Love & Friendship
2. Why Love Is Undergoing Yet Called Giving: Aristotle on Truth and Good, and Love in the Concupiscible Appetite
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[0:00] Now this first little text from Thomas is kind of anticipating what he's going to say in the first article that we're going to look at in Prima Secunda, right? That love is what an undergoing, right? Okay.

[0:16] But let's just look at this passage here from the sentences. Love pertains to the desiring power, to the heart, which is an undergoing ability, he says, right? Whence the philosopher says in the third book on the soul that the desirable moves as an unmoved mover, but desire as a moved mover.

[0:48] But as everything undergoing is perfected as it is formed by the form of what acts upon it, and its motion ends in rest in this. Thus the understanding before it is formed through the form of the understandable inquires and doubts. But when it has been informed with this, investigation ceases and understanding is made firm in this. And then the understanding is said to adhere firmly to that thing.

[1:19] Likewise, when affection or the desiring power is entirely filled with the form of the good which is placed before it, it is in agreement with it and adheres to it as made firm in it, and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a what transformation, a metamorphosis, right? Of the affection of the heart into the thing loved, right? We'll say later on that love is a what conformity of the heart with its what object, right?

[1:55] The loved, okay. So love is more a what undergoing, a receiving, than it is a what giving, right? Okay. So why do we say then that love is a giving? Why? Why? When the first gift is what love is the first gift, why do we say that, right?

[2:22] Because giving is not receiving, right? That's the old saying. It's more divine to what give than to receive, right? But we're talking about human love now, right? Okay.

[2:37] So not the same thing to give and to receive, are they? So most of these things that passages we had about love indicate that it's a receiving, right? It's a being wounded, it's being transformed by the loved, right? It's not giving. I mean, you might give as a result of love, but the loving itself is giving. Why do we say that?

[3:07] How do you justify the truth in in saying loving is giving in the face of all this evidence that loving is being wounded, it's being transformed, it's suffering?

[3:27] How do you reconcile that? The Thomas is going to say, especially in the second article, that love is a what? Undergoing, right? If you look at the, just the title, I don't look at the, look at it on

[3:54] page eleven there, right? The second article, whether love is an undergoing—that's the question—and he objects always, you know, that he's going to conclude. But then, in the body of the article, he's going to maintain that love is an undergoing, right? So, how do you reconcile that with "the word give" being used in respect to love? If that's what loving is, basically undergoing, at least human love, right?

[4:23] Then, then how can you speak of love as giving? I keep thinking of what Saint Paul says, although it doesn't give an answer, but says the same thing, Where Christ loved me and gave himself for me. Yeah, yeah. I see, what you give someone because you love them, right? Is an effect of your love. It's not the love itself, right? But is there a way in which the loving itself could be said to be giving?

[5:11] Huh? You see that Juliet is giving her love to Romeo, right? She's giving her heart to Romeo, right? You can see that too, can't you? How can you? How can that be correct when it's Romeo, as he says to Fr. Lawrence, "I was wounded, and someone else was wounded by me," right? When when she was wounded by him, huh? That's when she began to love.

[5:44] So, an active receptivity. Well, I think the answer is the answer Aristotle gives in the sixth book of Wisdom. Okay, where he contrasts truth and goodness, right? Okay.

[6:05] He says that truth is chiefly in the mind. Okay. Even though it's measured by things, right? Okay. Where do you find truth? You find it in the ground. We knew there was in the ground today. There, out there, digging out there. Does you find any truth when you dig in the ground? I don't think. And if you go down to the ocean or swim through the ocean, do you find truth?

[6:37] Is the truth there in the ocean? I could fly through the air or walk through the air. Do you find truth in the air? Where do you find truth?

[6:49] Yeah, it's in statements, right? Which are primarily the mind. Okay. If I say you are, you are sitting, I'm true, right? Okay. That's a statement I made, right? Okay. So truth is chiefly in the mind, and we can also say that the thing known

[7:13] is known when it's in the knower. Okay. The thing known must be in the knower before it can be known. So if I recognize people, I walk in here or I walk in some other place. It's because they already have their shape and color and so on inside of me, right? And I recognize, right? In fact, Alzheimer's at least, I'll recognize, you, right? Okay. And I'll have to have that, and that's why we say that knowing is

[8:01] a taking, basically. Okay. Or knowing is a what grasping. So we use the word grasping for understanding, don't we? Now, a professor might say, "Do you grasp what I'm saying? " Meaning, do you understand what I'm saying, right? When I grasp something, like I grasp this piece of chalk in my hand, it's contained in my hand, right? Okay. That's like truth being in the mind, right? Okay. The thing known is in the mind And so when we define something, right?

[8:44] If I want to grasp what a a square is, I take the genus of square, which is quadrilateral, right? And then I take the differences, like equilateral and right-angled, right? Okay. I take all these things, kind of first grasp them, and now I know what a square is—an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right? So, knowing is a grasping, right? Okay. Is that what loving is? A grasping? No, we don't say that, do we?

[9:15] Right? And why not? Well, Aristotle points out, good, for that matter, bad. Good is chiefly in things. Okay. And so, let's say if if in things virtue is something good, right? And vice is something bad, right? Then for me to love virtue is something good, right? Because virtue is something good. And to love vice is something bad, right? Because vice in itself is something bad, right? Okay.

[10:03] And so, what love does is to attach me to what I love, right? So if I love virtue, I'm attached to virtue. I love God, I'm attached to God. If I love Mozart, I'm attached to the music of Mozart, right? If I love vice, I'm attached to vice, right? Okay. So love, in a way, joins us to the thing in itself.

[10:34] And that's why this is a very important difference. Plato and Aristotle, the chief philosophers in history, they're often pointing out how there is the same knowledge

[10:52] of opposites. Okay. Like in the in the Symposium, the dialogue Symposium, the last bit of conversation in Symposium is Socrates is talking to the tragic poet Agathon Agathon, who's won the prize that year, and the comic poet what? Aristophanes, huh? He says, "If you guys knew what you were doing, you Agathon could write comedies as well as tragedies, and you Aristophanes could write tragedies as well as comedies, huh?

[11:34] " But he's hitting at the idea that there's the same knowledge of opposites, huh? And so, if you study, say, the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, you will learn both what virtue is and what vice is, huh? Okay. And knowing one helps you to know the other. So, when Aristotle defines moral virtue, it's a habit with choice existing in the middle, huh? Towards us is determined the right reason, and the vice is going to be something in excess or something what?

[12:08] Falling short, right? So the courageous man is in between the foolhardy man and the coward, right? And the generous man is in between the stingy man and the extravagant man, right? Okay. So understanding what virtue is helps you to understand what vice is, and vice versa, huh? Okay. The same way the medical doctor, right? In his knowledge of high blood pressure, is a knowledge of what? Healthy or normal blood pressure is, right?

[12:45] So the knowledge of one opposite helps you know the other one, right? And if you know logic, you know how to reason correctly and how to deceive as well. You see. And when I give a logic exam, I know what form is going to appear to some students to be good when it's bad. They know that, okay? Just like nobody knows better than a doctor how to make you sick.

[13:14] You see. And but now, is there the same love of opposites? Does my love of virtue help me to love vice? Does my love of truth help me to love falsity? No. But my knowledge of what is true helps me to know what is false, right? My knowledge of what is healthy helps me know what it is to be sick, right? But my love of health prevents me from loving sickness, right?

[13:52] My love of virtue prevents me from loving vice, right? If I love vice, that's going to prevent me from loving virtue. See the idea?

[14:05] Now, why is it that there is the same knowledge of opposites, but not the same love of opposites? Or why is it that the knowledge of one opposite helps you to know the other opposite, right? You can't really know one without knowing the other. But the love of one opposite impedes you and prevents you from loving the other opposite. Why is that? Well, it's because the good and the bad are chiefly in things, and in things one excludes the other.

[14:44] So you tend by your heart to one; you can't tend by your heart to the other. But in knowing, they go into the mind in the form of what thoughts and so on, right? And the thought of one opposite helps you to understand the reverse.

[15:03] See the idea? You can't love God and mammon. Yeah. So, so the motion of knowing is what bringing things into the mind, then. And one is having difficulty understanding something. One is having difficulty getting that inside one's mind, right? But love is tending towards the thing in itself.

[15:36] So, in the popular song, the words say, "I left my heart in San Francisco," right? Or our Lord says, "You know, you know, laying up treasures for yourself in heaven. That where your treasure is, there also shall your heart be."

[15:57] So love is more in the thing loved, but the thing known is more in the knowing. It's just the kind of contrariety between love, therefore, and what knowledge, okay? And that's reflected then in the use of the word "take" or "grasp" for knowing, and "give" for love.

[16:22] So, I used to always say, "It's always bad to lose your head." To lose your head, it's always bad. Yeah. Is it always bad to lose your heart? Depends upon to whom or to what you lose your heart, right? Okay. To lose your mind is always bad. You

[16:49] know Shakespeare will speak of lovers and mad men have such shaping fantasies and so on, such seething brains, you know. Now you compare love to what? The heat, because the heat overflows, right? And you speak of cool reason, right? We say keep your cool, right? Because the cold is not overflowing and going out to the things, is it? See, that's what knowing is—just pulling things into yourself, right?

[17:17] See the idea. Yeah. I talked about when I was first teaching philosophy, out in California. One student picked up on this idea—the same knowledge of opposites, right? And of course, at that time, ethics was required of everybody, right? Ethics course. And he said, "You guys shouldn't really be teaching ethics, right? " I said, "Why not? " He said, "Well, same knowledge of opposites, right? " So they learned not only what virtue is, but vice is, right?

[17:46] And since you're all inclined to vice, he says, "You're making them worse. " That was the best argument I heard against teaching ethics, right?

[17:58] But the point is, you can't know one without knowing the other, right? If I know grammar, I know that "I is your professor" is incorrect, right? So grammar enables me to speak correctly and incorrectly. So it's always the same knowledge of opposites there. Mozart has a piece of music called the Musical Joke, Köchel 522, I think it is, in which he teaches us how not to write music, right?

[18:31] Now there's some obvious mistakes in the Musical Joke that everybody can recognize, huh? There are more subtle things that many composers fall into, right? And Mozart's showing how not to write. Okay.

[18:48] It's the same knowledge, right? Knowing how to write music and how it should not be written. When Aristotle determines how the way of a science should be determined, he also shows how it should not be determined. Same knowledge of both.

[19:11] So this is the reason why we use the word give, right? Because your heart is going out to the, what, good which is in things, right? And therefore, love is more said, the heart is more said to be in where it, in what it loves, huh, than what it loves is said to be in it, huh? There's a way in which that can be said too, but it's more said to be in what it loves, huh?

[19:39] Um... So I say that in the popular song, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? But you might say, I'll keep you in mind, right? I'll keep you in mind. That's knowing, right?

[20:00] But there, if I was talking about, you know, if I keep San Francisco in mind, that's knowing, right? But if I love San Francisco or something or someone in there, then I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Okay. Like Romeo says when he when he's banished there, you know, how can I go forward when my heart's back here, right? You know? Or Anthony goes off to Rome, you know, he's leaving his heart there with Cleopatra, right?

[20:27] Okay. Or Augustine says, you know, the the soul is more ubi amat quam ubi animat right? The soul is more where it loves than what it animates, right?

[20:45] That's why you say yeah, right? Not because in, in, uh, originally loving someone or something, you are giving something to that person or thing, right? But rather they are acting upon your what?

[21:03] Heart, right? Transforming your heart, right? Okay. You might give them in the strict sense something, right, as a result of that, but the loving itself is that they made an impression upon your heart. They've transformed your heart, they've wounded your heart in some way, right? You see? See how loving is basically for us an undergoing. Okay? And that's true from the romantic love and all the way up to the to this love that, uh, Saint Teresa of Avila or Saint Teresa of Lisieux have, right?

[21:33] Where it's spoken of by both as a wound, right? A wound is something you, what, receive rather than give, right? Yeah. But because the object of love is the good, and the good is chiefly in things, then the heart is said to be what? In the thing love, right?

[21:59] And notice how, you know, you have to do something you don't, you don't like to do, that I'm sure you experienced that, right? And we have an interesting expression, you know, someone will say, my heart's not, what? In it. Huh?

[22:17] You don't like doing this. My heart's not in it. You know? See the idea? Yeah. So although loving for us is, is an undergoing, basically, right?

[22:39] uh, there's a reason why we are said to give our love or give our heart, right? But it goes back to what Aristotle points out, this is in the sixth book of wisdom, right? That the good is primarily or chiefly in things, right? And there's a lot of ways of showing that, right? But they say one of the most fundamental ways of showing it is the fact that, um, love respects the condition of things, where one opposite, what, eliminates the other, right?

[23:12] So if I have normal blood pressure, that eliminates abnormal blood pressure, right? Or if I have abnormal blood pressure or high blood pressure, something like that, that eliminates normal blood pressure, right?

[23:30] You have an overactive thyroid, right? That prevents you from having an actively formed you might have to take a tonic cocktail or something. people had, that Always kind of frightened me tonic cocktail, um or an inactive one, right? But as far as knowing is concerned, right? In the doctor's knowledge of overactive thyroid is what a healthy thyroid, right?

[24:04] Could the doctor know I'm overweight without knowing what my weight should be? But in in things, I can't have the weight I should have and be overweight at the same time. If I have the weight I should have, then I can't be overweight, can I? If I'm overweight, I can't have the weight I should have, right? One excludes the other, right? And so, when you can't love both opposites, but one love prevents the other, right?

[24:36] It follows the condition of the things themselves, right? Because good and bad are in the things, and as one excludes the other, so the love of one excludes the love of the other. But knowing is in the mind, right? And even contrary things

[24:55] are what in a way the same knowledge, huh? And the very definition of ignorance is what a lack of knowledge, right? So when I define ignorance as a lack of knowledge, then my knowledge of ignorance is knowledge, right? And when I, you know, understand what blindness is, right? Then my definition of blindness is a lack of what sight, okay? But in things, right? Sight and blindness exclude each other, don't they?

[25:36] I can't love both of those, right? If I love my sight, I must hate blindness, right? But if I know what sight is, that helps me to know what blindness is, right? In fact, I can't really know what blindness is without knowing what sight is, right? Do you see that? Yeah, that's why we use the word giving, and that explains, I think, why.

[26:07] I'm talking about the love itself, not not what you might give someone because you love them. That's an effect of of your love, right?

[26:22] And so there are many ways that the idea that love is undergoing was brought out. The word suffering, the word wound, right? The word metamorphosis, transformation. In many ways, you see that love is as Thomas will teach and undergoing. Okay.

[26:45] So I take a little break here on it, huh? Yeah, yeah. I have to stop around four thirty, but we will look at this first article one.

[26:56] Now, Plato and Aristotle, maybe other philosophers before them, they had distinguished as far as the emotions are concerned. They had distinguished two kinds, and in Greek, they are called epithumia

[27:21] and thumos huh Maybe you can each put out it here. Thumos. In Latin, they translate epithumia by concupiscible appetite, naming it from the most known emotion of this kind of powerful emotions, namely desire for what is pleasing to the senses, right? And thumos In Latin, they call that irascible appetite. An appetite originally means desire, but it's used here not for desire but for the ability for certain emotions, huh?

[28:16] And so, Plato and Aristotle distinguished these two, huh? Now, what was the basis for this, huh? Well, epithumia follows upon what is pleasing to the senses, right? Or what is painful or disagreeable to the senses. Okay. Now something pleases my senses. Like candy pleases my senses, right? Then I like or love candy, right? Okay. If I don't have any, I want some. If I get some, I have joy, pleasure, right?

[29:00] Okay. So I have three possible emotions with regard to what is pleasing to my senses. If the music of Mozart pleases my ears, I like the music of Mozart, right? And then If I don't have any around. I want to hear something. I desire to hear something, right? And when I hear it, I have joy, pleasure, delight. Okay. And then there are three other emotions that encubes our appetite, which are with regard to what is disagreeable or painful to the senses.

[29:38] So if you give me a dish of salmon or something, right? Okay. I hate the taste of that. So I dislike it intensely. Okay. And if possible, I'll try to just not want it, but to avoid it, right? I'll turn away from it, right? But if I'm somewhere and it served me and I have no alternative, then I may try to conceal it from the host or hostess.

[30:08] I'm sad within now. Pain, you know. Okay. See that? Okay. Now, originally, referring to six emotions, right? And in the will, there are acts like that, right? Okay. So when I know what wisdom is, I might start to love wisdom, right? If I don't have any wisdom, I might want wisdom, right? And if I succeed in getting some wisdom, I am I get delight, joy, right? What does Augustine say?

[30:47] Heaven is gaudium de veritate, joy of truth, now. And if I know what vice is I might hate it or dislike it, right? And try to avoid it, right? But I'm saddened when I realize. Look at myself in the mirror. See all my vices. Okay. You see that?

[31:13] So these words like love and desire and hate, sadness, they can name emotions, right? Or they can name the more bodiless acts of the will, right? That are like them. Okay. Now, Thumos is really the fighter and defender. Of the concupiscible, because sometimes the good that I want is hard to get, right? Okay.

[31:48] And there are two emotions that can possibly arise at that point: either hope of overcoming the difficulties, right, which will make me persist in pursuing what I want, or else despair of overcoming those difficulties. Okay.

[32:12] Now, likewise, the thing I hate and want to avoid, right? Sometimes it's difficult to avoid, and then I feel fear from the bully or something in grade school. Okay. But if I think I can overcome this bully, then I have what boldness, right? Okay. Now, that's four of the emotions of the Thumas. Hope and its opposite, despair; Fear and its opposite, boldness, right? Okay.

[32:50] Ah, but there's also a irascible one that arises from that arises from pain or sadness, and that's called anger. Especially if I think I can get rid of what is causing me sadness or pain, huh? Then I have what you're stepping on my toes and causing me some pain, you know, and I inform you the fact, and you say, "So what? " Well, you know, unless you're awfully big and I'm afraid of you or something, I'm going to get angry, right?

[33:25] No, shut it off, me, you see. But there's no emotion irascible that arises from joy or pleasure. No Difficulty in enjoying yourself, right? Once you are enjoying. Yourself, I should say. Okay. So there's six emotions in the concupiscible appetite, and five in the irascible appetite. Now, if you listen to the classical music, especially you know Mozart, who is the supreme musician there, you'll see that he uses different keys for these different emotions, huh?

[34:03] So for desire or joy, he'll use a major key, and for sadness, he'll use a what? Minor key, right? If you had the two quintets he wrote right next to each other, five fifteen and five sixteen, the first number, the joyful one is in C major, and the sorrowful one is in G minor, huh? Okay.

[34:28] He represents anger and despair and fear in the minor key, but he represents hope and boldness in the major keys, like maybe C major, D major. Okay. So the rhythm is something of the two differences.

[34:52] Aristotle and Thomas and so on. Saint John the Cross, Vatican II. They recognize the four principal passions: joy and sadness in the concupiscible, and hope and fear in the thumos, huh? Of course, the two main forms of fiction, huh? Comedy moves us to mirth, which is a form of joy and hope, and tragedy to what? Pity, which is a form of sadness and fear. If you look at, say, the Constitution on the Church in the modern world, you know it says the Church, you know, the joy is the sadness, the hopes, the fears.

[35:35] You'll find those four together, right? You see treatises of Saint John the Cross in those four, right? And Thomas would have articles on them being the four principal passions, right?

[35:48] So this treatise on love is in the treatise on the emotions in the prima secundae, right? But mutatis mutandis, you can apply it to the acts of the will. you don't make the distinctions in here. So he's going to talk about love, and he's going to talk about hate, and talk about all these things. But we're interested in love, so he's asking, does love belong to the epithumia, to the concupiscible appetite, or to thumos, right, huh?

[36:13] Okay. Because the good or the bad, as such, pertains to the concupiscible, right? But the difficulty of getting or avoiding, difficulty getting the good or avoiding the bad or getting rid of the bad, right? Thumos comes in, right? Okay.

[36:40] Now, as you know, in the Summa, Thomas will always object against the truth first. Okay, and so let's look at this on page nine now, if you could read this. One proceeds thus to the first, whether love is in the concupiscible appetite, and the Latin word there is the what amor, which names more the emotion, right? Sometimes you'll see later on the word dilectio for the love of the will.

[37:11] One proceeds thus to the first. It seems that love is not in the concupiscible desiring power, for it is said in the Book of Wisdom in the Old Testament, chapter eight, verse two, "I have loved and sought this wisdom." But the concupiscible, since it is part of the sensible desiring power, the power that desires as a result of some kind of sensing, right, is not able to tend to wisdom which is not grasped by sense.

[37:41] Therefore, love is not in the concupiscible. I assume that when he answers the objection, he's going to point out the difference between the love which is an emotion and the love which is an act of the will, right? That is the reason why he uses the word love for both, right? But the love of wisdom is going to be more in will than in emotions. I assume he's going to do that.

[38:02] We'll see. Okay, the purpose may be a surprise, right? Moreover, love seems to be the same as any passion, any emotion. In Latin, they call the emotions the passions, right? Which very well names that they're an undergoing, right, a suffering, right. We use the word emotion that implies you're being moved by the object, huh? For Augustine says in the fourteenth book of the City of God, "For love, longing to have what is loved, is desire."But having it and delighting in it is joy.

[38:42] Fleeing what is opposed to what is loved is fear. But sensing this thing being forced upon you that's opposed to what you love, it's sadness, huh? But not every passion is in the concupiscible. But fear also enumerated here is in the irascible. Therefore, it ought not to be said simply that love is in the concupiscible. Now, probably what Augustine is doing here is saying that love is the root of all the others, right?

[39:10] So I want something that I love but don't have. I have joy when I have something that I do love. I hate what is opposed to what I love, right? I fear what will take away or keep me from what I love, right? I have hope for overcoming the difficulties, right, in getting what I love and so on, right? Yeah. Everything's moved by love Yeah, yeah. But love is like is cause of all the other emotions in some way.

[39:43] If I didn't love my body, I wouldn't hate sickness, right? Moreover Dionysius in the fourth chapter about the divine names, huh? Lays down a certain natural love, huh? But natural love seems more to belong to the natural powers which belong to the living soul, the soul, you know, the plant, huh? So you hear, you'll see the guy in the nursery saying, you know, now this plant loves a lot of sunshine, or it loves a lot of water, right?

[40:18] Okay. I've heard broccoli says a big feeder, you know, it's a big feeder. It loves to eat this plant. That's natural love, right? Okay. It likes sun or it doesn't like sun, you know. Therefore, love is not simply in the concupiscible.

[40:39] But against this is what the philosopher, it's Aristotle by antonomasia. I was reading the Greek here in the Gospel of Saint Matthew, and there's an incident that appears, I think, in Matthew and I guess Mark, Luke, several of the Gospels anyway, where Christ says, and it's often translated, "God alone is good," right? You know, someone would say, "good master," Why do you call me good. Why do you speak of good?

[41:11] And I think in a couple of the Gospels, the other Gospels other than Matthew, it does say God alone is good. But in Matthew, it says, "God is ho agathos, the good one." Well, that's antonomasia right? The good one. I say that my energy all the time to the good one. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So he calls Aristotle. by antonomasia the philosopher, okay. So the philosopher says in the second book about places.

[41:43] That's the book in logic, by the way, in dialectic reasoning. That love is in the concupiscible But Aristotle would say in Greek epithumia right.

[41:57] I answer that love is something pertaining to the ability to desire, since the object of both is something good. Hence, there is a difference of love according to the difference of desire.

[42:14] There is a certain desire, a certain wanting, not following upon the grasping or the knowing, right, of the one desiring, but of the knowing or grasping of some other one. And this kind is called natural desire, right? So the plant wants sunshine, sunshine or water, not because it what grasps what sunshine or water is, right? But because this inclination has been put into it by its maker, right?

[42:46] For natural things desire what is suitable to them according to their nature, not through their own grasping—that's the knowing, right? But through the grasping, the understanding of the one instituting nature, as has been said in the first book about the first book of the Summa. There is, however, another desire following upon the grasping of the one desiring, but from necessity, not from free judgment, and such is sense desire in the beasts.

[43:21] So, without having free judgment about what is good or bad, right? They do have what some kind of sense knowledge, huh? So the cat comes around the table and you're having some meat or something, huh? Sometimes we take the wine glass and go down there. set The wine glass, and she walks away. No kidding. Yeah. And such is sense desire, he says, in the beasts, right? But nevertheless, in men, this partakes to some extent of freedom, huh?

[43:55] In so far as it can obey what reason, right? There is moreover another desire following upon the grasp of the one desiring by free judgment. The reason why reason has free judgment is because it knows universal. And there's nothing so good in this world that reason can't find some reason to regard it as bad. Because it always prevents you from doing something else that's good, right? So I can see it as bad, right?

[44:24] So getting up and going to mass on Sunday prevents me from sleeping another hour, right? So it's bad, right? So you have this this ability, right, to judge things even other than they are, right? To judge that good is bad and bad is good, huh? Like the witches say in Macbeth, right? Fair is foul, foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air.

[44:57] And such is reasonable or understandable desire, which is called willing, huh? So he's distinguishing three kinds here. In each of these desires, that is called love, which is the beginning, right, of a motion tending towards the end loved. In natural desire, the beginning of this motion is the connaturality of the one desiring to to that to which it tends, which can be called natural love, right? Which is the plant loving or liking, right?

[45:34] This. And in the old physics, there just as the connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place is through heaviness and can be called naturally natural love, right? And likewise, the fitting of the sense desire or the will to some good, that is the agreement of the good, is called sense love or understandable or reasonable love. Sense love, therefore, is in sense desire, as understandable love, is in understandable desire.

[46:08] And now he gives a reason why it pertains to the concupiscible rather than to the irascible, and it pertains to the concupiscible because it is said with respect to good absolutely,

[46:21] not by reference to the difficulty, right? Which is the object of the irascible, right? So if there's no difficulty in getting what I want, you know, if there's a a bowl of peanuts there, right, or a bowl of candy, whatever else that I like, huh? You know, and just reach over and, you know, no irascible emotion at all, right? Okay. But if you're pulling the bowl away from me, right?

[46:51] Like you've had enough purpose, right? I might get a little angry at you, you, see, you know, because you're now an impediment and a difficulty in the way of my getting what I want. See? Okay. And so Aristotle says the animals they fight over food, right? If You throw a piece of meat out there between two dogs, you might have a fight, huh? Okay. Just one dog, no, I'm going to eat the meat, right?

[47:17] But there's another dog there wants the piece of meat too, but now it's going to be difficult to get that piece of meat, huh? See? So they fight over food and sex, he says. huh? There's a lot of fighting over the partners there in the animal world, huh? Okay. But there's some kind of a difficulty in getting what you want or avoiding what you want to avoid, right?

[47:36] And then you have the irascible emotions arising, huh? And it pertains to concupiscible because it is said with respect to good absolutely, not by reference to the what difficult, which is the object of the what irascible, right? Okay. You can see why the theological virtue of hope is named from what? And he originated the name of an emotion down in what the thumos, right? Because you're dealing here with a good that is what difficult, huh?

[48:11] Okay. Take that down. Our charity is more named from love, right? Okay. Not naming the difficulty, right? Now, the first objection was like I think I took it to be right. He's talking about the love of wisdom, right? Well, that's not. An emotion, right? Okay. I told you that funny story when I was in college. I used to always syllogize, right, when I could. And so this little Polish professor of philosophy there was a little bit frustrated with me.

[48:50] So one day he said to me in class, you know, in front of the whole class, Mister Berquist, he said, "Do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism?" And I just laughed and said, "Well, I could have an emotional attachment to a girl, but hardly an emotional attachment to the syllogism. But my reason respects the syllogism because it's an argument in which the conclusion follows necessarily.

[49:14] And that's why it gives you so much difficulty. I didn't I didn't add that. I could have, right? You know. But the same way, you know, I mean, the love of wisdom is not what an emotion, right? Okay. And the same way, the love of God is primarily an act of the will. It's not a what emotion. And I can remember sitting in grade school in church there and listening to the priest, the sermon, talk about the love of God, right?

[49:41] Huh? When I heard the word love. I thought of girls. And what does this mean, the love of God, right? Huh? Is it? And so I having a little difficulty there, distinguishing between the love that is an emotion and the love that is an act of the what will, right? Okay. And sometimes you are not too sure, you know, what your love is. It might you might have a little bit of both loves in some cases, right?

[50:04] Okay. When Augustine and Thomas talk about music, huh? Kind of interesting, right? You know, does music move you to the love of God, huh? Is it moving kind of the will through the emotions, or what is it doing, right? It's not always clear what it's doing, huh? Some ambiguity. But that's one of the distinctions of the kinds of love that we'll meet later on in the article.

[50:33] So he's already touched upon it here. So you see, we use we name first the emotions, and then we carry the word over and place it upon the acts of the will by reason of a certain likeness that they have to the emotions. But you drop out the bodily aspect of the emotion because the will, like the reason, is immaterial.

[51:06] But the emotions we have in a way in common with the beasts, although maybe in a higher way. By the will we have in common with the guardian angels we spoke of earlier and God Himself, right?

[51:20] So the love of wisdom then is not an emotion, but it's the act of the will that is like love, right? It is the emotion, so it's called a love. Of course, in Greek, you know, you got to be careful because in Greek you have more than one word for love, right? And so,

[51:40] in English, we don't have as many words for these things, right? You know, the famous book of C. S. Lewis, there, the Four Loves. You may have seen that. He's talking about four different words in Greek, you know, philia, storge, and eros, and so on, right? And agape okay. But in our translations of the Bible, you'll find, you know, these different words translated with the same word, maybe love, right?

[52:08] Yeah. Okay. In some cases, the word might be, you know, agape, it might be eros. Okay. The second one objection was the one from Augustine, where Augustine seems to be saying that love is all these things, right? Well, it's all these things in the sense that it's the cause of them, all right.

[52:39] To the second, it should be said that love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness, not essentially as the same thing, right? But as their what? Cause, right? That's easy enough to see.

[53:03] Now, this natural love, huh? To the third, it should be said that natural love is not only in the powers of the living soul, that is to say, the plant soul, but in all powers of the soul, right? They all have a natural inclination to something, and also in all parts of the body, and generally in all things, because as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names, the beautiful and good is lovable for all, since each thing has connaturality to that which is suitable to it according to its nature.

[53:36] So, in a sense Thomas. What is doing here in the first article is determining whether the emotion to begin with of love belongs in this group of emotions or in this group of emotions, right? And the answer is that it belongs to this first group, right? Because it regards the good without qualification, absolutely.

[54:03] In order to be among this group, it would have to regard some difficulty in getting what is good, or some difficulty in avoiding what is bad, or some difficulty in getting rid of what is bad already forced upon you, right? Okay. So hope and despair arise when there's a difficulty in getting the good that you want,

[54:34] and fear or boldness arise when there's a difficulty in the way of of avoiding what is bad, right? And anger when there's a difficulty in getting rid of what what is harmful, so if a mosquito lands in my finger and starts eating me, I go, you know, I don't mean to hate you, you know, see. But if you're standing on my feet, you're a bully. You're standing on my feet, you know, causing me a deal, great deal of pain in my feet, and I say, you know, on my feet, and you say, so what?

[55:11] Well, now this is a little difficult to hear, right? You know, and this calls probably for some what anger, right? Of course, you see, anger in our Lord, right, When he chases the money changes on the temple, right?

[55:29] In Mozart's music, you'll see that representing, you know, maybe the sadness and the anger trying to get rid of the cause of the sadness, right? Maybe succeeding or not succeeding, you know. Very, very beautiful when he does it.

[55:47] Mozart represents anger, mainly in the D minor concerto and the C minor concerto, right? But you have it in the opera too, There's a beautiful letter from Mozart to his father, where he's describing his imitation of anger in the abduction from this Seraglio, and he says that a man who gets angry like Osmond does in the opera, he kind of loses control of himself, right? He says the music must represent this, he says, but not in a way that is displeasing to the ears, or in other words, ceasing to be music.

[56:30] Music for Mozart has got to be pleasing to the ears, right?