Ethics
10. Aristotle's Proemium to the Ethics: The Highest End, Method and Fit Hearers
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[0:00] New technology here. New technician, new technology. Missing somebody there. I'll show you next. Okay. Keep it back; it's real sensitive. So, what is the

[0:30] editorial and reference division of the Nicomachean Ethics? Well, the editorial and reference division is into ten books, and these books are some editions divided into chapters, right? In Thomas's commentary; they're divided into lexios or readings, right?

[1:03] Because sometimes you see the Becker numbers down to the verse, almost of the sentence. Now, what is the logical and understandable division of the Nicomachean Ethics? Yes,

[1:23] it's starting. It's asking the question, "What man's end is?" So it starts with a slight, a short discussion as to the nature of man's end. Well,

[1:37] a logical and understandable division is usually into two or three parts. Okay, we talk about that rule of two or three in logic sometimes, huh?

[1:57] And almost all Aristotle's books, a logical and understandable division is into two. And if I can compare it to something more known, it's like the logical and understandable division of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet.

[2:22] What is the logical and understandable division of Romeo and Juliet by William Shakespeare? Into two or three. Three. Did they go by? Go by geography, where the where the acts took place. Am I thinking of the summer's night's dream? No, Romeo and Juliet by William Shakespeare has a prologue and then the play, right? Okay, so the logical. An understandable division of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet is in the prologue and play, right?

[3:13] Now the play is usually divided into two, tying the knots and untying the knots, right? Okay. Now almost every work of Aristotle's, and you'll see this in Thomas's commentary on them. You see it in his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics. You'd see it in his commentary on the Metaphysics. Almost every work of Aristotle's is divided logically and understandably into two parts. The proemium, as it's called in Greek, which is a Greek word meaning paving the way, and then, which may call the main body of the work.

[3:56] In Latin, they call that the tractatus, the drawing out. Okay. And the proemium usually occupies the beginning of the first book. So you divide the beginning of the first book that contains the proemium against the rest of that book and all the other books. That's the logical and understandable division. Now, if you know the prologue to Romeo and Juliet,

[4:31] you can see the prologue in a way is preparing the audience, right? For the kind of play that this is going to be. It's a little bit like the overture, right? To an opera, gives you kind of a foretaste of what's it's going to be, huh?

[4:56] Now Aristotle was anticipated in this by none other than Plato himself, huh? Now Plato, as you know, didn't write treatises for the most part. All we have is these dialogues, which are called in Greek the Socratic conversations.

[5:17] But in the work called the Timaeus, right, you're closer to a treatise like Aristotle has. And in the Timaeus, which is the work that Plato is carrying in the famous painting by Raphael that hangs in the Vatican, right? The School of Athens. You've probably seen that painting, right? Where they're coming under the arch. Aristotle is carrying Nicomachean Ethics, and Plato is carrying the the Timaeus. But in the Timaeus, Timaeus is it's named.

[5:47] He does most of the talking, and Socrates listens. But Timaeus gives a proemium first, and then there's a kind of a break there where Socrates praises the excellence of the proemium huh? And then. He had the main discourse of Timaeus about the universe. Okay,

[6:11] so you'll see what I've done here. I've reproduced Aristotle's proemium here, which is in the editorial and reference division. It's in book one, chapters one through three, right? Okay, and then I've attached to that a reading, a central reading in book one, where Aristotle is drawing a line around the end purpose of man, right? Okay.

[6:48] Now, the most important thing, usually in a proemium, is what they call in Greek the scopos, which means the target, what you're aiming at, right?

[7:04] In Latin, they say it more abstractly, the intentio libri huh The, intention of the book, the aim, the goal, right? But that sometimes will involve an elaboration of the importance of what you're aiming at, right? And if it's not too difficult, maybe even something about how we're going to go about it. Okay. Now,

[7:35] one thing that's common to the proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics here, which in a way is a proemium to the whole of practical philosophy,

[7:47] because the ethics, in a way, contains the elements of political philosophy, and the proemium to the to wisdom that Aristotle has at the beginning of the Metaphysics, I have it with me too, but I'm not going to give it to you. yet. Um, that both of these proemia unlike many other proemia, have an epilogue at the end, where Aristotle recounts what he's done in the proemia. Now it's interesting when Thomas gives us the logical and understandable division of these proemia.

[8:30] He gives a division of the proemium to wisdom into two parts, but a division of the proemium to practical philosophy into what three parts, huh? And of course, at the end of the proemium to wisdom, Aristotle recounts two things he's done,

[8:50] and at the end of the proemium to ethics or practical philosophy, he recounts the three things he's done. But in both cases. He recounts them, going back in time. So he recounts the, and here the third thing he did, then the second thing, and then finally the first thing he did, right? In the in the epilogue of the proemium to wisdom he recalls the second, right? Thing he did, and then the first thing he did, right?

[9:24] Okay. I think I mentioned how Dei Verbum in Vatican II has a proemium, right? When I first saw Dei Verbum, I saw it in an English translation, and they called it an introduction, the translator, right? And then someone gave me a copy of the Vatican II documents in Latin, which is the official text, right? And so I looked at. The proemium non-Latin it doesn't say introductio, it says premium.

[10:05] See, and I'm particularly fond of that premium. I think it's a magnificent premium, you know, to the proemium. It's the one on divine revelation, right there in scripture. So,

[10:20] but you know, a premium is something very small compared not only to the body of the work, but to what you'd call an introduction, right? In college, you know, we have a lot of courses in different departments that call it introduction to economics, introduction to sociology, or you know, and and introduction means what? A leading in, right? You know, see, my premium is something shorter. You know, not leading you into the subject, but saying what you're aiming at, and something maybe about how you're going to go about it, and so on.

[10:55] Now, if you look at the on page three there, that sentence in the top of page three is the last sentence in the premium, and that's the epilogue where Aristotle recalls, right, the third thing he's just done, and then the thing he did before that, and finally the first thing. Okay,

[11:24] let this much about the hearer who is or is not a suitable hearer of these teachings. That's the third thing he does in the premium. How it should be received? That's the second thing he does.

[11:42] Okay, and that's touching upon how you have to proceed in ethics. Okay, but then the first thing he did, what we propose, right? The skopos, right? What we're aiming at, Let that pave the way, and and therefore he has the word proemium there, paved the way. The verb form prooidopoiesai, I think it is. Let this pave the way, right? So now, if you look at Thomas's commentary, he'll say he does three things in the premium: right, firstly, shows what he's aiming at; then, how we're going to proceed; and then, finally, who is or is not a suitable hearer of this teaching.

[12:22] Okay, do you see that? Now, that first part, what we're aiming at, he's going to be saying they're aiming chiefly at what the end of man, right? The purpose of human life, huh? Into what science does this belong? Okay, he's going to lead up to that thing gradually to help us see what that is, huh? Okay.

[12:57] So let's start to look at the text here now, chapter one. He says, "Every art and every science, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim at some good."

[13:19] As Thomas will explain the commentary, there he's giving a kind of induction, right? Does the art of carpentry aim at some good? Yeah. Does the art of cooking aim at some good? Does the art of the tailor aim at some good? The art of the watchmaker, right? Okay. And every science aims at some knowledge, right? And that's something good, right? And every action you do for the sake of something good, at least it seems good to you, right?

[13:49] And you try to choose what is good, right? Okay. They all seem aim at some good, right? Whence it has been well said, he says, that the good is what all desire. Okay. The good is what all want, huh? Yeah. So he's kind of manifesting by induction that first definition of the good, right? Okay.

[14:14] Now, I've already done this for you, but if I was, you know, starting with this text, right, I might make a kind of a excursion at this point, right, and say, okay, now is that a definition by cause or by effect, right? And we raised that question before, right? Is it good because we want it, or do we want it because it is good? Aristotle doesn't go into that question at this point, right?

[14:46] Although he knows the answer to it, right? But it's kind of a good, you know, excursion to make, right? But we've done that already, right?

[15:02] But a difference of ends, he says, is seen, for some are acts, while others are products beyond these. So if I go to the what art museum to see the beautiful paintings, my end is simply to see these things, right? But if I'm making what a chair or a table, there's something beyond the making, namely the chair or the table itself, huh? So sometimes the end is an activity like seeing.

[15:37] If I put on a Mozart symphony, I'm not going to make something. but I'm just going to hear it, right? Okay. But if I get out the spaghetti, I'm going to make spaghetti, right? Okay.

[15:54] Now, where there are ends in addition to the acts, when there's a product, right? In these, the products are better than the acts. So, a chair is better than what? Making a chair, right? Okay. Because the ultimate end there is not the making a chair, but the chair itself. In the case of seeing a beautiful painting or hearing the beautiful music, the end is no product, but the seeing itself, the hearing itself, right?

[16:23] Okay. He's pointing out a difference, right, between these things. So, now he's going to start to talk about an order among these goods or ends that the different arts and sciences aim at, right? And corresponding to that, an order among the arts or sciences. But first of all, he points out that as there are many different arts and sciences, so there are many different goods being aimed at, right?

[16:54] Since there are many acts in arts and sciences, there come to be many ends. And he gives some examples, right? For medicine, the end is what? Health. Of the art of shipbuilding, the end is the ship. Of the military art, victory, right? Well, Douglas MacArthur would agree with that, right? MacArthur said, "What? In war, there's no substitute for victory." Right. That's the right end. But now this last example, Aristotle doesn't agree with.

[17:29] And Thomas will point out how subtle Aristotle is. But that's a common thought in this time. And of the household art, well, Aristotle will point out later on that wealth is only a means, right? It's not the end of the household art. But he gives sometimes examples acceptable to his audience before he's determined the truth about those matters. He does it more more than once. This is one of the first times I remember Thomas or noticing Thomas pointing this out.

[17:57] How careful, Aristotle writes sometimes. Okay. But now he's going to go to the order that there is among these what goods the different arts aim at, and a corresponding order among the what arts or sciences. Because sometimes the end aimed at by one art or by one action, right, is for the sake of a good aimed at by some other art or some other science. In which case, one art or one science comes under the other and is commanded by it, huh?

[18:37] Now, when many of these come under one power, as the art of bridle making or saddle making, right, is under horsemanship, right, and whatever other arts are about the instruments for riding horses. In this and every other military act. Under the military art, okay. We might say, you know, the example, the art of making a rifle, right? Is for the sake of a rifle, right? But the rifle is for the sake of what?

[19:12] The soldier, right? Okay. So the military art, in that sense, is going to command the art of making rifles, huh? And you know, sometimes these rifles out there they jam and so on, right? You know, when the when the Germans got into Russia there in the Second World War, the German guns are much more precise than the Russian ones, but they froze up. They weren't suitable for the circumstances, right?

[19:39] So if you see a defect out in the field there, then they start to make their guns more like the Russian guns. Kind of funny that's what actually happened, huh? But there are many examples of you know people having problems with certain guns or some other things. So just as the gun is for the sake of the, you know, fighting, right? So the art of making guns is. Under the art of what, fighting the military art, huh?

[20:08] In the same way, others come under others, right? Okay. Now the example I always give in class there is the the art of the medical doctor and the art of the pharmacist, right? And the art of the pharmacist is aiming at a good called medicine, right? And the medical art is aiming at the good called health, right? Now is there a connection between health and medicine? Yeah.

[20:35] The medicine is for the sake of health, right? Well, then the art of the pharmacist comes under the what? Medical, art, right? And in fact, the medical art will command the art of the pharmacist. And what we call prescription, in a way, is an order from the man who possesses or practices the medical art to the the pharmacist, right? And the pharmacist, as such, doesn't have to know why you're getting the medicine.

[21:08] He may happen to know, but that's not what makes him a pharmacist. What he has to know is how to make the medicine that the doctor tells him to give me, right? Okay. So Aristotle is saying that just as there are many arts and sciences and many different acts, right? So there are many goods or ends being aimed at by these different arts or sciences or in these different actions, right?

[21:34] But where one of these goods or ends aimed at comes under another one, then the art or science that is about the one that comes under another one comes under that other art or science, huh? Okay. And in a sense, is commanded by that the other one. Makes sense, huh?

[22:00] And so if I'm the great chef, right? And you work in the kitchen there, peeling the potatoes. I tell you how I want the potatoes cut tonight. It's not yours to question. Why? But to cut the potatoes the way I tell you, because I know what I'm making tonight. I want them cut this way tonight. you see? Okay.

[22:24] Made chicken picato last night, Sam. But now you got to pound the chicken, you know, make it thin. You know, we do that, right? You see? You see it's like a scalopini. So you prepare the raw material, right? In a different way, right? And I may tell you to do that, right? Okay. I want to cut this way. I want it hammered out or something, right? Okay.

[22:47] So in that sense, the art of the of the potato peeler comes under the art of the what? Chef, right? My father's company made farm wagons, huh? Okay.

[23:08] Well, the farm wagon gets out on the what farm, and it's loaded and so on. The farmland is not like the highways, not smooth, so the farm wagon bends like that. Well, sometimes the what steel will snap underneath, huh? Then you have a mad farmer, you know. So, but my father would always put enough steel in there, right, huh? But then he tells the people who produce the steel what size he wants the steel and what shape he wants it, right?

[23:45] And they obey him, right? And so, in that sense, you can say the steel is for the sake of the wagon, in the same way my father's company would order wood from the people who prepare lumber, right? He wants a certain kind of lumber and a certain size and so on, right? Okay. So, if the lumber and the steel for the sake of the wagon, then the art that makes the wagon commands the arts that prepare the wood or prepare the what steel, right?

[24:18] I dropped one little steel on my toe one time. Had to take me to the hospital and sew me up. Anyway, so you could multiply your examples of that, right? The pharmacist coming under the medical doctor and so on.

[24:42] Now he says, in all these cases, the ends of the chief arts. Now he's calling the chief art the art which aims at the good to which other goods are subordinate, right? In all these, the ends of the chief arts are more desirable than all those of the arts under them. So health is more desirable than medicine, right, huh? The grand meal is more desirable than the potatoes, right?

[25:09] For the latter are pursued for the sake of the former. Now here you're getting into the idea. The second thing I was teaching I was teaching you that the good is what all want, right? And then we onto the question, what is better, right? And the main statement we learned about what is better in general is that the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, right?

[25:31] So if the good of one art is for the sake of the good of another art, right? And the one that aims at the

[25:42] non-subordinate good, right, is the chief art, right? But it's aiming at a greater good because the other one is desired for the sake of it.

[25:53] So the wagon is better than the steel or the the lumber. So the house is better, right? Than the the wood or the number. For the latter, are pursued for the sake of the former. And as far as this is concerned, he says it makes no difference whether the acts themselves are the ends, right?

[26:17] The acts or something besides it, some kind of product, right? Okay, as in the said what sciences, right? Okay. So these things here are not for the sake of a product, although they are a product themselves, right? They're for the sake of the act of seeing, right? So I can see the the painting, right? Okay.

[26:42] But then manufacturing a medicine is for the sake of what medicine, right? Okay. Now, why is he talked about all these things, Aristotle? Right. Because he wants to lead up to what we're aiming at in practical philosophy. We're aiming at a a good, right? Which is not for the sake of some other good, right? But other goods are for the sake of it, right? We're seeking a knowledge, right?

[27:18] Therefore, that is going to be most of all the chief art. Is going to aim at that good that is not subordinate to some further good.

[27:30] If there is some end, right? Of what we do, that we will for itself, right? And other things for it. And we do not choose all things for the sake of something else. Okay. I

[27:51] see. Sometimes you choose one thing for the sake of something else. We choose medicine for the sake of health. And we may choose health for the sake of happiness or something, right? But is everything chosen for the sake of something else?

[28:08] Well, if this were so, it would go on without end, he said, right? So that our desire would be empty and foolish, right? You'd always be pursuing something further before anything you've pursued so far is desirable. You always be pursuing something else to make desirable everything that you pursued up to this point.

[28:33] Now we could go on and elaborate in this, you know, the difficulties of this. As we said before, if I desire, let's say, A for the sake of B,

[28:49] I can't even desire A unless I first desire B, right? And if I desire B also for the sake of something else, like C, I can't desire B or A until I desired C.

[29:08] How would I begin to desire if everything was desired for the sake of something else? Because I could never desire anything until I desired something else. So how am I going to begin to desire? So there must be something that I desire, but not for the sake of anything further.

[29:31] Plato talks about this in the what Symposium, right? Okay, and very often we name it happiness, right? Not knowing exactly what happiness is. So if there's something that we desire, and it must be something we desire, not for the sake of anything else, but just for its own sake, this will be knowing the good, but the what? The best, he says, right? Because the end is always best. better Than what is for the sake of it, right?

[30:03] So if B is the, if in my example here, if B is the end of A, if A is desired for the sake of B, then B is more desirable and better than A. And if B is desired for the sake of C, then C must be better than B, as well, say, right? But if C is not desired for the sake of anything further, then C must be the best in this whole.

[30:32] So that's we're going to be talking about, right, in this book. Would not then the knowledge of this way greatly upon life? He says.

[30:42] It's understatement, isn't it? It's like Thomas will talk about Aristotle, you know, being very modest in what he say. And just as arch is having a target, will we not hit more upon what is right? Okay. If everything we do in life is done for the sake of something,

[31:05] wouldn't knowing this have a great influence upon what we do in life? And knowing it, wouldn't we be more able to hit it? You know, if you aim at the target, you might miss. If you don't even aim at the target, what are your chances of what? Hitting it, yeah. Odds are, odds are greater that you'll miss. Yeah, you might say, for you know, if I don't aim it at the target, you could say, for all practical purposes, I'm going to miss it.

[31:33] So if you don't know the end or purpose of life, how can you aim at it? If you don't aim at it, how are you going to get it, right? So it's a very practical thing to know what the end or purpose of life is.

[31:46] Now, when Thomas is talking about the theological virtues, right? He says, by faith, we know what the end is. By hope, he says, we what tend towards that end. And by charity, he says, we're already in a way united to that end.

[32:12] And that's why charity is greater than hope, but hope is greater than what faith. But you have to have the faith, right? Otherwise, you can't get the the hope with the charity.

[32:26] So notice in that sentence, would not then the knowledge of this weigh greatly upon life? And just as arch is having a target, will we not hit more upon what is right? Aristotle is kind of elaborating there upon the importance of knowing the end of human life, huh?

[32:47] If this is so, then he says, right? We ought to try to get hold of an outline what this is. That's already anticipating what he's going to be doing in the first book, trying to draw a line around what this is. And to which of the sciences or powers it what it belongs, right? Okay. Now, in the last paragraph on page one, he's going to say, "Well, to what art or science does it belong, really, to know the end or purpose of human life?"

[33:21] Well, he's going back and using what he's shown already that the art or science which is about the end commands and directs, in some sense, the art or science which is about the what means, right? Now, is there some art or science Aristotle says that in a way directs us in all the other arts or sciences? And he's going to argue that the what political art does this, okay?

[33:54] And so, you know, sometimes they close down what restaurants in the city here, huh? Too many cockroaches or something, right? Um, so even the art of cooking in some way comes under the command of the city, right? The art of driving a car, that license there issued by the state of Massachusetts, right? Can I go downtown here and set up offices there as a dentist, or you know, right?

[34:31] No, to some extent they control who may or may not practice the the medical art, right? Okay. And they may, you know, decide to draft me and say you're going to practice the military art for a while, okay? And even when when the president of Assumption College confers the degrees upon you know, if you listen to you know the graduation ceremony, in virtue of the authority invested in me by the state of Massachusetts and the board of trustees is a whole, formula he uses, right?

[35:03] And he confers degrees, right? So you say Assumption College is authorized to teach, you know, and to grant degrees, bachelor degrees or master degrees, whatever it is, you say. So all the other arts or sciences, in some way, come under the command of the what the city, right? Who may or may not practice these things, right?

[35:31] It would seem, then, he says, to belong to the most authoritative knowledge or science, and the one that is most of all chief art that commands other ones, right? And such is clearly what the political knowledge, the political art, for this sets in order which sciences are needed in cities, huh? What sort each shall learn up to what point? So all kinds of requirements as to how far you have to go in school, right?

[36:01] What you have to study in school, somewhat right? Requirements of different arts and so on. And we see the most honored of powers among the Greeks, right, are under this as the military art, right? So Aristotle must have believed in the subordination of military to the political. But we understand that when we call the President Bush there, the commander and what chief, right? Okay. So the military art is aiming at victory, but victory is subordinated to the good of the what city or nation, right?

[36:36] So the military, the political art that aims at the good of the city or nation, commands the what military art, right? The household art, right, with all kinds of laws about marriage and so on, right? And where you have to teach your children and so on, right? So even the practice of the household art in some way comes under the direction of the state, right? He mentions the art of speech because you have what force and persuasion in the city, right?

[37:06] You can get people to do what they should do either by persuading them—that's the art of speech—or else you can force them by the military art, the police art. Can't force everybody, so you got to persuade some of them. Okay.

[37:30] Thus, using the rest of the practical sciences, and further ordaining by law what one ought to do and what stay away from, the end of this science must then embrace those of other sciences, so that this will be the good of man, right? Okay. And that's the way he's reasoning there, right? He's saying you can reason either way. You can say the art there is a chief art, the art that aims at the end rather than the means, right?

[38:03] Is going to command the art that aims at the means, right? So if you see that medicine is for the sake of health, right, then you can see that the art of the pharmacist is subordinated to the art of the medical doctor, right? But vice versa, if you see that the medical art, the physician commands the pharmacist, right? That's a sign that the good that the pharmacist is aiming at is subordinated to the good that the

[38:38] medical art is about, right? Well, if we see that the political art in some way commands the practice of all the other arts and sciences, and who may practice them or not, right? You won't let me practice the medical art, you know? If I set up an office downtown, see, playing Burlesque dentist, right? Far from screams of my patients, they'll be down there pretty soon, closing me up, right?

[39:05] Maybe hauling off to jail, right? I'm not authorized by the state of Massachusetts to practice the art of dentistry. I wouldn't recommend that you go to me if I if I try to do it. But I mean, the state's going to, you know, so you cannot practice that, right? Okay.

[39:20] Um. So once you understand that, then if you see that the political art does command all the other arts and sciences in some way, it must be aiming at the good to which all the other goods aimed at by the other arts and sciences are subordinate, and that's the good that is desired not for the sake of anything further, but for its own sake, right? Okay. Is this what he's doing?

[39:47] Okay. So he's in a sense saying what this is all about, right? Say, this is going to be chiefly about the end or purpose of man, of human life. Or to put it a little differently, it's about the end or good that is desired for its own sake, but not for the sake of anything else. But everything else, for the sake of it, and it pertains in some way.

[40:13] It's a kind of foundation, at least, of what the political art, because that's the art that commands all the other arts. Okay. Now, in the first complete paragraph on page two,

[40:34] he says, "For if this end, happiness, is the same for one man in the city, nevertheless, he says it is better and more perfect to achieve and preserve that of the city." Right. For it is worthy of love, he says, it's lovable when done for one man only. If I help one man, my son or my brother or my friend, right? If I help one man to be happy, that's lovable, he says.

[41:06] That's desirable, right? Okay. But is more beautiful, he says, and godlike when done for a nation and for a city. Right. Okay. And notice Thomas will remark upon that. Why is it more godlike? Well, God acts for the good of the whole universe, right? Well, you and I can't do that, right? But when we act for the good of the whole city, we're more godlike than when we act for the good of just one individual.

[41:36] But even that's lovable, right? Okay. And sometimes you can do more for an individual than you can do for a city, right? But nevertheless, it's more beautiful and godlike, right, to do it for a city, huh? Okay.

[41:54] So you see a man like, you know, Saint Benedict or somebody, right, who who set this rule of life, right, whereby what he achieves a happiness for a whole group of people, right, huh? You know, it's more it's more godlike, huh? As we go to the statues there around the Vatican, there, right? You know, the the square there, piazza, in front of Saint Peter's, right? Those the founders' orders, I guess, mainly around there.

[42:30] That reminds me of the definition that Socrates gives of philosophy in the Theaetetus, huh? Where he says that philosophy is becoming like God so far as possible for man. Okay. So you can see that reference to the godlike here, right? You'll see that same reference to wisdom being godlike, right? When Aristotle gives the premium to wisdom. So,

[43:08] in one way, practical philosophy is trying to be like God, especially the political philosophy. And another way, looking philosophy and looking wisdom, wisdom in the full sense, is trying to be like God. Okay, so it's very interesting what the Greeks say there.

[43:31] So he says the knowledge then aims at these things, being something what political, being a form of political knowledge. Now that's the end of the first part of the premium, right? Where he's mainly saying what are we after in this book, right? Or after trying to know, right? The end or purpose, huh? That is not subordinate any further end, right? We're trying to find out what is best in human life, right?

[44:03] What therefore could be said to be the end of human life, the end or purpose of man, right? And this knowledge could be considered to be the foundation of political philosophy, right? Not that our politicians know it, but that means they have no foundation, right? You see. You ever read the life of Alfred the Great? You know he's a very impressive man, huh? In England, huh?

[44:36] Very impressive. Yeah, he had interest, you know, in in the theoretical life too, and and you know, not just so much being able to pursue it, he was so involved in in the disorders of the day, you know, but but you know, getting people to read Boethius and so on. It's um very impressive man, but anyway, okay. You know when they fought the Danes. Yeah. Okay. Now,

[45:06] the second part is how do you go about this, right? Or how should one try to study these things, to speak of these things, huh?

[45:16] And Aristotle begins with the basic principle, right? Enough will be said if it is made clear according to the underlying matter. This is the basic principle that

[45:32] Plato already announces in the Timaeus, right? In the Timaeus, in his Discourse, does huh? That your way of considering something ought to fit what you are what considering, right?

[45:48] And your way of knowing ought to fit the thing you're trying to know, huh? So if I'm going to know the music of Mozart, I'm going to use my ears. If I'm going to know the paintings of Titian, I'm going to use my eyes, right, huh? Want to know the excellence of the wine? I'm going to use my nose and my tongue, right? Primarily, color can be admired to the wine, but you don't really ever need to judge a wine or to know it until you smell it and taste it, right?

[46:20] Okay. When you get a good wine, it's different. Say, I know it's good even if I haven't tasted. But you can't, you know, sound. You know, sounds like good wine.

[46:34] No. So what way is is suitable to this matter, right? And Aristotle descends to the question of even certitude ought not to be sought in like manner in speaking about all things. He makes a beautiful comparison, just as neither in the products of the arts.

[47:10] Now, if you are doing the busts of the presidents out there in South Dakota, right? Can you be as exact as someone, you know, drawing their likeness on a piece of paper? If you're blowing up rocks, you know, you can't be as precise with that material, right? You can't expect the same precision there. Okay, that's a beautiful comparison Aristotle is making. You can't be as precise or exact or certain in every matter, right?

[47:49] Okay. You're asking me earlier there about when the wife brings home something, and what are you supposed to say? You see, and it's not as clear here, right? As things might be, say, in geometry, huh, or something, huh?

[48:13] Aristotle shows that there's much uncertitude in these matters, but there is much difference, he says, right? In error about good and just things, which political knowledge considers.

[48:31] So that they seem to be by custom only. Now, this is not Aristotle's position, right? But he's pointing out that some people think that, right? Which is a sign that the matter is not as certain as, say, the matter of geometry. Okay. So that they seem to be by custom only and not by nature.

[48:57] And there is much error. About good things, due to many being harmed as a result of them. For some have perished through wealth. So, is it good to be wealthy? Someone says it's good to be wealthy. Yeah, but maybe they kidnap your kid so they can get ransom, right? They kidnap your wife or something, right? Or Lindbergh gets his, you know, baby, you know. Okay, so is it good to be wealthy?

[49:27] So they're not going to kidnap my kid because I don't have any money to give them, right? So it seems, on the one hand, that it's good to be wealthy. But Aristotle announces, I mean, he he buys his son an airplane, and his son crashes in the Athens airport, and he's got no son. I still got my son, but that's because I wasn't wealthy enough to buy him an airplane.

[49:52] He said, "Me, so some have perished. They've been killed because."Their wealth, so is wealth something good? There's an ambiguity there, right? You can't be too precise about these things, huh? And others have what perished through their courage, right?

[50:14] Okay. My mother's always warning you know when you're trying to lift something heavy, you know, be careful, you know, because maybe you know you can. She knows people who strain and hurt themselves trying to lift something too heavy, right? So maybe a strong man will try to lift something that a weaker man would not. As a result, he gets unstrung, right? And right. So is it good?

[50:44] The woman is beautiful, so she gets raped or stoned by the pirates or something, right? So it's good to be beautiful, you know. The plain girl got left, and not hurt. You see. And there seems to be something

[51:01] imprecise about these human goods, huh? We should be content, therefore, he says, in speaking about such things and from such things to show the truth. What? Roughly, right? Now, when Thomas elaborates on this, showing the truth roughly, huh? He says that

[51:35] part of this is that you're applying something what universal and simple to something that is what singular and complicated or composed of many things.

[51:54] And in speaking about such things and from such things as are for the most part to conclude such as are the same, right? Now you know the standard example, huh? Should you return what you borrowed?

[52:09] Okay, but now I borrowed your gun, right? Huh? And now you want your gun back, and you're you're mad at your wife or something. You see, somebody. Maybe shouldn't you know? Maybe you shouldn't misplace your gun or something? Right. There are times I shouldn't give you back your gun, right? Okay. And should you ever go through a red light? Should you go through red light? No, stop red light, right?

[52:37] I think the answer you give when you take your driving exam. Well, there are times you should go through a red light. You know, when I go to Assumption there sometimes at Salisbury and Park, you know, the the lights are frozen or whatever it is, and everybody stops, stop, stop, and stop, and the red light is there. What do you do? Well, common sense would tell you, you know, you see the caution after certain times that there is something wrong with the the thing, right?

[53:06] So, at times, when you should go through a red light, right? And maybe there is some kinds of emergencies where you might you might do this, huh?

[53:15] So, can you give a rule? Always return what you borrowed, huh? Let's see, we're at the party, you know, and we need some more drinks, and so you lend me your keys, so I can drive your car and get some more booze for us, and so on. I come back, you want your keys back because you want to go home, but I can see that you you've had too much.

[53:33] Well, maybe I shouldn't return your car now, huh? Even though you demand this is your car, maybe it's not the thing to do now. No, so these things are not. They're not absolutes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Should I marry an un-Catholic. What do you think?

[54:05] Ordinarily no. Yeah, ordinary, no, right? You know, my mother married an un-Catholic, so I ended up okay. But someone want to make a universal rule? because I wouldn't be here. Yeah. That explains what my father said when he heard your name. That's Scandinavian. They're not Catholic. Yeah, that happened when my wife went to tell the parish priest. You know, I know that you would get, you know, engaged and so on.

[54:36] And so on. Oh, oh, fine, wonderful, wonderful. What's young man's name? And we really worked it out. Oh, he thinks that health and philosophy, see, because they don't realize that influenced maybe as a young boy, Thomas.

[55:10] So, and I was in the military school, right? Huh? We used to have federal inspection, right? And the military officers would come from Washington D. C. or someplace, and and you know, your ratings at school depend upon that, right? Yeah. And we had very high rating. You know, we we would get two years college credit for our military training. And my company was

[55:40] the best company, I don't know, drill-wise or something like that. So we were assigned to be the official escort for the military inspectors. And I was, you know, in the position of taking roll, right? Well, this jerk shows up late, and when the whole company is, you know, in dress uniform, they're waiting for the military man to come out from their lunch with the school authorities and so on.

[56:03] And this guy's, you know, scared stiff because he's late and he's gonna. I says, "Stay right here. I'm not gonna mark you late. I won't mark you absent. Stay right here." So when the the military instructor found out later what I'd done, he commended me for my prudence, right? You see, so some of these circumstances, right, we've got to you got to do something, and not do what you normally would do, right?

[56:34] Now he says, in the same way, one should receive each thing said, right? For it belongs to the educated man, huh, to seek certitude. And the Greek word there, akribeia can be translated as certitude, or it can be translated also as precision, right? And either way, it makes sense, right? For it belongs to educated man to seek certitude or precision in each kind of subject to the extent that the nature of the thing admits, huh?

[57:08] Now he gives a beautiful example here from the liberal arts. Now you know the liberal arts involve what the trivium: grammar, logic, and rhetoric, and then the quadrivium, which is geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. And Aristotle takes the most precise thing, the mathematician, right, and then the most loose thing, the rhetorician, in his arguments, right? And for it seems about the same thing to accept the mathematician persuading.

[57:39] If you let the mathematician persuade you by rhetorical argument, you're demanding less precision or less certitude than the subject or matter of mathematics admits, huh? But to demand from the rhetorician the certitude of argument that you find in geometry is to demand more certitude, more certitude than the matter of rhetoric allows, huh? Because rhetoric is about human actions and the singular, and all kinds of exceptions and so on.

[58:17] Um. So in one case you'd be demanding more certitude, and in the other case less certitude than is befitting the matter, huh? Again, that idea, the virtue lies in the middle, right? So I can demand more rigor in the arguments than is possible, right? Huh? See, leading up to the election, right? Huh? I'd see on news broadcasts and so on. There's always new being somebody who's going to win the election, you know, and so on, you know, and.

[58:51] And trying to get the guy to make prediction right, and a lot of times they kind of sidestep it or they qualify it, you know, and so on, right? But even you know things more exact like economics, maybe you read the interviews with the top economists in the U. S. Newsmo Report or someplace like that, and towards the end of the article, it's a economist is saying, barring unforeseen circumstances, the economy should da da da by such and such a date, right?

[59:23] But he's kind of hedging his thing a bit, right? See, and the same way when you talk about what the stock market is going to do, right? Well, I guess some people understand the stock market better than other people, right? But they don't always call it right, huh? And so you're going to demand the precision about the stock market or the economy or who's going to win the election that you can about whether the triangle has interior angles equal to right angles.

[59:54] See, so the rhetorician will use the Example, right? So, if you ask me, you know what's a good Chinese restaurant to go to? I say, well, the Westboro Mandarin. I had a wonderful meal there last week, you know. And that's a reason to go to Westboro Mandarin, isn't it? Yeah. But are you sure to get a good meal there?

[1:00:29] No, but we use that kind of argument all the time in human things, right? We reason from one singular to another singular of the same kind, and of course, the strength of the argument depends upon how much they're alike, but there are always some difference, right? So,

[1:00:49] you might have the wrong chef on tonight, or it might even the good chef can make a mistake, right? And so, you can't have that kind of certitude when you're arguing from past examples like that.

[1:01:10] And even the enthymeme, which is like a syllogism more, but the enthymeme, for the most part, is reasoning from things that are true for the most part, right? A man staggering coming out of a bar is drunk. Well, yeah, I suppose most of the time he is, but people do stagger for other reasons, right? I thought shopping with my wife there last Saturday, and I got really kind of dizzy.

[1:01:41] I'd go home, you know, and I'm going to go to bed, right? And for about a day or so, I was like top heavy, you know. And finally, my wife said, and my my friend said, "You go see the doctor." So I go see the doctor, you know, and checking me out to see if it's related to the heart or something like that, you know. And then went down to the memorial there on Wednesday.

[1:02:01] There, you know, the cardiac scan they called. You know, I don't think it's related to the heart, you know, but but could see me a little bit dizzy. They say, "Well, Perkins is drunk again," you know. So he could have, you know. And not everybody who who who's on steaming feet is you know like I was bumping against the wall, you know. So and who it was, but so

[1:02:31] the matter doesn't admit a complete universality unless you you know state something very generally. do good and avoid the bad, right? But you know, to return what you borrowed is not always true.

[1:02:53] Now, in the next to the last paragraph. In the last two paragraphs here, Aristotle is going to talk about the third part now of the premium, which is about the here, as he says it, in the epilogue there, in, the next page. And who is or is not a proper hearer of lectures on political matters, right?

[1:03:23] Now he says, as a principle here, each man should be judges, I guess. Each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a good judge. The man educated in something about that, and simply the man educated in all things. Hence, the young man is not the proper hearer of political knowledge, for he is without experience of the actions in life, while the arguments are from these and about these.

[1:03:53] So, insofar as you lack experience, you are not a capable judge of these things, right? An suitable hearer of these things. I remember one of my earliest defenses of the Catholic faith when I was a very little boy, and I learned somehow from my mother that you don't have children until after you are married, and that seemed to me a pretty good argument for the importance of the sacrament of matrimony, right?

[1:04:21] That you can't have children without the sacrament of matrimony. Well, this is kind of a lack of experience about these things that I had, right? You know, so I'm not really a good judge of these things, right?

[1:04:38] But it's like, you know, you know, the the young man, and then the man has been married twenty years, right? Talking about marriage, right? Well, the young man who's hardly knows what the woman is is like is not a good judge of these things, but the man who's been married twenty years is a good judge of, you know, so he's a more suitable hearer of lectures about domestic things.

[1:05:04] And so Aristotle is talking here eventually about political knowledge, right? But you need a vast experience to be able to judge these things, and most people don't have that, right? Especially the young. But even in terms of of ethics itself, the young man doesn't have enough experience. And

[1:05:28] you can see this even in men who are not very religious, you know, and so on. But sometimes when they get a little bit older, they they see the folly of their ways as as being younger, right? And they're able to judge these things.

[1:05:45] So some people are not a suitable hearer of these things because of their inexperience. Okay. Others because what? They're going to follow their emotions. They want to do what they want to do, and they don't want to follow reason. So they are useless here, right? Further, being a follower of the emotions, as a young hedger, right, he will listen in vain and uselessly. Since the end of this is not knowledge itself, right, but action or doing.

[1:06:21] Okay, so we learned, for example, about friendship, like we did in the books eight and nine. there, you know, that book eight uh we had mainly from. But why do you study friendship in ethics? What's for the sake of being a friend and a better friend and knowing whom to choose as a friend and so on? Right, it's not just to know what a friend is, but to be a friend, right?

[1:06:43] Okay. He says, in this regard, it makes no difference whether he is young in age and therefore ruled by his emotions, or youthful in character. Right, he's a playboy. Expression is well said. He's a boy, and therefore he lives by his emotions. Right? Okay. So it makes no difference. He's a boy or a playboy. In this case, he's a useless hearer of lectures in ethics because he doesn't want to live by reason.

[1:07:10] He wants to live by his what? Emotions, huh? For the defect in this case is not by time, but through living and pursuing each thing by emotion. But knowledge is useless to such as it is to the what? Incontinent, huh?

[1:07:30] Aristotle will compare them, you know, to a man who listens to a medical advice but doesn't follow it, right? So the doctor tells you need to get exercise. You need to do this or that, and if you're not going to act upon his advice, well, then why go and listen to the doctor in the first place, right? And that's what people like in ethics, right? Why listen to lectures on ethics unless you want to do what's reasonable?

[1:07:54] Okay. And incontinent are those who what know that something is bad, right, but they're overcome by their emotions. So what what good does it do for me to know that I shouldn't drink too much when I can't resist drinking too much when the stuff is available, right? In that case,

[1:08:19] I'm a useless hearer because the end here is not to know that you shouldn't drink too much, but to not drink too much. To act upon that knowledge, right? And so, if I can't act upon that knowledge, then what good does it do me to know it, huh?

[1:08:39] But to those desiring and acting according to reason, it will be very useful to know about such things, right? So, you recall then at the top of page three the three things he's done. Well that this much about the hearer.

[1:08:59] Who is and who is not a suitable hearer of these things? Huh? The man who has some experience and who wants to live. A reasonable life, right? He's a suitable hero of these things, right? But the man who lacks experience, or who lives by his emotions and can't control his emotions, he's either can't understand what is being said, or he's not going to profit from what is being said because the end or purpose of this knowledge is not to know, but to act according to it.

[1:09:32] Okay. The purpose of knowing about courage and moderation, the ultimate end is not to know what courage is and what moderation is, but to be courageous, to be moderate, right? Okay. To be just and so on.

[1:09:50] And how it should be received, right? This matter doesn't admit of complete but certitude, right? Or complete precision, right? And many things have to be said, for the most part, right?

[1:10:11] Do you believe in free trade? Yeah, generally I say good free trade, but maybe there are certain industries that are just starting up in a country that have to be protected, right? to get their feet in the ground. Maybe you should make some exceptions, right?

[1:10:29] And what we propose, well, that's we propose to what? Draw a line around the what? End or purpose of man, of human life, the end or purpose that is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, is a kind of foundation of political knowledge, right? That's what we propose. All of that, as they say, is the first of the two parts that logically and understandably you can divide the whole work, right?

[1:11:01] Later on, we look at we can look at some wisdom. We'll see Aristotle's *proemium too, right? In the first chapters of Book One of the Fourteen Books, right? But but the Fourteen Books of the Metaphysics, the Fourteen Books of Wisdom, that's the what?

[1:11:21] Editorial and reference division of the work, right? But the logical and understandable one would be the proemium and that would be divided against the rest of Book One and two through fourteen, right? So

[1:11:38] now, if you look at Shakespeare's plays, a lot of editions Shakespeare's plays are divided into five acts, right? That doesn't mean anything. Those five acts, right? It's useful to refer to, you know, it's in Act Four, Scene Two, and maybe I'll give you that if I'm you know, reference, maybe even the number of the lines. But probably the best way to divide it is into the tying of the knots or knots and the untying of the knots.

[1:12:09] You see, that makes that illuminates the work, right? Shakespeare says in one of the plays, "Oh, time thou must untangle this. It's too hard a knot for me to untie. See how he unties the knots later on. But that helps you to understand what the play really is doing. huh? Five acts is kind of arbitrary, right?

[1:12:36] Now, next time we'll we'll look at this key chapter there, where Aristotle's you know drawing the line around the end or purpose of man, right? And we've already done that. but we didn't see a little bit of what he does here, but of course he leads up to that gradually, and he follows into some things. We're always going to look at that kind of the central chapter there.

[1:13:02] But after he sees the connection