Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
37. Is Moral Effect Accidental to the Poet? Accidental Causes, No Science of the Accidental, and Modern Determinism
Class of 2005-09-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7a-wisdom-2005/037-is-moral-effect-accidental-to-the-poet-accidental-causes/

[0:00] Well, then people have a problem when they try to understand the the poetic art, right? See, is it accidental to the poetic art to be moral? See, some people try to claim that, right? They try to claim that the poetic art is like the the art of cooking, right? You know, that the poet is trying to please you, right? Like Shakespeare often say in the epilogue they will strive to please you every day."

[0:29] Okay. So is it accidental to the poet that his fiction has a good moral effect upon you? What would you say? I would say it's not accidental, but

[0:46] most people would disagree with me today. Thomas, when he's talking about the poetics, there, he makes a statement, "Poetae est inducere ad aliquid virtuosum per decentem repraesentationem." It belongs to the poet, right, to lead us into something virtuous by suitable representation. Now, Thomas is not inclined to speak per accidens, but per se, right? Yeah. So he sees it as being per se to the poet, right? But if you presented that in an English class, you know.

[1:31] You try to get a master's degree or a fourth-year doctor's degree. You'd be quite cacked for imposing this moral in upon fiction, right? Now,

[1:51] so is that likeness? It's perhaps more known to us, right, that the poetic art is like the art of cooking; that it aims to please, right?

[2:17] The same way as the music art, right? We had the famous letter of Mozart there to his father, right? About the way to represent the anger of Osmin in the abduction from the Seraglio, right? And how the music has to represent the anger in the sense of him, but Mozart says, "But not in a way that is displeasing to the ear, " or in other words, cease to be music, right?

[2:45] Okay, so I was quoting earlier there Shakespeare, we'll strive to please you every day, right? So it's more known to us that the musician aims to please our ears, right, and emotions too, I suppose, and the poet to please our imagination, please our emotions. So it seems, in that respect, to be like the art of cooking, and therefore it's a possibility, right, to say the other is accidental.

[3:29] That's a little hard thing to see, right? In other words, does it belong to the poet to make a morally, you know, to make a work that has a good moral effect upon this audience? Does it belong to him to do that as poet or as a good man? Say, which isn't? Yeah, well, I'm saying when Thomas says it belongs to the poet to do this into something virtuous, to a suitable representation,

[4:16] then Thomas seems to be saying it belongs to him as poet and not simply as a good man, right? But how would you show that? Say, how would you show that?

[4:34] It's interesting. Aristotle defines tragedy. He defines tragedy as a likeness of an action with a serious, complete, and of some magnitude, right? In sweetened language, acted out rather than narrated, right? Moving us to pity and fear, so as to purge these emotions, right? In Greek word catharsis there. Well, he puts catharsis in the definition of tragedy, right? And catharsis is a name taken first of all from what?

[5:19] Medicine, right? And what does catharsis or pregation mean in medicine, right? It means the elimination of something harmful from the body, right? So the simplest example of a catharsis is when you swallow something that's poisonous, and and sometimes they induce vomiting. Says they don't know what to do, but but that's the simplest example of catharsis, right? To removing this harmful substance from it, right? So what would mean a catharsis of a reason?

[5:49] Socrates would speak of is kind of saving men as a catharsis of their reason. Well, he talks to a little slave boy there in the Meno. He asks the slave boy how do you double a square, and the slave boy says you double the side, right? Well, he's mistaken, right? Double the side, you're going to get a square four times this big, okay? So Socrates shows the slave boy that he's mistaken, and so he he's purged the mind of the slave boy, right?

[6:25] Okay. So what would be the catharsis of emotions? Huh? Well, you're reducing the emotions to a more healthful state, huh? But again, the fact that Aristotle puts that in the very definition of tragedy makes it, in his opinion, right, essentially belong to the poet as such, and the tragedy as such, right? Okay.

[7:00] Why in the cookbook, you know, they say you mix this with that, and this with that, and so on, and eat this and that. and you have a delicious sauce, right? It never says, and then you have a healthy sauce, right? Is it? Some books not what they grill. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I see, I see. Well, yeah, yeah. But it combined two arts there, he said. Yeah.

[7:22] No, that's kind of tragedy, then, huh? You know, by the topic, I guess who is healthy to taste good, right? Okay, I mean, you're paying this. This book was written to cook. It's like those light beers. Yeah. Tastes great, less money. Who cares?

[7:50] But Aristotle does say that the cook is being accidental. Okay. Once it happens, we say, right? And some way he makes, but something he does not make. He's not ending at that, right?

[8:11] Okay. And he goes into the fact that other things that aren't come to be by accident, the cause is also what accidental. Now just talk upon that. We haven't talked about causes, accidental causes, but. There's many senses of accidental cause.

[8:37] You say a house builder, right? He makes a house, right? Okay. And the house collapses on top of somebody. So, the house builder, in some sense, is responsible for the death of this person, right? Okay. But he didn't intend it, right? Intended the house, right? Well, here's something that happened to the per se effect of the house builder.

[9:19] This Aristotle is exemplifying there in a bit, right? Okay. The cook is aiming at the what? Tasty. And the tasty happens to be healthy, right? So the cook made something healthy, but that was what outside his intention, right? Okay. Now the other way, or another way that you talk about the accidental, is you can say that if the cook happens to belong to the house builder, the house builder happens to be a cook, then I can say that the cook made a house, right?

[10:02] And or vice versa, if the house builder happens to belong to a cook, then you can say a house builder made something tasty, but again, it's an accidental cause, right? Okay. So Aristotle

[10:21] saying you look for an accidental cause, the accidental, right? Okay. But there's many different kinds of accidental cause. More than those two kinds, but those are the ones we begin with. But Aristotle takes a luck or chance in the second book of of the Physics, Natural Hearing. He says that it's a what? An accidental cause of what happens rarely, right? As a result of something done for an end.

[10:51] And if it's done by will, then it's luck, right? But if it's done by nature, it could be called chance. A chance can be said of luck too. Okay, this don't say

[11:07] there about accidental causes. So the next paragraph he says, "Hence, since all things do not exist or come to be by necessity and always, but most usually, it is necessary that what is by accident exists, as the white is musical is musical, neither always nor usually." But since it comes to be sometimes, it would be by accident. If not, all things would be by necessity.

[11:36] Whence the matter which can be other than what it is for the most part would be the cause of the accidental. That's certainly why the the evolutionists right want to say that things develop by chance because they're making matter the first cause of all these things. We don't have any any mover that has a motive here, right?

[12:02] But one must take this to getting whether nothing is neither always nor for the most part, or this is impossible. There is something, therefore, besides these, what happens whichever way and by accident.

[12:25] Okay, this will not be true, of course, as he says about the eternal things. Okay, now finally, and fourth paragraph on page four, he gives the reason now why there is no science of the accidental. It is clear that science will not be the accidental. For every science, you could say the same thing about art. Is about either the always or the usual, right? How else could one learn or teach it?

[12:51] Right. Okay. So if you're learning how to build a house, you're not going to talk to. But what would happen to people in that house? He's not going to tell you about that. Okay.

[13:12] The same way you're giving rules on grammar or some other art, right? You can give a rule about what is true always, obviously, but we also give rules about what is true for the what most part, right? And I kind of invent that rule, right? The rule of two or three, right? You know, which maybe not be true always that we divide into two or three, but you could say usually, huh?

[13:40] When you divide into more than two or three, you're combining some way more than one division into two or three, right? Okay. And so you take it apart, you find out that there was a what

[14:00] division maybe into two or three, and you subdivided one of these members, or you crisscrossed them, like we said, right? Okay. I see. If you look at the beginning of of this second reading, where you recall the senses of being from the fifth book, right? How many senses of being does he have?

[14:26] Four. Four, four, yeah. Oh, distinction to four, right? Distinction to four. But you go back to book five, right? What does he do? He divides being into two: being kath' hauto per se to itself as such, and being kata sumbebekos by accident or by happening, right? That's a distinction into two, okay. And then he subdivides accidental being. He doesn't do here, but he does it there, right?

[15:03] When two things happen to the same thing, right? And then that thing is said to be both, right? Or else, when one happens to the other, right? And the two ways of doing that, right? And then being kath' hauto in Greek, per se, being per se, being through itself by itself, being as such. then distinguishes. Into three, right? Being according to figures of predication, being as true, and being divided into act and ability, right?

[15:40] So actually, it divides into two, and then he divides one of those into three, right? The same way, I think I don't have to the text in here, but the one at the beginning of the commentary Thomas on the Nicomachean Ethics, where he wants to divide the knowledge of reason by the order it considers. Do that text a little time here? And he divides order in comparison to reason into four.

[16:10] He says that the order which reason does not make, like the order of natural things, is the order which reason makes in its own acts, its own thoughts and the words that signify them, and is the order which reason makes in the acts of the will. and what you do, right? And then there, which reason makes in matter, okay? Say, hey, distinguishes into four, right? But Thomas, you know, seeking brevity there, right?

[16:42] Doesn't make explicit that the first order is divided against the last three, right? Because the first order is an order not made by reason. The last three are an order made by reason, and that distinction is by the maker in a sense, right? Okay. Either made by reason or not made by reason, and then you subdivide the order made by reason by that in which it is made, either in reason's own acts or in the acts of the will or in matter.

[17:16] So what you have really, you take it apart, a distinction into two, and then a distinction of one of those two into three. So everything is a two or a three, okay? So usually you come back and you analyze it. They don't always make that explicit, right? But to understand how you got these four, okay? Aristotle, he distinguishes the ten categories. He distinguishes them into ten. But when Thomas tries to explain the ten, right?

[17:49] He divides them into what three? Something is said of individual substance by reason of what they are, or it's said by reason of something in addition to what they are, but existing in them, right? Or it's said by reason of something outside of them into three, and then he'll subdivide the second and the third, right? But always sub dividing by two or by what three, okay?

[18:23] Okay, so they don't always make that explicit, but you start to analyze it. But are there exceptions? huh I'm sure there are Aristotle divides quality into four species, right? Well, I don't know if I would be inclined to say there's a two or three there, right? Okay. And of course, the division into four, that's hard to understand, but

[18:52] I'm willing to admit that there are maybe exceptions to dividing into two or three, right? But I still give us a rule, by telling us a rule for the what most part, right? So I'm going beyond Plato, who's always going to divide into two, or Socrates in the dialogues, right? Socrates is saying always divide into two, and then Hegel always divides into three. Well, nobody else ever gives you the other number, other two or three, for always dividing into.

[19:26] See, but I put the two together. I don't say always divide into two or three. I say, for the most part, you divide into two or three,

[19:38] and you have to analyze things that way. May be a very useful rule, but could I give a rule for what happens beyond? Sometimes divide into four, and maybe sometimes you know.

[19:57] Couldn't give a rule. for it but it wouldn't be of any use, right? Once in a while I divide into four? That's not giving any direction, right? Okay. For every science and every art, you would say is about either the always or the usual, what is for the most part. How else could one learn or teach another?

[20:24] For it must be limited by always of the most part. If you try to consider anything might happen, right? Can I teach you what might happen to you if you go to the store? Go to the bookstore? What might happen if you go to the bookstore? Hmm? Well, you might be an old friend. huh? The drugstore in Shrewsbury the roof might fall in, didn't one time. Unfortunately, not in there.

[20:53] Might get shot, huh? Robbed. Can't you can't teach that, can you? That might happen. So the accidental being rare, you can't make it the object of any art or what science.

[21:19] It has been said then what the accidental is, and through what cause it is, and that there is no science of it. Maybe we should stop there, huh? Because the third reading is another thing here now. The third reading is going to be talking about

[21:46] there are really things that happen now. Aristotle, there are things that happen. Of course, you know the moderns had a principle that they call what the principle of determinism, okay? And the principle of determinism, and I think we mentioned we were talking about Democritus, right? Everything happens for a reason by necessity, he says. Well, this, in a sense, is the absolute principle of modern science in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and sometimes it's stated in terms of what the past and future.

[22:24] If you knew the position and momentum and so on of every part of the universe at any point in time, and you had a supercalculating mind, you could see the whole future unraveling with complete what necessity, right? So the past necessarily determines the future, and you probably heard me take the example there of Claude Bernard, huh? As a witness to that being the absolute principle of modern science,

[22:54] you know this principle arises because you have a mathematical science in it, especially, and mathematics you have to kind of determinism, huh? It's absolute, and so you study the natural world mathematically, you kind of carry this determinism over to the natural world.

[23:15] Now, it developed, as they say, in the physical sciences first, right? And they got all this prestige, right? And then, when biology, and later on psychology, and maybe the social sciences later on, when they tried to what take on the robes of science and and the prestigious science, what they saw as being most necessary in science is this principle of determinism.

[23:48] Now, it's a very famous work by Claude Bernard, who's one of the fathers, I suppose you'd say, of modern physiology and biology. And they still reprint his introduction to the study of experimental medicine, right? The universe from Harvard and so on, but he was trying to make biology more scientific, there, right? Around 1860, right? Wasn't scientific enough biology, and so among other works, he wrote this book called Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine.

[24:23] Well, the book has three parts, and the first part is a general description of the experimental method, the scientific method. The second part is a description of the scientific method in biology, in particular, and the third part is. concrete examples from his own research, which are very ingenious, right? Of following this experimental method in biology, right? So it's to make biology more scientific, huh? But now in the first part, Bernard has a good understanding of the fact that a scientific hypothesis is never known for sure to be true, okay?

[25:07] And from elementary logic, you can see the reason for that, right? See, because the way the scientific hypothesis is confirmed is you say if H is so, my hypothesis is so, then you predict what will be so, right? If my hypothesis is correct, then there will be a eclipse of the sun at ten this morning, right? Okay. Now you wait until ten o'clock, and ah, there's an eclipse of the sun, right?

[25:41] P is so, now can you syllogize that H is so? No. And that would be what? invalid, because P could follow maybe from something besides H, right?

[26:07] And so the fact that P is so doesn't mean that H is so, right? It's a sign that it is, but it doesn't prove it. Yeah. Now my example in class is that Berquist dropped dead last night, which is my hypothesis about Berquist. Then Berquist will be absent from class today. Well, he is absent from class today. Therefore, he dropped dead. I always tell students that's wishful thinking.

[26:32] It's not logical. And of course, Einstein says that Newtonian physics have predicted so many things that came true. That they began to think this must be true, Newtonian physics, huh? And then Einstein showed he could predict the same things with a different hypothesis, right? Plus some things that didn't look predict. And then he said it became crystal clear to the physicists that you never know in the strict sense.

[27:06] Now, of course, the more things you predict that come true, right? And the more precise those things are, right? If he says there'll be an eclipse of the sun at ten a. m. Pretty precise, right? The more probable becomes that hypothesis, right? But this form of argument never is a syllogism. It never follows necessarily that H is so. So you never really know that H is so, right?

[27:34] Okay. It might be reasonable to accept it for the time being because you know everything is predicted so far has been so, right? Of course, the thing that really you know strikes them is sometimes when they work out this, it predicts something will be that they've never seen before. That can predict, you know, like Dirac worked out the math there, the elementary particles, and he predicted that there was going to be a a positive electron.

[28:05] No such thing. Well, soon enough they found a what? Positron or something, right? Okay. So you predict the existence of something nobody knows exists, and you find out later on that does exist. Wow! You know that's that's striking. But still, the form doesn't what? Doesn't follow necessarily, right? So Bernard, in a sense, realizes that no matter how many times an hypothesis has been confirmed. It still might make sense sometimes to what test it again, and so he says the doubt is intrinsic to the experimental method.

[28:47] Ah, but when it comes to the principle of determinism, he said you can't doubt that. To doubt determinism would be to doubt science. He seems to be being inconsistent. Well, no, I mean I give as a witness, right? He's a man who, in some sense, understands very much, right? The fact that a hypothesis is never by its confirmation shown to necessarily be true, right, and therefore it can always be submitted to some further test, right?

[29:23] But yet he excludes determinism from this, right? So the determinism becomes, in a sense, the or seen as the absolute principle of science. You must hold on to that to give up determinism is to give up science.

[29:41] Now the other example I always give is from psychology, right? And I tell him the story of my cousin's dream, right? And my cousin used to have these wild dreams, and he'd tell us about them in the morning. We'd have a good laugh about him. And the one we remember that he had one time was a tiger was chasing him, right? And he was trying to escape, and the tiger running this way, run that way, and finally runs down this way.

[30:06] It's a dead end. And I said, "Oh, he turns around to face the tiger, right? " As the tiger comes up, the tiger says, "Would you like to buy a raffle ticket? " How irrational, right? You know, if anything seems irrational, not to have any reason for it, right, and not by necessity, it's a dream, right? But then along comes a guy named Freud, right, and he's going to make you know psychology scientific, right?

[30:36] And so there's a reason why you dreamed that last night, cousin, and you you had to dream that, right? And it tells us something about you. We're going to find out what it tells us about you, right? That's kind of an extreme example, right? But you see, that's what he's got to hold on to: determinism, right? Okay. Now determinism was not challenged in modern science until quantum theory, right?

[31:04] It was Heisenberg, right, who first clearly formulated, right, the principle of indeterminism, and Einstein, as you know, would never go along with this, huh? Wanted to hold on to the determinism of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and the Copenhagen so-called interpretation of quantum theory with Niels Bohr and Heisenberg. So-called because they were all students at one time of Bohr, I was associated with him, and he's in Copenhagen.

[31:41] That was the subject, you know, was the great showdowns of physicists in the Solvay Conference. In 1927, there was the last big showdown, and Einstein came to the conference. He was trying to break down the Copenhagen interpretation, and he would think up a thought experiment that seemed to produce difficulty for the Copenhagen interpretation. And Niels Bohr stayed up all night, came back the next day, and refuted Einstein's objection.

[32:14] Right, so Einstein would try another, right? And finally, the last attempt of Einstein was pretty devastating at first sight, anyway. And I've actually had one of the books, you know, the picture of Einstein and Bohr leaving, you know, Einstein's put his last and greatest objection to him, and Einstein's kind of walking along and then, you know, kind of self-satisfied looking at his work on his face almost, and Bohr's coming after him, you know, and looking kind of worried, you know, it's thought.

[32:45] Well, again, Bohr spent a sleepless night, and he found that Einstein in his objection had overlooked part of his own theory. Oh no! And so he came back the next day and pointed out, and that was the end of Einstein. He never tried to object publicly again to it, but he never would accept it. And Ehrenfest, who was a physicist who was kind of a personal friend of Einstein, said, "I'm ashamed of you, right?

[33:11] You can't give an objection that holds up and then you won't go along with it, right? " It shows how strongly they wished that idea, determinism.

[33:22] But the indeterminism that Aristotle sees in the natural world is tied to his understanding of matter, right? And Heisenberg, when he started to see the indeterminism, had an interest in Aristotle's idea of matter and the potency of matter, huh? That matter is really able to be other than it is, even when it's this way, able to be another way. And he thought that quantum theory, you know, suggested ideas in the physicists' minds, like the one that Aristotle had.

[33:56] That's what he says in the in the Gifford lectures, huh? Would it only be in the determinism of matter that Heisenberg is rooting this, or would it also be because it seems so clear that we are free? Yeah, that's another. So would it? Yeah, yeah. As far as the actual science is concerned, Heisenberg go up with you, right? He might do that, yeah, but but that's to be a different kind of determinism.

[34:22] Aristotle would see that too, but I mean, as far as natural things in terms of. Of matter, right? Okay, so this third reading, Aristotle's going to be kind of, you know, attacking the idea of determinism, right? Okay.

[34:40] But indeterminism in modern physics seems to be there to stay now, you know. But this doesn't want to go back, you know. And so, next time we look at the third reading, we'll see some of the reasons Aristotle gives for this.

[34:59] And then we'll go on to the fourth reading, which will be about the the being as true, right? Okay. But this is already given the reasons why accidental being doesn't have to be considered much, a lot in wisdom, right? One reason because no reason about knowledge, right? Considers the accidental, right? And second, that this is the reason our knowledge is about being as being, and it hardly is a being.

[35:38] It hardly is. What's kind of interesting is Aristotle begins with the being that least of all is, and then go all the way to the one that says, "I am who am," right? You see. And this is kind of the picture of our mind that goes from what is seems more real to us, but is less real, right? Least real, goes to what is most real, but least what?

[36:09] known to us, huh? Now many of us start to go from motion, right? Yeah. But in motion, hardly is. But accidental being is sometimes even less. real But later on, you find out that God is the cause of being as being, right? Then His causality extends even down to accidental being. And as Thomas would say, God's causality is so strong that not only what

[36:44] He wants to be is, but it is in the way He wants it to be. Some things by necessity, and some by what chance, and so on. And you realize how transcendent God's mind is, right, compared to to our mind, huh?

[37:06] Where you can't, you know, foresee the accidental, right? But I am not controlled. People running around, you know, did they do enough, you know, to help people in New Orleans and so on? You know, there's an awful lot of accidental being in these things, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

[37:29] There was a video moment today about the Rita, the new hurricane coming in there, and everybody's fleeing, you know, and the city are told to evacuate. But the line of cars is just one hundred miles long, and the speed is two miles an hour. Oh man! Well, one woman, you know, said, well, that guy's gonna run. out of gas if I get out of here. I'm gonna be stranded somewhere on the highway, so she turned around and went back home.

[37:53] So all kinds of things going on, right? And uh... can't blame people all together for the accidental, right? I'm sure you should have had an alarm. Yeah, you should have foreseen. The army's going to do some airplanes, but it's still just other people think, "Oh, of course, you know, how how is there, you know, built, you know, to take this much at this time in one time?

[38:20] Everybody's leaving. Is this Key West. No When you're talking about Texas, now it's supposed to come in Galveston and Houston. I don't know I don't know. how far? How far is Houston from the shore? I don't know. 50-miles roughly Yeah, This is also category 5 They they call it a category five. Yeah, just like last. Oh, really? The last one was was it four? Wasn't it? It was.

[38:42] It built up to 5. Oh, I thought I heard. the... Well, Karl Marx and Freud, right? They say, you know, uh, explain this fragment of of um, Empedocles. You know, Marx um, tells us all part of the truth, right? That the economic mode of production does has something to do with the social structure, of society, and with the political structure, you know. I think so. But the economic mode of production explains everything, you know.

[39:13] And then, and then Freud comes along and says, "No, sex explains everything." I'm sure sex means something, but does it explain everything, you know. And and you know, can they both be right? You know, economic, economic mode of production explains everything, and you know, but you see, because the problem in evolution has been, you know, the main problem is how do you get a whole basic pattern, you know, of animal, right?

[39:44] Piecemeal, you can't do it. You can't introduce it piecemeal, and you can have maybe you know variations in color or variations in the length of the nose or something, right? It has some connection with changing things in the environment. But that's like that's not that's not the whole the whole makeup of the animal, right? That's a problem they had from the beginning that they can't really explain it.

[40:17] And of course, apparently, the chemistry say of cells involves so many things that have to be coordinated, right? one after another. You can't, you know, the cell won't work unless all these things are in place. And how can you do that piecemeal? You can't do it piecemeal, is it? So they're kind of extrapolating, right, with no basis from a little part of the truth they saw that there were, you know, But if you find in England, you know, that the birds, some kind of bird I think it was, or not as a bird it was an insect, but the ones that had a certain color, right, that fit in with the smoky landscape of the industrial England, they survived, right, because they couldn't be seen

[41:02] by the predators, right, and ones of other colors, right, started to disappear, right, because they were picked up by the predators, you know. Okay, so you can see something there, right? But that's kind of a minor thing compared to the whole basic structure. of this or that kind of animal. They don't really can't really address that,

[41:24] but they take it sometimes, you know. I mean, I saw sometimes even in Catholic magazines, you know, saying, "Well, John Paul II accepts evolution. You know, that's the whole thing he thinks now. You know, this is the whole truth, right? " But that's a common thing. He sees part of the truth in a way. I suppose the whole you boast and that's a good piece, that they boast of having seen the whole.

[41:48] And I think that that seems as learned by men. I think behind it, behind it, to the idea that an evolution is basically the materials, right? So they're thinking of matter as the beginning of all things, and a mindless matter as the beginning of all things, right? Then you have to try to explain everything by luck or by chance. Chesterton

[42:15] sort of mocked that theory by saying that particular principle is saying some evolutionists want to say that the whole universe is like a giant egg that laid itself by accident.

[42:32] That's what it comes down to in their explanation. In human things, we see you know, luck or chance leads to chaos. You know, you know the standard example there is the library, right? You know, if you just put a book in anywhere in the hole in the in the bookshelves, the whole collection goes from order to disorder. So over time, things get more disordered than ordered. You take your desk, you know, that's a good example.

[42:59] I'm in school. Of course, the semester goes on. It's littered with you know kinds of things that come in all the time. You know, you get into something else, right? So unless you try to order and arrange your desk and clear it up, it gets it doesn't go from disorder to order. It goes from order to disorder. Same way the house goes that way, you know. You leave this magazine there, you leave this book there, you leave this wrapper there, you leave this cup here.

[43:25] You know, unless someone tries to you know clear things up, the natural tendency is to go from order to disorder. Like the physicists say, right? in thermodynamics, you're just going from an organized state to a disorganized state. My mother, my mother used to illustrate that to me because when it was time when my room was sufficiently disorganized, she would do is she would take all the drawers out and dump them in the middle of the room.

[43:54] Straighten it up. So I was forced to put order in because intelligent design. I have a practical experience with intelligent design. I don't know why I'd have to see the order you put in.

[44:07] Most intelligent. Quality rationality. More intelligent than the masses do know. Again, you look through there.