Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
39. Isagoge vs. Categories, What a Thing Is, and Metaphysics VII: Defining Substance, Accident and Motion
Class of 2005-09-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7a-wisdom-2005/039-isagoge-vs-categories-what-a-thing-is-and-metaphysics-vii/

[0:00] what's the difference between said of and the distinction of said ofs in the uh, Isagoge of Porphyry? And in the categories of Aristotle, what's the difference between the two? Would would it be in in in Porphyry or speaking about them in relationship to the subject, and that's

[0:04] why it'd be it'd be maybe like a property belongs to the subject per se, but it could be an accident, just like whereas in the categories he's simply defining what all the accidents are, and you're not seeing whether it's an essential or accidental relation. Well, yeah, it gets in there, but let us put it this way: in both the Isagoge and the categories, there's a distinction of set of, right?

[1:10] Yeah, okay, but it's obviously not the same distinction, right? Uh, you numerically, right? there's five in the Isagoge, right, and ten in the categories, right? Now I was quoting before that Father Delac, during the logic course at College Saint Thomas, when I was a student, and

[1:37] Delac said, "You know, he'd despair. I've been teaching logic all these years, getting students to see the difference between accident as opposed to substance, accident as opposed to property. They just can't. There's some things you discover as a teacher, right? And no matter whether you stand in your head or what you do, 99. 99 percent of the students will never, get in their head straight, right? They'll never see it, right?

[2:00] But but but they are different distinctions, right? Okay. So that what is an accident in one sense, in the sense of the categories, may not be an accident in Porphyry's sense, right? Okay. Okay.

[2:21] Now, to me, the clue As far as Isagoge is from my favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? And when Thomas has the chapter Contra Gentiles, where he's talking about names and God and creatures and so on, right? And he has a chapter where he wants to show that no name is said univocally with exactly the same meaning of God and creatures, right? Okay. And he has a number of arguments to show this, right?

[3:09] Okay. But one of the arguments is an either-or syllogism, right? Disjunctive syllogism. I use a big word. Where he says that every name said univocally of many things, right, is either a genus or a difference or a species or a property or an accident. So he takes the five in Porphyry's Isagoge as a complete distinction, right, of name said univocally of many things.

[3:54] And then he goes and eliminates each one of these. You know, that no name is said of God and creatures is a genus, and is a difference, and is a species, and so on. Then they saw all five right five, right? So that to me was was a clue to perhaps

[4:15] seeing the Isagoge as a distinction of names said univocally of many things. See when look at Porphyry's Porphyry's proemium he says we're going to talk about what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property and accident. So he's going to distinguish these five, right, in that book. But what is he distinguishing? See. And when he defines them, he doesn't define them as a what name, right?

[4:52] Okay. You know, say some. You know, we first heard the definitions kind of in the English translation of Porphyry and say that which is said, like the genus is that which is said of many differing in species and answered the question, what is it? And Latin says it in quid praedicatur, right? But are you talking about a name? I'm not.

[5:19] See. Now maybe Porphyry doesn't know what he's doing. Maybe he does," says all-authority. Maybe he wants to leave genus and species, ah, both for the name of a general kind of thing and the name of a particular kind of thing, but also use genus and species for the general kind of thing itself and particular kind of thing. Okay, but then t here is a little difference there, right?

[5:55] Okay. Now Aristotle talks about definition as a logos, as a speech, right? You say it's composed of names, genus and difference are the names, the names, right? So a very could perhaps use genus and species to mean something other than a name, right? It seems you got to begin there, the sensible name, okay? So when I made this discovery there in the Summa Contra Gentiles, my favorite book because of the large printed book, you know,

[6:35] I went to Monsignor Dian and I said to him, "Should not Porphyry, at the beginning of the day he said okay, right? Should he not have first distinguished between names said univocally of many things and names said what equivocally of many things? Right? Okay. " Monsignor Dian said, "Yes, okay. " And then we're going to take names said univocally of many things and distinguish them, and then every such name is either genus, a difference a species a proper and accurate.

[7:19] see what I mean? Okay, and then perhaps you have to have another introductory part there in logic, or first part where you talk about names said of many things equivocally, and then you distinguish between names said of many things equivocally by chance and equivocally by reason. And I think I've done here. I distinguished different ways in which a name is said equivocally by reason, right? Okay, and that would be doing for name or codical by reason something like what porphy is doing for names said univocally of many things, huh?

[7:58] Okay, but as it stands, if you want to regard genus, species, difference, and properties as five names, or five kinds of names, their distinction of name said of many things, univocally, right? Okay, So that's what the isogogiae is.

[8:26] It's about name, said of many things, univocally, Okay, meaning a name set of many things with the same meaning in mind in each case, right? So when I say the dog is an animal and I say the cat is an animal, I mean I have the same meaning of animal in mind—a living body with sensation. I call the dog an animal because it's a living body with sensation.

[9:01] I call a cat an animal, the same reason, exactly. Well, when I say that there were bats in there last night, and then there are bats in the church belfry or something, right? Well, then I have the same meaning in mind when I talk about these. Okay, is it? Now, the categories.

[9:32] Okay. Well, here are also distinguishing names, right? Okay. But how are you distinguishing those ten? Name set of name. Well, let's go back to the phrase set, right? You try to pluralize this so you can hear because you got five, right? Name set of many things, univocally, right? Okay. What are the names that you are distinguishing? Name set of what? What? Set of one. Yeah, but what does that do anything more or less?

[10:26] Well, be more precise than that. Names set of. Well, you see, before Aristotle gets to distinguishing the ten, right? He distinguishes between substance and accident, and universal and individual. Okay. So you get what four things, right? Universal substance, individual substance, right? Universal accident, individual accident, right? Okay. You're talking about shape or my shape, right? You're talking about man or this man here, right? Okay. So he distinguishes those four, right?

[11:11] Now is that connected with distinction of the ten that are on? So would be names of particular substances. Yeah. Names set of individual substances or particular substances, right? Okay.

[11:36] And the way Thomas he explains this distinction again, as you know, he follows the purposes of rule of two or three, right? Okay. And he says that in

[12:00] a name set of individual substances, it's either set of them as regards what they are, right, or it's set of them because of something in them in addition to what they are, right, or it's set of them by reason of something outside of them. Okay. And then the first one is rise to the category of what substance, right? Okay. So, a man is said of you and me, or individual substances, as regards what we are, right?

[12:34] And more generally what Animal is said of man, as regards what, man is right. Therefore, more generally of us, and then maybe living body of animal, right? And then body of living body, and then substance of body, right?

[12:51] And then there are names said of you and me, not by reason of what we are, but by reason of something existing in us, right? In addition to what we are, like you and I may be said to be white, son. Okay. And

[13:09] or you and I may be said to be healthy, I'd say, right? Okay. And then there are things said of you and me by reason of something outside of us, son. So you and I are said to be in this room, right? Or you and I are said to be clothed, right? Or you and I are said to be what Sitting, right? Okay.

[13:40] So I won't go into the law of distinction again, but you see what you're doing, right? So it's quite a different distinction that's being made in the two words, right? Okay.

[13:55] Now, notice how substance signifies what a thing is, right? Now, there's only two places that I know of where Aristotle enumerates all ten of the

[14:21] categories, right? And one is in the book called the Categories, and the other is in the book called the Topics of the Places, Okay. And in both he gives exactly the same ten in exactly the same order,

[14:41] with one exception. In the Categories he calls the first of them ousia, which would translate by the word substance, right? In the Topics he calls it to ti esti, what it is. Okay. That's very very revealing, huh? You see? I say what it is, how much, how, towards what, very concrete, right? So

[15:13] Aristotle will often use the word substance to mean what it is, right? Of course, its definition tells you what a thing is, right? So, in the seventh book, he talks a lot about what it is, and he talks a lot about definition, right? Signifies what it is, and what belongs the definition, and so on, right? Okay.

[15:44] But one of the questions that eventually is going to be elucidated there is: in these material things, is a thing and what it is exactly the same?

[16:05] No. Or even in mathematical things, right? Is a circle and what a circle is identical? What if a circle and what a circle is were the same? Is there no difference whatsoever? Would you have more than one circle? No, no. Because what a circle is is something one, right? So, if a circle and what a circle is was identical, would be be more than one circle? Okay.

[16:42] And if what a man is and a man were identical, would there be more than one man? In the same way, for a dog and a cat, and so on, right? Okay.

[17:05] Now, Plato in a way had anticipated this with his strange idea of the forms, right? Because in the form of man and the form of dog and the form of cat, which exist in the world by themselves, there's only what pertains to what a dog is, what a man is. There's only one form of man, only one form of dog, right? And some somewhat unexplained ways, Aristotle explains, you and I partake, right?

[17:35] You see, of what a man is, and all the cats partake of what a cat is. And we might ourselves speak this way at some time, but we're not doing exactly the same thing as Plato does, right? Okay. And Aristotle was will argue in the seventh book, you know, if if I'm a man because I partake of what a man is, the form of man, and so on, and a dog is a dog because it partakes of what a dog is.

[18:09] What do you need your parents for? So Aristotle in the seventh book will be kind of reasoning against Plato, right? With obvious difficulties and some not so obvious difficulties, huh?

[18:35] But notice how this is preparing the way, in a sense, for the understanding of the immaterial substances, huh? Because will it also be true in the immaterial substances that the individual and what it is are distinct in the way that the material substance and what it is is distinct?

[19:04] Well, that involves partly understanding the material substances and even the mathematical things why there can be two of exactly the same kind. And you know, to start, to where Euclid starts at the point, right? How can you have two points when they're exactly the same, right? Two points, huh? Well, you can have one at the beginning of the line and one at the end, right? Because one's here and one's there, right?

[19:39] So there is a connection between the fact that you have the continuous quantity, right? Of course, sometimes we define a continuous as that which is divisible forever, right? Kind of the definition is worked out in the sixth book of the actual bearing. There is also the definition in the in the categories that the continuous is that whose parts meet at a common what boundary, right? Okay, so the two semicircles and a circle meet at the diameter, right?

[20:15] Okay, so involved in the idea of continuous is part outside apart from the part, right? Okay. So if someone says to you, "You know, why can you have many windows, let's say, exactly the same kind? " And I suppose the safest answer is, "You have enough glass. " Why can you have many chairs of exactly the same kind, with these being metal chairs, because you have enough metal, right?

[20:44] How is it going to have many wooden chairs exactly the same? Well, it's because you have enough what wood, right? So there is two things involved there: some kind of material, right, like metal or wood or glass, but some kind of material that is extended, huh, that has some quantity, right? And so, um, ah,

[21:13] because the quantity is divisible, right, huh? Okay, and because that quantity one can be here and one can be there, right? But now, if there is a substance that is not material. Doesn't have length and width and depth, then the basis for there being many individuals of the same kind disappears, right? You see? So this understanding of material substance and why there can be many individuals of exactly the same kind prepares the way, right, for understanding

[21:52] later on something about the immaterial substances, by way of what negation at least. I mean. And that's why when Thomas says talks about the angels, he would deny that there's any two angels of exactly the same kind,

[22:12] and that in each of the three hierarchies, right, in each of the orders, there's a beginning, middle, and end, and within each beginning, beginning, middle, end, right. But you never have two that are exactly the same. what? Kind of that

[22:31] Of course, there's an interesting question there where Thomas asks, you know, would the angels love each other more if they were exactly the same kind?

[22:52] And of course, Thomas has an interesting answer why they love each other more because they're not exactly the same. And he says the more intellectual, the more understanding, right?

[23:12] A creature is the more it's concerned with the common good, with the order of the universe, right? And of course, the common good in the order universe is more what satisfied by inequality than by what equality, right? The old teacher Casaubon used to say, God hates equality. And they say that no two saints, even in heaven, will be what equal. You know, star differs from star, right?

[23:51] Okay. And you can see why the envious will not be in heaven, right? That envy is contrary to what heaven's going to be like, huh? So,

[24:12] but just as no two saints will be equal in heaven, no two angels are what equal, and they love each other more for their inequality because they love most of all the common good, and they see the order that comes from the inequality. And it's kind of interesting, right? But he says Aristotle is preparing the way for this understanding, but Plato is too, huh? Because in the world of forms, there's only one form of each kind.

[24:44] There can't be two forms of man himself, or two forms of dog itself, right? But each form is unique, huh? Now, though Plato's misunderstanding, you know, what the ideal substances are. It's not Aristotle kind of, you know, makes fun of a little bit of Plato. A little bit like the the poets, you know, who imagine the gods to be what kind of superhuman beings, right? And you

[25:13] know, if you read Homer, there, you know, Homer is concerned about showing favors because his wife is on the other side in the Trojan War. There's got to be some domestic disturbance, you know. So it's very human these gods in some way, but but it's not really true, right? You see, Aristotle says not really knowing the nature of the gods, they imagine them to be like us, but just you know, kind of superhuman beings, huh?

[25:43] And you know, some of the philosophers before Aristotle had, you know, talked about this. Xenophanes said, you know, cattle could make statues and so on. They make their gods look like cattle, you know. He said Ethiopians they make their gods look black, and you know, and the Greeks make their gods blonde, and the Thracians and so on. And like they don't really know what the gods are, right?

[26:06] But they imagine them to be like themselves, but somehow perfectible. And Aristotle says, "That's the way Plato's doing it." You know, man himself, the dog himself, right? But nevertheless, Plato is seeing something of the truth of what immaterial things could be—that each would be of a different kind, and no two would be of the same kind. That's a wonderful what discovery, right? I don't know what the man in the street thinks, but probably the man in the street thinks that the angels are being kind like us, you know, many of the of the same kind.

[26:44] And that isn't the idea, so okay. So those are some of the things talked about in the what seventh book, huh? The distinction between I think that's the most interesting thing in some way. Distinction between immaterial substance and what it is, without getting into Plato's position, right? But to do some take complete identity there between the nature of the material substance and the individual substance itself.

[27:29] But then how that will prepare the way for understanding something about the immaterial substances. Okay, but now in the eighth book, which will I'll bring some copies. There, how many do we need, by the way? Eight, ten, how many? Ten. That's on time. Yeah. Okay, I have some. In a sense, I have to have enough more, but ten is enough, you think, or what? Because there's one listening.

[27:46] He's not back in a week or two, and Friday night will be coming down. Yeah. So at least ten. I'll see. Okay. But in ten, he's going to approach substance now, not in a logical way, but from what? Natural philosophy, from the understanding of matter and form, and therefore the way of motion.

[28:31] Now, a lot of times the wise men will lead us by the hand. They call modo the lower sciences to wisdom, right? So, in Book Seven, he's kind of leading us by the hand from logic, and then in Book Eight, more from what motion from natural philosophy. Leading you by the hand, but Thomas, in contrast to the two, will speak of the one proceeding per modum motus, right, the way of motion, and that's appropriate to the natural philosopher.

[29:11] But Siddha, eh, is more the way of leading man. Logic, it's only in the mind that something is said of something. isn't it Outside the mind, nothing is said of anything. Okay, so to proceed by way of how something is said of something, right, is to be in the domain of logic. And so, if you lead you to see something about being, in fact, this whole distinction of being according to figures of predication is saying you're distinguishing them, right, with the help of something that's proper to logic.

[29:56] You're distinguishing them by the way something can be said of individual substances. But even in the case of the Isagoge, you're distinguishing things by the way they can be said of. If you're distinguishing univocal and equivocal names, you're again distinguishing by the way something can be said of something. Says something with the same meaning in mind or different meaning in mind, and so on, right? But this is a distinction in the way something is said of something.

[30:25] That's proper to logic. Talk about the way something is set up. It's a very, it's a very, you know, right on the nail on the head. Or what is it? Hit the nail on the head. Yeah, as far as the difference between proceeding in the way that natural philosophy does and the way the tradition does, huh?

[30:47] It's interesting. It begins kind of from the what? The logic, huh? If the logic has a certain affinity to wisdom, and one affinity has to wisdom is its universality,

[31:10] because the things logic talks about can what? Something said of everything, right? It's like the Ritz about this, right? Not everything's emotion. Something said of everything, and and the mind in some ways all things. But then the other way that logic is like wisdom is in its immateriality. Monsignor Dionne used to quote that words that Heath has in his edition of Euclid. There, Heath has a quote there from Euclid.

[31:48] You know what he is. You know that mathematics purificat oculum mentis It purifies the eye of the mind, right? In a way from material things, because there's a way in which geometry is a certain purity, a certain immateriality. But Munsiandian said, but logic even more so purifies the eye of the mind. It's even more immaterial than than logic. And see how the mind gets mixed up with mathematical, logic, and so on.

[32:18] But there's some kind of immateriality, there right, compared to natural. Philosophy, Very much material. Uh, take a few more minutes here. I'll take another thing here from Book 7 here.

[32:41] approaches substance and accident by definition, right? A definition is a Latin word. It comes from the Latin word finis, which means end or limit. Okay. Now, in Greek, you have sometimes a definition horos which means a limit, or sometimes you see horismos which is from our word horizon, right? The horizon is what that line that separates the sky from the ground, right? Now, if you think about the word, the origin of the word definition, horos, limit is something very what?

[33:34] Very precise, huh? And if you have the city limits of Worcester, or any other city, but let's take the city limits of Worcester. If I have the limits of the city of Worcester, should any part of Worcester be outside the city limits? No. No, it's near and around the limits, right? But should any part of the surrounding town, Shrewsbury and Holden and so on, be within the city limits of Worcester?

[34:05] No. So you could say that a definition is a tight fit, huh? Okay. It's a very exact thing, huh? So it should include only the thing being defined and nothing else, right? When

[34:27] Aristotle says, "Can you define then an accident? " Or can you only define substance? What it is. Well, an accident is really something of another.

[34:59] It's something of something other than itself. So can you really say what an accident is without bringing in something other than itself? But isn't that contrary to what a definition is? A definition should contain only the thing being defined. He said, "Right.

[35:34] So, in that sense, it seems that only substance can be defined. " If I was going to try to define health, let's say, right, Well, it would be something like health is the good disposition of the body, something like that, right? Well, now I am defining health as something of a what? Another. So I am bringing into my definition of health something other than health, namely the body, which is a good condition.

[36:07] So isn't that contrary to what definition is? The most perfect, the most perfect definition of definition. Yeah. yeah, yeah. So Aristotle says Because either,

[36:25] either there is definition only of substance, because substance is not something of another, right? Or if you want to admit that there is, in some way, a definition of health, right, it brings in something other than health, then you are

[36:56] changing the meaning of definition, right? Okay. Or, definition has two what meaning? Right. You see. Okay. That's interesting, right? And see what Aristotle is doing, huh? Because he's saying

[37:23] either there is definition only of substance, or if there is definition of accident as well as substance, definition has two meanings, because the definition of substance contains only substance, while the definition of accident contains in it that of which it is an accident. Okay. So the distinction in substance, I mean, excuse me, distinction in definition, would it be two kinds of definition, right? Or one can be defined and the other cannot?

[37:58] Corresponds to a distinction in things. Why is it that accident either cannot be defined at all? You take definition in the strict sense as something containing only the thing being defined, right?

[38:16] Or if you want to carry the word definition over and say. Good condition of the body is a definition of health, right? Which it is in some way, right? You are changing definition from something that contains only the thing being defined to something that contains the subject, something other than the thing being defined, right? Then that difference in in in being able to be defined or not, or being defined one way another way, corresponds to different definition.

[38:47] A should be a difference in things, right? That a substance is a thing in itself, right? While an accident is either not a thing so much in its own right, but it's something of another thing. It's something of that. It's a strange kind of reality, right?

[39:10] Now that goes down when you go to state privations, right? Okay, can you define blindness without sight? That's in some ways even strange, isn't it? Because blindness excludes sight, right? You are blind. You lack sight. It's a lack of sight, but you can't define it without bringing in so as big as opposite. That's kind of strange, isn't it?

[39:50] In case you can't define health without bringing in subject, you can't define a lack of blindness without bringing in that which it is a lack of. Can't define ignorance without knowledge, right? Now, someone says, "What's the difference between sight or blindness and deafness You've got to bring in but it's a privation of lack. Now, what's in between an accident and a lack?

[40:26] Yeah, or you could say motion, right? Yeah. Can you define motion without bringing in something that's more there than motion? Could you define let's say let's take something like motion, but easier to work with? Is learning the same thing as knowing?

[41:00] Okay, but can you define learning without bringing in knowing in it? So it's a strange thing. Can you seem to be defined, right? Of course, in the case of motion, somebody says, "Well, define means what?

[41:28] Precise, limited, right? But emotions can be something indeterminate, right? It doesn't mean to define it, right? So it may be more than just two meanings of definition, right? If you move from substance to accident, to motion, to what privation or lack, right? do you have different meanings of definition? The same thing. But that corresponds to difference in being, right? In fact substance is being primarily, right? So it's kind of interesting the way Aristotle is using definition, right?

[42:06] In which something can be defined or not, or can be defined in one way, and something else is defined in another way. That it's kind of secondary means of definition to bring out differences in things themselves, right? Kind of an amazing thing, huh? But When Thomas is talking about. The ten categories and the figures of predication, right? In the commentary of the fifth book, there, you know, the modi essendi, the ways of being, right?

[42:36] In some way, correspond in this case to the modi predicandi, right? You got to be careful because there's not exactly one to one thing, but corresponding to the ways things can be said of, individual substances are really different ways of being.

[42:56] My being in this room and my being a man and my being a geometer, those are really different kinds of being, right? But man and geometer and and being in this room are said of being in different ways, right? But these different ways of being said of being correspond to different ways of being. It's kind of an amazing thing to see that.

[43:25] But act and ability. When he starts the consideration of act and ability in the ninth book, he'll start from act and ability as they're found in motion,

[43:37] and you could say book eight is kind of in the middle because in the distinction of matter and form, you're being prepared for understanding something involved in the distinction of act and ability, right? But also looks back to substance that you talked about in book seven, right? So it's interesting the way Aristotle ordered these. Interesting, huh? At Laval and the two greatest minds there taught about logic and natural philosophy.

[44:08] But you kind of see, you know, how basic these things are, right? Because you have to be led into these things about being as being. Have to be led into wisdom from logic and natural philosophy, especially, right? So he kind of taught the natural philosophy and Diyan taught the logic, you know.

[44:31] But yet again, there. So sometimes he kind of would go beyond and says, "Do give me a logical analysis of this beyond it, laid out." So I'll share you the. I'll spare you the going through book seven, yeah. So I'm doing that somewhere.

[45:07] The one I did, TAC, you know. The first time we went out there, they wanted to do book seven. What? So that's the last thing I I slept to do, but you bet they wanted to do that, so I did that. But there are interesting things in there, right? And a little hard to look through a little bit. Those two things kind of stick out of my mind.

[45:35] Either that, either the definition only as substance, right? Could you tell me something about substance and accident? Or if there is also a definition of accident in this definition in a somewhat different sense? I mean,

[46:02] sometimes in logic, you know, you've maybe seen when I talk about definition. Sometimes we we distinguish definitions by how or by what you're defining something. I will say, well, you can define something by its effect or by its cause, but it's more perfect to define it by the cause. Or you can define it by genus and difference, or by genus and property, right? And so on, and but they were talking about distinctions when you might define one the same thing, right?

[46:36] But if you go back to the definition of definition as speech signifying what a thing is, or because the substance and accident are not really the same kind of thing, then there is a distinction between a thing that can be defined by itself and a thing that can be defined only as something of the what of another, right? Of course, I remember that when I talk about motion, because

[47:04] Descartes and John Locke, you know, father of modern philosophy and the first of the great rationalists, you know, Descartes and then Locke, one of the important empiricists, they both say you can't define motion, right? And for for Locke, it's where the simple idea is, right? Yeah. Well, in a definition, there's never one word, right? You've got to have some kind of multiplicity there to have a definition, and so on.

[47:36] But if you realize that motion is something of another, that's never motion itself; it's in motion something other than motion. You know, that walking doesn't go for a walk. It's always something other than walking that's walking. Then you realize that motion is that's the type of accident, right? It's something of another. So now you've got a basis, right? You can say what it is of another, and then you have a twoness there that's enough for a definition for something more explicit than just a name.

[48:22] Suddenly, take a different example. They say, "What about a point? " Right? Well, a point. Has no parts, so you can't make speeches more distinct than the word point

[48:38] drawn from different parts of the point, right? But if the point is the limit of a line, the point is the end of the line, right? Then it's something of another, right? And so you can say, what is it of another? What is the other? Well, in this case, it's a line, right? Well, what is it of the line? Well, it's not a part of the line, but it's the end of the line or the limit of the line, right?

[49:01] So to say the point is the end of a line or the limit of a line is more distinct than to say it's a point.

[49:12] But the multiplicity necessary for being more distinct there doesn't come from seeing two parts of the what point. It's not you see a knife. Knife is a tool composed of a blade and a handle, right? A blade and a handle are different parts, so you can kind of spell the parts and get something more distinct than knife, right? You can't do it with point, but because the point is something of another, it's the limit, and say what it is of the other, and now you've got the multiplicity for a definition for something for speech is more distinct than this.

[49:53] So you say motion is like that; it's something another. We bring that other in and say what it is of that. Now you've got something more than just the name motion.

[50:08] So did they both Descartes and Locke and a lot? They didn't. You're saying that there was a failure to understand substance accident that made them not be able to. Well, I'm saying he's can't define it, right? See, because they're saying you can't define motion, right? Which means that you could only name it, right? Now, when you get to the ninth book of wisdom, Aristotle will say you can't define act.

[50:36] Well, you can know what it is, but you can't define act. Aristotle knew where the thing stopped. It didn't stop with motion, because motion is going to be defined by ability to act, but act cannot be defined by anything else.

[50:56] So it's got to be something that you know without definition, otherwise you wouldn't know anything. Just like the statements, right? There must be some statements that are known, but not known to other statements. Because very statement having known to other statements, then there'd be what infinite statements you'd have to know for your own statement. You couldn't begin to know any statements because any statement you use to prove a statement, you'd have to prove them before you can use them.

[51:31] And statements prove them; they prove them, you know. Couldn't it go on? Of course, I have been reading about fear of doing there recently. No, statements exist. It kind of proves itself, right? See, and the man who says statements do not exist has, of course, made a statement. It's kind of it's kind of hard to maintain that statements do not exist. That is itself a statement. and the ball game is oh, really, you know.

[52:06] So there's some statements, like statements exist, that are known but not known through other statements. There's some statements that are known to be false, like statements in other That they are proving that that you know, kind of obvious, right? You know, D Descartes kind of quotes the definition of motion, kind of a obscure translation, whatever it is. Who understands those words? You know, they just play with words, you know.

[52:48] And he kind of makes himself look kind of ridiculous, you know, the man understands the definition, but... but you know, once you give up defining motion, then you're missing, you know, one of the main middle terms for showing uh, the dependence of motion upon a mover, which is the beginning for knowing that God exists, right? So, in a sense, you're you're closing the door, right, to reason on knowing that God exists, right?

[53:22] Now, the, the the First Vatican Council, you know, that's article faith now that we can know the existence of God by reasoning, and the Vatican council teaches that. First Vatican council, and this is kind of making it impossible, you know, because you're eliminating the starting point for that argument. Because it's a very serious mistake, part of it. But

[53:53] the philosophers who come after it don't even bother trying to define motion, or even bother saying, you know, can't define motion, right? I mean, just kind of taking for granted, you know, Now their custom, you know, to not define motion.

[54:25] So it's time to close up shop here for the day.