence the act of the will is understood by the understanding, and insofar as someone perceives himself to will, and in so far as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently the nature of its source, which is the habit, or the what, power, right? Huh?

[1:03:01] So do you know your friendship for somebody? A friendship is a habit, right? But you know the friendship through the what, knowing your goodwill that you have towards this person, right? So the reason, and knowing that goodwill that you have towards somebody, recognizes your what, friendship for that person, right?

[1:03:26] Now the first objection says, hey, these two things, two different powers, right? And you can't know the act of the will unless it was in the what, the intellect. But it's not intellect; it's in the will, right? The first objection, right? Nothing is known by the understanding except it be present in some way in the understanding. But the act of the will is not present in the understanding, right?

[1:03:54] They're diverse powers, huh? But they're very much connected. Thomas says, to the first, therefore it should be said that that reason proceeds as if the understanding and the will, just as they are diverse what powers, right? So also they differ in what subject, huh? For thus what is in the will would be absent from the understanding, huh? But now since both are rooted in the one substance of the soul, and one is in a way a beginning of the other, huh?

[1:04:30] Because it's the good as understood that is willed, huh? Just as it's the good as sense that is what rouses our feelings, right? So they're rooted in one substance of the soul, and one of these is in a way the beginning of the other. Consequently, what is in the will is also in a way in the what, understanding, huh? So in a sense they're members of each other of each other, right?

[1:05:11] And not only are they rooted in the soul, but in that what part of the soul which arises above what matter, right? That part of the soul that is not what, immersed in matter. Okay.

[1:05:30] Interesting the word that Thomas uses there, right? You know he speaks of the the soul of an even of a dog, let alone the soul of a plant, as being immersed in matter, right? It's like thinking of what the water, right, huh? And something immersed in the water is entirely under the water, right? Okay. But then there's something else that is what, floating in the water and partially immersed, so part of it rises above the water, right?

[1:06:03] And this is the way our soul is in the body, right? It's not entirely immersed in the body. Now how do we know that, huh? Because it has acts like understanding and willing that are not in the body, so that shows that the soul is not entirely immersed in the body. So we're kind. of A strange creature to come right down to that way,

[1:06:26] quite different from the dog and from the what angel, right? Because the soul of the dog is entirely immersed in matter. It has no operation except in the body and through the body. And the angel is what entirely separate from matter, right? But our soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools, huh? But not every power that it has is in a bodily organ, huh?

[1:06:57] So we say the soul is not entirely what immersed in matter. huh Borrow that word from the the ocean right? Okay. In other words, what happens is that the body shares in the existence of the soul, and the soul doesn't have existence just in the body. And the soul and the body doesn't share entirely in the existence of the soul. And therefore, the soul has some operation that rises above the body.

[1:07:30] We're a very strange creature. Shakespeare says somewhere we're all bastards, you see. But in a sense, we are kind of what you know, half angelic-like and half beast-like, huh? Kind of strange creatures we are. But as Democritus says, we're a little cosmos, huh? A microcosm, the material world and the immaterial world. But when they talk about the suitability of of the word becoming human, right, rather than angel, huh?

[1:08:09] Part of this suitability is that man is what a little cosmos, right? So God is taking back as we're the whole of creation, both material and immaterial. He takes on human nature.

[1:08:27] So that's what he said for us, even though bias is right in saying we're most most men are bad. In in a sense, this is why you know the American principle that you have to divide power, right? It's based on the idea that most men are what bad, huh? When Aristotle's talking about the emotion of fear there in the rhetoric, right? And what is to be feared?

[1:09:04] And he says, among other things to be feared, is to be in the power of another man. For as a rule, he says, men do bad whenever they can. So apparently, Aristotle agrees with bias of Bias of Priene. You know, who appears on the list of the seven wise men of Greece? Said, know thyself, nothing too much.

[1:09:31] Yeah, a very important proposition. You kind of talk about government, right, as well as ethics.