Ethics
6. Goods of the Soul, Body and Exterior: Socrates vs. the Athenians, and the Scope of Practical Philosophy
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[0:00] Now, you could see from Socrates or from Aristotle that the philosophers do talk about all of the goods of man in general, right? They don't talk about all of the goods of man in particular, because the carpenter would talk more about the chair, right, and the cook more about dinner, right, and maybe the coach more about the athletic ability, and the doctor more about health and so on, right?

[0:39] But the philosopher does talk about all of the goods of man in general, right? And does point out that we need some of all of them, right? And does point out that everybody is to some extent aware of them, right? Okay.

[1:00] And I was I was using a very simple example there of the saying as a child: early to bed, early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise. As a sign, there you know how even as a child we were in a way made aware of these goods, right? Because health is a preeminent good of the body, right? Wealth is an excellence of exterior goods, and wisdom is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, good of the soul, right?

[1:35] Thomas has interesting application of this when he's talking about the six articles and the humanity of Christ, which you can divide in at least two ways. But the way the articles are divided in the Te Deum, right,

[1:54] where you have you know incarnation first, right, and then you have his death on the cross, opening up the glories of heaven, right. But then you have a few mysteries concerned with that, the descent into hell, right, the resurrection, and then the ascension, right. And Thomas sees a sort of connection between the three, because he descended down to hell, meaning down to the patriarchs and so on.

[2:22] He gave them the what? Beauty of vision, the good of the soul. The resurrection is getting back to your what body, and then the ascension is going to a good place, right? That's the exterior. So you have the three goods there, right? Okay. That's a very you know impressive example of the application of this doctrine. huh? But as I said, it, goes all the way back to your childhood early to bed, early to rise, makes man healthy, wealthy, and wise, right?

[2:55] Whether whether the Cicerone is saying that this is good for the whole of human life. Now, does the medical art, as such, talk about this division, and which is better?

[3:14] Does the carpenter talk about this division? If? You pick up a book in carpentry, you know, they'll say, "No, this is the division of all the goods of man." Now, is there a reason why the moral or political philosopher gives this division explicitly, right? And raises the question, right? Do we need all three of them? Yes, you know, but then the question: which is better, and why is this better, and so on, right?

[3:43] Is there a reason why the moral and political philosopher should talk about all the goods of man? He he talks in particular about the goods of the soul, right? The moral virtues and the virtues of reason. But why should the man who talks about those talk about also all of the goods in general, and ask the question which are better?

[4:16] Yeah, but also because what's most fundamental in ethics and practical philosophy is the end or purpose of man, the end or purpose of human life, and all of these goods are necessary for the end or purpose of man. They all contribute in some way to the end or goal of life, right? So, the philosopher, I mean, the practical philosopher now, the moral and political philosopher, this is chiefly about the end or purpose of man, and that's why it belongs to him and not to the carpenter, because the chair is not the end and purpose of a whole human life, and and the health of the body is not the end and purpose of a whole human life.

[5:04] But the man who does talk about the end or purpose of human life will talk about all the goods of man in general, although not about all of them particular. Okay, you see the reason why he does it? Okay, and this is a certain likeness to wisdom. You know, after too long, we'll be looking a little bit at wisdom itself, right? And wisdom is chiefly about God, chiefly about the first cause.

[5:34] But you'll find out that wisdom is also about all things, but in general, right? I see a connection between being about the first cause

[5:50] and talking about all things in general. Well, the first cause is the cause whose causality extends to all things, right? So it's appropriate that the science called wisdom, whose end or goal was to know the first cause, we need to know God,

[6:11] should talk also about all things in general, right? And no other science does that. You see? But there's something like that here, now. Practical philosophy doesn't talk about the first cause, that's wisdom does that. But it does talk about the what? First good, the first cause in the sense of end of human life. It does talk about the end or purpose of man, the end or purpose of the whole human life.

[6:45] What happiness really is, what true happiness is, huh? And therefore, it should also talk about all the goods of human life, at least in general, and about the distinction of them and their order as to which are better and so on. You see? So it's appropriate that Socrates, in his defense of his life, right? And Socrates is a guy who kind of turned the philosopher's attentions to ethics and political philosophy, right?

[7:20] Not the first guy to do so, but I mean, there's kind of a emphasis upon him in Socrates, right? So if you read the dialogues of Plato, which are sometimes called the Socratic conversations,

[7:33] because in all of them almost Socrates appears and converses with somebody, right? But there mainly in practical philosophy, right? Things on virtue and things on courage and things on justice and so on, right?

[7:49] It's appropriate that Socrates should have emphasized this distinction or division of all the goods of human life, right? And been involved in saying which are what better, right? Okay. Now,

[8:11] when you're faced with this disagreement between the Athenians and Socrates, it's no little disagreement, right? It's a disagreement about all the goods of human life. And because the disagreements which are better, it'll be a disagreement about the purpose of human life. Okay. Now, there's, as we said before, there's a false solution to this. Huh? You could say, well, Socrates, if you want those goods so much, go for them, right?

[8:40] That's your thing. But we're interested in these things, so you know, forget about that. We'll go for these, right? Well, the man who says that is saying that these goods are better for Socrates, right? Because he wants them more. But these goods here are better for most men, because that's what most men want more. And we excluded that by what syllogism? What kind of syllogism did we use to exclude that false solution to this disagreement?

[9:19] If none. Yeah, if then syllogism, yeah. And where do we syllogize from that we learn in our study of the good? If if things are if things are not good because we desire them, yeah, then they're not more good or better because we want them more. And the antecedent we showed before, right? Something is not good because you want it. Therefore, it's not better for you because you want it what more, right?

[9:54] Okay. See that? Okay. You guys, you realize the fourth the argument is a very strong argument, huh? And I was making a simple comparison. If you see something that people would not disagree about at all, is something sweet because it's white? Well, no one would maintain that, right? Well, something is not sweet because it's white. Is it sweeter because it's whiter? No, no. And if someone is so stupid as to say something is sweeter the whiter it is, then he's forced to say that something is sweet because it's white.

[10:37] And that's obviously absurd, right? Okay. Now it's not as obviously absurd to say that something is good because you want it. but We did show that that is false, right? So once you know that something is not good because you want it, otherwise that last drink in the party would have been good for you, right? Even though it made you very sick, huh? Or was good for that kid to drive his car 100 miles an hour down the windy road, right?

[11:05] Into the tree. So once you realize something is not good because you want it, then it's not better because you want it more. Well then, you've got to give a reason for saying something's good, right? And you've got to give a reason for saying something's better.

[11:29] Now, take a little break now. Sure. But we'll review the reasons and add another reason to the ones we did before, right? But once the Athenians are forced to give a reason,

[11:44] they can't give a reason. All the reasons seem to be on Socrates' side, right? And sometimes I try to help the students to give a reason to the side, right, one that they think is is good, right? And I'll oh, I'll try to do two. Okay.

[12:08] Show the couple ways we could reason that the goods of the soul are better than the things. But actually, what I did last time, if you recall, was I first of all contrasted the inside goods, right, with the outside goods, right, okay, and

[12:32] by induction by syllogism, we showed that inside goods, including both of these, are better than the outside goods. Now, what did we? What was the main syllogism there?

[12:51] Well, we have to give a reason for saying something is better, right? And the basic reason for saying something, the basic statement about the better, is that the end is always better than what is the sake of it. Now, if we could show by induction that the exterior goods are for the sake of the inside goods,

[13:13] then you could syllogize, right? From these two statements, the outside goods are for the sake of the inside. goods. and the end is always better than what is specific. Okay, so if the inside is the end or purpose of the outside, then the inside must be better than the outside. Right? Okay. But how do we show that the outside is for the sake of the inside? Well, again, by induction, right?

[13:43] Are your feet for the sake of your shoes, or your shoes for the sake of your feet? Are your glasses for the sake of the eyes, or the eyes for the sake of the glasses?

[13:56] Am I for the sake of getting my car to school? Getting my car to the monastery, or is the car for the sake of transporting my body, if he's moving my mind with it, to the monastery? See? And is my, and are you for the sake of taking notes, or the notes for the sake of your mind? See?

[14:21] Well, you can see inductively that the outside is for the sake of the inside. Otherwise, you'd be a mannequin, like down the department store, right, for you to display the clothing. Okay. Um.

[14:41] Now you might say there are some inside goods that seem to be for the sake of outside goods, like the art of carpentry, right, just for the sake of chairs and tables and doors. But they, in turn, are for the sake of the what? Body, right? Are you there to hold down the chair, so no one steals it, or is the chair there to hold you up?

[15:02] Are you for the sake of keeping the money safe under the mattress, or is the mattress there for the sake of giving you a good night's sleep? Okay. So by induction, we see that the outside is for the sake of the inside. But the end for the sake of which is always better. Therefore, the inside is better than the outside. So we give third place, or to use the Olympic thing, we give the bronze medal to the outside goods right?

[15:34] Okay. I'm not healthy for the sake of taking medicine? Am I? No, if I take medicine, it's for the sake of the health inside the body. Now, which is better, the goods of the soul or the goods of the body? Right? Well, if you knew enough about the soul and the body, you'd realize that the soul is the end of the body, but that's a little hard to see.

[15:59] Well, we could argue if you admit that man is better than a beast, then the goods that man has, that place him above the beast, are better than the goods he shares with the beast. Or if you admit that God is better than man, right?

[16:21] Then the more divine goods are going to have to be better than the goods he shares with what is below it. Okay. But notice, huh? You can now also argue from the end or purpose of man, right? Since the end or purpose of man is what is best, right? Which is closer to the end of man, the goods of the body, the goods of the soul. Well, if the end is the act with reason according to human virtue, obviously the goods of the soul are closer to the end, and therefore they're better than the goods of the what?

[16:55] Body, right? The goods of the soul are involved in the very end of man, right? So the end is always better. So that's perhaps the strongest argument, right? Saying the goods of the soul should get the gold medal, and the goods of the body the silver. Okay.

[17:22] So Socrates is correct, and the Athenians are mistaken. No wonder they wanted to kill the guy. Because in a sense, he was examining them and showing them that their life is based on mistake. Who wants to have a life based on mistake?

[17:46] Now, can the Athenians give any reason for saying that the goods of the body, the exterior goods, are better than the goods of the soul?

[18:07] Sometimes I give the students this question. I say, which is better, to. Breathe, or to philosophize, which is better? What answer do you think I get from breathe? They all say to breathe, right? Okay. And I say, okay. Of course, to breathe is something more bodily, right? Philosophize is up here with the with the soul, right? So now you got a good argument, right? We all agree, I say, that to breathe is better than to philosophize.

[18:51] Yeah, yeah. But now, why do you say that it's better? Of course, what they all say is, well, if you're not breathing, you won't be doing anything else. I say true. But I've already gone through the senses of before, in the twelfth chapter, the categories, okay? And they are showing now that to breathe is before to philosophize. In what sense of before?

[19:24] Leading to. Yeah, it can be without the other, but not vice versa. It's before in being, right? That's the second sense Aristotle gives of before. One is before two. One can be without two, but two can't be without one. Okay. So you've shown that to breathe is before to philosophize. In the sense that you can breathe without philosophizing, but not vice versa.

[19:57] That's not to show that it's better. You're confusing the second and the fourth sense of before, huh? Let me just recall those senses. Some of you, I think, I don't think you all met them. Let's just recall the fourth senses of before.

[20:19] The first sense of before is in time. Okay, today is before tomorrow, right? That's the first sense of before. Second sense of before is in being. And what does that mean? When something can be without something else, but not vice versa. Aristotle's example is one is before two, right?

[20:48] Another example would be wood is before a wooden chair. Wood can be without a wooden chair, but a wooden chair can't be without wood.

[21:01] Third sense of before is in the discourse of reason, in our knowledge, right? And then the fourth, the strangest sense, he says, is better, right? Before in goodness.

[21:26] Now, if someone says Chaucer comes before Shakespeare, therefore Chaucer is better than Shakespeare. I am older than you, therefore I am better than you. Everybody recognizes that as the most common kind of mistake, mixing up different senses of "before," right? Okay, so because Chaucer is before Shakespeare in this sense of before, can you conclude is before Shakespeare in this sense?

[22:03] No. What is before in time might be better. It might be lesser, right? So it's obviously a mistake in reasoning to say that because it's before in this sense, therefore it's before in this sense. Now, when they ask the students, "Why do you say that to breathe is better than to philosophize?"

[22:28] And they show that you can't do anything else, unless you're. breathing. They've shown that to breathe is before philosophizing in this sense here. I can breathe without philosophizing. I can't philosophize without breathing. And they're concluding that because it's before in being, therefore it's before in what? That's obviously the most common kind of fallacy in thinking. The fallacy of equivocation, a mistake from mixing up different senses of the same word.

[23:01] Exactly. So the argument breaks down. Notice the basic reason for saying something is better is that it's. The end is better than what is for the sake of the end. Okay. You know,

[23:28] take something like breathing, right? Huh? You know, is breathing the purpose of life? See. Now, when I was in grade school, you know, the sisters used to ask us, you know, do you live to eat or do eat to live? Huh? And some people seem to be a little mixed up on this subject. See. So some people, you know, are in the mistaken position of thinking that they they live to eat, right?

[23:58] Um. But I don't anybody who thinks they live to breathe. See, breathing is the most one of the most necessary things, right? That you do in life, right? Is that your end or purpose? No, you breathe so you can do something else, right? Play football or eat or philosophize, but you know, see. So to breathe is before most other things in life, in this second sense, isn't it?

[24:26] But nobody thinks of it as being as an end or purpose. Do I philosophize so I can breathe? Do I eat dinner so I can breathe? Do I play football so I can breathe?

[24:44] I breathe so I can do these other things, right? So they're better than to breathe, right? Even though to breathe is more what necessary, right?

[24:56] Aristotle shows you know how wisdom is the best knowledge. He says every other knowledge is more necessary, but none is better. You see, you see the difference between those, huh?

[25:12] Now, they're pretty frustrated by by showing the fallacy in their argument, huh? Well, then I come back and I try to strengthen their argument, right? Okay.

[25:27] And like we did before, when we talked about opposites, right? He asks them that isn't the better the opposite of the worse. That seems at least probably, right?

[25:51] The better is the opposite of the worse. That seems to be true, right? Now, which is worse? I say now, huh? Let me help you to argue a bit. Which is worse?

[26:13] To stop philosophizing. Or stop breathing. Which will be worse, for Mister Burpless, in, the next hour to stop philosophizing or to stop breathing? Breathing. Yeah. See, now we've got you, right? Because you're saying to stop breathing is worse than to stop philosophizing, right? But the better is the opposite, of worse. Therefore, to breathe must be better than to philosophize, since the opposite of breathing, stopping, it, is worse, right?

[26:58] I say, well, now there you go, now it's got some probability, right? It's not just a fallacy, of equivocation, reasoning from one sense of before to another sense of before, which is obviously a mistake in thinking, right? But is this proposition here, which is highly probable, does it admit of any exceptions?

[27:20] Yes, one very important exception, right? And that is that when one thing is before another in being, then the loss of that is worse,

[27:43] even though it's not what better, right? Okay. So if I stop breathing, I stop philosophizing, all the rest, right? Because to breathe is before to philosophize, and all the other activities of life, right? In being, right? So to take away that, well, I'll say,

[28:09] is water better than a plant? No, water is for the sake of the plant, right? Okay. And life as we know it is, you know. material world is now without water, right? So water can be without life, but life cannot be without water, right? They're trying to find water on Mars, right?

[28:33] Does that make water better? No. If water is for the sake of life, right, then life is better than water. But the loss of water would be worse than the loss of life, because if you lose water, you lose life too. Or if you lose life, you still have water, right? Okay. So when what is before, when something is before something else in being, then the loss of it is worse, right?

[29:03] Even though it's not better. Okay. So that's obviously the case here with with breathing, right? So that's the exception to the rule here. so that's about the best they can come up with. You see, but I may help them with that. But even that is a defect, right?

[29:25] Um. I take another example. Which is better, bricks or a brick wall? Brick wall. Yeah. See, the bricks are the sake of the brick wall, the brick house, or the brick patio, or something like that, right? And that's why you'll pay more for a brick wall than for a pile of bricks, right? But which is worse? Do I have a brick wall, or do I have no bricks?

[29:51] no bricks. Yeah, yeah. Because bricks are before brick wall, brick house, brick patio, in being, right? So the loss of bricks involves the loss of brick walls, brick houses, brick patios, right?

[30:11] But that doesn't make the bricks better than them. See? So you see, there is an exception to the rule that the opposite of the worse is better, right? And that is when something is before the things in being, right? Then the loss of that is worse, right? Than the loss of the better.

[30:39] So at that point, the only thing that remains is if all the argument is on Socrates' side, right? And only defective arguments can be given on the other side. So Socrates is obviously correct, and the Indians are wrong. But you might say, well, why is everybody mistaken? See? Why do people

[31:04] think that the lesser goods are better? Or why do people want more the lesser goods? Because if good is the cause of desire, right? Presumably, the greater good should be wanted more, right? Okay, this is like the problem we raised before. If good is a cause of desire, why are sometimes even bad things desired? Right? We had to bring in the fact that there's something that comes between the good or the bad and us, and that's the sense of the reason, right?

[31:34] But now, which of these goods is more known to us? The goods of the body and the exterior goods, right? Okay. So that could explain why the lesser goods are desired more, right? Because they're more known. Okay.

[32:04] But if you say the Athenians are correct and Socrates is mistaken, right? You couldn't explain why Socrates should want the lesser goods more, because there's only less known to Socrates even than the what?

[32:21] Than the what? Exterior goods, right? Socrates was a boy before he was a man, right? And he knew the goods of the body and exterior goods before he knew the ones. The baby cries when he's sick, first, you know, got a pin in him, not because he's ignorant or has no virtue or something like that, right? Yeah.

[32:42] Even our Lord in the in the parables, we use what? You know, kingdom of heaven is like a man who found a treasure, right, in the field. He went and sold everything he had, bought the field, and so on, right? He'll make a comparison to the lesser goods, right? Okay. He'll eat and drink with me in the kingdom, right? I was reading Thomas there today in the Summa Contra Gentiles where he talked to heretics, you know, so he'll, "Be eating and drinking and so on and so forth and he doesn't understand these texts, right?

[33:12] But you'll eat and drink at my table with me, right? He says that in the Gospels, right? So he even speaks of the. Lesser known goods, but the greater goods, right? Under the likeness of the goods, they're more known to us, huh?

[33:29] Thomas, you know, call communion o sacrum convivium o sacred banquet, right? Or you call the ineffable banquet, the ineffable banquet, huh? The inexpressible banquet, right, You think you've got a good banquet? wait you see this one?

[33:56] but you know those things are more known to us, right? Okay. So Aristotle says in the famous text there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, that when he's trying to define place, right, in Natural Philosophy, and he says now a definition of place, he says first of all tell you what place is. That's what you expect a definition, right? And it should explain the things we say about place, right?

[34:25] And should solve the difficulties we have about place, right? And should even make clearer why people have thought otherwise about it. Well, if you say that Socrates is correct, right? As to which goods are better, the Athenians are mistaken. You should be able to explain why it's possible that people should love more the lesser goods, and the answer could be that they're more what? More known, right?

[34:57] And in fact, we say in the beginning the goods of the soul are unknown, right? Okay, so it's not surprising that the goods that are known are loved, and the ones that are unknown are not loved, or the goods that are more known are more loved, and the goods that are hardly known are less loved, right? Okay.

[35:18] Um. Why did Romeo love Rosalind more than Juliet? Didn't he love Juliet at all? And Juliet apparently is much more beautiful than Rosalind, huh? Didn't know her. Never met her. Yeah, yeah. He he. He went to the the House of the Capulets there to get a glimpse of Rosalind and we saw Juliet. and we never hear any more about Rosalind. Much of the she's rendered. I mean, that's the amazing thing of Father Lawrence.

[35:53] Lawrence. Lawrence. Yeah. Um. But you see, an explanation of that, right? He loved the lesser good, not the greater good at all, right? But it's not because Rosalind is more beautiful, but because he knew Rosalind and didn't know Juliet, huh? So we can explain why, right? We can explain why most men, like boys, right, could love the lesser goods more, because they know those goods more, or they know them no nothing else.

[36:29] But if you say that Socrates is wrong and mistaken, how would you explain this, right? Why does he love those hardly known goods, those lesser goods, more? Right? You couldn't hardly say that, but he knows them more. No, he knows the goods of the body and outside things more.

[36:52] I can remember as a boy there, you know, Christmas Eve there, you know, and we open our presents on Christmas Eve and all these presents around the Christmas tree there, and one of my aunts used to come down visit us, and my father and my mother being there talking with aunt so and so, you know, and blah blah blah blah blah blah. We want to get to the presents and open, you know, be patient, you know.

[37:13] I mean, you know. So I was I anxious for the goods of the soul then, no, no, these exterior goods, you know, these toys, these things are wrapped up in the things, all right, huh? So, you know, so I wanted these goods long before. I wanted candy long before I wanted wisdom, you know.

[37:38] I go down town, you know, my mother, you know, and now if you if you you know don't give me a lot of problems here, be patient, you know. We'll stop at the candy store on the way. Okay, so I'd be a little good because you know didn't say enough. I feel good. I give you a little wisdom at the end of the day. That would that wouldn't mean anything to me, you know?

[37:56] It's not the same thing. You know, stop and you have to pick out some candy, you know, and then yeah, that that's worthwhile behaving yourself as a. Yeah.

[38:07] See, see, so you can hardly explain why do I love wisdom? I think I love wisdom now more than candy, but what explains this? You see, that wisdom is more known or to me than candy. No.

[38:24] So that's a sign again, huh? You know that Socrates is correct, huh? That you can explain why the others are mistaken. Why, if they were correct, if you assume that they are correct, you can't explain why Socrates gets all mixed up.

[38:40] No obvious explanation of that. So now, what is practical philosophy about? When you talk about any knowledge. the. First thing you want to know is what it's about, right? Okay.

[39:07] So you say, what is practical philosophy about? You can say, chiefly, it's about the end of man, right? The purpose of man. Okay. Now, because of that, as we were trying to show before, it's about all the goods of man, also, in general, right?

[40:14] And to make it a little more concrete. It's about the what division of all the goods of man, right? Into goods of the soul, goods of the body, and outside goods, and also about the order of these goods, right? Especially as which are better, right? Okay. So the distinction and order.

[40:45] Of course, notice in order there, there's as many senses as before, right? So we talked about the order of these goods in goodness, right? Which are better, and who got the gold prize, the silver prize, the bronze prize, and so on. And we also talked about the order of these goods in being. In our in being, yeah. We also talked about the order of these goods in the discourse of what reason in our knowledge, right?

[41:12] Okay. So distinction order. Of all the goods of man, these are things that the practical philosophy is concerned with, and that follows from its being about the end of man, because all of these goods in some way contribute to the end of man, right? They're Necessary for the end of man,

[41:37] and I made a comparison here to wisdom, right? Wisdom is not about the end of man, but it's about the end of the whole universe. It's about the Alpha and Omega, right? And therefore, it's also you'll find out about all things, but only in general, right? Okay.

[42:07] But then you can say that practical philosophy is ethics in particular is about the goods of the soul in particular. See, okay. Ethics, here the fundamental part of practical philosophy about the goods of the soul in particular.

[42:39] Now, why is it about those goods in particular, but not about the goods of the body, right? And the outside goods in particular, but because of the proximity of these, right? And that means being able to the virtues, the virtues of reason and of what partakes of reason, the moral virtues and the virtues of reason. So, in the proximity of them to to the chief end of man.

[43:07] Okay. I mean, to the end of man, which is what ethics is chiefly about. So, when Shakespeare says, "Right in the Taming of the Shrew," the guy who's studying philosophy. that part of philosophy that treats of Happiness, by virtue, especially to be achieved. Okay, but the goods of the body, you know, like health and the exterior goods, I mean, some wealth, food, and so they contribute too, but in a more remote way, right?

[43:34] So, especially to be achieved by the goods of the soul. So you got to realize this is fundamental, right? Because this is what's fundamental to the practical philosophy, to ethics. That's both the reason why he considers, at least in general, all of the goods of man, right? And why he considers, in particular, the goods of the soul, right? Because they seem to be most approximate to this and to almost enter into it, right?

[44:01] Because even our rough drawing a line around the end of man, it was man's own act, the act of reason, according to virtue, right, throughout life. So this is very much tied up with that, and that's where Aristotle, when he takes up the end of man in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, he, as he says in Greek, perigraphe peri around, graphe draws a line a line, he draws a line around happiness, right?

[44:29] And then after, he's gone through all the virtues in particular. Then, in the tenth book, he comes back and says more precisely, right, but happiness is. that consists mainly in the act according to the virtue of wisdom. You

[44:53] must not follow those who advise us to be mentioned to think of human things. So he's gonna have to talk about the divine, huh?

[45:13] So you wouldn't say it's about it's one of those things, right? But you see it's in order among them, right? It's chiefly about the end of man, and that's the reason why it's about all the goods of man in general, and about the goods of the soul in particular.

[45:46] Now, maybe we should talk a little bit about the virtues. You know, without necessarily going through the whole to come back in Ethics, you know, but

[45:57] about the division he gives other virtues first, human virtue into the two kinds, right? And then a little bit about the moral virtues he talks about, and then the virtues of reason, right? Okay, maybe we do that next time, you know. Okay. Because I have a little idea about these things, huh? Okay. Get a chance to go over to school. Maybe I'll bring a little bit of the things in the first book there, the Nicomachean Ethics.

[46:33] A little bit of the text of Aristotle, some of the key things. Because in the very proemium to the to the ethics, you'll meet that definition of the good. Is what I want. Aristotle doesn't develop it a lot there, like we're doing, you know. And then a little bit about what's better, right? And then a little bit of the text there, which draws a line around the purpose of man, right?

[46:58] Which I kind of expanded on in my lecture, you know. But then after you see that connection between that and virtue, then you go to the next thing, which is the distinction of human virtue into the moral virtues and into the virtues of reason. And then the definition he works out of what moral virtue is, and the various moral virtues he takes up, and then the distinction he makes of the virtues of reason.

[47:25] So, the little idea. of. Ethics. Now you see in these other parts of philosophy, you know, the kind of a anticipation of wisdom, and sort of likeness to wisdom.

[47:45] Um. In the eight books, they have natural hearing. They lead up to. In the seventh book and the eight books, to the dependence of motion upon a mover, right, and of the moved movers upon an unmoved mover, right. And but in natural philosophy, there you take up all natural things in at least a general way, right? So Aristotle will be defining what nature is. and what motion is and what place is and what time is and so on, right?

[48:27] In studying these things, and you see a little bit of yourself, you just see the wisdom, right? But Aristotle says in the beginning of the fourth book that he takes up place. He says the common opinion of the philosophers before me is that whatever is must be somewhere. And isn't somewhere it doesn't exist, right? So in the thinking of the early Greeks, there to be somewhere to be in some place is a property of everything that is.

[48:55] But to be in place is really a property of bodies, right? So they they can't get out the idea that all that is is bodies and what's in bodies, right? And it's only you know with Anaxagoras in particular, and and more so with Plato or Aristotle, that you begin to have some kind of reason to say there exists something besides these bodies, right? And this comes up partly when they reason out that there's an unmoved mover, and a body doesn't move without being moved itself, or when they reason out that the human soul can exist and operate without the body, right?

[49:37] It's only there at the end, you might say, of natural philosophy in the study of the soul, that they begin to realize, hey, there's something besides bodies, and therefore the study of what is is going to be something even more general, more universal, right? And the study of causes is something more than just the causes of natural things, right? And that's how you get this name metaphysics, which most people don't realize that means, but it actually is a contraction of three words in Greek, meta after ta the phusikal books in natural philosophy.

[50:13] This is the wisdom that came after natural philosophy when they realize that in their studying of natural things that there's some evidence to something besides these these bodies, these natural things and artificial things. Now Aristotle when he begins the study of natural things, he says, "Well, the things that are, some are by nature, and some are by other causes. " And of course, the only other cause you hear about at first is art, right?

[50:45] So you, look around, you know, what do I see? Well, this is by nature, and this is by nature, and this is by art, right? And most of what I see and look around the room here is by art, right? Now if I went for a walk in the woods out here, most of what I see would be by nature. But it seems in the world around us, it's mainly natural and artificial things.

[51:09] That's it. And so he distinguishes between nature and art, right? Is that the whole picture? No, no. But it begins. That's where we begin, right? But which is wisdom—the study of the things that are by art, or the study of the things that are by nature?

[51:37] Yeah, because the things that are by nature are before and are causes in some way the things that are by art. So if I could find the first causes of natural things, I'd be arriving at the first causes of all things. But in studying natural things, there's

[51:57] two or three places where they get some hint that there's hey, there's something besides these bodily things, huh? And the Greeks began to guess at first, right? That the

[52:14] mind of man was not something material, right? And they begin to realize that there had to be an unmoved mover, and this couldn't be a body, right? So it's by reasoning that they came to the conclusion that there's something besides these bodies. It took them 200 years to do that. You know,

[52:43] I mean, as Christians, I mean, we know about you know God and the soul and the mortal souls and the angels and so on, right? You know, but if you didn't have the church, you're left with just reason. You'd be stuck for 200 years with the very creative minds of the Greeks, even. You know, you think that whatever is must be somewhere. Even somewhere doesn't exist, right?

[53:09] You know, if you like the Russian astronauts during the communist days when they went up there, you know, there's no God up here. They're waving back there there's no God here. Like you've got to be. up there in place in some place, right? You know, I mean, you know, and it's very hard, you know. I told you years ago, you know, I had a, I had a, actually seminary in class, right?

[53:35] And he's kind of puzzled about the angels, you know. So I told you, he asked me, you know, do do angels really exist? I said they're more real than you are. The guy was a seminarian, right? You know, and just these immaterial things is kind of hard for them to, you know. I remember one time my my cousin Donald, you know, was a philosopher, arguing with his mother.

[53:58] You know, you know that God doesn't have a body, right? And so, you know, oh, this doesn't make it. He gets so frustrated. So I mean, even if you have the faith, you know, it's hard to to to think about this, right? Huh? You know.

[54:15] One of the earliest religious discussions, you know, remember they're saying the cow just as a little finger could make the world, you know, something like that, you know. This stuff kind of thinking, you know, a little bit. What you say? Um, as Boethius will say, there in the kind of the Trinity, there that the you talk about God, you can't try to imagine the way God is, right?

[54:39] Because if you try to imagine God, who's not imaginable, you're going to have a false imagination. That's where people are, right? It's very hard, huh? To transcend that.

[54:54] It's kind of marvelous the difference there between, say, work of Summa Theologiae, which kind of presupposes, you know, philosophical training and years of things and years of things, and the difference between the order in which the Summa Theologiae proceeds and the order in which the Bible proceeds, huh?

[55:15] Because if you go to the to the most important books, the greatest books of the Bible, the four Gospels, right? And of course, the Gospels that emphasize more the humanity of Christ come before the Gospel of John, right? Right. And so, but also in the professions of faith, you know, I mean, the whole church is is built on Peter's profession of faith, and Peter says, "What? Thou art the Christ, the Son of Living God.

[55:45] " So he he ascends from the what human nature of Christ, whereby he's anointed, to his divine nature, right? And you know, and Christ says, you know, I am in the way, the truth, and the life. Well, as man, he's the way. As God, he's the end, the truth of life. But notice the order: says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life. " Same order that you have in Peter's confession of faith, huh?

[56:16] You know, important. Peter and John are for the confession of faith, huh? And these are two apostles running to the the tomb there, right? The resurrection, so on. And you see how close they are in the gospel and in the you know the trial of Christ, even right?

[56:35] But John has at the end of his gospel almost exact confession of faith that Peter has. He says, "These are written that you might believe that that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, right? " The same order there. You know, you go from the human nature to the divine nature, right? But that's also the order of the four gospels, right? So Matthew, Mark, and Luke, especially Matthew, emphasizes the human nature of Christ, and then John, more the divine.

[57:10] So that same order, right? But now in the Summa Theologiae, God in His divine nature, the existence of God and the divine nature and the Trinity, and so on—all that's in the prima pars of the Summa Theologiae, right? And and the incarnation is in the tertia pars, right? So the order in that sense is kind of the reverse, huh? Okay. Now, of course, it's kinda anticipated there—the order of the Summa in the Gospel of Saint John, right?

[57:41] The Gospel of John begins with the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God, and the Word was God, right? And then a little bit later on, we're told, and the Word was made flesh, you know. So there, you are starting with the divine and descending to the what? So it's not like there's no basis for Thomas's order, right? But? But nevertheless, the order that Thomas has is more like the order in John's gospel, right?

[58:06] But that's the last gospels. There is a reason why it's the last one, right? You know, so you kind of you led the human nature to the divine nature. I think the councils did that too. When the councils. wanted to make sure the heresies would stop. They said he was human, but he was divine. Did they say divine or human? divine. True, God true man True God and true man So the councils that went away You can jump Yeah, yeah.

[58:34] " The councils, Yeah, Chalcedon Yeah yeah yeah True God Yeah. But since we kind of led to the divine nature of Christ through his human nature, right? So, the sensible, right? I mean,

[58:51] that's what you have in philosophy, right? But you start with the study, the sensible, right? Now the things that are, some are by nature, and some are by other causes, and the main other cause is by art. You know, then there is some reference to, like, chance, and what is that? You know, that's some more obscure thing, right? But manifestly, almost everything around us seems to be either by nature or by art, and that's where we begin, right?

[59:16] And then later on, we'll come to to God as a cause, and so on. Kind of interesting if you read Thomas's commentary there in that chapter that I was referring to earlier today, the chapter on the perfection of God. I mean, perfection rather. He gives these three names of perfect, you know. Then later on, he distinguishes between the perfection of the creature and perfection of God. And it's really kind of amazing, Thomas sees what Aristotle is doing there, right?

[59:46] And and the difference is that the creature is perfect when he lacks nothing belonging to his kind, and God is perfect in lacking nothing.

[1:00:01] That's just perfect in his kind, right? You know, so you could you could say that Homer is what He's a perfect poet, He's, not the perfect philosopher. He's not the perfect cook, but he's a perfect poet, huh? He's lacking nothing that a poet should have, but God's lacking nothing. You know, so he says Thomas describes it universally perfect.

[1:00:35] Like when he says to to Moses and people like that, sometimes you know, "Follow me, and I will show you every good. " Thomas says, "That is myself. " That's kind of

[1:00:50] interesting. Aristotle saw that distinction, right? God is perfect simply without qualification. Creature is perfect in his kind. Perfect chair. Perfect. painting. What was the third meaning of perfect again? We had the first one as that has all. First meaning of perfect is what has all its parts, right? Okay, perfect or complete. Then, what has all parts has the whole ability of its kind, right? Yes. Yeah, yeah.

[1:01:29] That's kind of interesting because when they were discovering the greatness of Shakespeare, right, and and John Dryden, Dryden, who was became a poet laureate of England, right, he describes, you know, as a young man, you'd see more plays of Fletcher and Beaumont than of Shakespeare and so on. But as you saw these plays more, and you realize how much greater Shakespeare was than Fletcher, and the way he described it was, he says Fletcher was but a limb of Shakespeare.

[1:01:55] It's beautifully said, right? Like an arm or a leg of Shakespeare, right? See, but now you're already to the second sense, right? That Shakespeare has the whole ability, the whole power of a poet, right? His plots, his characters, his his words, right? He's got the whole power there, right? See, that's a little different than having all your parts. not missing an arm or a leg, right? See, that's the second sense of perfect, right?

[1:02:24] Um. Then the third sense of perfect is what has reached its end. Okay. So the first two meanings are like the whole is said to be perfect, but the whole and the parts it's composed of, are the whole ability. Okay.

[1:02:45] So sometimes I simplify and say that the perfect means the whole or the end, right? To have reached to, but to some extent you can say the end is more fundamental, because in a way the whole is the end of the part. The part is for the sake of the whole, right? That's kind of the basic statement, then. You could say it's a little more abstract, you say the perfect is better than the imperfect, the complete than the incomplete.

[1:03:16] But then, it's a little more concrete to say, the whole is better than the part, and most people would agree with that. You said that right, better you have the whole car out there, and it's part of the car, right? And your whole dinner, not just part of your dinner, and the whole of the ballpoint pen, not just part of the ballpoint pen, you know, the whole of the whole glasses, you know, and not just a part of them.

[1:03:35] And it's pretty obvious, right? But then, a little more subtle. The end is also better than the. That's the sake of the end, right? The thing is perfect when it reaches its end, its goal. The Philosopher is perfect when he when he reaches wisdom, right? When he has geometry, start. But the thing about Aristotle too is you know you might say Aristotle is a perfect philosopher you know Thomas would call him the philosopher right.

[1:04:11] But what you see in Aristotle is the whole power of the philosopher. Both the practical philosopher, like we're seeing a little bit of here, but also the looking philosopher. He's also called the father of logic, right? And what's kind of amazing in Aristotle, I mean, you read like say, wisdom where you're talking about all things in general, it's very abstract in one sense. We're reading about logic and the syllogism, very abstract, and then you have the fifth book of the Politics, which is how governments, revolutions take place, and you know Aristotle has researched 150 of the Greek city states.

[1:04:47] You know, I mean, you know, and you have he's doing anatomy, and you can see what a complete and balanced mind this was. Plato doesn't have been that balanced. Aristotle has, so Aristotle, in this, is the is a complete or perfect philosopher. The first philosophers, now you had the emphasis upon natural philosophy and geometry, and then with Socrates you turn to ethics and political philosophy. But Aristotle brings them all together.

[1:05:21] You know, he is both of them. So he's he's the he's got the whole power of the philosopher. It's kind of amazing to see that. So he's a perfect philosopher, in second sense of perfect, just like Homer is a perfect poet, or Shakespeare is a perfect poet, or Mozart is a perfect musician, you know. Now it's going up. You know, I used to think Beethoven was you know the greatest, you know, but you know even singers say that Beethoven didn't know how to write for the human voice.

[1:05:55] But you know, compare you know Mozart. You know, I mean, the opera, every particular form Mozart does it perfectly. I mean, he adapts himself in the way he writes to the piano, the way he writes to the clarinet, and he writes to the trumpet, horn. You know, each instrument he he excels it. Knows exactly how to do it, so he's the complete. He's the perfect musician, Mozart.

[1:06:19] Like Homer is a perfect poet, Aristotle is a perfect philosopher, you know. But it's like too, you know, when when Pius XII is talking about Thomas, you know, and how you can't read Thomas without knowing Thomas' commentary on the Gospel of Saint John, you know. Some people might know the Summa Theologiae, right? But not the commentary on John, you know. And if Thomas had just written works like the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, and hadn't written his his commentary