Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
50. Metaphysics IX, Reading 5: Act Known by Induction and Proportion; Motion vs. Perfect Act
Class of 2005-11-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7a-wisdom-2005/050-metaphysics-ix-reading-5-act-known-by-induction-and-proportion/

[0:01] In the, name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our Almighty guardian angels, stir from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images and rouse us. and see it more quickly as St Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that you are written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

[0:29] amen. So up to reading five, huh? Never know how to translate lexio, huh? Sometimes they translate lecture, right? But since we're reading this, we also translate reading, right? How? About reading five, it's a little more relaxed and lecture anyway. So reading five and six are the second part of the ninth book, where he's going to emphasis will be upon act, but in a much more universal way than just what motion.

[1:05] And so Aristotle, continuing himself what has gone before, referring back to the first four readings, says, "Since the ability, said according to motion, the ability to move another, right, or the ability to move another, and so on, has been considered, let us now determine about act what it is and how it is,

[1:35] and the able at the same time will become clear to those dividing that we call able not only what is apt to move another or to be moved by another, either simply or in some way like to do so well, but also otherwise, right? In a more universal way, there be kinds of acts that can be found even in the what immaterial things that are not really subject to motion in the strict sense.

[2:08] And then we'll see at the same time that there are senses of ability, right, other than the ones that we saw in the first part,

[2:20] but also otherwise, there are other senses of act for which we have gone through the others in our what investigation. I think what this shows is again, like I said before, a little bit of the order, right, in wisdom, huh? That you tend to ascend, right, from a less universal consideration of something to a what more universal consideration of something. So really, in the first part, the first four readings, he was considering ability mainly, but also act, but only the act called motion and ability for motion.

[3:05] in some way. Now he's going to see act in a completely universal way, and then you'll see other senses of ability. But you could say that not as clearly, maybe, is here. But when he takes a substance, he's doing something like that. That he starts with material substance, and then he tries to rise to a universal understanding of substance, somewhat applicable even to the material substances then.

[3:35] And the same way, when he considers the one, which is convertible with being, you start from the one that is the beginning of number, and then you ascend to the one that is convertible and is universal being. The one that's beginning of number is really limited to the genus of quantity, but the one that is convertible to being is much more universal. And sometimes, you know, when Thomas says that, following Avicenna, that being is what is first understood by our mind.

[4:15] He's not as precise as he is at other times when he says that the being that we first understand is being considered immaterial things. And when we come to talk about immaterial being, we talk about it kind of by thoughts that fit more material being than immaterial being. And you see that when you talk about God, especially,

[4:46] so when you talk about God, you have what words that are what concrete and words that are abstract. And there is no distinction, God, between what is right and that by which He is what He is. But in material things, there is a distinction, and so we have these two kinds of thoughts, and we have to negate the distinction that there is in material things when we talk about God.

[5:19] We don't have one thought to talk about God, right? We have two thoughts corresponding to the two things in material things we start from. So we do ascend from the less universal, not respect to the to the more universal. Now, in the second paragraph, he begins to talk about act,

[5:47] and of course, you'll see that he doesn't define act like he defined ability, and he'll stop and explain why he doesn't do that. Act, then he says, is the existence of a thing, not in the way in which we say ability.

[6:05] And now he starts to exemplify. We say in ability. As Hermes, now Hermes is but the Greek god corresponding to Mercury, I suppose, in Latin, now, the messenger of the gods, And like to make statues out of, but to represent Hermes or Mercury. As we say, the ability, as Hermes, is in the wood, right? Okay. So before the wood has been formed, right? Okay. But then, when it's been formed, then you have act, right?

[6:37] Okay. So the wood is an ability, a statue, but then it's an act. Statue of Hermes when it gets its form, so form is a kind of act. And you say, Michelangelo saw this big slab of marble he says, someday I'll make something out of it." And he made the Pietà out of it one day, huh? And the half is in the whole because it might be taken from.

[7:02] So you got a parallelogram there, and you draw a diagonal, and now you got actually two what triangles, right? But those two triangles were there in ability, but first, huh?

[7:16] And then another quite different kind of ability in act here. When the man is what able to consider some theorem, let's say of geometry, but is not actually considering it, right? And then sometimes he's actually considering. I'll go to the board and do the theorem. like they do on the TAC, where you go to the board and you diagram a. You've done it. You're out there. And the diagram of these things, huh?

[7:44] Well, you're going from ability to act. did. You know that. Hopefully, you're going from ability to act, if you've done your homework and and done this right, huh? And

[7:58] during final exams, I often go to the board and do the Pythagorean theorem just so I don't forget the proof of it. I'm going into act, right? I had the ability before I went to act. Now, the third paragraph, Aristotle is going to explain why he has not tried to define act, huh? And he's going to say that you can't make known act by definition.

[8:31] What we wish to say, he says, is clear in the particulars by induction, and one should not seek a definition of everything. That's a principle in what? Logic, yeah. And it's proportional to one should not seek what to prove every what statement, huh? Okay. Now you know that logical thing there. If every statement was what in need of being proven, would you prove any statement? Begin. You couldn't even begin to prove, right?

[9:17] Because the statements you use to prove a statement, someone would say, before you use them to prove that statement, prove them first, and then the same thing about the one that to prove them, and so on. So you couldn't even begin to prove anything. You wouldn't know anything, huh? Is that true? We don't know any statements. My favorite example recently is statements exist,

[9:43] and the man who says statements do not exist is making a statement, right? So it's kind of you know you're caught, right? You don't try to prove, right? The statements exist. It's obvious, huh? And

[10:02] So it's like that with definitions, right? If every part of every definition was the meaning of the definition, then there'd always be a definition before you could define anything, and therefore you couldn't even begin to what define. And so we wouldn't know what anything is, right? But I think it's part of our experience to just approach in one way. It's part of our experience that what some things are have been made known to us by definition, and this is possible only if we know the meanings of the parts of that definition.

[10:41] And there could not have been an infinity of definitions before that we would not ever have made known what a rhombus is, or a rhomboid, or trapezium, or something, right? Okay. So if you have the experience of coming to know these things by definition, you know that not everything had to be defined. Something had to be known without definition. And the question is, what is that? And I think we've mentioned here before that Descartes, right, the so-called father of modern philosophy, and John Locke, one of the prominent empiricists, they both deny that motion can be what defined.

[11:26] And they criticize Aristotle's sense for trying to define motion there in the third book of Natural hearing. And Aristotle is aware of the fact that nothing can be defined, but he sees that motion can be defined by act and ability, and it's not motion then that's undefinable; it's actually what act. Now it's funny you don't seem to be aware of the text here, as if Aristotle thought everything can be defined.

[12:02] Everything should be defined. Aristotle is quite aware of the fact he's the father of logic after all. He's quite aware of the fact that some things must be known without definition,

[12:17] just as some statements must be known but not known by reasoning to them from other statements. Those are the first statements of all, and like we said, things that are known without needing to be defined are the first things we know, and through them we define everything else.

[12:37] And Aristotle is saying, well, it's act that cannot be defined. Ability can, to some extent, be defined through the act and its ability for. So we talked about ability as beginning or source of motion, and another as other, right, and so on. We define it by the act called motion there. But it's act that cannot be defined. But how is it known? Well it's known, partly as, he says, by induction, and as he goes on to say here, but also by seeing a what proportion, right?

[13:11] And notice the proportion here is being used in Euclid sense, not for ratio, but for a likeness of ratios. And he gives something of the proportions here in the rest of the same third paragraph, as the one who's actually building a house, right, is to the house builder, right, and the one who's awake to the one who is what asleep, right? And the one that is seeing to that which has its eyes shut, but has sight, that is to say, is not blind, but has the ability to see.

[13:53] And that which has been formed out of the matter to the matter, right? And that which has been worked up to the unworked. I notice in the first examples there, house building to the house builder, and awake to the sleeping, and seeing to that which has its eyes shut. They seem to be more something like an activity or a motion, right?

[14:17] Although the house building is more transitive action, and seeing is one that remains within the one seeing. But then the that which has been formed out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been worked up to the unworked, there he's seeing what form as proportional to what motion. Okay, so just as I'm able to see people, but since my eyes are closed, I can't actually see you, right?

[14:48] And how am I now to when I open my eyes and actually see you, right? That's something like the wood before it's been shaped, is to the wood now that it has been what shaped, right? So he's seeing then that act can be said of both motion or operation and of what form. And perhaps that's the first distinction you can see among acts, an act that is like a motion or a doing of some sort,

[15:23] and act that is a what form, okay? And Aristotle is showing here that the word "act" has more than one meaning, and as the order his examples show, it's the motion or the doing that first is called act.

[15:45] But then the word is kind of carried over to form, and one way of carrying it over to form is by a likeness of what ratios, huh? Okay. Now there's a number of words that Aristotle points out that are equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios, and so we saw that I think before in the these courses here with the word what before right, and you see it with the word in and out there in the in the meanings of in and out there, being in and being out in the fourth book of natural hearing, and you see it in the beginning of the fifth book with the word beginning, okay.

[16:34] Now there are other ways that words are equivocal by by reason, huh? But one way that words are sometimes equivocal by reason is by reason of a likeness of what ratios, huh? Okay. So the form in a way is to the wood before it's been shaped, something like by seeing you people right is to my eyes when I had them closed right, but was not a blind man right?

[17:04] Do you see? And so that's one way certainly of seeing that act is not being said equivocally by chance of these two, and likewise ability right, but you distinguish at the same time your two abilities, the ability to be in motion or to do something, and the ability to be what formed, corresponding to these two different kinds of what act.

[17:37] I seen Thomas in another text there in the De Potentia but another text where he he points out that form is at the end of motion right, and form is also a beginning of motion because the thing acts through its form. So that's another way you can see that act is not said what equivocally by chance, huh? But by the ratio of form to motion as its beginning or as its what end, huh?

[18:11] So when I transform something, I'm changing it right, but the end result of this change is it has a form Form it didn't have before, And uh when you might have been formed, then you can go on and teach. So form is a beginning of motion or doing, and also a end of some kind of motion or doing, and

[18:36] so I could say you know that by teaching you results in a certain formation of your mind, but then the form is like the end of the activity of teaching, but then you see once the mind has been formed, then it can teach others, so form can be the beginning of a doing. So that's another way that a name can be equivocal by reason. Instead of the second, by reason of its what ratio to the first, it's the beginning or the end of the first in this example.

[19:15] Just like we call logic philosophy, equivocally, but by reason the ratio of logic to philosophy, it's a tool of philosophy, right? So it's not purely equivocally that we call logic philosophy, but it's not philosophy in the original sense.

[19:41] But in the third paragraph here, Aristotle sees the likeness, sees the equivocation by reason of a likeness of ratios. But as I mentioned there what Thomas, there in other texts, He sees another way that you can see that the word act is what. Equivocal by reason by reason of the ratio of form to motion or doing. You follow me? So there's more than one way you could present something as what?

[20:14] Malogous? Yeah, yeah, Yeah. equivocal by reason. Now, going back to the mistake of Descartes and Locke, in terms of natural philosophy, and in terms, I suppose, of natural theology, giving up and denying that you can define motion is most serious. When Aristotle begins the investigation of what motion is in the third book of Natural Hearing, he said that if motion were unknown, then nature would be unknown.

[21:08] Because in the second book, nature is defined as a beginning and cause of motion and the rest, and that which it is, first as such and not by happening. So nature is defined by motion. So if motion were unknown, then nature would not be fully known. And so in the third book, then he he goes about defining motion. You may recall that definition was by means of act and ability.

[21:37] But then later on, the definition in the seventh or the eighth book, I guess, of Natural Hearing, the definition of motion is a beginning for seeing that nothing moves itself, and that's the beginning for eventually reasoning out the existence of the unmoved mover, which is the first argument for existence of God. So throwing out the definition of motion has most serious consequences for understanding nature, and later on for the argument for the unmoved mover, for the first and most manifest argument for existence of God.

[22:22] Things in motion soon to catch the eye, but not stir us. So the argument for motion is the first argument for existence of God. So it's no little damage, you might say, that Descartes and Locke are doing to natural philosophy and into wisdom by

[22:45] denying that motion can be defined. Descartes kind of quotes a somewhat garbled version. Says, "Who understands that? That's just playing with words. That's it." And Locke talks about, "Well, motion is a simple idea. You can't define the simple."

[23:08] As I point point out, I think a long time ago, you might be able to define even a point as the end of a line, even though the point has no parts, right? Well, here it's simple. Of course, motion isn't that simple. Really, it's a point, man. But motion is always something of another, right? So there is a basis for the multiplicity of definition. You can say what it is of what, and this is more than just a name.

[23:38] It's the act of what is able to be, right? In so far as it's able to be, it takes a long time to understand that, right? I remember as a young philosopher thinking I understood the definition of motion. My brother Richard is kind of laughing at me, you know.

[23:56] I know the words, but but you talked about the definition of motion to me earlier. Okay. Yeah, we'll go back to it right now. But it's kind of amazing, huh? That on something as important as that, huh? Descartes and Locke, you know, speak almost as if those who try to define motion aren't aware of the fact that some things have got to be known without definition. The idea was really first seen by Aristotle clearly, and but also he he sees what it is that we know without definition, huh?

[24:46] So you see a little bit of the proportion here then, and the distinction between an act that is like motion or doing, and an act that is form. So he says that one part of the difference here be distinguished as the act, and the other is able. So you can say we know it by induction and by seeing a what proportion, right? Okay, but not by definition.

[25:19] Now, in the fourth paragraph, he comes back to this distinction between motion or doing and form. But all things are not said to be an act in the same way. It's not univocal, but in proportion as this and that, or towards that. Well, this and that is said more with regard to form in matter, right? Or towards that as the ability to see to see, right? Or the ability to hear to hear, right?

[25:52] And that way of speaking is used more in talking about motion or doing. So is this and that? So another in another, or towards another, right? For some are as motion to ability, and others as substance, which is Aristotle's annoying way of referring to form. Now, right? Because we see, you know, from the eighth book, you know, that form is especially substance, right? And Aristotle wants to emphasize that, right?

[26:30] Now, in the next paragraph, he talks about another kind of ability and act, which is a kind where the ability is never fully actualized. Okay. Unlike my ability to see, right? My ability to see is fully realized actually by my seeing you, right? Okay.

[27:05] And likewise, when the statue is finally formed, right, it can be fully enacted. Now the statue. But what about the continuous? The continuous is defined in natural philosophy as that which is divisible forever, that which is able to be divided forever.

[27:30] Well, we've talked about this before, but in geometry, a straight line can be what? Bisected, right? When you bisect a straight line, what do you get? Two straight lines. Yeah, two shorter lines. Huh? Well, then they can be bisected, right? What do you get? You bisect them.

[27:51] Yeah. Now, does it ever come to an end? Nope The only way to come to an end would be if you cut a line into two nothings, and that would be the end of it. But that's laughable because then the line would be made out of nothing It would have been nothing, right? Or if you say you can cut a line into two what? Points. Points. But that's a mistake to think you can put points together and make a line.

[28:21] We talked about that argument before, but just to briefly touch upon it again: if you're going to try to put points together to make a line, the points would have to come together and touch. And since the points have no parts and no edge and an interior, the only way two points can touch is to coincide. And so, if two points touch, they coincide, and to coincide, they have no more length than one point, which is no length at all.

[28:54] And if ten or a hundred or a million or infinity of points touch, right? Then what they can touch is to coincide. And if they coincide, they have no more length than one point. There's no length at all. So you can't put together a point from lines, even from infinity of points. So I tell the students, your high school math teacher said, or your college teacher said, that a finite straight line is composed of an infinity of points.

[29:22] He was mistaken. But his being mistaken is a sign of the difficulty of understanding that kind of ability. But at any time you cut a straight line, what do you get? A point. And so it seems like the point was there already. But after you cut the line, you're making actual a point that was there only in ability. And so you keep on cutting it and making actual points as long as you want to.

[29:53] But you never what? You always cut a straight line into two shorter lines and never into what? Two points or two nothings, Then is that ability ever what? Satisfied or actualized.

[30:12] And of course, time and motion and so on are what also continuous, huh? So he's talking about an ability that is never fully actualized. Huh? It's kind of a strange animal, right? But there is that kind of a thing, okay?

[30:36] Or the ability, let's say, of numbers to increase, right? Well, if you can divide and continuous forever, then the number of lines can get larger forever, right? Huh? But is that ability of numbers to get larger just add one to whatever it is to the number you have? Is that ability ever fully realized? No.

[31:03] It's like the you know ability to reflect upon yourself, right? I know what a square is, and I know that I know what a square is, and I know that I know I know what a square is, and you can go on this kind of sterile infinity, right, forever, right? But you have an ability here that is never what fully actualized, huh? Okay.

[31:33] Now, in the next paragraph here, there is a problem, not so much about the distinction of two acts here. He's going to be distinguishing motion or doing, right? But what we should name these two acts, huh? Okay. In in Latin, Thomas will sometimes say, for want of a name, you speak of motion and operatio, huh? Okay. But operation is not

[32:16] altogether a satisfactory way of naming this, huh? Okay. You could say motion and and doing, huh? But kind of abstract a little bit on the problem of what name should give these, and see the difference that Aristotle wants to point out between these two things, huh? And it's a difference between, um,

[32:44] let's say my walking home and my seeing you, right? Okay. And they're both on the side of motion or doing, as opposed to form, right? So it's a subdivision, you might say, here of the first kind of act, huh?

[33:07] Now, when I'm walking home, can you say that I have walked home? No. So it's essentially an imperfect act, walking home, right? And when I have walked home, it's grammatically, you would say, perfect, right? When I have walked home, am I walking home? Okay. So that's why we call motion here an imperfect act.

[33:48] Okay. So long as I'm walking home, I haven't walked home yet. And when I have walked home, I'm not walking home. Okay. Or when you're building a house, right? Have you built the house? And when you can say that you've built the house, are you building the house? So that kind of a motion or doing, if you want to call it, is essentially what imperfect, right? Essentially a incomplete act, if you want to use the word incomplete, imperfect, right?

[34:32] Okay. My walking home is not yet completed when I'm walking home. And when it is completed, my walking home, I'm not walking home. Okay. But now, what about my seeing you, right? When I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? Yeah. So that's essentially a what perfect act, huh? A

[35:05] complete act. Okay. Now, notice grammar reflects more the imperfect act. We're going to use grammar, and that reflects the fact, as Aristotle said, that motion is the what we first call act, huh? And seems most actual to us, right? But it's actually an imperfect act. And this is important, you know, for the whole philosophy that when you talk about the activity that is going to be our happiness, right?

[35:40] Is it going to be essentially one of these imperfect acts, or is it going to be a perfect act, a complete act, huh? So seeing is one example, the sensing of that sort, or the act of reason, like say understanding, right? When I'm understanding what a triangle is, have I understood what a triangle is?

[36:06] It seems almost grammatically strange to say it that way, right? But that's a big difference, huh? And when I was sticking for the girls, when I'm loving you, have I loved you yet? Oh, yes, yes, I agree to that. So,

[36:29] sensing and understanding and loving are a different type of doing, right? Than walking home or even building a house, making dinner, right? You're making dinner. Have you made dinner yet? No. When you have made dinner, making dinner. No, now it's time to sit down.

[36:58] Okay. So Aristotle is distinguishing those two, huh? In this paragraph here, since of the acts or acts of which have a limit, none is an end or about the end. For example, the parts themselves, when one is making them, thin are in movement in this way, not existing that for the sake of which is a movement. This is not an act or not a perfect act, for it is not an end.

[37:28] But act, we don't call it, huh? As they come, you know, for want of a better name, we call it operation, is that in which the end is. For at the same time, he says we are judging and have judged, are understanding and have understood. But learning is more like emotion, isn't it?

[37:49] When one is learning something, one hasn't learned it yet, right? Or when one is becoming healthy, one is not yet healthy. And then he touches upon the importance of this for ethics, huh? At the same time, we are living well and have lived well, right? And are happy and have been happy.

[38:13] Of these, then some should be called motion, but the others what? Acts, huh? Energia maybe energy, Kinesis and Energeia But there's no problem about how we name these two, right? But the first one is more clearly named motion, and the second one, energeia or act or operation or doing, right? It's a little problem about how to name it best, but using the phrase "perfect act" and "perfect complete act," and happiness is going to have to be the second kind, huh?

[38:49] He goes on exemplifying these things. Of these, then some should be called motion, but the other acts. For every movement is incomplete, huh? Thinning, learning, walking, housebuilding—these are movements and imperfect. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved.

[39:25] But neither. But then the other kind that he calls act here or energeia, but the same has seen and is seeing and understands and has understood, and loves and has loved. The latter I call an act, and the former a what? A movement. That's the way it turns out an idea there. Notice that these words like act, action, activity, right? You'd think of something like the emotion or doing first, wouldn't you? You wouldn't think of form as an act at first, and then these words derived from act, like activity, action, you wouldn't probably apply them at all to form, right?

[40:11] It's the contrary. So you begin to see that the word is is equivocal, and that it names first motion or something like that, and then we place the name act upon motion first because things in motion sort of catch the eye, but not stir us. and then

[40:33] and because our knowledge starts with our senses, right? So that's the act that's most known. I was telling you about one of my philosophical friends there who said that so long as his eyes are over the page, his wife knows enough not to interfere with his serious activity. But when he looks up in the page and there's no outward motion, now's the time for him to come in with his small talk

[41:01] because he's obviously not doing anything, right? So so he's maybe doing the most important part, huh? That's time when you when you kind of sit back after reading something, you kind of think about it and you kind of penetrate it and absorb it, you know. That's probably the the key movement, a movement of your your study, right? And but it appears his wife is not doing anything at that point, so

[41:31] but he's actually what maybe getting some perfect act at that point, huh? But when you're reading the page, have you read the page yet? When you have read something, are you reading? So reading is kind of you know that first type of activity, huh? But that's the one that you know seems to be doing something, right? You know, Professor, Surik there, his last one was worse than mine, huh?

[42:07] He used to always quote Thomas. The man sitting makes wisdom. By the way, I read Proclus Thomas homo sapiens, fit sapiens, huh? The man sitting becomes I guess it would be, huh? Why? It wasn't makes wisdom, but that's an adjective. But he hasn't said, the idea of what Thomas is saying, right? So the man seems to be doing what? Nothing, huh? You get these descriptions of Socrates, huh?

[42:37] Where he's going off to maybe a dinner, at somebody's house with a friend, and something comes up in the conversation. Socrates stops on the porch or something and stands there, you know, still for some time to think something through, right? And the other guy goes on into the dinner, whatever it is, you know, and leaves Socrates standing out there. But then Socrates is really doing his what?

[43:03] His deep thinking, right? So let it be clear then from these things and such as them and what and how it is to be an act.

[43:25] I know Aristotle here doesn't go to existence as an act. Here he doesn't speak of that, does it? Okay, but if you look at Thomas Day when he's distinguishing

[43:41] in, the Summa Contra Gentiles he will distinguish the composition of matter and form, right, from the composition of the substance of a thing and its existence, right. You know, contrast those two, showing their differences.

[44:00] So, if you're going to, when he's talking about the separated substances, but he wants to show that it's not the same kind of composition we've been talking about in natural philosophy of matter and form, he contrasts existence and substance with form and matter. So that sense of act would have to come after the ones that Aristotle distinguishes here, right? In other words, you first see motion as act, and more generally some thing like doing or operation, activity, right?

[44:35] And then you see form as act, right? And perhaps last you would see what existence or to be as an act, huh? Okay. And this, as you would contrast form as an act from motion, and existence from what form.

[45:01] Now the other distinction Aristotle sometimes makes among acts is between the what transitive act, right, where you act upon something outside you, and then what an operation, activity that remains within the what doer.

[45:19] Okay. So seeing and understanding and loving are intrinsic acts, huh? And this is important when they talk about somebody's name instead of God, right? Did God love us before He made us?

[45:45] Yeah. But did God was God our Lord, our ruler, and so on before He made us? No. No. So those operations and Something extrinsic to God, right?

[46:03] Was God our Creator before He created us? No. The creation kind of signifies as an operation that has something, but outside of the Creator, right? But understanding and loving remain within the One understanding and loving, right? So God can be said to have loved us of eternity, right? To have chosen us of eternity, right? But we couldn't say that strictly speaking He created us, that He was ruling us, or He was our shepherd before He had His flock, the shepherd, right?

[46:39] So that is an important distinction between those two kinds of acts, the one that remains in the doer and the intrinsic one. So, does that always correspond? And all, in other words, all intransitive acts are perfect and vice versa. Well, no. If you take in us, you know something like learning, right? Learning is more like what motion, right? Oh, yeah, and that's why sometimes you know when I'm explaining how we define motion, let's come back up a little bit.

[47:12] Let's get here. You know, take a simple example, like say, coming into the room, right? Okay. Remember how I explained this before. You say coming into the room

[47:33] is the act of the ability to come into the room. Now, is that statement true or false? How do you see true, right? But now you say, is that a definition of coming into the room? No, you'd say no because you would be defining it by itself, right? Okay. Then you take the next thing and you say coming into the room

[48:15] is the act of the ability to be in the room. Okay. Well, now I'm not defining it by itself, right? By coming to the room, I'm defining it by being in the room, right? Okay. But this seems to have another defect. It avoids the circularity of the first statement, but unfortunately, it seems to be false because the act of the ability to be in the room is to be in the room, right?

[49:00] Okay. So you seem to have kind of an insoluble problem here, right? Either you say what is true of coming into the room, but then it's not a definition, right? Because it's circular, right? Or you avoid circularity, and then you end up saying something false, right? Okay. But then, on second thought, we can say, "Hey, yeah, but when I'm coming into the room, I'm already partly in the room, right?"

[49:37] So that coming into the room is a partial act of the ability to be what in the room, right? So if I say coming into the room is the imperfect

[49:55] act of the ability to be in the room, I seem to not confuse it. With being in the room, right? And I seem to be now saying more what it is, right? Okay.

[50:10] But then someone might say, "Yeah, but what about the guy standing in the doorway? You know, one foot in, one foot out. Is he coming into the room? No, he's standing. He's not moving at all, right? He's probably in the room. Well, then you've got to say that coming into the room is an act of ability to be in the room, an imperfect act of that. Insofar as you're still able to be in the room, right?

[50:39] It's it's ordered to a further what? Activity, right? Okay. And then you can separate it from standing in the doorway, right? So when you get the definition of motion as the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's able to be, right? I understand the last part. I understand it now. Insofar as it's able to be, as saying two things, right? One that the act has only partially completed that ability, and secondly that say what a partial actualization on the way to a further actualization, right?

[51:21] Okay. And that separates it from both being in the room fully and standing in the doorway. Okay. Now sometimes I manifest this by learning, right? And I say, is learning the same thing? Learning something the same thing as knowing it? And we say no, right? Okay. And learning is the act of the ability to learn, and knowing is the act of the ability to know, right? Well, obviously it's not definition of learning to say it's an act of the ability to learn because you'd be defining learning by itself.

[52:00] But then I say, is the ability to know and the ability to learn two different abilities, like the ability to walk and the ability to talk? Or is it by learning that your ability to know is in fact actualized?

[52:17] Yeah. And when you're learning something, are you entirely ignorant of it? No, sir. Okay. Well, then you can say learning is to some extent imperfectly an act of the ability to know. Okay. Depends upon whether your philosophy professor is trying to fool you. But

[52:42] again, like with motion, you could say, you know, sometimes a student enrolls in a course, and somewhere in the middle of the course, he decides that this is not the way to go, and he doesn't like the subject, and maybe doesn't like the grades he's going to possibly get, and so he withdraws from the course, right? Now when he withdraws from the course, is he learning anymore?

[53:08] No, no. But he might retain a little bit of what was communicated in the course, But he might have no intention of ever what getting to know one bit better, right? So learning is an act of the ability to know. In so far as you're able to know still, right? But in so far as what you're on the road to knowing more, right? So you got to understand both of those things to really know what it is, huh?

[53:40] And so I kind of manifest the definition of motion by the definition of learning, huh? It's kind of easier for the student to see that learning is, in fact, to some extent, an act of the ability to know, but it's an imperfect act of that ability to know on the way to a further act, right? That's what motion is, right? Coming into the room is an imperfect act of the ability to be in the room on the way to a further act of that ability, huh?

[54:09] That's what it is, huh? So someone asked me, is everything intrinsic a perfect act? Well, learning is more like what motion, right? Okay. Um. So long as I'm learning, I haven't learned yet fully, right? Okay. And when I have learned fully the Pythagorean theorem, then I'm no longer learning the Pythagorean theorem, right? Okay. So I wouldn't say every immanent act is is a perfect act, right? Okay.

[54:49] But these um. Ah. But most of these perfect acts that we would see would be intrinsic acts, like seeing my seeing you or my understanding what a triangle is or my loving you or something of this sort. Okay. But but is the converse is every transitive act imperfect? Well, the question is, are there some transitive acts that are what all at once? Huh? So I mean, like did creation take any time?

[55:27] When God is creating my soul. He has created my soul, right? So maybe they're really two different divisions of of these things, huh? Divide motion or doing or activity, whatever you want to call it, you know, into

[55:45] imperfect and perfect one, right? And then immanent and then what transitive, right? But most the ones that Aristotle takes from us, I mean, like building a house or making a statue, making dinner, whatever it is, making wine, these take time, right? Huh? So yeah, every there isn't there isn't one with us. Every transit it would be imperfect. Well, you got to be a little careful that, right?

[56:11] Yeah, yeah. I think, for example, substantial generation. Oh, that's right. Yeah, that's right. But anyway, the examples here would be, you know, mainly ones that would be imperfect, huh? So those are probably the two main ways, right, of dividing motion or activity, right? Now, Thomas in the commentary will mention how Plato sometimes uses the word motion more loosely than Aristotle to cover either one of these, huh?

[56:48] And when he talks about Plato, the Platonist, saying that God moves Himself, and he's the first mover, and he's never really contradicting Thomas says Aristotle says God is the unmoved mover, because when Aristotle says that God is the unmoved mover, he's using motion in the strict sense, the for the imperfect act. But when Plato maybe says that God moves Himself, he means that God understands Himself and what loves himself, right?

[57:25] Okay. He better, I think. It's probable.