Love & Friendship 19. Aristotle on Friendship: Who Can Be a Friend, Friends Among Unequals, and God and Man https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/6-love-friendship/019-aristotle-on-friendship-who-can-be-a-friend-friends-among/ [0:00] Now, what's the transition from what's gone on up to this point and the sixth reading, right? Okay. Well, we've learned what friendship is and the kinds of friendships there are, right? But now there's another consideration here, and that is, in whom can these friendships be what realized, right? Okay. It's a little bit like what you have in in practice in political philosophy. [0:40] For it's one thing to say what government is, right, and to distinguish the kinds of government there are, right. But then, what about realizing? [0:55] This kind of government in this or in that people, right? Okay. Now, is it possible to realize a democratic form of government in Iraq or in Iran or in A Afghanistan or some other or some African country, right? And sometimes, you know, people are kind naive, right? About whether a given people are ready, right? You know, after the Second World War, a lot of these colonies in Africa became independent, and they got, in name at least, a kind of democratic or parliamentary form government. [1:38] But in practice, were they really? See, and you got kind of, you know, terrible tyrants in many cases, you know, bloody tyrants and so on. So it's a little different to talk about what government is and the kinds of government, right? And now come around and say, in whom and how many can this kind of government be what realized, right? Okay. So it's a little bit like that here, right? [2:08] He's talked about what friendship is and the kinds of friendship, right? Now he says, now let's get a little more practical and say, in whom or in how many or towards how many, right? Can these kinds of friendship be realized, right? Okay. [2:28] Or who is more what capable, right? Of this quality, this habit of friendship, right? Okay. And who is not so suitable, right? Okay. So you see the difference in the in this thing, and the reason why this comes where it does, right? Okay. [2:52] Now he's already talked a bit, but he comes back and makes the point again here. Friendship comes to be less. in those harsh, right? huh People kind of severe and you know, character. But you've probably met some people in life like that, right? huh? [3:13] And and sometimes they they may have good will towards you, you know. Right? They're not, you know, they're not malicious or evil or like that, right? You see? But they're kind of a word we use, kind of severe, you know, personality, right? Huh? Kind of foreboding or something, right? [3:35] So this is not so fruitful a soil for for friendship, right? Huh? Okay. And again, those who are old, right? Especially in Aristotle's day, the old, but even our day, they get what? They've got ailments in there. They've got the rheumatoid, you know, rheumatoid They've got pains, you know, right? And and things. And maybe they're hard of hearing and so on, right? Okay. So they are more discontented, right, with life now, huh? [4:19] And they enjoy company less. right? can't stand the noise and the hub of it all, right? Okay. So and gets. It doesn't mean everybody old is like that, right? Huh. If you take the famous, you know, life of Samuel Johnson, right? Johnson continues to make new friends even in his old age. You might say, right? Huh? Okay. But he's kind of the exception that proves the rule, right? [4:51] And so the the the young, for example, more quickly and more easily make friends than the what old, huh? And a lot of times when people look back upon their life, they see that their closest friends are people they knew maybe in high school or maybe college, right? But in their earlier years, they'll make their best friends, let's say, right? Huh? Okay. [5:18] So the young are more suitable for becoming friends, right? Than are the what old, right? Huh? Now, maybe one could ask the reason for that, but that seems to be a matter of what experience, right? Okay. [5:44] But these things seem to be especially friendly and productive of friendship, right? Wherefore the young become friends swiftly, because they easily pleased and enjoy company, and, so on. But the old do not. [6:03] For they do not become friends of those whom they do not enjoy. Likewise, neither the harsh, but such can still be what well-wishers to each other, right? Okay. [6:17] For they wish good things and come to each other in need, right? It comes back to the idea now that friendship may be, in the fullest sense, it's only the act of friendship is living together, right? But they are not altogether friends, he says, right? Because they do not spend the day together or enjoy each other, which especially seems to what befit friends, right? Okay. And notice, living together is more the act of friendship, right? [7:05] Huh? Okay, where you enjoy each other's conversation and are mutually, you know, helpful and so on. Um, but again, you know, just like in the case of the moral virtues, courage doesn't just consist in having a habit, but actually in doing things according to that habit, right? Okay. So if these people don't want to live together, they don't seem to be friends altogether in the fullest what sense, huh? [7:34] Okay. Now he's going to say that the perfect kind of friendship is hard to have for more than one other person. Um. So he says, it is not possible. To be a friend of many, according to the perfect friendship, right? And he compares it to sexual love in this respect, right? Just as sexual love is not of many together or at the same time, right? Okay. I notice what's his comparison of the two, right? [8:22] Well, sexual love is something very intense, right? Okay, although it's something based more on the passions, right? But one cannot be that passionate, right, about two people at the same time. Okay. So when Romeo, take the example there of the play, when Romeo sees Juliet, right? He forgets all about Rosalind, right? Yeah. You know, takes a nail to drive out a nail nails, they say, right? Yeah. [8:54] You see, so because of the intensity, right, of this romantic love that Romeo has for Juliet, he can't have romantic love anymore, for Rosalind, right? It's just, you know, it's an intense thing, huh? Well, Aristotle is suggesting the likenesses in this that this perfect kind of friendship is a very intense thing, right? Okay. And you take the friendship there of Hamlet and Horatio, right? Okay. Or more, take the example of the friendship of Bassanio and the Merchant of Venice, right? [9:36] And the Merchant of Venice is willing to lay down his life for Bassanio, right? Okay. So you know, greater love than this hath no man, right? So it's not it's not romantic love, no. But there's an intensity of love there, right? Huh? And is it possible when you have a very intense love to have this for more than one person? See. Well, Aristotle compares the sexual love in terms of certain intensity, right? [10:02] And so just as in the sexual love, it seems to be one to one, Romeo to Juliet, right? Anthony to Cleopatra, right? Okay. Bassanio to Portia, right? Huh? You know, all these famous ones are one to one, right? Okay. That seems to be because of the intensity of the of the sexual love, the romantic love there. Well, if the highest kind of friendship is that has a certain intensity of its own, right? [10:33] Is it possible to have this for more than one person? Okay. Certainly not for you know very many people, right? Maybe we have it two or three or something, right? See, okay. But these famous examples, again going back to the greatest of the poets, in in the Iliad, right? You had the friendship there of what? Of Achilles, right, and Patroclus, right, and Patroclus, you know, because of the tragedy of the thing, loses his life, and and and Achilles, you know, he'll never have a friend like this again, right? [11:09] So it's kind of like a one-to-one thing, right? Okay. Bassanio and the Merchant of Venice have many other friends that we meet in the in the Merchant of Venice, right? But there's nobody that is the Bassanio, like the Merchant of Venice, or vice versa, right? There's a real closeness there, huh? And the same way with Hamlet and Horatio right? Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and those guys are nothing compared to Horatio, right? [11:37] So there's an intensity, huh, of those most noble friendships, right? And they seem to be one-to-one, right? Okay. Okay, so notice what he's saying here, right? He can say, "ah, this is the most perfect kind of friendship, right? [11:59] This is the only full friendship. " But is it reasonable to say I can have this for ten people, twenty people? No, you're lucky if you have the kind of friendship that Hamlet and Horatio has for one other person, right? Huh? Okay, With that closeness, huh? So he compares it to sexual love, for it seems like the excessive, right? Huh? Okay. But such is apt to come to be towards one, right? [12:42] And he gives another reason. Further, it is not easy for many to be pleasing to the same one at the same time, right? Okay. Now here he's thinking maybe of of lesser things besides virtue, right? Huh? Okay. So maybe you. like to use a lot of garlic in your food, and I can't stand it, right? Or all kinds of little things that are kind of secondary in life, right? [13:06] And then you do with your character, really, you know. Father Boulay used to be known for like garlic a lot, you know. They say you know the garlic, garlic at the table, and so, so maybe this guy, you know, some something about the man's habits, you see, that you just don't, you know, quite go for, right? Okay. [13:29] I had a friend who never got up until about oh one o'clock in the afternoon, right? So if you called the houseline to talk to him, you know, he's still in bed, you know. [13:40] So I mean, now, and once in a while, I was this way too, right? He would, you could get him to about two in the afternoon, right? Same, but these guys they would read or you know study through the night. Well, nothing wrong with that, right? Any more than you know anything wrong with the English driving the left side of the street, right? But you can't quite get what used to those little things, right? [14:04] Okay. My mother, you know, was Irish, you know, and of course she knew in those days, of course, Irish women worked as what maids in the households of the rich, right? And a lot of times they work in the household of the Jews, and of course the the the eating habits the Jews are much different from the Irish, right? Oh, I see. So it's not that that one eating habit is is sinful, but just you can't what. [14:35] No, you can't take it, right? You see. I suppose some people in the world there, you know, their diet is mainly what fish, right? See, I don't like fish, you know. So how am I going to live with someone who wants to fish four or five times a week? You know, he's having a steak four times a week, but not fish. I'm always saying, you know, Well why do we speak of something as being fishy? [15:03] You know, must be something wrong there with that food. See, but or even in terms of fish, you know, my my wife grew up here on the East Coast, you know, so she's used to ocean or seafood, you know. I grew up in Minnesota, so I was used to fresh water. See, so for me, the the best thing in fish is walleye pike, huh? With almond slivers on it, huh? [15:30] Walleye pike, see. But she might like lobster, or you know these things, and I never quite got used to lobster. I can do a little shrimp and some of these things, you know. But again, it just you know, partly your your habits, your customs, right? Huh? So there's all kinds of little things in life that might please you or annoy somebody else, right? Huh? So to be really close to somebody, you got to have a lot of what. [15:58] Both things alike, right? You see, if you're a beer drinker primarily, I'm a wine drinker. Well, you know, you want to go where the beers are. I want to go where the wines are. You know, and you know, well, doesn't mean one of us is bad because of this, but it just, you know, makes life less pleasant, right? You know, if you enjoy wine more and beer less, we could get along a little better, you know. [16:19] So he's talking about all these little things, right? Okay. What time of day do you play your music, right? You know, some people like to do their work in the morning and then listen to music and they relax in the evening, and some people want to hear some music right away in the morning, you know, so on. Was it Karl Barth? He had to listen to Mozart right away when he got up, you know, before he began his day. [16:48] And say, okay, I'm going to get up and say my prayers in the middle, or read a Psalm, Thomasian, and might get a little bit tired than God since some Mozart. You know what I'm saying? You, you, you know, just little things, part of us, right? [17:05] Sura starts being very human here, right now. For it's not easy for many. Yeah, take a little break there at that point. All right, thank you. So in the second paragraph of reading six, he gave a reason why the highest kind of friendship, the perfect and the full kind of friendship, is had hardly for more than one person, and that reason was the intensity of the friendship, right? [17:39] Okay. And you know, if you read, you know, those plays I was mentioning, Hamlet, or you read Merchant of Venice, you see the intensity of that friendship between Bassanio and, the Merchant of Venice, right? The Merchant of Venice would be willing to lay down his life for Bassanio, right? Okay. So that intensity—it's hard to have that for more than one person because it's so intense. And you make that comparison, right, to the sexual love, the romantic love, right, like you have between Romeo and Juliet. [18:14] It's only one to one, right? Okay. And then he gives a second reason in the third paragraph, in the first part of that sentence, [18:26] that it's not easy for many to be pleasing to the same one at the same time, right? If you think of all the little things that go to make up find to be enjoyable somebody, right? Huh? Everything from, not only their virtue, the essential things, but you know, their eating habits and their habits of life, right? Huh? How loud they play the radio, or how, you know, okay. [18:53] Aristotle adds a footnote there, and perhaps not good. You see, if I found many people extremely pleasing to be with, I wouldn't be able to get the work done, right? I'd be constantly, you know, distracted by all these close friends I have, right? Okay. So maybe there's something in in nature or divine providence there, but you don't have this kind of intense friendship for everybody, right? Huh? [19:27] Just like if Romeo had as many women as interested in as he is in Juliet, right? Now, on the top of page eight, there he gives another reason, right? [19:43] And that is that in order to have this highest kind of friendship, you have to have been what? Have a long experience of another person, right? You have to be put in circumstances, in other words, whereby you can talk to this person and associate them for a long time and get to know that they are trustworthy and that they are truly virtuous and so on, right? For it's necessary to have experience and to become intimate, huh? [20:11] Conversations, so on, which is the most difficult of all, right? Okay. I know sometimes students, when I've talked about this in class, you know, a student told me one time, you know, how you went to some wedding in the family, right? Huh? At the wedding, you know, in the reception afterwards, you get talking to people, right? And how you meet somebody, you really think is a nice person, and you'd like to be friends with this person, but they're from some other part of the country, so that's Aristotle talking about it, right? [20:41] Now, okay. Um, you have to be thrown in, you might say, together with this person, right, to get an experience of them and to have a lot of conversations with them, and and it's not possible in most cases, right? Huh? Okay. I might go to a philosophical conference and I meet somebody who kind of oppresses me in some way, right? But he goes back to his college, you know, and it's not really an opportunity for us to get to know each other that well, right? [21:12] Okay. So you might say there's basically three reasons Aristotle gives, right? But the friendship of the highest kind Second, it's difficult to realize for more than one person, right? And one reason is because of the intensity of that friendship, right? Another reason is because they have to be pleasing in all kinds of things, right? Even kind of secondary things, right? In order for you to really enjoy being with them all this time. [21:43] And then third is difficult to have this what intimate experience of another person, unless you have circumstances whereby you are brought together with that person. [22:02] But now, what about the other kinds of friendship, right? But it is possible to please many through the useful and the what pleasant, right? Like we're seeing over here in the friendly topics there, you know that Garrett the actor, right? Huh? Is always being invited to somebody's house and he enjoys his company, he enjoys his company, right? So you can have many pleasant friends and many useful ones, right? [22:25] Huh? It's amazing how many friends one of these politicians will have that are successful, right? You know, when I was down in Kentucky here this recently, my son had a biography there of Lincoln, so I started reading it, you know, and got interested in Lincoln again. So I came back here, I went to the library and I got a another rather competent biography of Lincoln, and it's amazing, you know, you see Lincoln of course building up, you know, towards the eventually the nomination of the Republican Party there in 1860, right? [22:57] But all the people he knows, and you know, you know. All the people who you have to be associating with, right? Of course, Lincoln was always going around, you know, Illinois and the circuits, you know, and you see to know everybody by name. They say, you know, and get to know so many people, right? And all these people became useful to him later on when he was going to make his his push. [23:17] So it's possible. In fact, you see it in these great politicians, right? That they have many, many useful friends, and they do need many useful friends to to get anywhere in politics, okay? But you now have also many what they call social friends, right? And those are usually friendships of what of pleasure, right? Okay. [23:42] For there are many such people of this sort, right? It could be useful to you, right? An agreeable one, one way or another, and the services are in a short time, right? You're not devoted entirely to this person, right? [24:01] But of these, he says that through the pleasant seems more like friendship. Whenever the same things come to be from both, and they enjoy each other, or the same things, such as are the friendships of the young. For the liberal is more in these, but that to the useful is commercial. So the friendship of pleasure is is closer to the highest friendship, right? Than the useful one is, right? [24:29] And the useful one seems more like business, right? More like commerce, huh? Now, of course, the liberal word liberal there comes from the Latin word liber, meaning free, and the Greek had had the same thing, right? I think I mentioned how in English, now if you look in the etymological dictionary, you'll see that the word free and the word friend are related, huh? And we talked about that a little bit here in the friendly topics, huh? [25:05] So to say, it's more liberal, more free, huh? More like friendship. And he gives another sign here, and the blessed have no need of the useful, but of the pleasant, right? [25:20] For they wish to live together with someone, right? Now, one may put up with the disagreeable for a that should be a short time, I think, but no one can submit to this continuously, right? Not even the good itself if it were a disagreeable to oneself, huh? Okay. [25:43] Whence they seek pleasant friends, and perhaps such such ought to be good, and further to them, for thus there will belong to them whatever ought to belong to friends. [26:00] Now he comes to those in power, right? Now, Aristotle has some experience of men who are powerful. Yeah, Alexander. He is the teacher of Alexander the Great, right? There's a lot of speculations if you read the histories or biographies that they have of Alexander the Great, right? What exactly was the relation between Aristotle and Alexander, especially in later years? And there's some questions of whether Alexander was a bit corrupted by power, you know, in the later years, right? [26:32] Okay. But you can see there's another powerful man too. Those in power seem to have separate friends, for some are useful to them, and others pleasant. The same are not at all both. So he has some men he associates with for the sake of pleasure, they play golf with or whatever it may be, right? Others that he finds useful to get work done, right? Not the same people, okay? [27:04] They seek neither those pleasant with virtue, nor those useful and noble things, but the witty when desiring the pleasant, right? Or the terribly efficient to do their commands, but not the virtuous, right? But these do not at all come to be in the same. [27:29] It has been said that the good man, the virtuous man, is at the same time both pleasant and useful. But such a man does not become a friend of one place or others unless he be also overtopped in virtue. If not, he will not make equal the proportion of being overtopped. But it's not at all customary for such to come to be. Aristotle may be hinting that power corrupts, right? [27:55] And absolute power corrupts absolutely. I told you that little story there when I was teaching at Saint Mary's College, you know, and back in the early '60s, and there was still some of this hazing, you know. So when you were a a a freshman, you had a, you know. So I came on campus and I saw this sophomore who I had known as, you know, had in class as a freshman. [28:24] But now he's got a freshman carrying his books around for him like a slave, right? I just kind of laughed at us seeing this situation, you know. The sophomore turned to me and he said, "Now you know that power corrupts, right? " But just think if he had, you know, absolute power with this freshman, you know, what he would be able to do, right? [28:43] So Aristotle could see this in the powerful men. The fore said friendships then are inequality, for the same things come to be from both. This is kind of a [29:09] epilogue here to the treatise of friendship so far, right? Which has been between what equals, right? Because in reading seven, he's going to talk about the other kind of friendship, which is among unequals, right? Okay. [29:28] Of course, because of the connection between friendship and equality, he talks about the equal friendships first, right? Okay. So what about the friendship of God, the Father, and God the Son, right? Friendship among what? Equals. Yeah. Now the fore said friendships then are inequality, for the same things come to be from both, right? We can be equally useful to each other, right? Or equally pleasing to each other, right? [30:01] And are wish to each other, or sometimes they exchange one thing for another, such as pleasure for utility, and try to equalize things that way. [30:12] That these are less friendships, the friendships that are based on usefulness or upon merely pleasure, and less lasting, has been said. Now he's kind of summarizing. They seem through likeness and unlikeness to the same. Now, as they seem through their likeness to the highest and the perfect and the fullest kind of friendship, the friendship simply, right, and not by happening, they seem through their likeness and unlikeness to the same to be and not to be friendships, right? [30:40] Okay. I mentioned how Cicero would only regard the highest friendship, the friendship based on virtue, to be friendship, right? Okay. So these other ones seem to be and not to be friendship, right? [30:56] For this, the highest one has it pleasant and the other useful. But these belong to that. But in this one, being without slander, the highest kind and lasting, but those quickly changing and differing in many other things, they do not seem to be friendships on account of their being unlike that one true love seems to be what eternal, like in that sonnet we have Shakespeare's, right [31:25] in there about love. When Lincoln Lincoln got married, right, he gave his wife a ring. What's in the ring? Love is eternal. Okay. So do we really love each other if we're not going to love each other forever? [31:52] You know, you know these people get married now, you know, and they have these prenuptial agreements, huh? That's like saying, you know, we're going to get married and see if it works out. If it does, we'll continue. If not, you know, we we're going to be protected by this prenuptial agreement. You know, I'll take my stuff and you take your stuff, and so on, right? Well, that's something wrong there, obviously, huh? [32:23] Okay. So what do you say? Do we love each other if our love is not forever? I mean, limited. Yeah. Yes or no, right? [32:39] Yes. So now we have a little pause here, and he's going to go on to talk about friendship among what equals, right? I mentioned how how the greatest poet of the Greeks there, his poet of antiquity, is only Homer, and. How these two great works that have come down to us from Homer, the the Iliad and the Odyssey, right? The Greeks regard the Iliad as a greater work than the Odyssey, right? [33:11] But they're both great works, and the Iliad, in a sense, is the tragedy of the friendship of what Achilles and Patroclus. But that's a friendship, as it were, of the first kind among equals, right? Now the second work, the Odyssey, right, is kind of celebrating the friendship of Odysseus and his wife Penelope, right, who waits for twenty years for him, right, faithful Penelope, right. But also the friendship between Odysseus and his son, and the friendship between him and the faithful swine, right? [33:49] Okay, and I think I mentioned before how in those three friendships among non-equals, you have this reflected again in Saint Paul's epistles, right? Where when Thomas is dividing the text to Saint Paul, Saint Paul is giving advice to husbands and advice to wives, right? Advice to fathers and advice to what sons, right? Advice to masters and to slaves, right? The same three, right? Which still exists in his time as it did in Aristotle's time, right? [34:29] So when Aristotle takes up the household or the family, right, you've got to talk about the relation of the husband to the wife, and vice versa, and the father to the son, or general to the parents to the offspring, and vice versa, all right. And then the master to the slave and the slave to master, right? Okay, and those those same relations exist when when Saint Paul is writing, and therefore he's giving advice as to how a husband should behave towards his wife, right, and how a wife should behave towards her husband, and how a father should discipline his sons in general, right? [35:06] And and whether suitable or unsuitable in the way he disciplines them, right, and how a son should behave towards his his father, right, in the same way for the master and the slave, right? Okay. [35:22] He says there's another form of friendship, another genus, you might say, of kinds of friendship. The one according to what superiority, right? And the prime example is that of the father towards the son, right? Okay. Now what did Cicero say? The son is always indebted to the father. Okay. [35:49] So it's a friendship between unequal, son, and in general the older to the what? Younger, right? Huh? So you see that in all the different arts and sciences, right? Huh? [36:06] And the man to the woman, right? This is very popular in our days, right? Okay. And the ruler to the what? Ruled, right? Huh? So the friendship there of the pope and Ratzinger or something like that, eh? Okay. But this is a friendship of unequal, right? The ruler to the ruled, right? Huh? [36:36] Now, these differ from each other, right? He's going to say that the friendship of the father for the son is not exactly the same as that of the son for the what? Father, right? The friendship of the father of the husband for the wife, and that of the wife for the husband is not exactly the same, right? Of the master or the ruler for the ruled, right? [37:02] And vice versa is not the what? Same, right? While in the case of the friendships that we spoke about before, the friendship of Hamlet for Horatio and Horatio for Hamlet is the same kind of friendship, huh? [37:22] There is not the same of parents to children and rulers to ruled. That's one difference too. But neither of the father to the son and the son to the father, nor of the husband to the wife and of the wife to the husband. Okay. [37:45] Now, what's the proof of that, right? When the third paragraph he says, "For the virtue and the work of these is what different, right? " Let's take the the first example he gives there, which is that of the father and the son, right? Huh? Is the virtue and the work of the father [38:08] the same as that of the son? Well, one of the virtues of the son would be what? Obedience, right? The son should obey his father, right? And in general, the the the offspring, right? Their parents, right? Are the parents supposed to obey the child? Huh? That's a disorder in the in the household, right? Okay. And what do we expect the father to do, huh? See. Well, the father should discipline the child, right? [38:43] Huh. But he should also advise the child, right? He should also what? Has some foresight, right? Okay. To expect the child to discipline his father. No. Or for the child to what? You know, have foresight and for his father's life. No. Well, we expect the father to have some foresight, right? Huh. Okay. So the very virtue and the work of of the father and that of the son are quite quite different, huh? [39:27] And that, on account of which they love, is also different. Now we we saw that principle used even in talking about the distinction among the friendships among equal, right? And that love is because of something lovable, right? And because the the good or the or virtue and the pleasure or the usefulness or different kinds of goods, right? Then the loving's are different, right? And therefore, the kind of friendship is different, huh? [39:56] Okay. By saying the reason why the father loves the son and the reason why the son loves the father is not the same. Right. Now, why does the father love the son, right? [40:16] Wishing him, huh? Wishing him well. What he does, yeah. But but the father's reason for loving the son is that the son is a continuation of himself. Okay. And so we use the term reproduction here, right? Huh. And I say to students, what does the word reproduction mean, right? Does it mean production? See, who is reproduced? [40:49] Yeah. See, reproduce means to produce again, right? So the son is not produced again. He produced for the first time, right? You see, it's the father and the mother. That are reproduced in the children, right? Okay. [41:09] So, the reason that the parents have, the father has, for loving the son, is that the son is a continuation of himself, right? A reproduction of himself, right? Okay. [41:34] This tree to be new made when thou art old, as Shakespeare says, right? And see thy blood warm when thou feel'st it cold. Okay. Now, does the son see the father as a continuation of himself? Reproduction of himself? No, no. But the son [41:59] has another reason for loving the father, right? No, that the father gave him life, right? The father gave him what? Education, right? Nourishment, and then education, right? Okay. So the reason the son has for loving the father is not the same as the reason the father has for loving the son. And if the reason for loving is not the same, then the love is not exactly the same, right? [42:32] And if the love is not the same exactly, then the friendship, right, which is based on, it's a habit of loving, right, is not exactly the same, right? Okay. [42:47] Do you see that? So it's the same principle, right? And as we said, you know, this thing runs through. our thinking even back. In the De Anima, right? Huh? That the powers are distinguished by their what? Acts. The powers or abilities by their act, and the acts are distinguished by their objects, right? So, because color and sound are really different, right? [43:19] And if you understand or know in some way the difference between color and sound, then you know. Secondly, that to sense color, right, and to sense sound is not really the same thing, is it? But one is seeing and the other is hearing, and then the ability to see and the ability to hear are not the same, right? You see that, right? Well, the same way here, right? [43:49] The habit of some kind of love differs from another habit of loving because the loving's are not the same, right? And the loving's differ because the what? The lovable, the reason for loving, is not the same, right? You see that? Okay. Now, just make a little side note, you know. Um. [44:17] Obviously, the friendship between God and man, if that's possible, right, is a friendship between unequals, right? Okay. But does God have the same reason, shall we say, huh, for loving us, [44:39] and that we have for loving Him? Say. Well, in case you didn't know it, we're made in the image and likeness of God, right? Okay. So God has a reason for loving us, right? Because we are the very image of God, right? Are we deficient in image, right? Okay. Um. Have we made God in our image and likeness? Maybe the poets did when they they had Homer had Zeus or somebody, right? [45:13] Huh. But but no no no. But we have another reason for loving God, right? One is that He created us, right. Another is that He conserves us in existence, right. Another is that He shepherds us towards our final goal, right? Huh. Okay. Now, do we? Does God have that reason? Do we create God? No. Do we keep Him in existence? No. God is dead. People might think so. [45:48] That's a lot nonsense, huh? You saw that that that cartoon you know where they have a a little billboard you know Nietzsche is dead, right? Oh, signed God. Oh yeah. But anyway, um, uh. So God doesn't have that reason for loving us, right? That we created Him, or that we keep Him in existence, or that we shepherd Him to some goal, right? No, no. So the reasons that we have for loving God, right, are quite different than the reasons that He has for loving us, right? [46:28] You see. So you know this helpful, right? When you go to a very unequal friendship, okay. And again, you know, going back to the first reason Aristotle gave, the virtue and the work, right? [46:50] Well, I mean, in God, you have what? The work is creation, conservation, right? Things like that. see? Why our virtue and our work are different, you know, humility, obedience, right? Virtues of this sort, right? Theological virtues, right? Okay. We believe God, right? Don't we? Okay. We hope in Him, right? So He does this. No. So the [47:26] same two reasons, son. Beautiful, the Aristotle gives here, right? Okay. Now again, the husband and the wife, right, are the virtue and the work of these the same? Sewing, no, did, yeah. Interesting. On the old days, even the courts, son, the queen would what? Sew, right? Yeah. Men never sew, right? Okay not in the family, right okay. [48:08] But is the reason that the husband has for loving the wife the same as the reason the wife has for loving the husband? Think about that. More difficult to see, right, than the father and the son. Or if you have this this friendship between the master and the slave, or even between the the ruler and the ruled, or the man who commands, the man who obeys, right? [48:35] You know, you can know your officer, right, and then those he commands, right? Is the reason that I have for loving the general the reason he has for loving the soldier? Not the same reason, is it? And again, the virtue of the commander in chief and the virtue of the soldier is quite different, right? You know, we expect the soldier to obey his officer, right, and to be brave and so on. [49:08] But we expect the officer to have some foresight, right? Not be sacrificing his men unnecessarily, right? Right. And that's why they, you know, they're somewhat critical of the officers there in the First World War, you know, these, this, you know, just massive killing of people right without gaining anything, really, you know, just kind of a pathetic war, really, in some ways, huh? Churchill was trying to avoid that, you know, the Gallipoli, plan, but he didn't get the proper assistance, you know, but he could have been successful, I think, if it had been done better. [50:01] So in the Second World War, there MacArthur would like to know, you know, jump from island to island, lead the troops, you know, kind of isolated there, you know, huh? And that way, you'd give less injuries, right, or less less deaths, but with on the mind. Okay. But the things we look for from the from the commanding officer, the general, is different, isn't it? What we look for from the guy down below. [50:28] And so the reason for loving each other is different, huh? Shakespeare's very good on that in the Henry the fifth play there, for the Battle of Agincourt right Oh. And. He says the same things do not come to be to either from the other. Nor ought they to be what Soft, right? Huh? Okay. [51:07] So the husband should not expect the same thing from the wife that the wife expects from the husband, right? And same thing in children and parents. For whenever children give to parents what is owed to those who have engendered, right? And the parents have given to sons what is owed to children. The friendship of these will be lasting and what good, right? Huh? Okay. So if your parents provided for you, right? [51:37] And nourished you, right? Huh? And gave you some advice as to what to do in life, right? What to avoid and what to pursue, right? Huh? Okay. [51:48] Then you've gotten from your parents what you should have gotten from your parents. Now it's going to come back this idea of equality because even here there's a kind of equality, proportion. [52:10] Now the loving he says ought to be proportional in all the friendships according to superiority. As the better ought to be loved more than he loves. Both the more useful and each of the others likewise. For when the loving comes to be according to worth, then there comes to be in some way equality which seems to belong to what friendship, right? But it's a kind of proportional thing, right? [52:41] But now he's going to, in the next paragraph, he's going to distinguish between the way equality is in friendship and in what justice, right? That's kind of a subtle thing here. But the equal does not seem to come about in the same way in the just and in friendship. For in matter of justice, the equal is first according to worth, but second according to quantity. While in friendship, that according to quantity is first, but that according to worth second. [53:15] Now, what the hell does that mean? Well, notice, huh? They're going down to the store, and I say, "Would you pick up a quart of milk for me and a loaf of bread?" for You there? You say, "Sure, okay." Now you do that, and I'm going to settle with you when you come back, right? Okay. Now you come back, and what's the situation now? [53:51] What's the worth of that milk and so on, right? That loaf of bread would it cost, right? And now I'm going to make things equal, right? I'm going to give you what you paid out for me, right? Okay. First, of all I'll have to see what is the worth of that milk and that bread, right? Okay. The same way in a commercial dealing, right? If I'm selling you something, right? [54:24] What is the worth of what I'm selling you, right? So if I'm selling you this house and you're going to receive this house, then you have to give me the equivalent of that house, right, and the market value, wherever it is, right? So you're going to make equal, [54:42] and then the work of justice will be over, okay? Then we have nothing to do with each other anymore. I got the house, and you got the money, right? You're taking off, and I get the house, and you get the money, okay? But in friendship, right, Aristotle is hinting here that there has to be a kind of what equality between us, right? [55:06] And then I treat you what as myself, right? Because that's the way you treat someone who's my equal, right? Who's another self, in other words, right? Okay. So it's kind of a little subtle difference there, right? There has to be a kind of equality between us, and then I treat you in the way that someone who's equal to me is worthy to treat such a person. Okay. [55:44] Well, in the case of justice, there is a kind of what inequality to begin with, and you're trying to make things what equal, right? Okay. [55:57] And then Aristotle comes to the problem then, right? It is clear that if there is a great distance in virtue or wickedness or wealth or something other, they are no longer friends or expected to be. Okay. [56:14] Now this is the kind of the common thing in in in what is Dickens' famous novel there, David Copperfield, right? You know, if you and I live in the little town there and out of the way and so on, and I have the opportunity to go to London and become famous, right? And it becomes a great distance between us, right? And I become wealthy in London, and you're back in the small town there, poor, right now. [56:40] So if there's a great distance between us, then that makes friendship what difficult, if not impossible, right? Or if you remain what rather ignorant, right? And I go and I get all kinds of degrees and all kinds of knowledge, right? Can you expect to be my friend? [57:13] Of course, you see this in in Boswell's Life of Johnson. You see, because Johnson goes from the small town down to London, becomes world famous, right? And then some bumpkin from the town shows up, right? And expects to be on intimate terms with Johnson, right? You see, but now there's been this great what disparity, right? In education and fame and everything, right? Can you expect them to associate, right? [57:43] That's only impediment to friendship, right? Okay. So the wealthy marry the wealthy, right? Usually, but then you know we saw the thing before that you know love is supposed to overcome these distances, right? Because love is a power that unites. [58:18] This is clear in the gods, right? For these excel much in all goods. This is clear also in kings. Those falling short of them a lot do not expect to be friends of them, nor do those worthy of nothing expect to be friends of the best or wisest, right? [58:41] Now, Aristotle explains in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, you can't have in ethics the precision that you have in what mathematics, right? Okay. And this is why he adds now the next paragraph. There is no precise limit in such things, right? Up to which they are friends, for many things taken away, it remains, right? Okay. [59:14] So how much inequality makes friendship impossible, right? Not to be expected, right? You can't say precisely such, right? Okay. He says, when it's separated much, then it seems to be impossible, right? Okay. And notice the example he gives here: as from God, no longer, right? Okay. And he may be speaking a bit according to the, you know, the Greek position about the gods, right? Okay. But would the Greek hope to be the friend of Zeus or Apollo or something like that, right? [1:00:00] Okay. Aristotle does say also in the Ethics, you know, that if God is friends with man, he'd be of the philosophers who are lovers of wisdom, right? Okay. Okay. But notice he's kind of raising the question here, here, and it is a question for us as Christians, right, to think about, right? How can there be friendship between God and man, right? When there is such a distance, in fact, a what infinite distance among them, right? [1:00:28] And as I mentioned before, when Thomas is giving the reasons, you know, why the incarnation is is reasonable, right? One reason he gives is in terms of friendship between God and man, that God becoming a man makes easier for there to be friendship between man and God, huh? That's interesting, right? [1:00:57] But as if. Again, you want to be very precise, but as if it would be much more difficult, suddenly. Right? Not necessarily impossible, but be much more difficult for man, right? [1:01:17] And God to have friendship. If God, what, didn't become man, right? Okay. Maybe not absolutely necessary for God to become man, or for there to be friendship between us and God, but it'd be very difficult, right? And [1:01:41] very hard, right? Okay. So you could say that. I mean, you could go back and say, "Well, isn't there friendship between God and Moses? " Well, suddenly, there is, right? Okay. But it's kind of interesting, huh? When the Church Fathers talk about the the burning bush, right? And it represents the incarnation, and the bush represents the the human nature of Christ, and the fire, right, the divine nature, and that the fire does not consume or destroy the the bush, signifies that the divine nature does not swallow up or destroy human nature, that that He's both God and man, right? [1:02:28] And that this arouses the wonder of Moses, right? Anticipates the fact that the incarnation is the most wonderful thing that God has made. Thomas, in in the fourth book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, says that this is the most wonderful thing that God has what made, right? And then he quotes the the principle that Aristotle taught us that what is most in any genus is. The cause of all the rest, and therefore, this most wonderful thing that God has made, the incarnation, is the reason why everything else wonderful is done. [1:03:13] Was done. It's all to point to this, you know. Okay. So even though the great Moses, you might say, where is Christ, right? But Moses is in the line leading to Christ, right? And even in that burning bush, right, there is a figure of the of the incarnation. [1:03:35] But in anticipation, that God was going to become man, right? And even more so when He has become man, right, then friendship between God and man becomes much more what possible, right? And and maybe you could say that because because of the incarnation, there is more friendship between God and man than there was before. You see, and when men turn away from the incarnation or the incarnate one, then then they tend to lose the friendship with God, right? [1:04:17] But it's something connected with what Aristotle is saying here, right? That when there is great inequality, then friendship becomes something very what difficult, okay? [1:04:31] And then Aristotle raises a certain problem about this, huh? Because a friend is someone who wishes well to you, right? But I wish so much well to you that you would be so much greater than me that therefore there would be no friendship between us, and then I'd lose out in this greatest of good or one of the greatest of goods, huh? Friendship, right? Whence also it is asked, he says, if friends do not wish to friends the greatest of goods, such as to be gods, right? [1:05:01] Huh? For they would no longer be friends to them or goods, for friends are goods, right? Right. You love yourself most of all, right? Huh? And even in the order of charity, you have to love yourself more than your neighbor. But if I am wishing well to you, right? What I wish you to become. [1:05:26] What I wish such great good to you, right? That there would be such an inequality between us, and that we can only be friends. Therefore, I lose this very great good of mine, namely friendship with you. A little tension there, right? You see. Okay. Um. I remember reading reading a little account there by some nun, right? Huh? Talking about the time when she decided to be a nun, right? [1:05:56] And apparently there was some young man who was interested in her, right? And of course, obviously to be the nun is a higher state than the matrimonial state, huh? But now, does he wish her to be a nun? But he wants to marry her. See, because he's apparently going to lose her now. See, but yet, if he wishes her well, then he should, right? So, said the young man's last words to her were, "Well, I'm glad God's getting you instead of another man." [1:06:29] It's kind of funny, but it reminds me, you know, when Aristotle is talking here, right? Huh? Yes. Would I want my best friend to become pope? See, well, they say when a man is is made a bishop, huh, he has to almost, you know, cut himself off a bit from his buddy buddy friends that he might have had before, right? He has to, you know, kind of treat everybody reasonably and equally, you know, and so on. [1:06:58] And so, maybe, you know, if if you became pope, I would no longer be able to what teach you. Yeah, yeah. Well we'd have to make classes I couldn't sit around on Friday evenings and drink beer or wine with you anymore, you know. I mean, you see, you know, you're so far above me that you know I can't, you know, I'm going to lose my friendship, right? [1:07:23] Like Thomas Becket and uh King whatever his name. is Yeah. Yeah. That's funny. If it has been well said that the friend wishes good things to the friend on account of the latter, it will be necessary that the latter remains such as he is, for he wishes the greatest goods to him as being a man, right? [1:07:49] Further, perhaps not all, for each one wishes good things, especially to himself, right? I think this is kind of the way of difficulty Aristotle is posing it, right? Huh? Okay. You know how in. Greek literature, or Greek mythology. in a sense, a man is raised to the status of a god, right? You know, he has in some of the plays and things that sort. Now, would I want my friend to be raised to the status of one of the immortal gods? [1:08:14] Now, look at this there. Well, I wish good to him. This is a great advancement in life, right? Okay, so we have to quit now. We got to quit now, y'all. Yeah. The next time we'll be looking at the last reading here, and then we would do a little things, fundamental things in ethics there, because, [1:08:51] notice in talking about love as we did in the treatise on love, and now about friendship, so we had to talk about the good, right? Because the good is the object of love, right? And Plato is very subtly in the dialogue called the Symposium. It's a dialogue about love, right? But the occasion for the dialogues about love in the Symposium is the victory of the tragic poet Agathon that year. [1:09:26] And of course, if you know Greek, Agathon comes from the Greek word agathos, meaning good. So, in honor of the poet whose name means the good, they have six speeches about love, right? I think Plato is subtle there, right? And that there's a connection between love and the good, right? Now, [1:09:49] so if you have to know the object before you know the act, right? Maybe we should have talked about the good before we talked about love, right? So I have to correct that. Okay. And of course, to understand good is the fundamental thing in ethics, right? And you have to understand good before you can understand better, because better means gooder. if that were grammatically correct then. Okay. [1:10:22] And