Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
10. Metaphysics IX: Motion as the Most Known Act, and Heraclitus and Hegel
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/010-metaphysics-ix-motion-as-the-most-known-act-and-heraclitus/

[0:00] Again, upon the distinction of act and ability, right? And he's going to say a bit about what ability is, but not as completely. He'll be saying it in the second part of the book, right? As he's still seeing ability in act reference meaning to motion, and what is to be an act? And he's going to be emphasizing motion because that's the only act we're concerned with so far.

[0:25] He's going to say some very interesting things about them. He's going to give a a certain way of speaking here of what ability is, which he's going to use later on in the second part of this reading.

[0:43] So around line twenty-four there, so esti de dunaton that is possible or able, huh? That if what it's actualized, nothing what impossible will be.

[1:05] That is dunaton, right? to which aion hypaxei energia, if there exists in it, right, the act of which is said to be the ability, right? Nothing impossible results, right? Kind of interesting, right? That is possible, or that is able, which, when the act of which it is able, right, exists, nothing possible results. Kind of interesting, huh? He's going to use it for that particular way, huh? I say, for example, if something is able to sit, and it happens to sit,

[1:55] if there belongs to another sitting, nothing impossible will be resulting from that, okay? And something is able to be moved or to move something, or to stand or to make stand, or to be or to come to be, or to not be or to not come to be, and so on. Likewise, huh? Nothing impossible results, huh? Okay. He's going to come back to it again in towards the end of the second part of this reading when he's dealing with the second mistake, right?

[2:33] Um, to say that something is possible or or able means that if that for which it is able actually exists, nothing impossible results from that. Okay. Is that sort of the contrary of the argument he was making against them

[3:00] when he said that? If somebody can't stand, then he'll never stand. Oh no, that was a separate argument. I don't see it as the same as what he's saying here. Now, here he's trying to give a certain notion of ability that he can reason from later on.

[3:20] And of course, you'll be saying later on that if something is able to be, and it is, nothing impossible is also. So that's saying something other than saying that you need the possible in order to avoid impossibility. No, but in a sense, you have to know abilities. We'll see more fully in the third part to act.

[4:09] And you know, this will come out maybe more in the second part of this reading, as somebody will say, "Well, it's possible for the side of a square, huh? "

[4:26] And the diagonal is it right to be commensurable? Is it? But it will never be, they say, right? Okay. But then, if you say if that's possible, then by his definition, it should be. If it does actually come about, there's nothing impossible in what has come about.

[4:54] Is the impossible more known than the possible? Is the impossible more known than the possible? He's using it in the definition. Impossible than possible. You know, it seems you kind of define the impossible by the possible, right? But he's giving this definition here because he wants to argue from this. Aristotle does that sometimes, huh?

[5:26] You know, if you look at at the fifth book of Wisdom, there he's talking about the one. He's talking about the continuous, right? And the continuous is one sense of one. And Aristotle gives a kind of strange definition of the continuous as that of which the motion is one. Okay, you remember that? And that's not to be the definition of continuous, is it? The basic one, but.

[6:00] It helps to bring out that a straight line, say, is more one than a an angle, right? For an angle, you can move one part and the other part, you say, but a straight line, without breaking it, you you can't move it without the whole thing moving, right? So the straight line is more one than the other, right? So it's kind of like a special definition, right?

[6:22] Huh? Which is not really the fundamental definition of of that, huh? Okay. We probably define the what impossible is what is not able to be, right? But this is a definition that's useful to use against the second error. The second error will be saying, you know, that that things are all things are possible. That's the error, say, right? And

[6:52] but some of them will never be, and therefore they're trying to avoid, right? A contradiction there. Aristotle saying, but really to say that something is possible means that it could come about, right? And if it did come about, there'd be nothing impossible involved in that, okay? And that can be used to argue against the man who says that all things are possible, right? And the avoids end up with you know having them be commensurable, right?

[7:23] As he says, that that will never happen, though. It's possible, but never. See, so it's not as impressive a mistake or error that he's attacking the second one, right? As the first one, right? But there's something complete. This is Aristotle attacking the man who says nothing is possible, right? Um, in a way, because he's saying nothing is possible except when it's actually there, right? And therefore, in a way, he's denying all possibility.

[7:52] And the other guy is saying just the opposite extreme. Everything's possible. And the truth is what in between two extremes, huh? See, it's a bit like you have sometimes in the modern thinkers where you have the scientists and so on saying everything is necessary, everything is determined, and then you have the existentialist or somebody, you know, everything is contingent, everything is, you know, and the truth is in between those two extremes, huh?

[8:25] And the truth here is in between these two extremes that nothing is possible and everything is possible. Anything can be so. You do have people running around, I think, thinking that today, don't you? I mean,

[8:40] probably the academic world, right? People that think that everything is possible, right? And even though everything will not take place, right? But everything's possible. Aristotle, when that last part will be distinguishing between the the false and the impossible, they're not don't mean the same thing, right?

[9:05] So this touches upon the truth that truth is in between what two extremes, and it's a little bit like moral virtue where the virtue lies in the middle between two extremes. But Shakespeare often touches upon that, right? Like in King Lear, where

[9:35] the character says, "All my reports, Kent, you know, that be faithful friend of Lear, all my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so." So

[9:57] you seem truth is is mean there between something that is more and something that is short, or Falstaff says, you know, about his buddies there, they say more or less than the truth. They are, you know, liars and so on.

[10:20] But what does it mean in the court when we say, "I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth"? I think the average person thinks that the second and third phrase are just emphasizing what the first one says. I'm, I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. but actually, you say, to tell the whole truth, that's against what?

[10:49] Less than the truth, and nothing but the truth. To say more than the truth, right? Falstaff's phrases is more clear. If they say more or less than the truth, they are villains. He says, "In the sons of darkness." He's the biggest liar himself, but.

[11:10] But what does it mean to say more than the truth? See, as Aristotle explains, you're saying the truth when you say what is in things is right, and what is not in things is not. So there's two ways of being mistaken. One is to say what is in things is not, and that's saying what we're less than the truth, and the other is to say that what is not in things is, and that's to say more than the truth, right?

[11:42] So if I'm the bartender and I called into court to testify, who was present at the bar between nine and ten, and let's say Joe and Tom were present at the bar, and I say what, just Joe was there, then I'm saying less than the truth. I'm saying that who was there. Was not, okay, but if I say Joe and Tom and Bill were there, then I'm saying more than the truth, right?

[12:12] I'm saying who was not there was there. There's two ways of departing. So when I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, I'm swearing to tell the truth, which is that Joe and Tom were there. Forget the names I used, and I'm not going to leave one of them out, nor I'm going to add somebody who wasn't there, right? So I'm distinctly saying I'm not going to give false testimony in the two ways you can give false testimony by saying more than the truth, what is not is, or saying less than the truth, what is is not, huh?

[12:50] Okay. When you say that just the one is there, if you don't say just, you say something true, but you don't say everything that you ought to say.

[13:04] Well, I'm not getting into a little bit of a different question, aren't you? I think that's what the whole truth means. You're not allowed to withhold. Yeah. You're kind of complicating the matter now, huh? You know, the whole truth is that Joe and Tom were there, right? If I leave one of them out because he's a good-paying customer or something, then I'm not telling the whole truth, right?

[13:25] But if to protect those guys, I add somebody else, you know, who wasn't there, then I'm adding, adding to the truth. So in a sense, those who say that nothing is possible, right, are they adding or subtracting from the truth?

[13:49] Subtracting. Yeah, yeah. But some things are possible, right? By those who say everything is possible, are adding to the truth, right? Aristotle is going to be like Kant. All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so, huh? In Shakespeare, you know, instead of saying neither nor, they say nor nor, and instead of saying either or, they say or or. So that's

[14:22] what you see in that line there, huh? So you give. That's a good question you raised. I mean, he's giving kind of a definition that he can reason from later on, for special purpose.

[15:02] Now, now down about line thirty-two there, or line thirty rather, Aristotle is talking about what is act. Now, of course, he's in the context of the first part here, where he's considering ability only reference to motion. Right? He's going to make some points about motion that are interesting, and very important to have in mind.

[15:33] The name he says Energeia, right, seems to have come right, that which is coupled with actuality. Most of all, for motions, huh? For act seems to be especially motion.

[15:55] Now he says it seems to be especially motion. What is he saying about this act called motion? It's the most known. Yeah, it's the most known to us, right? It's not the most known in itself, right? He's not saying it's the most actual, but it's the most known to us, and so motion seems most actual to us, and therefore most what real to us, huh? And that's very important to see that.

[16:30] Now, the reason for that in part is that Shakespeare says, "Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs." So, if our knowledge begins with our senses, and things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, then act would seem to be the, or motion rather, would seem to be the act that's most known to us. Huh? Most known to us.

[16:59] And then you probably heard the words of attributed to Heraclitus that all things flow, nothing abides, huh? You can't step what twice into the same river, huh? And why not? Because the river is always flowing, right? And so sometimes we speak of the situation as fluid, using that same likeness to the water, because it's changing as we speak of it.

[17:33] And then Cratylus, who was the student of Heraclitus, on the one hand, on the other hand, teacher of Plato, Cratylus says you can't step once into the same river because as your foot, you know, breaks the top of the water and starts to go down, the water is flowing by, so it's not really the same water that you broke into when your foot goes down. Now,

[18:05] Cratylus, as you know, was not the only teacher of Plato. Another teacher of Plato was the the Pythagoreans born in Italy, and he left Athens in disgust after the death of Socrates. But Socrates was even more important teacher of Socrates, I mean of Plato, than Cratylus. And Plato wrote a dialogue called the Cratylus, where his two teachers, Cratylus and Socrates, have a conversation.

[18:37] And you might conclude from reading the Cratylus that Plato puts Socrates somewhat above Cratylus, but nevertheless, in in the in the metaphysics itself, I think it's in the first book if I remember rightly, Aristotle says that even in old age, and that's when he knew Plato in old age, even old age, Plato was still holding on to some of the things he had been taught by Cratylus.

[19:08] And so Plato had the idea that the world around us, the material world, was always in motion and flux, and this produces a a problem for Plato because how can you know something that is always changing? And that marvelous Greek word that we mentioned before, episteme, which comes from the Greek word to come to a halt or a stop,

[19:38] and we spoke of that in reference to the English word too, to understand, right? But how can you understand something that doesn't stand? It's got to stand still to be understood. So how can you have episteme? How can the mind come to rest with things that are always changing? And now Cratylus is supposed to said, you know, all you can do is point, because if you try to say something about things before you finish your sentence, the thing will have changed, huh?

[20:13] And it kind of illustrates that sometimes I walk in front of the classroom in front of the first row, huh? I say, where is Berquist? Well, he's in front of, and of course, before I finish the sentence, he's gone beyond that person, you know, so you can't really say anything about Berquist where he is because he will not be where you're saying he is. By the time you finish, you're still to where he is.

[20:36] So all you can do is point. So perhaps in a negative way, this made Plato look for somewhere else that he could really what have episteme.

[20:55] And you know how sometimes Plato compares being and becoming and non-being to episteme and opinion, and then sophistry, huh? Of course, Aristotle picks up on that in the in the sixth book of Wisdom when he's talking about accidental being, and he says Plato wasn't far wrong in saying that sophistry is about nothing, because sophistry is especially about the accidental, and the accidental hardly is. So the way you're talking about nothing.

[21:34] And but notice on Plato put opposite becoming, opinion, right? Opposite being, episteme or knowledge, huh? So this world of becoming, you can't really know. And so in the Tomeos and so on, you've got to bring in mathematics, to, even so, in the beginning Timaeus says you can't really know these things, huh? And he talks about the difference in knowing things that are unchanging, and trying to know things that are changing, huh?

[22:08] So if Heraclitus said this, and there certainly were men who were saying this, that all things flow, nothing abides, huh? Nothing is real unless it's what changing, huh?

[22:28] Now you find something like this when you get to the Hegel and the Marxists and so on, that that's the way reality is. It's always changing, huh? And

[22:43] if you speak of it as something unchanging, you're this is abstraction from reality, as Joseph Stalin would tell you, right, huh? You know, you stop the you stop the movie, but this you know, it's a moving reality, huh? And you know, if you talk about what man is, no, no, there's medieval man, there's modern man, and there's you know proletariat man, and but there's no you know unchanging essence there that you could know, right?

[23:15] See, that's a very common thought running through modern thought, huh? I remember some of the assumptionist seminarians there. They had a house down in Boston, you know, where some of the seminarians lived and so on. And it has some exchange with the Jesuit house there, you know, and so on. And of course, they're remarking how you go to the Jesuit house and he's speaking human nature. You know, you get laughed at.

[23:42] The great idea, you know, that there's some human nature, some, some what it is that you see. And you kind of see this in Heidegger too. You know, the emphasis upon being in time, the emphasis upon becoming. So that what's real, the only thing that's real is what in motion, what's becoming, huh? And the whole universe is like that, huh? So you find Hegel saying this in a way, and Marx is very much so, right?

[24:12] And you see them in official documents, you know, Stalin. You know, they go on in Soviet encyclopedia, you know, what this is really about, huh? But that's what he's saying, huh? That that the real is is history, right, huh? You know, like like the I used to summarize the

[24:33] existential position, you know, saying man has no nature, just as history, right? And for history, this is reality, huh? Of course, you know how Hegel says philosophy is the history of philosophy. Man is therefore also the history of man, right? So you're seeing this fluid reality as being what reality is. Aristotle sees that way of thinking because he sees that the actual is what's real, and motion is the act that seems is most known to us, and therefore seems most real to us, and therefore reality is is must be a fluid reality.

[25:20] And also, he goes on to point out that in the text there, when he says that the word "act" seems to have come from motion, and from motion, it was carried over to other things. Can I ask you? Yeah. Quick question. In the. um uh let's see. What line is that? You translated here. um Let's see let's see where the final line. uh Line thirty there. Yeah. The name, the name act.

[25:52] Yeah. Has come being placed with perfection, I think. Yeah, we see. Yeah, entelechia I guess is a word that they say Aristotle invented, you know. But entelechia is a word he'd use more in talking about form. You know, so I remember right there when he defines the soul, right? It's the first act. We say, I think the Greek word is what entelechia It's not energeia. huh But energeia is probably for the idea of action, of activity, right?

[26:28] But in English, we can use the word act. But if you use the word act just by itself, you don't think of form, do you? The average person would never call form an act, would they?

[26:44] When they think of act, they think something like activity, right? And they think of activity, they think first of all motion, and only gradually see there might be some other kind of activity than motion. So motion seems to be the most actual thing. But as I say, I think the word energeia is probably closer to activity, right? And and entelechia is a word that would be more applied to form, but it could be applied as a synonym for energeia.

[27:22] Here, I mean, I wouldn't see a real distinction of it, you know, that they're not somewhat synonymous here, but they are different words, right? Okay. What did he make it up from? Tell us. Yeah, in and in, yeah, yeah. So it signifies more perfection, right? And so, the word etymologically, I should put it that way. The word entelechia more signifies what perfection, right? And and form and so on,

[27:58] because motion is an imperfect act, right? And so, motion is for the sake of some end, but motion is never the end. But entelechia names more a more perfect act. But at this point, I wouldn't, you know, say too much. They're being used more or less synonymously here. Except in except in this one line where he seems to be, I mean, he's distinguishing. Yeah. Yeah. And is he putting?

[28:26] But let's see how he uses those words when we get to the second part, which is about act, right? And we'll see how he uses those words. Aristotle sometimes, like in the beginning of the of the proemium to Wisdom, there it talks about sensing comes first, and then memory, and then experience, and then comes art or science, right? He uses the term art or science kind of interchangeably there, meaning simply what a knowledge of the universal, and so the difference, the first difference you know between art or science and experience is that experience is still a knowledge of singulars, and art or science is a knowledge of the universal.

[29:08] Now later on Aristotle says now in the ethics, right, he distinguishes between art and science, but it's not relevant to what he's doing there, right? He's just using them kind of as synonymously for a knowledge of the what universal, okay? So I am not sure here that he's using them, you know, to signify other things distinctly, right? But nevertheless, the assuming the etymology of entelechia lends itself more to naming a perfect act than a imperfect act of motion, okay?

[29:46] But still, he would he could still use, I think, the word entelechia in in defining motion. In fact, look if he put here down in where he recounts the things here. I don't have my physics with me, but

[30:25] where he defines motion, he calls it. Kappa excuse me. Okay, and then the let me see if there is any energeia there. He talks about motion.

[31:36] Then he uses the word entelechia too. Where are you at Yeah, it's in book Kappa. book what 11 right, And the ninth chapter there.

[31:58] I thought at the beginning he used the word energeia I mean, he defines motion. there He used the word energeia, yeah. Then later on, it he seems to almost call motion entelechia there. right

[32:35] Right. Sometimes he used the word energeia sometimes entelechia Like down in 933 he tou dunatou he dunaton entelecheia kinesis estin right. The act of the able in so far as it is able right, is motion. There, there, there he's using entelechia there, the definition right. When he began the chapter, he's using the word energeia. So, he's using them somewhat synonymously, it seems to me. It's interesting in this line here.

[33:13] He seems to be opposing entelechia with motion because, as you as you translate, he says the word "act" which is placed upon perfection, which is entelechia, and upon other things has come most of all from motions. So he's saying, on one hand, it's applied to perfection entelechia, but it's also applied to motion. So he seems there to be opposing. Okay, but maybe he has in mind there the fact that the word "act" is applied to motion first, and then it's carried over to more perfect acts, and the word "entelechia from its its etymology lends itself more to describing it seems a perfect act, which is more like you know an end, motion is more like towards an end.

[33:58] So he wants to bring out that the word "act" is carried over from the act that is most known to us to the more perfect acts that are less known to us. That's why he says placed upon. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, but but the point is that the word "act" is placed first of all upon motion, right? And we used to get a kick out of the French films, when we were in Quebec.

[34:25] We. Used to have the newsreels in those days, like we used to have in our theaters. You know, it's probably before your time. I don't know. you guys are pretty young In high school, we had them, and we have them playing back. Yeah, yeah, the newsreel, yeah. And sometimes you can buy them now. You know, the old newsreels from the Second World War and so on—they're kind of fun to watch.

[34:42] But you know, the in the French theater, with the French language there, the part on the newsreel was called les actualités. Of course, many philosophers thought that was kind of funny, right? See, these are the real things going on, right? These these these actualités. But it kind of

[35:06] shows you, right? What Aristotle is saying here, right? That the things that are going on, or the action is, right? That's what's real. You ever think of the students coming out of college one day and and and said, "Where are you going to? " He said, "Going downtown. " What's going to be happening there? You know, that's that's where the action is. You know, So why are you going down there?

[35:27] That's where the action is. See, that seems real to him, right? You know, I mean, to stay up in his room studying or something—that's not real. To be down where the action is—that's that's where reality is.

[35:43] I suppose things like war and revolutions seem more real because there's motion, huh? Monsignor Dionne used to talk about if you want money from the Canadian government, you know, for a sabbatical or for a, leave of absence, whatever it is, you don't have any locomotion in your request. You're not going to get accepted, right? You're not doing anything, right? If you're going from one place to another, right?

[36:09] And what you kind of see, you know, people jumping around to one conference to another, right? Of course, you go to these conferences, you're wasting an awful lot of time. You know, just in getting there and getting back. I mean, that that that time you could you could sit and study at home, and you go and hear some talk, you know, about some guy's you know, pet project or whatever it is, and you don't learn much at all, you know.

[36:38] So there's a lot of motion going on, right? Then go to another conference, another conference. You're doing something, right? You're accomplishing something, right? So even academic people, you know, it seems more real if you're going from one place to another. And so, if you're going to be on a sabbatical or something, you've got it. You must be going somewhere to do your research, right?

[37:03] And uh, if you're just going to sit in your room and think, you know, or read? That's not doing anything, right? I mean, why should you pay money to do that? You know, but if you have to go to Paris and to London and consult the library here, the library there, then you're doing something, right? There's some motion involved. huh It seems real. People see you just standing.

[37:28] you might be thinking or praying or something. Yeah. Yeah. yeah. But this one philosopher said he's sitting in a living room there, right, reading one of his philosophy books, and

[37:42] his wife knows enough not to interrupt him, right? But then he stops to think for a moment about what he's read. Then she thinks she can come in for a small talk. He's not doing anything, right? As long as his eyes are going, you know, he's doing something, right? But as you know yourself, while you sit back at this and kind of think about what you just read, that's the most important, and that sort of gels, and that's when you, when you see something, you know, and it sinks in, you know, and that's when she thinks you can come in because you're not doing anything at that moment.

[38:17] There's all kinds of funny things in daily life that show the truth of what Aristotle is saying. Then you go to Heraclitus, or you go to the Hegelians, the Marxists, and Heidegger, and so on. What's real for them is becoming, and being is not really real unless it's in motion. Notice that, Aristotle gives a sign here of that. So he says, act, and therefore you could say reality, right?

[38:49] Especially seems to be motion, right? Okay. Doke seems right. It isn't. Motion, when you study motion by definition, as we do in the third book of Natural Hearing, we find out that motion is the least actual of any act. In fact, it's hardly there. Because when I walk across the room, my motion is always partly not there, and partly to come, right? Partly gone by. And how much motion is there ever at once?

[39:30] It would have to be in two places for there to be motion for it to be fully actual. So motion is actually the least actual of all acts. But at the same time, the act which is most known to us, and because of that, the act that seems most real. And so things in motion seem more real than things that are not. huh? And so Aristotle is going to go on to say here.

[39:57] Whence to things that do not exist, right? ta me onta things not existing, we do not attribute to them that they are in motion. Although we attribute to them certain other predicates, as that they are understood and they are desired, right? Okay. So I might speak of I'm thinking about something that doesn't exist, right?

[40:25] I desire something that doesn't exist. I imagine something that doesn't exist, right? So it can be thought about, desired, imagined, but can it be in motion? It doesn't exist. No, it's in motion. It's real. That's reality. Yeah. Right. That's reality.

[40:56] What? Especially with children, motion is yeah overrides, and it's a sign of maturity when you don't need so much motion. And why don't we attribute motion to what doesn't exist? Because motion seems most actual, and therefore most real. And if you'd be attributing existence, right, actuality, to what is not actual, If you attributed motion to it, think about it. Yeah, fine. Want it? That's fine. You can want things to exist.

[41:30] Imagine them, yeah, but they can never be said to be in motion. It doesn't exist. Then they would have to say, there is just motion, but there is nothing moving. Well, to get to that, yeah, almost to that point, yeah. I mean, because with the light waves, what's waving, right? Well, it's you know ether, right? And then you have no ether. When you start thinking the ether isn't there, there is no evidence of ether.

[42:09] Then you have a wave with what? Nothing waving, right? Yeah, it is. It's reality. Waves. So modern science would say that the great Max Born, that you may have seen the one book of his, you can get in Dover, I think.

[42:29] It's about the modern about the world as modern physics sees it. What's the name of the book? It's called the What? The Restless Universe. You seen that book? But you know Max Born is one of the greatest physicists of the twentieth century. But in the book The Restless Universe, Max Born says, "It's strange we have a name for what doesn't exist: rest. " You see, and but that's that's what he takes as a theme for the book, right?

[43:00] That there is really no rest. And so I often refer to the book when I am talking about Heraclitus. I say it's another guy, you know, things like Heraclitus. All things flow. The restless universe. There is no rest.

[43:15] That's true of TV, Yeah. He says of non beings, some are in ability, right? But they are not, and strictly speaking, simply because they are not what An act, right? But if they're in motion. They would be an act, and they would be real, right? As an example, I couldn't think of something that's a non being.

[43:49] Well, I shouldn't have an example of the non beings. But. He's touching upon the fact that abilities, you know, what is able to be, simply speaking, is not,

[44:08] in some qualified sense, you could say, yeah, okay, yeah, because it's not an act, right? What is an act? Is simply speaking, right? So what is in motion, simply seems to be to us at first, simply. When Aristotle, you know, said that that what is more known to us is less known by nature, right, or less knowable, and what is less known to us is more known by nature, well.

[44:40] Kind of supreme example of that is that the most actual thing of all, which will be God, is pure act. He's least known to us, right? And the act which is least known—I mean, excuse me—least actual, namely motion, is most known to us. So when we reason, like in the first proof of God, when you reason from motion, right, to God, you're reasoning from the least act, actual act, but most known to us, to the least known to us act, but what is most actual.

[45:18] So it's a beautiful example of seeing the ultimate example of what is more known to us is less known. Because something is really known to being actual, it's really knowable to being actual.

[45:35] But the fact that we don't know the things that are most actual—not just God, but the separated substances—is given by Aristotle as a sign that the difficulty in knowing is chiefly in us, right? That what's most knowable, because it's most actual,

[45:55] is not most knowable to us. It must be because of the weakness of us, right? Just as if we don't love what's most lovable, the defect is in our heart, right? So likewise, if we don't know what's most knowable, the defect must be in our ability to know.

[46:18] But Descartes is already getting goofed up in that, right? When he tries to make the more actual, the distinct, more certain for us. He couldn't doubt those things that are so clear and distinct to him.

[46:43] What's clear to us is not so clear. Simply speaking, huh? To say I'm drinking dry red wine is not so clear, right? But it's pretty clear to me that I'm drinking dry red wine. So what's clear to me is not clear.

[47:04] What's clear and most clear is not clear to me. Strange, huh? Can you say to Matt's question that the non-being would be like the omelet because? before I cook it it doesn't exist but it's desired and understood What example for your TAC plus tofu? Tofu, tofu, yeah, yeah. People around TAC, that's prime matter, you know. I got the standard joke at TAC. You give me example of prime matter, yeah?

[48:02] Here's some of the cafeteria. So in the old days, that when we used to teach Marxism more because you know. Max has written a book on After World and so on. I used to use sometimes, you know, Joseph Stalin's thing on explaining what materialism is. It comes out very clearly, right? You know how their their they see reality as something in constant motion, and it's only these you know abstract thinkers, you know, who abstract from the moving process and try to make something.

[48:45] Man has no nature; he's only a history. It's kind of funny how the way Hegel says that philosophy is the history of philosophy. Kind of strange, isn't

[49:00] it? To make it make it a fluid, moving reality. Of course, the Hegelian system is like that, huh? It kind of moves on its own accord. Hegel's there not watching it. It's always moving forward, huh?