Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
11. Metaphysics IX: The Second Error, 'Everything Is Possible', and the Definition of the Possible
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[0:00] Okay, now we come in the second part of this reading. Actually, in the other division, it's of a chapter, right? Three and four, but we come to the second second mistake here. I mean, I finish this right before I break up. Anyway, the second part Thomas divides just into two, right? And in the first one, Aristotle briefly talks about the the mistake or error, and then he brings in this consequence, huh?

[0:35] That if A is possible, you know, if it's true that if A is so, then B is so, right? And A is what possible, then B should be what possible, right? Okay. As Thomas explains, he's not talking there about the possible that is opposed to the necessary, right? But the possible that includes the necessary. You know that distinction there: the two senses of possible. The possible that's opposed to necessary, and that's the possible that is what what is able to be and able not to be, right?

[1:19] Now, if you say that that the necessary is not the able, well, I might say you're saying what is necessary is not able to be, then it's impossible, right, and so on.

[1:38] The necessary is able to be in the broad sense, right? It's not able to be and able not to be. But sometimes you use the word "able" to mean what is able to be and able not to be, huh? Okay, the possible is what can be and not be, right? But there must be another sense of the word "possible," in which the necessary is possible.

[2:08] Because the necessary were not possible, then it'd be impossible. It's obviously not necessary, right? So there's two different meanings of the word "possible" or "able," right? Is necessary the one that takes because it has something significant in the name?

[2:28] Yeah, partly yeah, yeah. That's partly the example that case maybe yeah. Because able not to be isn't really an ability, You see, you have things that are able to be, and some of them are also able not to be, but some must be, right? The ones that must be maybe have something worth what talking about, right? Addition, so they get the new name, right? They're necessary, huh?

[3:00] The things that are able to be and not be, they just keep the name able. So that's more known. Other means the word possible. Yeah, yeah. If you use the word "possible," the word "possible"

[3:19] can be said of what is able to be and not be, and what must be, right? Both possible. Then you keep the word "possible" sometimes, so what is able to be and not be, and you give a new name to what is not able and not be, right? And call that the necessary, huh? So,

[3:45] let's look at the at the text here. So the beginning of chapter four here, but down on line 38 there. If the possible is as we've defined it here, huh?

[4:07] It is clear that it is not true to say that something is possible, but will not be. And this is a little kind of not as explicit as it could be, so that one escapes in this way the impossible being. You kind of need Thomas to say what's this all about, right? Thomas is saying that this is a position that's saying everything's possible, right? Huh? Even things like the side of the diagonal being commensurable, right?

[4:48] The commens the the diagonal being commensurable with the side, right? Huh? But it will never be. It's possible, but it'll never be. See, therefore, avoid having something impossible, right? Aristotle says, "Well, you can't really say that if by the possible or the able you mean something which, if it takes place, nothing impossible happens, right? " Yes, I see that.

[5:16] Yeah. These Aristotle's get kind of a difficult way of explaining this. It's not possible. It's not cannot be true to say that this is possible, but it will not be, so that you can say what you can escape. You might say, huh, Impossible. The impossible things by this. I mean, for example, if someone says it's possible that the what the diameter, right? I guess, be measurable with the side, huh?

[5:50] He doesn't say it clearly, but it's kind of a famous example. Everybody would know that Greek thought, but in fact, they'll never take place that they are what measured together, right?

[6:05] Ah, the one what not thinking that the impossible will be, huh? That nothing prevents the possible to be or to come to be, to not be or not come to be.

[6:30] But that is necessary, right? From the things laid down, if we lay down to be or come to be, what is not, what is possible, that nothing what will be impossible. He's going back to the definition of what he meant by possible earlier, right? Okay, It would happen, something impossible, namely that they be what

[7:00] measured, huh? The diagonal with the the side of it, huh? And Aristotle points out it's not the same thing, the false and the what impossible, right? Because the false would be it just never happens to happen, so it's not true. Yeah, so he gives an example there for you to stand now is false, but it's not what impossible, right? Huh?

[7:26] That's kind of a strange position, and not as as probable as the as the first one, right? Okay, but um, do you find people running around in your academic world who say everything's possible, anything's possible? I mean, people say that, you know, but do they really mean that? Anything's possible. In some other world. Yeah, yeah, anything's possible. Okay.

[7:59] But if some of these things are impossible, then to avoid admitting impossibility, they say, "But those things will never happen. " They're possible. I find that if you tell somebody God can't make a square circle, they get upset. Yeah, maybe they're thinking the same thing. They'll say that's possible, but they never do it. Well, just that he can do all things; it must be possible. He can do all things; it must be possible.

[8:32] So all things are possible. Yeah. Why do they think that? Everything's possible. I don't know. I don't think Thomas even suggests a reason for it, huh? I think it's not as as the reason doesn't come to mind at first, right? Okay.

[8:56] But in a way, it's like the opposite of saying everything's necessary, right? You know, put it up to an extreme and say everything's possible.

[9:07] Maybe they want to be free Maybe maybe it comes from from the imagination, right? Huh. Or can can you imagine a square circle? Huh.

[9:27] Huh. Can you? Is that that transcend even the imagination and the freedom of that? You can imagine a gold mountain or unicorn or something, mermaid. But can you imagine a

[9:47] square circle? I don't think? You can, can you? Just make it big enough; you can't see the curve. You can get to see the whole thing. It seems to come more from a weakness of mind. You know, it's kind of interesting when Aristotle is talking there in the

[10:24] second book, there of wisdom. And he says some people want everything to be shown with great certitude, right? Like the people want to proceed mathematically and so on. Others are bothered by certitude, right? He says either because they can't follow it, right, or because it seems to be illiberal, huh? Okay. And I know Shakespeare in the sonnets there when he's talking about flattering people and so on, right?

[11:03] And he speaks of the stingy truth. Oh, it's kind of interesting, right? The stinginess is you know opposed to liberality, right? That's that's the opposite of liberality. And the truth seems to be something what stingy, huh? So you go to somebody's house and they serve you dinner and you praise the dinner, right? You don't say you know no this was good, but that was not

[11:36] that's stingy, right? That's the truth, but it seems kind of stingy, right? This was almost as good as the last meal I had with you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But Thomas says to seek certitude is a sign of a good mind, right? Unless you maybe seek it where it cannot be found, right? But it's more characteristic of a good mind to seek what certitude, huh?

[12:07] Well, then it seems to be the opposite, would be the weak mind, right? The mind that that necessarily thinking it to be stingy, but it can't follow the rigor, right? Huh? They can't see that some things are impossible, right? Huh? So everything's possible. In that example of the incommensurate is good because at first it seems that that's not true. The imagination always gets a small enough measure.

[12:37] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Do you find people you know who when they talk about science as challenging common sense and so on, right? And things that we thought were impossible, we now know to be possible, right? You would have thought impossible to go to the moon. We've all gone to the moon, right?

[13:09] You would have thought impossible to talk to somebody on the other side of the world, right? We've done that, you know. So impossible things with new technology become possible, right? So even the impossible becomes possible.

[13:28] Everything's possible, right? That kind of mushy thinking. Why would you want to put a limit on the kinds of models that might be useful in science? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Don't limit that. Yeah, yeah. You kind of see that science is all these wonders of science, right? The things we would have thought impossible, you know, has suddenly become possible, right? We fly, we fly through the sky, right?

[13:53] Yeah, the medieval man would have thought that's impossible, right? So everything's possible, right? You don't know how far this this. We get carried away, don't they? Talking about the future and what's going to be, you know, true in the land of the mistakes. But everything's possible. You know it's a mistake Yeah.

[14:28] I've heard someone who say that. Christ also said we're divine. Yeah, was it was it the Mormons? Who was it that each when you die, each of us picks our own world or something like that?

[14:53] But I think of these these two mistakes that you have here, right? The first one is is one that the better mind makes, right? And the second one is the one that the lesser mind makes. But

[15:08] you can be a scientist to make both. From the technology, he can make the second mistake, and from the mathematics, he makes the first mistake.

[15:17] Yeah, yeah, yeah. And now. After this, Aristotle goes into this little business here, right? After he's talked about the false and the impossible not the same, right? And then starting in Hamah there, around 914.

[15:44] The same time, it becomes clear that if a being is necessary that b be, okay. So if you admit that if a is so, then b is so, right? And then you say that it's what a is possible, right? Then b must be possible, right? Okay.

[16:21] For it is not necessarily possible. Nothing would prevent it from being what? Not possible, right? Let then a be possible, right? If then a be possible, then according to our definition before, if one posits a to be right, then nothing impossible should happen, right? Therefore, b is necessarily also. But it was impossible, right? Well, let it be then impossible. If then is impossible for b to be.

[17:18] And we we used to say here that if b were impossible, then a would be impossible, right? If you accept that if a is so, then b is so necessarily, but b is impossible, then you have to say that a is what impossible, right? You can't use the other way around and say that if a is impossible, then b would have to be impossible, right?

[17:45] You know, even if it's true that if a is so, then b is so. Because b could be so for some other reason. Yeah, a could be impossible, right? But c is so. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. If Socrates is a dog, then Socrates is an animal. Well, it's impossible for Socrates to be a dog? That's making it impossible for him to be an animal, right? But if it's impossible for Socrates to be an animal, then it'd be impossible for him to be a dog too, right?

[18:15] Okay. So it's just talking about the order of these things here. So then he concludes: if, therefore, A is possible, then B must also be possible, right?

[18:43] If it has it in this way, right, that A being is necessary for what B to be, right? So he's saying that if you admit that if A is so, then B must be so, right? And you admit that A is possible, then you must admit that what B is possible, right? Because if B was not impossible, then A would have been impossible, right? Okay. Or if A was not impossible, then it wasn't necessary that if A is so, then what B is so.

[19:24] So when he says that that first was impossible, what is he referring to? He says what twenty-five, but the first was impossible. If we're also the same.

[19:44] At twenty-three, mean there twenty-four. At twenty-three, there he's trying to conclude: if, therefore, A was possible, then B would be possible, right? If it is also so that A being so is necessary that B be so, that B be.

[20:07] I guess before that the line numbers are different. Yeah, I don't think the Greek. There is some question there about exactly where the Greek is, but he's saying because it might actually got two meanings here, huh? If it is impossible, or if it's necessary, right?

[20:33] The meaning there is that if it's impossible for B to be, it's necessary also for A to be impossible, right? Because the Greek text there seems kind of kind of messed up there. Oh, I see. Yeah. So that's that's the point he's trying to make, huh? Yes. Yeah. But you can't argue the reverse way that if A is impossible, that then B is right. But he's saying that if it it be true that if A is so, then B is so, right?

[21:01] That doesn't mean that A or B is what is true or possible, right? Okay. And so I I could say you know if if three is six, then three is half of what twelve, right? That that's true, right? See, but it's not possible that three be six, right? Okay.

[21:29] Okay And then it would follow it's not possible Yeah. But if it's but if you say something like this, if if a number is even, then a number is not what odd, right? And it's possible that number be even. It must be possible that a number be not what odd, yeah. Okay.

[21:54] Right. And then if it be impossible the b right, then you have to say that the a was either not possible right, or else it wasn't true that if a is so, then b is so huh? Okay. Okay. But I think Garsaw is going into this business because the other guy is saying

[22:22] this is possible, but it'll never take place, right? But if it did take place, it would be impossible. Okay. And so I wanted to point out you can't have your cake and eat it here.

[22:41] If it's true that if a is so, then b is so, and a is possible, then b itself must be also what possible, yeah. It can't be impossible.

[22:56] Well, and furthermore, if it can't be, yeah, then the first thing wasn't. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So he said, if houtos echonton ton a b, if having themselves in this way a and b, that if one is so, the other is so, and

[23:26] it was not possible for b to be right, then neither would a b have themselves. as has been laid down. That is to say, if a is so, then b is so

[23:40] on. And if a is possible, is necessary for b to be possible. If it is true that a, what being is necessary also for b to be.

[24:03] Was necessary for b to be if a is possible. This is what it signifies. Okay. So, when it is and as it is possible, so the other then and thus will necessarily be the same. Okay, clear enough.

[24:41] Okay. He's saying that if it be true that if A is so, then B is so, right? Then, as A is so, right, as possible, or however it is, then B must also be so, or possible. Clear enough. That last one, I'm just a little wondering. Yeah. If you if you assume the proposition, if A is possible, B is possible, then he says you have to say if A is, then B is.

[25:11] Well, yeah, but the two different things here. One is to say if A is so, then B is so, right? And you got to have a necessary, you know, for that to be true, it's got to be necessary, right? If A is so, then B is so, right? Okay. And in sense, the truth of an if-then statement consists in the consequent part following necessarily, the antecedent part.

[25:37] That doesn't say though that in fact the antecedent or consequent is so, right? Okay. But you're saying if A is so, then B will be so, right? Well, then if you admit in addition that A is in fact so, right, then you must admit that B is in fact so, right? If you admit that A is is possible, right, then you must admit that B is possible.

[26:05] Otherwise, it's not true. If A is so, then B is so, or it's not true that A is possible, right? Because if you say if A is so, then B is so, and A is possible, but B is impossible, then you then you have to deny one of the things you're trying to. Yeah. There, of course, you go back into well, then A is impossible, right? Assuming that if A is so, then B is so, right?

[26:37] But it goes back in sense the idea. Who's saying earlier that if something is possible, nothing impossible follows, right? Okay. But the man who says it's true that if A is so, then B is so, right? And it's true that A is so or A is possible, but B is impossible. Well, now you're admitting something impossible follows when something is possible. That that doesn't make sense. I thought I thought at the end he was making the the opposite claim also that if you grant that it's true that the statement if A is possible, then B is possible, and A is, then B must also be.

[27:18] Yeah, I don't know if you want to stick in necessary possible there, you know, in the if-then statement, huh? You want to keep the necessity there, right?

[27:27] So you are saying merely if A is so, then B will be so, and then you have to add some simple statement that A is in fact so or A is possible. You are going to do it, and then you conclude something about B.

[27:44] Well, then you can have a necessary connection between their being or a necessary one between their possibility. It's the same connection. Then go the

[27:55] other. They are as a point. Yeah, yeah. There are two different things in the mind there, right? What is what is the necessary connection between A being and and and B being, right? And the other is reasoning from the possibility of A and that if-then statement, right, to B being possible, right?

[28:19] And where Aristotle, in a sense, is saying is that can you admit, you know, Socrates says the third admission is a dangerous one, right? Because two things can lead to a contradiction. The third, right? So can I admit that if A is so, then B is so? I admit that. I admit that A is possible, and I say B is impossible. Can I admit those three?

[28:50] Can't can you? Because if you put together if A is so, then B is so, B is impossible, then you are going to be saying B is not so, and you are forced to say that A is not so, A is not. Because if you say A is so, then B will be. Well, two of these are going to contradict the third one, say. Yeah. Or if you say if A is so, then B is so, A is possible, then you are forced to say that B is possible, which contradicts the statement that B is impossible, right?

[29:21] So you can't hold on to these three what statements, right? You know, when Socrates is refuting the slave boy, the slave boy says that the way to double a square is to double the side, right? Okay. So now you take an example. You have a square, let's say, which is two by two, right, an area of four, and then you say you are going to double the sides.

[29:45] You have a square four by four, and the area four by four is sixteen. So now can you hold on to these three things, right? That the square whose side is double is double in area, and the square whose side is four is double in length. The square whose side is two and sixteen is what? Double four. Double four would follow from that, right? But you can see that sixteen is not double four, so you can't hold on to those three.

[30:19] So you must give up one, right? So I say to students, you know, I say, you got a rectangle. I simplify an example for you. You got a rectangle there, and the side is one side is two, the other side is three, and the area is eight.

[30:43] Well, that third admission gets me in trouble, right? You know, I may be mistaken about one side being two, another side being three, but that by itself doesn't give any difficulty, right? But by saying now the area is eight, well, you can't put on those three, right because two times three doesn't equal eight, or or eight divided by two doesn't equal three, or eight divided by three, which you can't really do, but it doesn't give you two, right?

[31:12] So any two of them contradicts the third one, so the third admission is the one that finishes you off. So Aristotle thinks something like that. He's saying, are these three things compatible? If A is so, then B is so, right? A is possible, and B is impossible. No, why not? If you put together, if A is so, then B is so. A is possible. It follows necessarily that B is thus possible, which contradicts B is impossible.

[31:43] Or if you say if A is so, then B is so, but B is impossible, right? Well, then A must be impossible, which contradicts A is possible. So you are going to have to give up one of these things. Either either B is not impossible, or A is not possible, or it's not true that if A is so, then B is so, right? So if you are given that A is possible, and you are given if A is so, then B is so, then you must admit that B is also possible.

[32:14] I just thought he was trying to make an example with three different kinds of things. It seems like he's saying there is a proposition: if when A is possible, B must be possible, and granting that no, I think he's mixing up the conclusion with the premise there. You know, so just misreading it. Yeah, Yeah. I don't, I don't think he wants to. I think he wants to keep if A is so, then B is so as one of the premises and one of the statements involved there.

[32:48] And then, in a sense, you can see it if you kind of see the conclusion, right? Then if A is possible, then B is possible. Yeah, yeah, but that's like a conclusion, right? And you got to be kind of careful about that because the conclusion of the argument would not be a an if then statement. The if then syllogism always has one if then statement, one simple statement, and the conclusion is always a simple statement, right?

[33:19] Okay, but we might you know dramatically sometimes you know put it in the if then form, but that's not really a good way of doing it.

[33:32] You're you're just reading here and you're saying you're taking the sentence that if A being possible not sorry, b is possible as a premise instead of a conclusion. I was actually starting from the second hand. And if when a is possible, b must be possible. Yeah. Then if a is necessarily also b is. You're taking that as a as the premise and not as a. Isn't that different?

[33:58] It seems like it's. If you're talking about the if then statement, I mean, you can state it in the form, you know, more explicitly. If a is so, then b is so. That means, you know, the necessary consequence there. You can state that more explicitly if you wanted to do.

[34:20] So the must there, right? If when a is. Maybe I'm just misreading it, but it seems like there's an argument here. Says. Just just I'll just read exactly what it says. And if when a is possible, b must be possible. Then if a is necessarily also b is.

[34:37] Is that? Yeah. Yeah. Let me read it again, but. You're saying that if when a is possible, b must be possible. Is saying something different than if when a is b is. Yeah. As you see, the Aristotle's kind of just putting the two together there, right? You're on twenty six, twenty seven. Yeah, the yeah the very end of it. Yeah. If to a duna to antas anim kei kai to b.

[35:05] Yeah. Yeah. But he's proceeding, isn't he? As he said in the last part of sense. E st to a if a is anim keene kai to b. He's proceeding from the the the simple if then statement, right?

[35:28] You want to say that somehow if a is b is and if a is possible, b is possible are different. Yeah. I mean, they're different statements, right?

[35:42] Well, I mean, the possibility follows from their being. Statement about the possibility follows from statement of their being, but does. As does the statement of their being follow from the statement of their possibility?

[35:55] The connection. between the. Well, what's able to be right could be or not be. So. But the. You could say it this way: if if a is possible, b is possible, right? When a is so, b is so. Yeah. Yeah. But then you're kind of stating a conclusion in a way that that

[36:20] should not be making a conclusion another premise, right? It's you seem to be doing right. So he's not making that argument there. No, no, no. He's saying, in a sense, that when A is possible, then B is possible. When it's necessary that if A is so, then B is so, right? Okay.

[36:41] Because when you say when A is, B must be. You're not referencing whether it's possible or not, right? You you're prescinding from whether it's possible, or impossible, or is or isn't. Okay. All you're saying is it's just a connection. The one must follow the other. And that's why you can argue if A can't be, I mean, if B can't be, A can't be. Wouldn't make any sense to argue that if you had to make distinctions about possible and impossible, and that changed all the forms of premises.

[37:18] If you had other premises by adding possible and impossible, then it doesn't make any sense to talk that way. The argument is the the from the necessary connection of their being, and if A is, then B is. Then there's a necessary connection between possibility. If A is possible, B must be possible. So he's making a distinction between the sentence connecting their being and the sentence connecting possibility.

[37:46] Well, he's taking he's taking right. If A is B is, then he says you can then conclude things right. That if you take another premise like B is impossible, you can quickly conclude that A is impossible. So is is just taking the argument, this other argument, whether it's not saying it. Can you make this argument? If A is possible, then B is possible. That's a premise. The second premise, A is.

[38:19] Can I conclude therefore B is? No. You couldn't. You could only. You say if A is possible, then B is possible. That's my first premise. Yeah, then you say A is so. You don't get anything. You can't conclude B is. All you can conclude is B is possible.

[38:44] You don't really have the antecedent anymore, right? You see, you can't even you're not referring to antecedent, right? B is possible because it could A could be. I mean, it's not syllogism. What? The two ways of reasoning from it, from the statement "if A is so, then B is so." To say that A is so, right? Or to say that B is not so, those two ways of reasoning from it.

[39:10] So if you're saying if A is possible, then B is possible. Then you could syllogize: A is possible, therefore B is possible. Or you could syllogize B is not possible, therefore A is not possible. But when you syllogize them to to say A is so, right? But the first proof goes from if A is, then B is, and then takes A as possible, and gets B as possible.

[39:39] I mean, you you have to use other steps to get the connection, but it's not a simple syllogism, just that. Well, you do by reduction to absurd. If you say A is, and you don't have to do anything more, but if you say A is possible, you can show that that B not be impossible. Let B be impossible, then you have trouble. Well, he's going back. He's going back in in in a sense.

[40:13] It's interesting because now they can syllogize the way it is exactly. But you are saying that if A is so, then B is so. I am just saying there is a necessary consequence, right? And now you are saying A is possible, right? Okay, he wants to include that B is possible, right? But isn't he kind of going back to the original definition of the of the possible in the previous error, saying that the possible is that which, if it takes place, nothing impossible results, right?

[40:45] So if you admit that A is possible, then A can be, right? That means that if A is right, then B will be right. But if B is impossible, then you are saying that when the possible is posited, something impossible results, right? Which contradicts the definition of possible. Is there some way to work from the definition like that?

[41:14] I don't think so because it doesn't conclude right. All it concludes is B is possible. Nothing concludes that. Well, I mean, it's not really concluding, but not just A is. The first premises: if A is possible, B is possible. Nothing concludes from saying A. Yeah, that's what you are saying. Not even possible. Yeah.

[41:35] Well, no. Let's see if A is possible. Yeah, you are right. Nothing possible. It could be that if A is possible, then B is possible. No, I mean Aristotle makes the transition. Well, wait, maybe it does. Aristotle makes the transition from A is possible to A is so, right? From the definition of of what possible means, right?

[41:59] And so he's saying what it means to say A is possible means that if A is right, nothing impossible will result, right? So you are saying then if if you admit that if A is so, then B is so, that follows necessarily, right? Then when you say A is possible, right, that means by the definition, right, that if A were so, right. If A is so, nothing impossible will happen.

[42:29] So you say A is possible. Let A then be so, right? So A is so, and since if A is so, B is so, then B must be so. If it's so, it's possible. But but if B is impossible, then something impossible follows from A being so. Therefore, A is not possible. Yeah, that's what he's saying. But with yours, if you take the first premises being if A is possible, B is possible, and you say A is, you don't get anything new, right?

[43:00] You get B is possible. B is possible because that's the premise, right? If A is, because if A is A is possible, right? So then you get B is possible. You don't get that B is.

[43:13] Depends on your definition. Right? I don't think so. All right, so I say if A is possible, B is possible. That's the major, right? And you say A is.

[43:26] All right. It could be true that B is not. It could be that B is not, but it couldn't be that B is impossible. Right. All you get what you get rid of is that B is impossible. Right, because your major premise is that B must be possible if A is possible. Now A is, so A is possible. Therefore, B is possible, but but not necessarily is.

[43:51] So the only thing you can really conclude is that B is not impossible. Yeah, it seems you can't argue it that way, can you? You're admitting if A is possible, then B is possible, right? Okay, and then you're giving us a second premise that A is so, right? You can't syllogize then that B is so. But you can conclude that B is not impossible.

[44:25] But if A is possible, then B is possible. Well, yeah, but but he's asking. I thought you're asking that if you admit that if A is possible, then B is possible, and then you admit that A is in fact so, must you admit that B is in fact so? I don't think you do. Doesn't follow. Yeah. But what does follow is not B. Yeah, yeah. So you couldn't syllogize that way.

[44:51] But you could include other things. I mean, in order to syllogize, you you have to syllogize from the affirmation of the antecedent, right? In which case, you'd only syllogize that B is possible, right?

[45:07] In order to syllogize that B is so, you'd have to have your premise: if A is so, then B is so. Yeah, but that's not your premise. Your premise is A.

[45:17] Quite the opposite of that, but but it does make clear, right? What's wrong with the second position? The second position is saying everything's possible, but it won't take place. Right?

[45:45] Certainly, if everything's possible, then this whole the the strength of these argument, these conditional arguments, would not. It would could could argue for. a lot of people Well I mean, what position is saying is that something is possible. Everything's possible, but it won't all take place, right? But among those things are things are impossible, right? Can yeah. So he's taking it as sort of evident, right, that if the possible, the possible is such, right?

[46:12] That's what he states earlier that that nothing impossible happens from the possible being. Yeah, yeah. That's that's sort of evident from the meaning. Yeah. In other words, something can't