Ethics
3. The Good, the Better, and the Three Kinds of Human Goods
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/5-ethics/003-the-good-the-better-and-the-three-kinds-of-human-goods/

[0:00] Spirit. And first, the first Boston player last night gets up, you know, this guy at the bat, you know, top of the first, hits a home run. The first guy. I think you just discouraged and said, "Louis, they just came up, you know." So they've won four games in a row, then. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Just like four games, you know, coming back against the Yankees. I thought you said St.

[0:26] Louis was no one. I'm surprised they're in there. Because they've had the most wins of any team in the league during the regular season. St. Louis doesn't say much about the National League this year. Yeah. Wow. Well, they must be so good. Remember, as a kid growing up, I'd always bet with my brother Marcus. You know, in the All-Star game, I'd bet the American League, and he'd bet the National League.

[0:47] He always won for some reason. I got the impression National League was better than American League. I was just attached to American League, so I would vote for them. But but he was smart guy. He always voted for the National League. Okay. Now you say a chain is no stronger than its what? Weakest link. Yeah, yeah. So you have to understand good well. And continuing to understand it well, to understand better, right?

[1:17] Okay. So let's just review a little bit. We said about the good last time, huh? And we began by asking a American boy, right? What's good, right? And what do we get as an answer to that? Any examples? Yeah, candy's good, pizza's good, baseball's good, etc. And then Socrates would say, well, okay, all these things are good. What do they all have in common? Or why do you call them good?

[1:51] Are they all sweet like the candy? No. Are they all things you can ride like a bicycle? No. See. And perhaps the little boy could only say, well, these are all the things I want, huh? And so that suggests a first definition of good, which is the good is what all want, right? The good is what all desire, huh?

[2:17] And then Socrates could ask the kind of question that he asked Euthyphro, a question of before and after in a sense of cause and effect, right? Is it good because you want it, or do you want it because it's good, right? Does your wanting it make it to be good, or does the goodness in the thing itself excite or arouse desire and wanting in you for it?

[2:49] And you can begin to investigate that question by saying, well, what can be said on one side or against one side and the other side? And perhaps the most obvious objection to saying that it's good because you want it, the most obvious objection to saying that the wanting is what makes. it good,right? Is the experience everybody has that they wanted something in life that not others, but they themselves admit later on was bad for them, like that person who says he wants one more drink, right?

[3:32] Later on, himself says, "I shouldn't have had that last drink, right? That was no good for me." On the other hand, if you take the other side and say, "Well, the goodness of the object is the cause of desire in us; our desire, our wanting, is an effect of the goodness in it." Do people always want what's good for them? Parents will tell you the kids don't always want what's good for them, right?

[4:06] Um. And furthermore, you could argue that, as the first objection makes use of, sometimes people do in fact want something bad for them, and since good and bad are contraries, if good is, as you say, the cause of wanting, then the contrary of good should be the cause of not wanting, but of turning away. So how is it that people can sometimes want something that is bad for them, right?

[4:44] Contrary effects of contrary causes and vice versa. Contrary causes we expect to have contrary effects. Then we begin to try to answer this question by the kind of argument that's more familiar with us, more proportioned to us. We try to answer this by a what induction, right? Rather than by syllogism, and so we made a list of the fundamental goods, most of which we share with the other animals, like food and

[5:27] water and reproduction and sleep, et cetera, et cetera, right? And the desires for these, some of which have a name, like hunger, thirst, some do not.

[5:41] And then we asked in each one of these particular goods and the desire for it. Well, is it hunger that makes food good for a man or for the dog? No. You can see that food is good and necessary for the man or the dog apart from his hunger for it. So did nature give us hunger for food to make food something good for us? No, but because it's good for us and necessary for us.

[6:14] And for the other animals, for that matter too, nature has given all of us an inborn desire for food, and you see that desire stronger when you need food more. Okay. But even when a person is sick and has temporarily lost appetite, they see the need to what eat something.

[6:35] So we went through the various particular goods, right, and the desires for them, and it seemed that the desire didn't make the object good, huh? But we could see that the object was good apart from the desire, and so therefore the desire is not the cause of the object being good, but its being good is why there is that desire for it. And therefore, we answer the question of Socrates: Is it good because we want it, or do we want it because it is good?

[7:12] And the answer by induction, or induced by induction, an argument from many particulars to something general, is that it's wanted because it is good. The good is the cause of desire, right? And so you recognize that this first definition of good

[7:34] is by what is more known to us, namely from the effect of the good. Okay. Now, if our induction is good argument, and if the conclusion we reached is true, how would you handle these objections on the other side, right? The objection that says, "Well, if good is the cause of desire, how can you have the good and not desire? How can you have something being good for you and you don't want it?

[8:08] How can there be the cause without its effect?"Or how is it that the contrary of good is sometimes wanted, like the bad? Well, here we have to use our reason and look before and after, like we did in our study of love with Thomas Aquinas. If you go back to the first two causes of love, the primary cause was good, but then in the second article on causes, Thomas said that knowledge is in some way a cause of desire or love too, and in a way for the same reason the good is.

[8:48] That is to say that it's the good as known in some way that is wanted or desired. Okay, you follow that? Okay. Now, sometimes the senses or reason are ignorant of something, right? I don't know what caviar tastes like. I've never eaten caviar. You see? Okay.

[9:19] So, if Romeo had never seen Juliet, would he want her? If he'd never even heard of her, you see? Okay. So that would explain why it is that something can be good and not wanted, because good is not the whole truth about the cause of what desire. It's the good as known in some way, right?

[9:50] Now the other objection said, "How is it that the bad then is sometimes desired, right? " Well, again, the senses and reason can be deceived by the likeness

[10:09] that there is sometimes between the good and the bad. I gave the example of the people eating the poisonous mushrooms because they resemble the good ones, right? So, at the original cause of their wanting to eat the poisonous mushrooms is the good mushrooms, right? But they were deceived as by the likeness of the bad to the good, right?

[10:37] Or it may be that the senses and reason see something good in the object, like in a delicious, smelling and tasting poisonous drink, right? Reason and the senses can be incomplete in their knowledge, right? So I'm drawn to the delicious poison not because it's poisonous. I know nothing about that. I'm drawn to it because it. Smells or tastes, good, huh? You see the idea?

[11:23] Of course, the fact that the good acts upon desire through knowledge, and again, kind of confirms the idea that the good is the cause of desire, rather than desire of the good, right? Because if desire was going to cause the good, it had to do so through knowledge, right? Because that's laughable to say that knowledge, what, as such, affects the thing being known.

[11:49] I see that piece of paper there. Is that affected by my seeing it, piece of paper? To change and transform by my seeing it? No. I might be changed by seeing something, right?

[12:02] Something might act upon my heart through my senses or through my reason. But my heart doesn't act upon things through my eyes or through my reason. Okay.

[12:19] So by induction, then, we drew the conclusion that something is not good because we want it, but we want it because it is good. That therefore, this is a definition by effect, which is not strange because effects are more known to us than causes, for the most part. So every time we ask the question "why," we know the effect but not the what cause.

[12:51] That's a sign that the effect is usually more known to us than the cause. And that's because our knowledge starts with our senses. So it's more known to the senses that the leaves change their color every fall, right? Then why they change the color, right? It's more known to us that. The sun comes up every day, right? Then whether the sun itself is moving around the earth or the earth is turning on its axis, right?

[13:24] Yeah. And so men will agree more about the effect than the cause. We agree with the ancients that there's day and night, don't we? Yeah. We might disagree as to whether the cause of it is the sun going around the earth, being pulled by somebody, or whether the earth is turning on its axis, right? But the fact that we disagree about the cause of day and night, but agree about the fact of day and night, the fact that we agree about the effect, and disagree about the cause, is a sign that the effect is more known to us than the cause.

[14:02] And that's why the first definition of good is a definition of good by its effect. The good is what all desire, or the good is what all want. Want and desire, there are synonyms, right? But want is more the native English word. Desire is a Latin word, okay? So any question about that? Okay.

[14:33] Now we're going to later on in our deeper study of the good get further confirmation that our conclusion by induction was correct, right? Okay. Let's go now to the second thing we want to talk about. We want to talk about gooder, more good. Okay. But in English we say what? Better, right? Okay.

[15:06] Now can you understand better if you don't understand good? Okay. And let's raise little questions here about better. Is something better for you because you want it more?

[15:36] Now could you reason from what we learned about the good to answer this question? Is something better for you because you want it more? Possibly, but no. Well, stop and think, huh? We asked the question about the good. Is something good because you want it? Okay. We said no, that's not true. So, if something is not good

[16:19] because you want it, then could it be more good because you want it more? Yeah. So, if something is not good because you want it, then it is not more good,

[16:46] better, because you want it more. Now, notice, that's an if-then statement. Okay. Now, in logic, an if-then statement is a compound statement, and it involves putting together usually two simple statements, right? And in the if-then, or sometimes they call the hypothetical or the conditional statement, right? You're putting together two simple statements with if and then, right? Okay.

[17:37] Now, does the truth of an if-then statement depend upon the truth of the simple statements it's made out of, or could you make a a true if-then statement out of two false simple statements? Yeah. Example:

[18:01] If I am a dog, then I am a four-footed animal, true or false? True. Yeah. Even though it's false, I am a dog. Right, and it's false that I am a what Four footed animal yeah, yeah. Now, how about this statement here? If I am a man, then I am white.

[18:29] That's false, right? Even though it's true I am a man, and it's true I am white, right? So I can make a false if-then statement out of two true simple statements: I am a man, I am white. Okay, and I can make a true if-then statement out of what two false simple statements? If Socrates is a mother, then Socrates is a woman. That's true. Even though it's false the simple statement, Socrates is a mother, and the simple statement, Socrates is a what woman, right?

[19:19] Do you see? So, what does truth and falsity mean in this statement? It doesn't mean that the simple statements put together are true or false, right? What does it depend upon?

[19:39] The relation between them. Yeah. Non contradictory. Well, it's relation between these two, but what does relation have to be? You take the simple statement in the if part, which comes first, so they call the antecedent sometimes, right? And the simple statement in the then part, which comes after, so they call the consequent. What's got to be the relation between the antecedent and the consequent in order for this to be true, the if-then statement?

[20:12] The consequent necessarily follows. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And also, if I say this about Socrates: if Socrates is a father, right, which he in fact is, then Socrates is a man.

[20:35] I think, five okay. but i turn around and said, if socrates is a father, is a man, then he is a father. See, it doesn't follow, right? See.

[20:50] If this is the number two, then this number is less than ten. True. But vice versa, if this number is less than ten, then this number is two. See, doesn't follow, does it? Do you see it? So, for an if-then statement to be true.

[21:13] The consequent has to follow necessarily from the antecedent, but you're not saying that in fact either one is true, right? Say, if I am the number two, then I'm half a four, right? I'm not saying that in fact I'm the number two. I'm not saying that I'm in fact half a four. I'm saying that if I am two, then I am half a four. Do you see that?

[21:42] Get the idea what the if-then statement is? Okay. That's why when we want to reason from an if-then statement to the way things are, we have to add the if-then statement

[21:58] a simple statement that we know to be so. Now, if this if-then statement is true, and then you add that in fact, but this is something we showed last class, reviewed already today, right? But in fact, something is not good

[22:27] because you want it. Now, in the second statement here, I'm saying as a matter of fact, right? It's the way things are. Something is not good because you want it, right? So, if that consequent follows necessarily from the antecedent, and the antecedent is in fact so, then you have to admit the consequent, right?

[22:56] Sometimes you'll see them represent the two statements by A and B, right? And you're saying that statement A is so, then statement B is so, but you're not saying either one is in fact so. Now, if you add to that, that in fact A is so. Then you're forced to say what? B is so, right? Yeah.

[23:23] If I am a man, then I am an animal. Does that follow? Yes. Yeah. But I am a man. In fact, right? Therefore, I am what? Yeah. Okay. You see that? Okay. Now, this premise down here, the second premise, we saw last time, right? And we reviewed it again in this class. But now, let's manifest this first one a little bit here, right? Okay.

[24:00] Let's take something a little more sensible here to get the idea. Is something sweet? Would you say because it's white? No. You admit that something's not sweet because it's white, is it? The reason why something is sweet is that it's white. No. Okay. Okay. Now, once you admit that something is not sweet because it's white, then is it going to be sweeter because it's whiter? Sure. No.

[24:34] See? So you see the argument here, right? If something is not sweet because it's white, then it's not sweeter because it's what? Whiter. You see the way it follows, right? And so, if in fact you admit that something is not white because it's or not sweet because it's white, then you're going to be forced to say it's not sweeter because it's whiter. You see that? Okay.

[25:06] Now, do a little bit of logic here, right? There's another way you can reason from an if-then statement, right? You might say, if B is so, C is so, and if C is not so,

[25:31] in fact, then what about B? B is not so. B is not so, right? You see that? Because if B, let's take let's use the same letters for now, and make it easier. If A is so, B is so, B is not so. Then I say you're forced to say A is not so because if A had been so, then B would have been so, right? But you're given that B is not so, right?

[26:04] So you're forced to say that A is not so. Now. I want to argue using this way here too. I could say, just take our kind of example again. Is something if you say you numbskulls, if you say something is sweeter because it's whiter, then you're going to be forced to say that something is sweet because it's what white, right? But that ain't so, is it? Something isn't sweet because it's white, right?

[26:43] Therefore, it is not sweeter because it's what white here. You see that? I could argue that way too, right? Okay. And so I say to you now, you find this in daily life, right? Somebody will say, you know, well, you want more steak and I want more chicken, so steak's better for you and chicken's better for me, right? You see?

[27:07] No, you're saying that it's better for me because I want it more, right? But if something is better for me because I want it more, then something would be good for me because I want it. See? Okay, more of that cause and more of that effect, right? But that isn't so. We learned last time, right? Something is not good because you want it, okay? Yet that would follow if you're saying something is better because you want it more, okay?

[27:41] Do you follow me? Okay. That's important because you get to say the apology of Socrates, right? Socrates will talk about his life, where he has conversations with men, right, and examines what they say, right. But then he says a little later on in the apology that he's been examining his fellow Athenians, especially about All the goods in human life, and which goods are better? And Socrates has been trying to convince his fellow Athenians that the goods of the soul are much better than the goods of the body and these exterior goods that we have.

[28:31] While the Athenians seem to be pursuing the goods of the body and the exterior goods most of all, as if they were the greatest goods in life. Now, someone might come along and say, "Well, Socrates, if you love the goods of the soul more, they're better for you. But we love the goods of the body and exterior goods more, so they're better for us, right? " In that case you're saying something is better for Socrates because he wants it more, right?

[29:04] And these other things are better for the Athenians because they want it more, right? A lot of times, people in daily life speak this way, don't they? You see,

[29:15] Mozart's better for you Burkwest because you want to hear Mozart more, right? And rock and roll is better for me because I want to hear rock and roll more. But notice what this person is saying is that something is better for Burkwest or better for you because you want it more, right? But if that's so, then something would be good because you want it. And if that's been excluded by the previous argument, the ball game is over.

[29:43] Now you can't say that, right? Now you've got to give a reason, just like we did in our induction. Give a reason why this is better than that, right?

[29:55] You can't simply say it's better for me because I want it more, because the consequence of that would be then something would be good because you want it, but that isn't so, right? Do you see that? So I can argue formally either one of these ways, but I'm arguing basically from the same what statement we learned last time that something is not good because you want it, therefore it's not more good or better because you want it more.

[30:27] Okay? Do you follow me? Okay. So now we got to talk about what is better, right? Now you want to talk about that in general first, right?

[30:47] In general, what is better? Okay. Now Aristotle, at the beginning of the so-called Physics, in the beginning of the first book of Natural hearing, he talks about how man. Knows things in a confused or indistinct way before he knows them distinctly, precisely, or so on. And from that he reasons that we know things in general before we know them in what particular, and that therefore the general is more known to us than the particular.

[31:36] And all good reasoning starts with what is more known to us and goes towards what is less known to us. Charles de Koninck said one time he could do the whole modern philosophy as a denial of the more known by the less known. Okay, in other words, you know, a real disorder there in the modern mind.

[32:00] Now, in general, what is better? You can see it, yeah, You can see a little bit more than that. Oh certainly could have been more yeah yeah

[32:38] Sometimes people say, 'In general, the whole is better than the part. ' Okay, that's one very general statement. So, is the whole chair better than just a part of the chair? The whole automobile better than just a part of the automobile? Your whole glasses better than a part of them? Your whole body rather than just a? Part of your body. Okay.

[33:26] Go back for a moment to the idea of the good, right? The good is what all want, right? Don't people sometimes want one thing for the sake of another? Okay.

[33:42] And you might call these two things wanted. One is the end, and the other is like a what? means right Okay Now which is better?

[34:01] The end, yeah. Okay. Now, this is another very general proposition, and it's very much tied up with the first notion of the good. The good is what all want, right? But I want medicine, let's say, for the sake of what? Health, right? So I want health, and I want medicine, right? But I want the medicine for the sake of the health, right? Which is better, the medicine or the health?

[34:33] The health. Yeah. If I could have the health and didn't need the medicine, I wouldn't bother with the medicine, right? Okay. So you'd say that the end

[34:50] is better than what is for the sake of it. The end is better than what is desired for the sake of it. Now, these two statements are perhaps the most general statements you can make about what is better, right? But if you had to say which of those is more universal or more complete, more basic, which one would you choose? The first one. The first one seems, in some ways, more concrete, right?

[35:39] Okay. But could one of these statements, in a way, be led back to the other one? Oh, the part is for the sake of the whole. Yeah. Yeah. So if the part is for the sake of the whole, then in a way, the whole is the end or purpose of the part, and so it's led back to the end as for the sake. of it. Okay. So perhaps that's the most basic general statement that the end is better than what is for the sake of it.

[36:26] But now we can reason out a little bit that that statement is true, both by induction, like we did before, right? Which would be easier for us to follow. But you could also reason it out by a syllogism, right? Okay. You could reason it out by induction, which would mean to start with particular examples of ends and what is for the sake of them, right? And see if we could see which one is better, right?

[37:07] And then induce in general what is the truth about this matter, right? You could also start from something more universal than this, right? And more difficult, right? But show it another way. Let's do it in both ways. Okay. So let's take some examples. We took the example already of health and medicine.

[37:40] Which is better, having money or making money? Yeah. So the medicine is for the sake of the health, but we'd all agree the health is better than the medicine, right? Or making money is for the sake of having money, but having money is better than making money. Which is better? I say to the students, knowing or studying.

[38:22] But studying is for the sake of knowing, right? Which is better, being in Paris or flying in Paris? Being in Paris, Being in Paris, yeah. Yeah. So you go on multiplying examples of these things, right?

[39:00] Huh? Which is better, the tile floor or the tiles? Huh? The brick wall or the bricks? You pay more for a brick wall than for than for a pile of bricks, right? Okay.

[39:25] Which is better, the wine sauce or the ingredients? You see, going multiplying examples, right? And you see in each case that the end is better than what is for the sake of it, right? So by induction, you could reason that the end is better than what is for the sake of it, huh? Okay.

[39:54] Now, there's another way we can show this, and that is by a very universal statement. That can be applied to this and many other things, right? So it's just the opposite in the way of induction, right? Induction, you start from particulars, you ascend to general, right? But in syllogism, you tend to apply something equally or more universal usually to something less universal.

[40:24] Now, it's a very famous thing we can apply this. I think I mentioned it before. It's very important in philosophy. Now, when Aristotle and Thomas, you know these wise guys, stated, you know, they're usually very brief they say, "dono a conflict, more so."

[40:52] Okay, I like to kind of unfold it a bit, right? Huh? Okay. I say, if the same belongs to two things. But to one of them because of the other, right?

[41:35] Which does it belong more? The cause or the effect? Yeah. It belongs more to the cause. So let's take a very simple example, right?

[42:03] Suppose hot is said of the fire, right, and of the air around the fire. But the air around the fire is hot because of the fire, which is hot air. Fire. Yeah. Okay. Or suppose sweet is said of sugar,

[42:28] and my coffee. But it's said of the coffee because of the sugar, which is sweet. Sugar. And a salty is said of salt, and my French fries. But of my French fries because of salt, which is saltier? Okay.

[42:55] Now, let's take a little more profound example, right? Take one application of this to logic. If known is said of the premises. of the argument, right? And the conclusion of the argument, right?

[43:21] But it said the conclusion because of the premises, which is more known. Premises, yeah, yeah. Of course, if they weren't more known, you wouldn't use those to prove the conclusion, right? Okay.

[43:41] So, notice we reason from the premises by the syllogism to a conclusion, right? And so the conclusion becomes known through the premises, right? So that known can be said the conclusion finally as well as premises, but it said the conclusion because of the premises, right?

[44:04] But then the premises are more known to us than the what conclusion, right? Okay. I suppose you are standing the edge of the cliff there, right? And I put a log against your back there, and off you go, right?

[44:22] Um. That's pole pushed you off the cliff, didn't it? Yeah, yeah. And I did too. Yeah. Which one of us did more so? You. Yeah, you are not going to bring out the pole and punish it, are you? Why punish me? I mean, I didn't touch it.

[44:47] Well, it's because what the pole pushed you off only insofar as is moved by me, right? So, in some sense, both the pole and me pushed you off, right? But the pole pushed you off because of me, right? So I am chiefly responsible, right? See the idea?

[45:13] So the unmoved mover is more the mover than the what moved mover, right? It's a very important thing in natural philosophy, huh? Now, let's apply that to the end, and what is for the sake of the end, right? You could say good or desired, huh? Is said of the end, let's say health, for example, and of the needs, what it's for the sake of the end, like for example medicine.

[45:53] Both are good, or both are desired, both are wanted, right? So something belongs to both of them, but belongs to one of them because of the other. So to be good or desired, belongs to which one of them more, so.

[46:13] Yeah, to the end, right? You see the argument there, right? It's the same as with the idea there of sweet, said of sugar and the coffee, right? It's said of both of them, but it's said of the coffee because of the sugar, right? Therefore, the sugar is sweeter. So, good or desired or wanted is said of the end, and what is for the sake of the end.

[46:38] But it's said of what is for the sake of the end because of the cause being right the end. Then the end is even more good, even more desirable than the means. You see the argument.

[46:58] Back to the example there, we had an an objection there. Sometimes, if I love your kids, your children, because I love you, whom do I love more?

[47:22] Yeah. If I love my neighbor because I love God, then love by me is said of what? God, and said of my neighbor. But if my neighbor is loved by me, a charity, right? Because I love God, then whom do I love more? Yeah. Yeah. So if I love my neighbor more than God, if I love my wife, let's say, more than God, am I loving my wife because I love God?

[48:02] No. If I love candy more than God, right? Am I loving candy because I love God? No. No. But if I'm loving my neighbor because I love God, then I must love God even more than my what neighbor? Yeah. You see the idea? So you can apply this to an awful lot of things, right? Okay. Now, as I say, when Aristotle says it's so great, on account of which more so.

[48:39] on account, of, which means the one being the cause, right? It's more so, right? Okay, and you see Thomas doing that. propter quod unumquodque et illud magis, he says. you know, on account of which you see more so. I just thought I'd spell it out for us dimwits, okay? I classify myself as dimwit, not too.

[49:02] Classify Aristotle and Thomas as wits, but I'm a dimwit, right? According to the famous division there of Hesiod. Best of all is the man who can discover these great things by himself, right? Next, the man who can learn it from the man who discovered it, right? And the man who can either learn it from another nor discover it himself. he's useless as far as knowledge is concerned, right?

[49:30] So I divide us into wits, dimwits, nitwits, right? The wits, like Aristotle, Plato, the famous, they can discover these great things by themselves. We dimwits we can learn it from the wits. The nitwits they can do it either, right?

[49:53] I started to subdivide the dimwits into those who know who the wits are and those who don't know who the wits are. So I call myself. I classify myself as an upper dimwit. Okay, but still dimwit. But don't quote me out of context, though. That's why I name those three characters. But you find that division in Hesiod, Aristotle refers to it in the Nicomachean Ethics, and Thomas picks it up from there and so on.

[50:22] But you find it in St. Basil, and you find even in Machiavelli right? At that threefold division. Oh. Yeah. So there are people like even the church, you know, people like Augustine say who can discover great things about the Trinity, right? Then there are other people in the church who can learn them from Augustine, right? And then there are some people in the church who can't do either one, right, and have to have a more, you know, simple faith, right?

[50:58] Okay. So you see the way we reason from this to that same conclusion, right? You can reason that the end is better than what is for the sake of it by induction, right? Which is better, health or medicine? Right. Which is better, making money or having money? Right. Which is better, studying or knowing? Right. Which is better, winning or playing to win?

[51:39] So you might say, inductively that the end is what is is better, than, what is for the sake of it. Right. But you can also, if you understand this general statement, you can apply it to the end and what is for the sake of it. Because here you have something good or desirable or wanted that is said of both the end and what is for the sake of it.

[52:05] I want to be healthy. I want to take medicine, right? But one of them I want because of the other. So the end, which is the cause of the means being wanted, is more wanted, right? It's better than right. Do you see that? Okay. Now you know what better is, right?

[52:54] You can apply that again to a whole and a part, right? But the part he says is for the sake of the whole, right? Okay.

[53:03] Now let's apply that to the disagreement between Socrates and the Athenians, as revealed in the Apology, right? And Aristotle refers to this many places, but most fully in the seventh book of the Politics. Right? He says this is a disagreement between the philosophers and most men. Okay. Most men act as if the goods of the body and the outside goods were the greater goods, right? And the goods of the soul were the lesser ones.

[53:41] and. But the philosophers are saying no. The goods of the soul are much better than the goods of the body. But before we get into that conversation about which goods are better, let's give this division of all the goods of man. That's what it is. This is a disagreement about all the goods of human being, all the goods of man. Okay. Now the Greeks were accustomed to divide all the goods of man

[54:20] into usually three kinds. The names that they usually give to these were the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, and then the exterior or outside goods, you could call.

[54:59] Now Aristotle discusses this in the seventh book of the Politics. He says everybody knows that there are these three kinds of goods, and he says they also all agree that we need some of all of them,

[55:21] but they disagree as to which ones are better. Now, even as a child, maybe in your Mother Goose rhymes or things of that sort, you might have touched upon this, huh? Most people have heard this one here: early to bed, early to rise, makes a man what? Healthy, wealthy, and wise. Yeah, yeah. Now the order of the words there is determined by rhyming and by alliteration, right?

[56:02] Because you have to use wise to rhyme with rise, right? Okay. And what? Healthy, wealthy, and wise. Healthy and wealthy rhyme, but wealthy and wise, are literate Okay. But. Notice those three goods singled out. Health is under which of these categories? Under the body. Under the body, yeah. Makes a man healthy. Let's put health there. Um, wealthy. Which of these goods is wealth? The outside goods. Yeah, that's an excellence of the outside goods, right?

[56:40] Wealth. And wise. Wisdom. That's the good of the soul, right? So even in that kind of a mother goose rhyme, almost I guess it goes back to Benjamin Franklin or something. It's almost like a mother goose rhyme we learned as a child. Like that, you touch upon these three kinds of goods, right? Okay.

[57:09] And if you look at government, right, and the giving of laws, are there laws concerning all of these goods? No, there's no laws concerning the good of the soul, I believe. Well, isn't there a law in the state of Massachusetts you have to go to high school until the age of sixteen? Oh, I see. Okay. Okay. There might be some laws about robbing, stealing, and murder. Things of this sort, right?

[57:48] Discouraging certain vices, something. Okay. All kinds of laws about health, right? No. Sometimes they close down the restaurant because there's too many cockroaches around the restaurant, right?

[58:06] Sometimes, and of course, you go in the doctor's office. Maybe you see a little thing, you know, state of such and such, you know. so I can practice, you know. I can't go down and start practicing medicine on mainstream work if I don't have any of this.

[58:22] Um laws about these outside goods. I got driver's license in here, right? All kinds of laws, you know, regulating commerce and business and so on, right? Taxes. Yeah, yeah. So

[58:39] there are laws about all three kinds of goods. It's another sign that everybody kind of recognizes there are these three kinds of what good, right? Okay.

[58:53] And so they're talking about political debates now. Education, right? But that's something to do with the goods of the soul, right? They're talking about health issues and so on, right? Vaccines and so. Okay, all kinds of health insurance and so on, and there are all kinds of things talking about the economy, right? So that there are enough jobs, and all sorts of stuff, right? So Aristotle's right, at least in a confused way.

[59:26] Everybody is aware of these three kinds, right? Okay. Now, is anybody who who's in doubt at that second point that we need some of all of these three?

[59:40] You need some outside goods, some clothing, maybe a chair, maybe some food, right? Nobody denies that, right? You need some of these. You need some health, some strength, at least to raise a food to your mouth, right? Need some of these goods of the body, right? Okay. You need a little bit of what? Courage, a little bit of moderation, right? Are you going to destroy yourself, right?

[1:00:02] Okay. A fool with his money is soon parted. He's a little bit smarts to get your money or keep your money, even right? Okay. So everybody admits you need some of these three, right?

[1:00:18] That's agreement. The disagreement comes as to which of these goods are better, right? Now, if you say that these goods here are better than those, as the Athenians seem to act, is that right?

[1:00:40] Then that's going to have tremendous influence upon your life, because if these are the greater goods, your goal in life, so to speak, will be to get as much as possible of these better things, right? And be satisfied with the minimum, right? Necessary to get or keep or preserve these goods, right? You need a little bit of moderation to preserve your health, right? A little bit of smarts to make money or keep money, or right?

[1:01:15] Okay. Protect your property and so on. On the other hand, if you think that the goods of the soul are much better than the goods of the body and exterior goods, then you're going to be satisfied with the minimum necessary of these things for living, and try to get as much as you can of the goods of the soul, right? You see, your whole life is going to be weighted what differently, right?

[1:01:41] Okay. But notice the second, maybe even more fundamental difference. If you go back to what we just learned, that the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, right? If you think that the goods of the body and outside goods are better than the goods of the soul, then the end of human life, the goal of human life, right, the purpose of human life, will look for somewhere down here,

[1:02:22] because the end is always better than what is for the sake of the what end, right? So if these goods are better than those, the end must be somewhere down here.

[1:02:37] But if you agree with Socrates that the goods of the soul are much better than the goods of the body and exterior goods, and the end has to be better than what is for the sake of the end, then the end and goal and purpose of human life must be somewhere up here among the goods of the what soul, right?

[1:02:58] So this disagreement between Socrates and the Athenians is not a little disagreement as between you and I, chicken steak or something, right, or licorice and chocolate or something, right? No, this is a disagreement about all the goods of human life. Right, and about the whole weight, you might say, human life, right, where it's weighted towards getting as much as possible of these goods, or getting as much possible of those goods, right, and being satisfied with the minimum of the others.

[1:03:27] But it's going to be a disagreement also about the very end and purpose and goal of human life, what it's all about. You see that? But all that follows, in a sense, from saying that these are better, or saying that those are better, right? Okay. Now, as I say, someone faced with this disagreement between the philosophers and the Athenians, or the philosophers and most men, might try to falsely address the question by saying, "Well, Socrates, if you love those goods much more than these, go for them, Socrates.

[1:04:08] That's for you. But we love these goods much more, so we're going to go for these ones, right? What's wrong with that answer? It shouldn't be a balance because you want it. Yeah, you're saying, in a way, that those are better for Socrates, right? And therefore, should pursue them. Why? Because you want some more. And these are better for the Athenians to pursue because they want these more.

[1:04:36] But then you're saying these goods are better for Socrates because he wants them more, and these other goods are better for the Athenians because they want those more, right?

[1:04:49] You see? It's too soon, people say. You know, all this liberal thought. Okay. But if something is not good because you want it, then it's not more good or better because you want it more.

[1:05:05] So by our reasoning about the good, we have a starting point to reason that something is not better because you want it more. And now the Athenians are caught, right? Because they can't say that these are better for them because they want them more, and those are better for Socrates because he wants them more. They've got to give some reason for saying these are better than those, and you'll find that Socrates has almost all the reasons on his side.

[1:05:35] Okay.