De Anima (On the Soul)
155. Aquinas, Summa I Q88 a1: Can we know the angels in this life? Plato, Averroes, and names made equivocal by reason
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/4-de-anima/155-aquinas-summa-i-q88-a1-can-we-know-the-angels-in-this-life/

[0:00] here the way he starts with the angels rather than God, right? And goes up to God. So I think we can know the angels, huh? We'll have to wait until next week to find out. Okay. In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly.

[0:34] Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us, and help us to understand all that you've written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. We're up to question 88 there, I think we looked at the objections last time, We'll just start with the body of the article then, We'll see the objections again when we come back to the replies.

[1:01] I answer. It ought to be said that according to the opinion of Plato, the immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but they are the first things understood by us. For Plato laid down that there were immaterial forms subsisting, which he called the forms. Huh?

[1:28] He laid them down to be the what proper object of our understanding, and thus what is first and through itself understood by us. But the knowledge of the soul is applied to material things, according as imagination and sense are mixed up with the understanding. Whence the more the understanding was what purified, huh? The more it would perceive the what truth about what immaterial things. If you read Plato in the Republic, right?

[2:08] He speaks of our soul as being kind of turned towards material things, and then when you study mathematical things, which are kind of immaterial but not completely so, it's like turning the soul in what to the side, right? And then you turn all the way around, finally, and look in the other direction towards the immaterial world. Why for Aristotle it's not like by turning away from the material world and therefore looking at the immaterial world,

[2:40] but it's through the material world that you reason your way into the what immaterial world. Okay. But you can see why Plato would be appreciated by the church fathers and so on, because they were concerned with the supernatural knowledge of God, huh? And therefore, you know, you read about the Dark Night of the Soul, and to use the words of Saint John the Cross and so on.

[3:10] There is a kind of what turning away from the sensible world, right? But that's to get a supernatural knowledge through God's enlightening mind. But naturally speaking, we don't come to know the material world, except or the immaterial world rather, except through the material world. Okay.

[3:31] But according to the position of Aristotle, which we more experience, he says, our understanding, according to the status of the present life, has a natural relation to the natures of material things. Hence, it understands nothing except by turning itself to the what images, right? And that's why we interfere with the brain by what alcohol or by drugs or by even just being tired, right? And then these other ailments, you know, like what is it President Reagan has?

[4:14] Alzheimer's. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I know somebody in the parish who has that, you know, and he's starting to. He doesn't really know people so well now. he comes to church, right, like you know, he's seen me for thirty years, but he doesn't really we know who I am, you know. He's friendly, but doesn't you know? And so you can see that kind of relation to the to the to the brain, right?

[4:37] The brain is not the organ of thought, but the object of thought is there in some way, right? Because the what it is is something you imagine, and so when the imagination of the brain is affected by whatever it may be, disease or or by these drugs or whatever it may be, then that interferes with thinking, right? Okay. So, when Aristotle speaks of the our reason's own object in the De Anima.

[5:03] He says it's the what it is of a thing sensed or imagined, right? The what it is of a natural thing or a mathematical thing, huh? And we don't know the material thing, immaterial things, except by reasoning from those things and by negating, you know, the materiality of them when we talk about the separated substances.

[5:26] Okay. And thus it is manifest that the immaterial substances, which do not come under the sense and the imagination, first through themselves, according to the way that we experience of knowing, are not able to be understood by us. But nevertheless, Averroes, in his commentary in the third book on the De Anima, says that in the end, in this life, a man is able to arrive at this point that he understands the separated substances.

[6:06] Through a continuation and union of a certain separated substance to us. Which he calls the agent intellect. It's a strange opinion, huh? That the agent intellect was not a power of our soul, but there was a separated substance, like an angel, that was illuminating us, huh?

[6:27] Which, since it is a separated substance, naturally understands separated substances, huh? Whence, when it was perfectly united to us, so that through it we are perfectly able to understand, then we'd understand also us the separated substances, just as now through the possible understanding united to us we understand material things, huh? Now he laid down that the active understanding is thus united to us in this way.

[6:59] For since we understand through the agent intellect and through the understandable things looked upon, as is clear when we understand conclusions through beginnings understood, it is necessary that the agent intellect be compared to the things understood and looked upon, either as the chief agent is to the tools, or as form is to matter, right? In a sense, you could say that, right? Even about agent intellect, huh?

[7:31] Just like the chief tool lighting our mind, huh? And the other things are like its tools, huh? For in these two ways, some action is attributed to two beginnings: to the chief agent and to the instrument, huh? Just as the cutting of the wood, right, is attributed to the artist himself and to the saw, I guess that is, right? Ah, but to the form and to the subject, as heating is to what heat and fire.

[8:07] But in both ways, the agent intellect is compared to understandables looked upon as perfection to the perfectable, and as act to ability. But at the same time, I received in something a perfection,

[8:27] and is perfection, huh? The perfect and is perfection, as the visible in act and the light in the pupil of the eye, huh? At the same time, I receive color and light, which makes the color actually visible, right? So at the same time, I receive the understandable and receiving what makes it what understandable, okay?

[8:53] Thus, at the same time, in the possible understanding, I receive the things understood and the acting upon understanding. And the more we receive the things understood, the more we approach to this that the agent intellect is perfectly united to us. Thus, that when all things understandable are known, the agent intellect will be perfectly united to us, and we will be able through it to understand what both material things and immaterial things.

[9:28] And in this, he laid down the last happiness of man. Right, Thomas said in the Summa Contra Gentiles. Right, when he shows that man's true happiness, right, is not to be found in this life, but only in the next life. Right, But he talks about Averroes and people like that. Right, We're straining, you know, to give us a knowledge more than our merely what natural knowledge. Right, and although they make mistakes as to how that is, they have some inclination to the truth.

[10:02] Right, that it's something more than this natural knowledge we have. And of course, the beatific vision is is not our natural knowledge. Right, supernatural knowledge.

[10:18] Nor does it make any Difference as far as pertains to proposal, whether in that state of happiness the possible understanding understands separated substances through the acting upon understanding as he himself thinks, or as he attributes to Alexander, right, that the possible understanding never understands separated substances on account of this that he laid down that the possible understanding was corruptible, but that man understands the separated substances through the acting upon understanding.

[10:59] Now, all this cannot stand, he says. Thomas says, huh? Okay. First, because if the acting upon or the active understanding, the agent understanding, is a separated substance, it is impossible that through it, as by a form, we understand, because that by which, as a form, an agent acts, is the form and act of that agent, huh? Since every agent acts in so far as it is an act, just as also has been said above about the possible understanding.

[11:41] So it cannot be the that a substance separated from me is that by which I formally understand. Does make sense, huh? It has to be by some form within me, by which I understand, right? Do you see that? No, because I mean, he has. How can I understand something by your understanding? See? if your understanding is not my understanding, right, my ability to understand, but it's your ability to understand, how can I understand something through your ability to understand?

[12:22] I can only understand something through my own ability to understand. So the ability to understand to this separated substance, my guardian angel, wherever he is, right? His ability to understand cannot be my ability to understand, can it? No. So how can I be said to understand something by my guardian angel's understanding of something? I've got to understand something by an ability to understand within me, right? Make sense?

[12:55] How can I see him by your eyes? Huh? I've got to see him by an ability to see within me, right? I must hear you by an ability to hear within me, right? I can't hear him by an ability to hear within you, can I? As Thomas is saying there, right? Huh?

[13:21] Moreover, because according to the foresaid mode, the act of understanding, if it is a separated substance, is not united to us by its own substance, but only its what light, according as it is partaken in the things looked upon, and not as regards the other actions of the what acting upon understanding, so that we are able through it to understand separated substances. Just as when we see colors illuminated by the sun, there is not united to us the substance of the sun, so we are able to do the actions of the sun, right?

[14:06] But there is only united to us the light of the sun for the vision of what colors, right? Okay. Third, because given that in the fore said way, the substance of the agent intellect was united to us, nevertheless they do not lay down that the active understanding is wholly united to us according to one thing understood or two, but according to all things understood, huh? Okay, you've got to have all these things you are able to naturally understand before you are going to be united with the agent intellect, huh?

[14:47] But all things looked upon and understood fall short of the power of the active understanding, because it is much more, much greater, right, to understand separated substances than to understand all material things. Whence it is manifest that even having understood all material things, the agent intellect would not be united to us, so that through it we would be able to understand what separated substances. There'd still be a distance there, right?

[15:22] Fourth, because to understand all material things hardly happens to anyone in this world, and thus no one or very few would arrive at happiness, which is against the philosopher in the

[15:39] in the first book of the ethics, who says that happiness is a common good, right, to which all can arrive who are not deficient as far as virtue are concerned. But is against reason that the end or the purpose of some species be achieved rarely, right? Ut in potioribus, right? By those things which are contained under that species.

[16:08] And fifth, because the philosopher himself says expressly in the first book of the ethics. That happiness is operation according to perfect virtue. And having enumerated all the virtues in the tenth book, he concludes that the final happiness of man consists in a knowledge of the things that are most understandable, according to the what virtue of wisdom, right? Which he laid down in the sixth book of the ethics to be the head of all the speculative sciences.

[16:44] Once it is clear that Aristotle lays down that the last happiness of man is in the knowledge of the separate substances, such as can be had through speculative sciences, and not through a continuation of the agent intellect

[17:06] feigned by some people, right? Confictor, right? Where did we get the word fiction, right? Something made up, right? Is it made up by some people, right? So wisdom is a what episteme? It's a reasoned out understanding. It's the highest reasoned understanding, but it's not a continuation to the agent intellect, according to Aristotle.

[17:36] Moreover, it has been shown above, because above has been shown that the acting upon understanding is not a separated substance, huh? But a certain power of the soul to which actively it extends itself to those things to which the possible understanding is receptive, right? Okay. Because, as is said in the third book, the possible understanding is by which one can become all things. The acting upon understanding by which all things can be made.

[18:13] Okay. So both understandings extend themselves according to the status of the present life to material things only, huh? Which the acting upon understanding makes understandable and act, and they are received in the possible understanding. Whence, according to the status of the present life, neither by the possible understanding nor by the acting upon understanding are we able to understand immaterial substances by themselves. Okay.

[18:49] If you understand them at all, it's only through material things, right? Which is to understand them as our causes and by way of negation, right? And they excel these things, but what they are in themselves, we don't know, right? Okay. Let's look at the objections now, huh?

[19:09] First objection is from Augustine there in the ninth book of the Trinity that our our mind, just as it what gathers knowledge of bodily things through the senses of the body, so it gains what through itself a knowledge of what immaterial things, which would mean, of course, the immaterial substances. Okay, now there's a lot of truth to what Augustine is saying there, right? That the knowledge of the soul, and especially a knowledge of the understanding soul, and the way the understanding soul rises above matter, right, and the immateriality of the understanding and the will and so on, that's the gateway to the understanding of the angels and of God, so far as we can, right?

[19:54] Okay, but does our knowledge of our own understanding soul enable us to know exactly what the angels are, or to know that they are also immaterial and they also understand and they also will, right? The same thing we know about God, right? You know, but they understand and will in a way superior to our way of understanding, okay? Like the old teacher Kasurik would say, "the guardian angel watching you make a decision.

[20:26] is like you watching an angleworm, right? Decide what to do. Okay. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that from that authority of Augustine can be had that that which our mind is able to get of the knowledge of incorporeal or bodyless things, right? It is able to know through itself, right?

[21:03] And this is so true, he says, that even among the philosophers, it is said that a knowledge about the soul is a beginning to knowing the what separated or immaterial substances. For through this, that our understanding knows itself, it arises at having some knowledge about the what incorporeal or bodyless substances, such as it is able to have. Not that simply and perfectly it knows them by knowing itself, right?

[21:38] In some imperfect way, in other words, it knows the angels and even God by knowing its own what rising above matter and it's having certain powers that are not bodily, right? Okay, but that this would be even more true of the angels, right? That they're more independent of matter than we are, right? And their understanding is even more perfect, right? Okay.

[22:06] So you know when Aristotle talks about how a knowledge of the soul is so wonderful, right? Because it's what the best thing in the material world, the soul, right? And therefore, the knowledge of the soul is kind of the best knowledge about natural philosophy. But also, it's useful for knowing other things, right? And it's useful for ethics, right? Because the virtues you state in ethics are in different parts of the soul, and it's useful for for logic because logic is directing one of the powers of the soul.

[22:38] But then it's useful for what the kind of knowledge we can have of the angels and of what of God, right? Okay. We have to understand our own understanding and our own will to realize what we can about God or the angels having an understanding and a will, right? But then we have to what negate the imperfection of our understanding and will. Thomas is always quoting Isaac, you know, who says we have a intellectus abumbratus, an overshadowed understanding, huh?

[23:16] And we don't understand very much, right? And most of what we try to understand, we have to reason out, huh? And that's why when Shakespeare defines reason, he defines it as ability for a large discourse, looking before and after. Well, looking means trying to understand, right? So you have to make an effort to understand. Why the angels, when they understand, they understand everything they naturally understand right away.

[23:44] Like you had all the arts and sciences already in you when you were born, right? I told you that by little, my son Marcus, and he's little, you know. Why can't we be born doing everything, you know? Have to go to study and go to school, right? I said you ought to be an angel. I said. But we're our mind in the beginning, as Aristotle says in the third book about the soul, is like a tablet which nothing is written.

[24:08] And you gradually start to write upon that as you gain experience and think about things. But the angelic understanding is filled with forms, right away So it can understand everything it naturally understands and everybody wants to. It's a nice way to be, right?

[24:30] Saves time. But I mean, you get a little hint of that. I know, even as a professor, there's certain things you know that I've taught over and over again, you know, and whenever I want to think about them, I can think about them, you know, and I understand them right away, you know. You see, but that's where the angel is in regard to everything that you can understand, huh?

[24:47] You see. So it's kind of it's kind of pleasant, you know, to to habitually understand, you know, things, huh? But the angel, you know, he habitually understands everything he's able to understand. But we, it takes a long time to acquire the habit of geometry and so on, huh? And even you know, you know, you talk to people who read maybe Euclid one time in their academic life; they've gone to a great book school or something like Thomas Aquinas or you know Saint John, something like that.

[25:26] But you know, five, six, ten years down, the thing they kind of forgot in the order, you know. Huh? You ask them, you know, about how do you prove that, and they kind of mixed up, you know, about how it's done, you know. And I find myself, you know, I have to go back and and reread Euclid from time to time, and then oh yeah, that's that's kind of marvelous what he proves this or that, right?

[25:46] You know, I was looking back at the at the fundamental theorem about parallel lines, right? What's the fundamental theorem about parallel lines? Do you remember what that was in there? Was kind of kind of a marvelous theorem, huh?

[26:06] It says for. It says when a straight line falls upon parallel lines, it makes the alternate angles what equal, okay? Now, once you can see that these two angles are equal, then it's easy to show that this angle is also equal to that angle down there, because of the what? These two angles equal. And then, if this angle is equal to that angle down there, then that these two here will be what?

[26:39] Equal to right angles, because these are equal to right angles. This is equal to that, right? But this is a fundamental theorem, right? Now, how does he how do you prove that? How do you prove that? If these two lines are parallel, how do you prove that this line that falls upon them makes every angle equal? huh

[26:59] I don't remember Yeah. No, we put that. We did that. I mean, it just is this earlier theorem in geometry where if you extend the side of a triangle, right, the interior angle is what? Greater than right? Either of the interior opposite angles, huh? Okay. Maybe we'll put that.

[27:39] So, I mean, the point is, if you don't think about things these things for a while, they almost seem to what? Disappear, right? And you don't have them an habitual way anymore, and so we're an intellectus abumbratus, an overshadowed understanding, huh? Of course, you know it's under the images, right? Yeah.

[28:08] Yeah, yeah, not not not the Isaac of the Old Testament, but but I think he's a writer in in Spain, I think. Really, but he's quoted with some authority, you know. Yeah. But

[28:25] you see, Latin when he had the word intellectus, it's one of these words where it's said of the human understanding and of the angelic understanding, right?

[28:52] But I've explained this before, I think. Sometimes a name which is said of two things, right, with the same meaning here, intellectus here means the ability to understand, right? But sometimes that name which is said of two things with the same meaning is kept by one of those two things as its own, and a new name is given to the other, right? And there's two ways that takes place, right?

[29:27] But one of those ways is when one of the things has completely and perfectly what is meant by the what common name, right? And the other has what defectively, right? And therefore it gets a what new name, right? So sometimes we say that ratio is intellectus, right? And sometimes we distinguish ratio and intellectus because the angel is able to understand. anytime he wants to. anything he naturally understands.

[30:07] Right. Most of what we naturally understand. We never do come to understand, do we? And a few things we do, things like like geometry, which is the simplest, you know, things for us to understand. We have to constantly go. Back over it because otherwise it escapes from us, right? So we hardly understand, right? And so we get this this other name here, the ratio Okay, that's a very common a very common way of naming things.

[30:43] A very common way that you have a name equivocal, by reason. The other way is like when you have animals. I would say, animals said of what?

[31:00] Man and the beast. Well, the beast adds nothing significant to the idea of animal. So sometimes then it keeps the name animal, right? But man adds something significant, understanding and reason and so on, gets a new name, right? So in one sense man is an animal. In another sense man is what? Divided against the animals, right? I always you know tell the story of how my mother didn't like me saying that man is an animal.

[31:31] I said, well, mother, I don't mean he's just an animal. Well, that's better, she said. You see, but this is just an animal, right? We're not just an animal. So we get we get a new name, right? Okay. So this is two different ways, huh? Two different ways. We one of the two things in which a name is said with the same meaning in mind, right? Is kept by one of the two, right?

[31:58] And the other gets a new name, right? See, it's like you know if you say, "What is a boy? Is a boy a man or a woman? "

[32:08] Which is it? A man. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But then you might Distinguish between the man and the what? Boy, right? And then the boy is is like what? This way of speaking up here, where the boy has imperfectly what a man is, right? And the same with the girl having pretty what a woman is, huh? Okay. So those are two very common things, huh? When Aristotle was talking to categories, right?

[32:47] He says disposition is divided into disposition and habit. Now habit is a firm disposition, one not easily lost, right? But disposition easily lost keeps the common name, and habit gets a new name because it adds something noteworthy. You're not just disposed in some way, but you have it is a firmness there, right? Huh? See. What we call mood, right? And I was going to say, you know, he's in a bad mood today.

[33:27] Don't disturb the boss. He's in a bad mood. But a mood is something that what can can pass in you know an hour or two, right? You know, okay. Because it's easily lost, right? I'm in a sad mood or an angry mood or whatever mood might be that I'm in today, right? But the habit is something what firm and solid, right? So this is the same way of speaking here as this one here.

[33:58] This one here, okay? Or you see the same thing with plant, right? You know, we might keep the word plant for the little things, and then the tree is not a plant. See? So if you go to the go to the the nursery where they sell plants, and you want to buy a tree, they wouldn't say you're going to buy a plant, would they?

[34:27] I'm looking for a plant for my aunt, you know. That's the little thing, right? But a tree is not a plant, then, right? But in another sense, a tree, of course, is a plant, huh? Do you see the idea? But because the tree is the most magnificent of all plants, and it towers above them, right? Sometimes it gets a new name, and the little little tiny things, insignificant ones, so to speak, keep the common name, right?

[34:54] So you see that again and again, right? You know, you know the people are always talking about you shouldn't treat the girl like a thing, treat her like a person, right? Okay.

[35:06] But in some sense of the word thing, a person is a thing, right? Otherwise, you have to say a person is nothing, right? You see? So when you divide person against thing, it's it's it's this way of naming things, right? You see? And you find it again and again. That's a very common way in which a name becomes equivocal by reason, right? But these you have two different ways here, right?

[35:32] Where the common name is kept by one of the particulars as its own, right? And then the other thing gets a new name, right? But sometimes, like on the intellectus, because one of them alone has fully what is meant by the common name, right? And the other has defectively, right? And therefore, the defective one gets the or imperfect one gets the new name, right? Okay. So Aristotle sometimes, you know, will call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the argument called example a rhetorical induction, right?

[36:18] But then sometimes you distinguish syllogism against enthymeme, induction against the argument by example. This is a very common, very common way of speaking. How many fingers do I have? Four. Say we usually hold it like this, or, they'll say five, right? Then I say like this, they'll say what? Four. Four fingers and a thumb. So notice, huh? These four keep the common name, and this one here gets say what?

[36:54] A new name because it's something that has that makes it stand out from the other ones, right? You see what I mean? So you might say I have four fingers and a thumb. We see that sometimes, right? Other times you say we got five fingers, right? So the thumb is and is not a finger, right? Obviously the word "finger" is being used in two different senses there, right?

[37:17] Do you see? This is probably the best example because it's very sensible, right? So you'll find that again and and again, huh? Now, sometimes is sensing knowing, or would you say?

[37:43] Yeah, in some sense it is, but sometimes people want to distinguish between sensing and knowing, right? Because sensing is a kind of what? Imperfect knowing, right? And then when we stir, we you know restrict the word knowing there to the one that has the more fuller, fuller fuller way. Okay.

[38:09] Um. What about love and like, huh? If I love something, do I like it? Yeah, but sometimes you know, I remember my daughter saying, "I don't like this, I love it." So sometimes we say liking, loving is is a form of liking, right? Love is a strong, right, liking, right? But then sometimes we use the word like for a weak liking, right? And then for a strong liking, you get a new name which is what?

[38:53] Loving, right? You see, so I could divide liking into loving and liking. Okay. Or it's like it's like what's the word? Thinking, right? You know, I might say, "Do you think that two is half of four? "

[39:17] Yes. Yeah. Okay. But then, in that case, but you know that two is half a four, right? But now you're knowing is is a is a kind of thinking, right? But sometimes we'll say to you, you know, is George Bush going to be reelected? And I say yes. And he said, now you know that, or do you just think that's so? Well, I think it's so. I don't really know it.

[39:40] He said. Well, then thinking is what Kept by what Well, it's uncertain thinking, right? And when you're sure about something, which is noteworthy, right?

[39:59] I'm sure what I think. Then I know. When I'm not sure what I think, then I just think it so. Is it? So you can you can say knowing is a kind of thinking, but it can also divide knowing against thinking.

[40:17] Okay do You see that? But here. it's. Because it's this one over here on the right side, it adds something significant or noteworthy, right, to thinking, which is what being sure, okay. Well, second, we're doing, huh? Sometimes we distinguish doing from making, okay. But making something is doing something too. So why does making get the new name and other activities called keep the what

[40:57] perfection to making? Well, yeah, it's not really the imperfection so much, but the fact that making has a product in addition to the doing, right? So it adds something, right, to the idea of doing, right? So it gets a new name, right? And then activity like listening to Mozart is doing something, but it's not really making, right? Okay.

[41:26] Or thinking through a geometrical theorem is doing something, but it's not really making in our sense. It so that's those are very common ways in which a name becomes equivocal by reason, right? But a name which is said with more or less the same meaning of two things becomes equivocal by reason when it is kept by one of those two things, and a new name is given to the what

[42:02] other, yeah. But there's two ways that takes place, right? Okay. One where one of them adds something noteworthy and significant, huh? And therefore gets a new name, right? The other where one of them has fully and completely or perfectly the common meaning, and the other has deficiently, right? And therefore the deficient one gets a new name, and the other keeps the name, right? Okay. But the one that's relevant to the text here is that understanding and the ability to understand, instead of the human understanding and the angelic understanding, right?

[42:39] But because it's so defective in us, then we are said to be what to have a reason rather than understanding, right? Okay. Although in another sense, you could say reason is an ability to understand, right?

[42:59] Okay. So you'll find this again and again, huh? This way of naming very, very common, very common. These are all distinguished from words equivocal by chance, correct? Yeah, yeah, but there's also another kind of way in which a name becomes equivocal by reason. And that is by being carried over from one thing to another, right? Okay. And a number of ways that takes place too, but okay.

[43:40] Like healthy is said of your body, let's say, right? And then healthy is said of your exercise or your diet or your complexion, right? But it's it's a reason of a relation to the health of your body, right? Because your exercise, or your diet preserves or maintains your health, or your complexion is said to be healthy because it's a sign of your health, right? Okay. So, I think that there are two ways that a name becomes equivocal by reason, right?

[44:10] Sometimes, when it's said of just one thing, right? And then it's carried over to some other thing, right? A reason that thing having some connection with the first one or a likeness to the first one, right? The other way is when a name is actually said of two things, right? With somewhat the same meaning, but then these two ways you got from the board here, it's kept by one of them as its own name, and then you get a new name for the other, right?

[44:39] You see. So these are very, very important, very important things. Okay.