Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
2. Looking Before and After: The Senses of Order, Distinction and Error, and Two Ways of Dividing a Book
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/002-looking-before-and-after-the-senses-of-order-distinction/

[0:00] Now, let's go back to the last part of the definition again, though. Looking before and after, I have to realize that the words "before" and "after"

[0:18] are equivocal by reason of, and perhaps the best place to see this first is in the twelfth chapter of the Categories, where Aristotle distinguishes the four central senses of before. And when he gets through with those and pauses a little while, catches his breath, then he brings in the crowning sense of before. Okay. But not fifth in order, I don't think. Now, the first meaning of the word "before," Aristotle gives in the Categories, chapter twelve, is that of time.

[1:07] Today is before tomorrow, right? Or today is after yesterday, huh? Now, the reason why that's the first meaning of "before" is that we name things as we become aware of them, right? We name things as we know them, as Thomas explains in Fifth Book of Wisdom,

[1:39] and our knowledge begins with our senses, huh? And as Shakespeare teaches us in "Troilus and Cressida," things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. But when you study time in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, the so-called physics,

[2:00] time is tied up with the before and after in motion. In fact, it's the the number of the before and after in motion. So it's the before and after in motion that is the before and after most known to us. So that's the first meaning of before and after.

[2:21] And to that first sense, you could date back not only before and after in motion, but the before and after in the road that you're moving down.

[2:37] That's the first central sense. Now, the second sense Aristotle gives is a sense of you might call it before and being, right? When this can be without that, but not vice versa, then this is said to be before that.

[2:59] So Aristotle gives example: one is before two. One can be without two, but two cannot be without one. So you have that sense even in geometry, in arithmetic, which doesn't what involve motion and time, things that are in motion or time. But you can go back to sensible world and see this a bit too, though. We can say in sensible world,

[3:25] bricks are before brick wall in being. Bricks can be without the brick wall, but the brick wall cannot be without the bricks. Or we can take the the word cat here, C A T, and the word the letter C can be without the what word cat, but the word cat cannot be without the letter C, right? So even in the sensible world, right? We can see the second sense of before, right?

[4:00] Water can be without Kool-Aid but Kool-Aid cannot be without what water? Huh? Good example for same order chemistry. Yeah, yeah. Hydrogen can be without water, they claim, and water can't be without hydrogen. Now notice, son, what is before and being might also be before in time. So we might make the brick before we make the brick wall, right? You might have one child before you have two children, right?

[4:39] But this isn't always true, is it? You might have two children all at once, twins, right? If I print the word cat on the board, I'll maybe make the C first, and then I'll make the A, and then the T. And so the letter C was before the word cat, but they're in time also, isn't it? But if I get a little stamp where I can boom stamp the whole word cat all at once, then C, the letter C and the word cat, come to be at exactly the same time, right?

[5:16] So C is not necessarily before cat in what time, right? But it's always before it in what being, in the sense that it can be without the word cat, but not vice versa. If I take that loaf out there, we're slicing bread today, right? And you take the knife and you slice one slice, and now we slice a second slice, right? And now a third. Well, one slice exists in time before two, and two in time before three, right?

[5:48] But if I, in the bakery, and I say to the girl, "I was just slice the loaf," and she puts it through the machine, right, and goes from zero to what, thirteen or fourteen slices all at once, right? So, thirteen or twelve or ten is not always before fourteen in time, is it? Or one before two in time. But it's always before it in what being, right?

[6:14] So they are different senses, aren't they, right? Even though something could be before in both senses, right? But something else might not be, right? Do you see that? So that's the second sense of before, and still closer to the senses than now the third sense, huh? The third sense of before that Aristotle gives is before in the discourse of what reason,

[6:43] and that's the way in which the premises come before the conclusion, or the definitions in geometry, and the postulates and axioms come before the theorems and so on, and that's the way also in the play,

[7:01] you might have the prologue before the play, right? Or you might have the prelude before the treatise, so on. Now this you see is further from the senses. This is now more in our knowledge, right? And to this third sense of before is led back any before and after in our what knowledge, any road in our knowledge.

[7:30] Now the fourth sense of before, Aristotle gives in Nicomachean Ethics, not in the categories rather, is the sense of better, right? You come before with me, okay?

[7:50] He says this sense now is a little more remote from the other senses, and very often what is before in knowledge might be before in being. The example you see in geometry, for example, that square is before cube in in being, and also in knowledge, right? Now this is not always true.

[8:14] Hydrogen might be before water in in being if the chemists are correct, but it's after in our knowledge, and that's why it's named from from water, hydrogen. It generates water. So we name it from water because it's known after water, but might be before in being. But a lot of things that are before in being are also before in our knowledge, and also before in time. But now this sense of better before in goodness, or better in one word, very often what is better comes later in time, because things are what being developed or perfected gradually.

[8:58] So what is before in goodness is often after in knowledge and after in time and even after in being. So that's the fourth sense. So there seems to be four

[9:20] central senses of before. There are other senses that could be led back to maybe one of these now by certain likeness, but and there are distinct senses. But these are the central ones that you want to have in mind. Now Aristotle is through with all that.

[9:40] He brings in another sense of before, which is most worth mentioning, and that's the sense in which the cause is said to be before the what effect. And Aristotle gives a example of a cause that is before an effect,

[10:04] where it's not before in being, and not before in time. And he says, "What about Matt sitting there, right? " And the truth of the statement that Matt is sitting, right?

[10:27] Does that statement become true some time after Matt sits down? Or is it true simultaneously with his sitting down? Does he sit down and he's sitting down for a while and then finally the statement becomes true? No, together with his sitting, that statement is true, right? Now, when Matt stands up, does that statement, you know, stay true for a while and then suddenly fade into falsehood? No, no, they go together, right?

[11:04] So when Matt is sitting, that statement that Matt is sitting is true, and when that statement is true, Matt is sitting, right? And yet, is there a before and after in those two things? Is Matt sitting because the statement is true? Or is the statement true because Matt is sitting?

[11:24] The statement is true because Matt is sitting, right? If he stands up, he'll be the cause of it becoming false. You make the statement false every time you stand up. You make someone's statement false, huh?

[11:39] But yet, this seems to be a sense of before, right? The cause is before the what? Effect. This doesn't seem to me to come fifth in order. This sense. It seems to me not to be most like the fourth sense of before, but more like the what second sense, huh? Because what is before in being seems a little bit like a cause, right? Because what is after in being depends upon what is before in being.

[12:10] The bricks can be without the brick wall, but the brick wall can't be without the bricks. So it seems something like cause and effect there, doesn't it? But yet you distinguish it from that sense with this example. But why does he bring in this sense, which is not one of the four central senses? Well, because this is the sense that's the culmination for, especially the philosopher, but for reason to know the cause, right?

[12:37] To look before and after. To ask why, right? Or even to ask what, which he shows in the Posterior Analytics for the cause. Now, did Shakespeare know that there are different senses of what before and after?

[12:58] Yeah. And what he does is to pun on the different senses of before and after, right? He's got a bad habit, Shakespeare, and they say you know that even at the most serious moments, huh? He will

[13:20] do that, huh? So. Now, when you pun upon different meanings, it's got to be something obvious, somewhat to your audience, huh? So, what meanings do you pun on?

[13:41] Farthest apart. Yeah, yeah. Now, when I was a little boy, my mother would say, "I see," said the blind man, but he couldn't see at all. And now you're punning on the first and the last sense of to see, right? The first meaning of to see is the act of the eye, right? The second meaning of to see is not to understand, but it's to what? Imagine something, huh?

[14:20] You can see your father or mother, maybe not, right? In your imagination, but you can't see with your eyes. But that's more like seeing with the eyes, and understanding is. A sign of that is that in a dream you think you see with your eyes, and you are actually imagining. But even in a dream, you don't think you are what you are not confusing understanding with seeing by the eye.

[14:43] Okay. So in this pun that my mother was quoting, "I see," said the blind man, but he couldn't see at all. It's punning upon the last sense I understand, right? And the first sense, okay. Well,

[15:06] in all's well that ends well. Do you know the play any of you? But in the play, Helena, who's a commoner, right, has found fallen in love with the son of the countess. So she's fallen in love with nobility. Well, commoners don't marry nobility, and so she's going to pine away and and die and so on. And famous words, you know, that are I think come from here.

[15:35] They're quoted by Pride and Prejudice and so on. But anyway, the countess who who likes Helena very much, she suspects that Helena's fallen in love with her son, and so finally she forces her to admit her love for.

[15:59] Do you love my son? Your pardon, noble mistress. Love you, my son. Do not you love him, madam? Go not about. My love hath in it a bond, whereof the world takes note. Come, come, disclose the state of your affection, for your passions have to the full pitched. Oh, finding Helena, nothing to confess. Then I confess here on my knee before high heaven and you that before you and next unto high heaven I love your son.

[16:37] Well, before the countess and high heaven, right? That's attached to the first sense of before, before in place is and before in motion goes back to before in time. So she says, "Then I confess here on my knee before high heaven and you that before you meaning now now the fourth sense that before you and next unto high heaven I love your son. So she loves high heaven first, then her son, and and then the countess herself, right?

[17:10] So he puns on the first and the fourth sense. So Shakespeare is quite aware of the fact that looking before and after, and the words before and after have more than one sense, right? And which sense of before and after does reason look? Well, not too hard to figure out in all four senses, right? Plus the what? Yeah, yeah. Plus the crowning sense, huh?

[17:40] Of course, when we learn that wisdom is about the what? First causes and the premium to wisdom, then it looks at what is before everything what? Else, right? So you most of all looks before in the crowning sense, huh? When you look for the cause and the effect, you're looking before in the crowning sense, the sense of before in which the cause is before the effect. When you look for the cause of the cause, right?

[18:12] You're looking even more before in the crowning sense, huh? And when you look for the very first cause, it's before everything else, right? Then you most of all are looking before in the crowning sense, huh? Okay.

[18:31] But if the first cause is better than anything else, then you're looking before in the what? Fourth sense, most of all, right? And if the wise man, for example, belongs to the wise man to distinguish the the roads in our knowledge, right? He's most of all looking before and after in the sense of even the third sense of before and after.

[19:06] It's kind of interesting when we talk about God being before creatures in the sense of cause before effect, right? But God is also before creatures in the second sense of before. And it's very important to see that, right? Thomas spends a long time in the Summa contra Gentiles showing, you know, that God's creation of the world was not something that just naturally followed from Him, that it was a free act of His will and so on, right?

[19:36] So it's very important in understanding God and creatures to know that not only is God before creatures as a cause is before an effect, but also He's before them in being, in the sense that God could be without any of the creatures, but none of them could be without Him, huh? So He's before in both of those senses.

[20:01] Now, let's come back again a little bit, and I point out again about the words "look before and after" in the sentences. You may have come across this. Thomas has the best explanation in a way of order and before and after, and it's there that he points out that order in general is defined by before and after. Order is he before and after,

[20:33] but then he also in that same text there points out that distinction is presupposed to order, and you can actually, if you wanted to, reason from the axiom of before and after

[20:53] to distinction coming before. The axiom of before and after is nothing is before or after itself, so today can be before tomorrow and after yesterday, but can today be before after today? No. And

[21:21] can something be before itself in being? Then he would be able to be without itself being, right? Yeah. Okay. So the axiom of before and after says that nothing is before after itself, and from that you can see there is always some distinction between what what comes before, right, and what comes after.

[21:53] And you could say that there can be a distinction, maybe without there being an order, right? But there cannot be an order without there being a what distinction, huh? I can distinguish between milk and syllogisms, couldn't you?

[22:11] Give your baby milk first, and then syllogisms later, right? So the distinction. Yeah, but I don't know if there's any real order between milk and syllogisms, is there?

[22:31] But also, you have to see a distinction before you can see it before and after. It's before in knowing as well. And so, if I can't distinguish between Budweiser and Miller, then I can't know which is better, right?

[22:53] And I couldn't distinguish between two wines, I couldn't know which is better, right? But I could maybe distinguish between them without being able to make up my mind which was better, right? My brother Marcus had, you know, a long time trying to decide which is better, Cabernet Sauvignon or Pinot Noir, even though he's able to distinguish them for a long time, huh? So,

[23:21] or who's better, Homer or Shakespeare, right? Well, we can distinguish between Homer and Shakespeare more easily than we can say who's who's better, right? Um.

[23:35] People ask me, you know, what's your Michael Gro asking? What's your favorite book of Thomas Aquinas? I said the Summa Contra Gentiles. He said, why? He said, well, the edition I have has got a bigger print than rather.

[23:51] I mean, you know, people ask me, you know, what's your favorite play of Shakespeare? You know, well, even though I can distinguish between these plays, I'm sometimes not too sure to say which one I think is better. If it is, I know which is better, right? So now I mention that because in defining reason as the ability to look before and after,

[24:14] Shakespeare includes the ability to see a what distinction, and you couldn't see a before and after if you couldn't see a distinction. But to see a before and after is something beyond just seeing the distinction of two things, seeing their order. So Shakespeare defines reason not as the ability to see a distinction, but the ability to see a before and after, because you define something you define ability by its what

[24:54] So, I think that's a good thing Now, it's kind of interesting, huh? I'm just noticing Shakespeare getting there. The Othello's bride's father's, not seeing how she could possibly marry this guy, right? This dark-skinned man. How she could, how nature could so, but preposterously err.

[25:29] What's interesting that the two most common words we have, error and mistake, for the same thing, more or less, have a little different etymology. Error comes from the Latin word to wander,

[25:51] and to err, therefore etymologically, there's a hint that it's a disordered movement of reason that gives rise to error. And our Lord is speaking there in the 22nd chapter of Matthew, there to the Sadducees, and the Sadducees deny the resurrection, and they're trying to get Christ in an impossible situation. You know, the man married the woman had no children, so his brother took her and had no children.

[26:28] There're seven brothers, and finally they all die without any offspring, and finally the woman died. Now, whose wife will she be in the resurrection, and so on? But Christ says, "You what? Planasthe is Greek, which is exactly etymologically the same as the Latin word for error. That's where we get the word planet. The planets, you know, are so named because they're the not the fixed stars; they're the ones that wander around the skies, right?

[26:56] So it's interesting, huh, that this you have the same word in Greek and in Latin for mistake, their error, but it comes from the word to wander.

[27:08] And so it seems to be saying that error is the result of a disordered movement of what reason. An order corresponds to what the opposite disorder would be the opposite of order, the opposite of before and after. Now the other word we have

[27:30] is the word mistake, right? And Shakespeare say in the famous play, "The Comedy of Errors." Huh? In the Comedy of Errors, which which plot somewhat goes back to Plautus and so on in the Greeks before Plautus, you have you know actually Shakespeare doubles the thing; you have two pairs of brothers, right, who are twins, and you can't really tell them apart, right? And then you have all these errors that come, right?

[28:02] But Shakespeare also uses in the play the word mistake. You know, I was mistook for you. You know, and so on. But mistake seems more opposed to what

[28:17] distinction, huh? Okay, so it's interesting these two words, mistake and error, both of which name a what defect of reason, huh? But one seems to name the defect of reason from your inability to distinguish, right? And the other from your inability to proceed orderly.

[28:43] So that idea, distinction, order, that are involved in Shakespeare's great definition of reason, is confirmed by the opposite, right? It's perfectly said. Now we're going to see in the ninth book of wisdom that the great Aristotle is going to distinguish act and ability first, as he does in the first two parts, and then in the third part he talks about what the order of act and ability perfectly ordered.

[29:17] See, and he had to do it in that way; couldn't be done otherwise, right? So I thought, although it's kind of an excursion here, you know, since reason and wisdom are very closely connected. You know how the modern biologists define man as what Homo sapiens, huh? The wise ape. We define man sometimes as the rational animal, the animal that has reason. But kind of points out a connection between wisdom and reason.

[29:52] And the connection between wisdom and reason is twofold: that wisdom is acquired by the use of reason, and it's a perfection of reason, indeed the very greatest perfection of reason. So it's some understanding of reason is necessary, right? And some understanding of what it is to use reason is necessary in order to understand wisdom. See what I was doing? And Thomas gives us a hint, as I say, in the proemia in Nicomachean Ethics, where he explains one of the things that Aristotle says about the wise man, kind of the culmination of the six-part description of the wise man in the preambles,

[30:43] that he orders most of all, and he gives us a reason. Well, that's because he says wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason, and is proper to reason to know order. But that's exactly what Shakespeare's telling us. Aristotle, I mean Shakespeare, completes the definition of reason by saying it's looking before and after. That's order. You see that? Yeah.

[31:13] Now let's come back a bit here to the fourteen books of wisdom, and you want to, you know, distinguish to some extent the books here, and distinguish the ninth book from all the other books, right? And see its place in the fourteen books.

[31:33] And one thing you got to be kind of careful about. I think that every mistake of reason comes in part, at least, from not seeing some distinction.

[31:58] And like, as I say, earlier we're talking about how some people, yes, and what is philosophy? And sometimes I say, well, philosophy is the love of wisdom. And that's not really the way in which Plato, at least, or and Aristotle, especially, use the word philosophy. They don't use the word philosophy to name the love of wisdom. That is the meaning of the word philosopher, a lover of wisdom.

[32:25] Yes, but philosophy is used by Aristotle always to name the knowledge, right, which the philosopher pursues, the knowledge which the philosopher has, and so on. So you're not seeing the distinction between.

[32:40] The etymology, or what Thomas calls the id a quo nomen ponitur, that from which the name is taken, and the id ad quod that to which the name is applied, the meaning of the word, right? You're confusing the etymology with the what distinction. Now there can be a connection between the etymology and the distinction and the meaning, but there's a distinction between the two. Thomas says, you know, perhaps a bad etymology of the word for stone, lapis, comes from lady laedens pedem, hurts the foot.

[33:18] So that's not the meaning of the word stone, right? Doesn't mean hurting the foot, right? But it's taken from that. That's what it does. Hurts the foot as you're walking along. Gets in your way. So that's the example. The etymology is not the same as the meaning. So if you don't, you don't maybe see that distinction, and so you're not seeing that love of wisdom is the etymology of the word philosophy.

[33:48] That's not the meaning. Now what distinction do I want to talk about now? Well, the distinction between the two kinds of division of a book or a work,

[34:07] and the first way we always divide a book, I call the editorial and reference division of the work. It's something the editor needs, you know, something you need to refer to a passage.

[34:30] Now that's one kind of division. The second kind of division of a work, which you will find, say, in Thomas's commentaries and Aristotle's books, or his commentaries on Scripture, is a division which you could call the logical one and the understandable division.

[35:01] And the logical division follows the logical rule of two or three, and it's called the understandable division because the one that gives you true understanding of the work.

[35:19] Now let's give you a couple examples of that from some scriptural works. You pick up the Gospel of Saint Matthew, the first Gospel, and in the present editions you'll find that the Gospel of Matthew is divided into 28 chapters, right? As a matter of fact, I guess Matthew didn't do that. It was made in the I think it was the 12th century at the University of Paris, and people were always referring to different passages in Matthew.

[35:53] They had ways of dividing it, you know. Let's get some consistency, right? And so they got together and they divided it into what, 28 chapters, huh? And the chapters were subdivided into verses, right? So if I want to refer to any passage of Matthew, I can say, well, it's chapter 20, verse 10, or something, right? That's the editorial and

[36:21] reference division of the Gospel Saint Matthew to 28 chapters. Does that give you any understanding of the gospel? No. Now, you pick up Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the Gospel Saint Matthew,

[36:40] and Thomas will bring out that the Gospel Saint Matthew most of all emphasizes the incarnation of Christ, the humanity of Christ, and therefore is usually represented by the man among the four figures. And Thomas says, now as man, he says, he came into this world. He went through this world preaching, and then he went out of this world. So the Gospel of Matthew is divided into three parts: his coming into the world, right, and that I guess involves what the first two chapters, huh?

[37:20] And then his proceeding through the world, chapters three through something like 20, and then his going out of the world, his passion, death, resurrection, right? Chapters 21, right? So he divides it into three parts, huh? And that really kind of illuminates the gospel, and he'll then subdivide those parts usually into two or three, huh? So it helps you to really understand the gospel in the way it's put together.

[37:51] If you look at the Gospel Saint John, Thomas divides that into two parts. You go to his commentary on the Psalms. Now the Psalms, there you have what 150 Psalms. No human mind can understand division 150. But Thomas, following the great Saint Augustine, Augustine notes that the 50th Psalm in the old correct numbering, not the old Catholic numbering, that the 50th Psalm is a Psalm of what?

[38:32] Asking for forgiveness, huh? That favorite Psalm of Saint Teresa of Avila, right? The hundredth psalm is a psalm of good deeds, progressing virtues. And hundred fiftieth psalm is a psalm of resting in God, right? So the psalms are divided into three parts, corresponding to the three stages of the Christian life. In the first stage, you are fighting mainly against your sins, and trying to be purged of your sins.

[39:04] In the second stage, you are progressing or trying to progress in the virtues, huh? So the emphasis is more upon that, although you still watch out. And the third part, you are resting in God, right? Yeah. So

[39:23] I want to say, treasure, you know, saying towards end of your life, you know, I don't know what more I could have in heaven now, you know. My union with God is already complete, but she's in that third stage, right? And then Thomas will will subdivide into the fifties, right? We only have the part, you know, on the first fifty, but he'll again divide into two or three, you'll see.

[39:47] And so, really, enables you to understand the psalms, huh? So the second kind of division, as I say, I call the logical and understandable division. I call it the logical because it follows the rule of logic that we should divide, for the most part, into two or three, not always, but for the most part. And it's the understandable division because it's the division that enables you to really understand the work.

[40:24] But you need that first division, which is the what editorial and reference division. When you make the second division, you refer back to the first, right? So the third part, let's say of the Gospel Saint Matthew, is chapters twenty-one through twenty-eight. You know, we can tell you where you are referring to, we can refer to where where it begins and so on.

[40:45] Now, the editorial and reference division of this book before us is into fourteen books, huh? And in some divisions, the books are divided into chapters, right? In Thomas's edition, the books are divided into lexios or readings, right? And sometimes these are broken down even more, you know, with the Becker numbers and so on, right? But all of that is the what editorial and reference division of the work.

[41:21] That doesn't really enable you to understand the work and how it's put together. Now, the what is the logical and understandable division of the fourteen books of wisdom, huh?

[41:43] Well, again, is by way of a manuductio. When Thomas gives us the logical and understandable division of a work of Aristotle, it's almost always in two two parts proportional to Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. Now, as Charles de Conick said, before you read philosophy, you should read some good literature, and so you should all read Romeo and Juliet before you try to read the fourteen books of wisdom.

[42:20] So, I assume you've all read Romeo and Juliet. Now, what is the logical and understandable division of Romeo and Juliet? Don't you tell me no? Don't you tell Father no? You heard me say this before, I'm sure.

[42:44] Courtship and then marriage. Nope, nope. Here in subdivisions. What is the logical and understandable division of Romeo and Juliet? It's a great work of Shakespeare. I've been down to where Juliet's house is. There, you know, they're still making it, but down to Juliet's house, and I've been where the tragic end comes and so on. But had my daughter get up on the balcony and let's take a picture of her and so on.

[43:16] Before the death or after the death of the cousin? No, no, you're all missing the logical and understandable division of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. That says

[43:34] a hint, huh? The logical division is almost always into two or three, right? So, it's a logical division of Romeo and Juliet into two or three.

[43:51] Yeah. This is a little proer than the rest of the play. Yeah, yeah. Romeo and Juliet, unlike most of the other plays, Romeo and Juliet does a prologue and a what play, right? Okay. So, the logical and understandable division of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet is into the prologue and the play. Now, the prologue is very small compared to the whole play, right? But it does, in some way, prepare the way for the play.

[44:23] Now, if you look at Thomas's commentary, say, on the on the so-called physics or the books of natural hearing, or the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics, right, or the fourteen books here of wisdom, you'll usually divide it into two. The premium, as it's called in Greek.

[44:46] And the whole rest of the work, what they sometimes call the the tractatus, the drawing out of the whole work. And so the prelude in a way is a little bit like the prologue huh? Strong in Juliet. It kind of paves the way for what comes afterwards. And so in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, the prelude doesn't occupy even the whole book one, right? It's just the first part of book one.

[45:17] So he's dividing that prelude in the beginning of book one against the rest of book one and books two through what ten, right? In the physics there, he's dividing the prelude, which is the very beginning of book one, against the rest of book one and all the rest. And the same way when he divides the wisdom here, the fourteen books of wisdom, he divides the prelude, which is the Greek word meaning paving the way, which occupies the first in the editorial division, let's say the first reflexios of the first book, right?

[45:55] He divides it against the rest of book one and books two through what fourteen, huh? Okay. Now the most important thing in a prelude is to say what you're aiming at, right? And from that to declare the desirability of it. And sometimes you go beyond that and say something, you know, about how you're going to proceed and so on. But it prepares the way. Okay.

[46:25] If you look at Shakespeare's prologue, there, it's written in the same meter and so on as a Shakespearean sonnet. It's got fourteen lines. The proemium. So you have fourteen lines of iambic pentameter, and they're actually divided into what three quatrains with alternate rhyming, and the final rhyming couplet. But the first quatrain goes something like this:

[46:59] Two households, both alike in dignity, In fair Verona, where we lay our scene, From ancient grudge break to new mutiny, Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean. So you're talking about two powerful families, and you know how tragedy is about those who are somewhere above us, right? Two families that have been feuding for years, right, to the point of civil war, right? Okay. Then the second quatrain starts to give you a little preparation of the plot.

[47:33] From forth the fatal loins of these two foes, right, a pair of star-crossed lovers take their life, whose misadventured piteous overthrows. Do with their death bury their parents' strife. So you realize there's going to be what? Something pitiful, right? That's one of the two emotions of tragedy, right? From the fourth the fatal loins of these two foes, forth the fatal loins of these two foes a pair of star-crossed lovers take their life, whose misadventured piteous overthrows, do with their death bury their parents' strife.

[48:12] And then the third quatrain brings in the other emotion of tragedy, the fearful passage of their death-marked love, and the continuance of their parents' rage. It's not fun, but the children's in. I'm going to put into this. And then in the in the last rhyming couplet, he says, "Which of you with patient ears attend, will hear our toil shall strive to mend strive to mend." So he's trying to get you to pay attention to this thing, okay?

[48:42] So the prologue is preparing the way for the what play, right? Now, that's the analogous to that is the division, the logical division of the whole fourteen books of wisdom, right? You should divide the premium at the beginning of book one against the rest of book one and books two to fourteen.

[49:12] Now, when Thomas comes to divide the premium, logically and understandably, he divides it into what? Two, again. Now, if you look at the premium to the Nicomachean Ethics, he divides that into three. Okay.

[49:34] He divides the Gospel of Matthew into three, Gospel of Saint John into two. So it's one or the other, usually. Now, what's interesting is that these two premiums I've mentioned here, especially the one at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics and the one at the beginning of the Metaphysics, in a way, one is a premium to practical philosophy, and the other is a premium to looking philosophy, contemplative philosophy, speculative philosophy.

[50:09] And what's interesting that at the end of both of these premiums, Aristotle has an epilogue where he recalls what he's done in the premium, and he recalls it, the thing he just did, and the thing he did before that. Yeah, did something before that? He does, huh? So in in the premium to Nicomachean Ethics, he recalls three things, right? What we're aiming at, how we should proceed, and who's suitable here.

[50:39] And in the premium to wisdom, the premium is two parts. What is the goal of wisdom? And primarily to know causes, and in the end to know the very first causes, and then the second part of the premium is what kind of knowledge this is. It's looking knowledge. It's liberal. It's not a human possession, but it's the best and most honorable knowledge. This is the most divine knowledge.

[51:07] So. So now we have to divide the drawing out of the treatise, through book one to fourteen, to find where book nine comes. We should wait till this afternoon

[51:30] to do that. So we meet again at two o'clock, and then we're going to see the logical and understandable divisions of the treatise of fourteen books of wisdom, right? If you divide the treatise or the drawing out of it against the premium,

[51:49] I don't know where we are when we take up the ninth book in some detail. Quite comes where it does, huh? Neither before nor after.