Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
15. Act Cannot Be Defined: Induction by Proportion, Descartes and Locke, and the Love of Wisdom
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/015-act-cannot-be-defined-induction-by-proportion-descartes-and/

[0:00] That act is one of those things that is known without definition, but then how is it known? It's known by induction, but induction is for many particulars. But the many particulars are what ratios, huh? Okay. And let me let me stop in that a little bit here, and again, this reminds me of the the fourth tool of dialectic.

[0:34] Of course, is it is a likeness between dialectic and wisdom, as Plato and Aristotle and Thomas all insist, huh? And the fourth tool of dialectic is a tool of likeness, huh? The ability to consider likeness.

[0:54] And Aristotle says, as far as the first purpose of dialectic, to exercise the mind, that the mind is exercised in seeing likeness or trying to see likeness in the reverse direction from the way it's exercised in the third tool when it's trying to see differences. He says the closer two things are, the more your mind is exercised in trying to find a difference between them. Where things are very far apart, the difference is easy to see.

[1:32] With likeness, it's in a sense the reverse. It's easy to see the likeness of things that close together, but the likeness of things further apart. So reason is exercised more in seeing a likeness of ratios than it is in seeing the likeness of things that are in the same species, right? Or even in the same what genus, huh? Okay.

[2:05] So kind of the culmination of the the great fourth tool of dialectic is the ability to see a likeness of ratios. It's not limited to seeing that likeness, as Aristotle teaches there, but that's kind of you know the utmost of that ability, huh? Is to see the likeness of these things that are far apart. Well, then when Aristotle gets to the

[2:32] usefulness of the four tools, and he gets to the usefulness of the fourth tool, he says it's useful for three things: the fourth tool, the tool of likeness. It's useful for defining.

[2:51] It's useful for induction. And it's useful for hypothetical syllogisms. Now, one place where I use this a lot is when you're approaching, say, the the definition of human happiness, the first definition in Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics. And I usually start a long induction, and I'll say,

[3:29] but I'll begin maybe with Plato's definition of a thing's own act. You've heard that definition. I think it's in the first book of the Republic that Plato gives the definition of a thing's own act, and you have to understand the definition of a thing's own act before you can begin to reason out the purpose of man. The definition of a thing's own act that Plato gives, I think, in the first book of the Republic, and that's where I got it.

[4:02] It's the act which that thing either alone can do, or can do better than other things can do. So, if only through the eyes can you see, then the act of seeing is the eyes' own act. If I can walk with my hands as well as with my feet, as you see people doing sometimes on TV or somewhere else, but that's not the hands' own act, right?

[4:32] Because they can't do it the way the legs can do it. Well, then you start a grand induction, and you say, well, you start from human tools, and you say, a knife's own act is to what? Cut, and to cut is the end or purpose of the knife. And a ballpoint pen's own act is to write, and to write is the end or purpose of the knife.

[5:04] And so you go through many tools, and you see each tool has its own act, and that act is the end or purpose of that tool. And then you can, if you want to, take the organs of the body a bit, huh? The eyes' own act is to see, and to see is the purpose of the eye, and the ear's own act is to hear, and to hear is the purpose of the ear, and so on.

[5:28] And you end up with the idea that each organ has its own act, and that act is its end or purpose. And then you take, let's say, the occupations of man, and you take obvious examples. The cook's own act is to cook, and to cook is the purpose of the cook. The teacher's own act is to teach. That's why we hire a teacher. Teach. And the pianist's own act is to play the piano, and that's why we hire a pianist, don't we, in my restaurant to play the piano.

[5:59] And so each occupation has its own act, and it's for the sake of that. Well then, you can make another induction, right, from those less universal statements to each thing's own act as its what, ender purpose. And then you can apply that. What does man have his own act? Does he without anything to do? As Aristotle says, and he does have his own act, right? Well, you're making induction by being able to see a likeness of what ratios, huh?

[6:32] That seeing is to the eye like cutting is to the knife, or playing the piano is to the pianist, huh? Okay. But then you can, you know, approaches to the hypothetical syllogism and say, well,

[6:49] what is to man as seeing is to the eye? What is seeing to the eye? Well, it's an activity. It seems to characterize that, right? Well, what is to man like seeing is to the eye? Well, it's the act with reason, right? But then you can construct an if-then statement.

[7:10] If seeing is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason is the purpose of man. But everybody knows seeing is the purpose of the eye. Therefore, the act with reason is the purpose of man. So,

[7:24] something like dialectic here, right? But something like the sunorama, that ability to see together, right? The likeness of two ratios, and to be able to make a what induction, huh? In some ways, the most interesting inductions are the ones that are made from particulars that are in fact ratios, huh? Those are the subtle ones.

[7:55] And in a way, this is the way logic and things like this arose, huh? Someone saw, you know, that gee, drama is to tragedy and comedy like habit is to virtue and vice. Do you see that?

[8:17] And then you're beginning to approach what genus and species are and so on, huh? You see, you're starting to see it through seeing a proportional what likeness, huh? So the ability to see a proportional likeness is very important, and you can see how the great Aristotle says that dialectic is useful to find the beginnings of episteme, huh? And here, by a kind of induction, and by an induction from seeing the analoga, the proportional, you're seeing the beginning of what wisdom, right?

[9:02] You're getting to an understanding of act, huh? In this universal way, huh? So you have to be able to see, not just that you know falling is to the stone as rolling is to the bowling ball, right? Just with motion, right? You've got to see, hey, in some way falling is to the stone like understanding is to the mind or something, right? A sees to the eye or like the form of mercury is to the, you know.

[9:31] And notice when Aristotle comes back here now, second time to proportion, he says as the oikodomoun pros to oikodomikon What's the one? What building a house, right? To the house builder, huh? And the one what awake to the one sleeping, and the one seeing to the one with his eyes closed but has eyes and so on. Now all of those first three ones seem to be comparing some kind of motion or activity to what is capable of that motion or activity.

[10:15] But then when he says the apo kekrimenon what is segregated is worth from matter towards the matter, right? And what is worked up and so on, fashioned for the matter towards what is not fashioned or worked up. There he seems to be taking the example again of what form to matter. So the first three examples are more like a activity towards the the actor.

[10:50] And the last two are more like form to some kind of what matter. So there are different proportions for the different meanings. No, no, now be careful. The ratio proportion, though. I mean, like these ratios. Well, no, he's going to bring out some differences, yeah. But at this point in seeing act in general, you're seeing a likeness of these ratios, huh? There's something like, you know, a man who's asleep to his later on being awake, right?

[11:28] That's something like having my eyes closed without being blind, of course, and then opening them and actually seeing, huh? Okay, that's something like what wood here and now it's what a table or a chair or a door or something into one of these things, huh? Because just as the eye was able to see when it's closed, right?

[11:56] But when you open the eyes, you actually see, huh? So the wood was able to be a chair or a table, but when it received its form from the carpenter, then it actually is a chair or a what? Table right, so you see a likeness between things that are somewhat far apart right. So as he goes from the first three to the last two here right,

[12:22] the first three have a like ratio, but they're closer together right, because it seems to be the ratio of an activity right to the one who's able to do it right, but isn't always doing it right. And the last two are seeming to be they're almost the same thing the last two there, but a little different way of speaking there. But you're comparing form to what matter right?

[12:51] So the like ratios across all five. Yeah, yeah, but but as I said, the first three are closer right, and then the last two are further what apart. Okay, I know myself, huh? You've probably done this too when you're teaching the syllogism, right? Sometimes you compare the syllogism with adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing, right? And there's a student like this because two gets you one in both cases, huh?

[13:27] And from two, in a very rigorous way, you might say in both cases you get something one. Now there are differences, right? But I'll say to the students, if you add and the number you get is the wrong number, what's the cause of your getting the wrong number?

[13:51] Well, either you didn't add correctly, huh? Or at least one of the numbers you added was the wrong number. You take the example of your checking account where you're always getting the wrong number. And when you know my mother was kind of a stickler, you know, if it didn't add up, she'd spend the afternoon trying to find what the cause is. It's not too far off. I don't bother with that sort of stuff.

[14:16] But you go back and you find sometimes that you what wrote in the wrong number or the wrong decimal point or if it is, so you added or subtracted the wrong number, huh? Or you find that you just didn't add correctly, huh? Well, that's like what you have with the case of the syllogism, because if the conclusion of a syllogism is not what true, huh? It could be because it didn't follow from the premises.

[14:47] It wasn't really a syllogism, in other words, or it could be because one of the syllogisms was one of the premises was defective, right? And you have to, and it can talk to you blue in the face, but you try to tell them that although we define the syllogism as speech in which some statements lay down, another one falls necessarily. The fact that it falls necessarily doesn't mean it's necessarily true, because the statements in which you reason one or the other might not be necessarily true, right?

[15:22] And so, but you can you can manifest that by proportion, huh? By the likeness to numbers, right? In adding and subtracting, so it's a very rigorous thing. But even if you add or subtract correctly, you might be using ballpark ballpark figures, right, in your calculation, and so your calculation is perfect, but the number you had was only probable and turned out to be in fact the wrong number, huh?

[15:50] So you think things that are far apart, right? And and then you compare sometimes defining with reasoning, huh? And just as not every premise. Is a conclusion right? So likewise, not every defining part is itself definable, okay? And that's really a necessary thing to see.

[16:20] They're very, very much alike in that respect, defining and reasoning, huh? And sometimes, you know, you go to another example there, where you say, "How do you learn the meanings of words? " If you're reading a book and you find a word whose meaning you don't know and you want to know, well, you go to the dictionary, right? The dictionary explains the word by other words, right?

[16:46] But how do you ever get started in this life? Because you come into this world knowing no words at all, so you can't go to the dictionary. Is that going to explain the word in terms of other words? You don't know any words, and you know it doesn't take too bright a student to see that the first words are not learned from other words. They're made known in some other way, and that's analogous to what you find about either you associate the object, right, with the thing.

[17:14] You want a cookie. You want a cookie, and and pretty soon the kid starts saying "cookie, cookie" after his meal because he wants a cookie. So he's associated the sound "cookie" with the the real thing, and he hasn't learned the meaning of "cookie" from other words, has he? Now, Johnny, this is what a cookie is. It's a sweet, small, um,

[17:40] so that's easier for them to see. I think that this must be true, huh? That the first words are not learned through other words, and so likewise, huh? The first statements are not known through other statements, huh? But that's a more difficult thing to see, huh? But or I'll say to them, you know, is the first number you used? Did get that by adding or subtracting or multiplying dividing?

[18:10] And see if Watson try to answer that. Well, the first numbers you get, you have to get by what? By counting, you can't get them by adding or subtracting because you got to already know at least two numbers to add, subtract, multiply, or divide. In order to syllogize, you got to know at least two statements, and you can't first have a.

[18:32] So you can't know your very first statements by syllogism. You already have some statements. So this is an extremely important way of coming to know, and that's the way you come to know actum. And you have to know act before you can know what motion is. Even the motion is what we first call actum. So of this difference, one part is act, and the other is what?

[19:03] The able, right? Possible. So you have you have the translation English translation here the word distinguished. Yeah. You don't see it you don't see it through making the distinction between act and the able. or maybe I should say you see that distinction in the virtue of this likeness. Yeah yeah yeah. In other words I I can see I can see that that the wood before it's been shaped into a chair right is to the chair and the form of the chair something like my eye right when I'm closed is to what my eye when I open my eyes and I actually see you people so one thing is his act and the other is his ability right So y so you have to see the

[19:51] proportion right see just just like if you're teaching logic and you say to the to a student and you'll notice in class I mean if you call upon a student spontaneously and he says you say what's a dog they'll usually say well it's an animal right and what is a chair well something to sit on right and you say well so's a bench so's you know and and then they realize that you kind of naturally begin with what the thing is in general but not specifically right then you have to add differences to get down there right and you know they struggle to really define what a chair is but you know for one person to sit on or many you got to keep on

[20:33] dividing to get to the chair but if you say something to sit on is to chair like animal is to dog right you've got to be able to see the likeness of those ratios and then you say now in logic we call the first right we we call animal with respect to dog and something to sit on with respect to chair we call that the genus it's general in fact the word general comes from the same root oh okay okay and and we call a chair a particular kind of thing under that general.

[21:12] we call that the species of logic we call it under the species so you've got to be able to see the likeness before you can begin to what abstract the idea of genus and the idea of what species huh so if you go back to logic like that or you go back to like I was taking Nicolachian ethics happiness and so on and so on then you realize you've got to be able to see a likeness of ratios very often to get to the beginning of these sciences yeah and even Aristotle is is you know manifesting what what moral virtue is you've got to be able to see the likeness huh

[21:57] of extremes and so on huh and the mean you have to see the likeness of ratios before you can separate things out. So the more difficult part of being able to consider a likeness is

[22:21] seeing a likeness of ratios is necessary to get to the beginnings of most sciences, if not all sciences, huh? You know, myself in in my study of Euclid's Elements,

[22:38] what happens? You get to Book Five, remember that? Get the theory of proportions, huh? And then in Book Six, you kind of come down to a little more concrete, but Euclid takes

[22:53] a triangle. It's not just the square that is equal to the squares and the sides, but in a, what regular rectilineal figure, right? You realize suddenly this tremendous power that he's gotten, huh? Where did it come from? From the theory of proportions, right? And and that's a good witness to the importance of the ability to see proportions. I know one time in the senior seminar, I had a topic in the senior seminar: the importance of seeing proportions in philosophy.

[23:27] And each student, you know, one guy had to take the De Anima, and one guy had to take the Nicomachean Ethics, another one had to take something else, and and find the proportions, right, and bring out how how important they were for this or that part of philosophy. And you look at the De Anima and I just got to teach you the De Anima this summer. And how many proportions are in there, huh?

[23:52] You couldn't do any part of philosophy without the ability to see what proportions sooner on, huh? Please use that that phrase sooner on to see together, right? People can't see these things together. No, even the even the modern academics see that because if you take their tests, they test that. Yeah, I remember one time in reading the Worcester newspaper, and the I was talking about this exam they give to people that want to hire in business, right?

[24:26] And the whole exam was really your ability to see a proportion, and because in these IQ tests, that's usually part of an IQ test, right? You know, I mean, they might have you know this is to that is this is, and you got to check the right one off. You know, you got to check the right one off. You're not able to see a what proportion, huh?

[24:46] At least the one they want you to take. Yeah. Well, you know, when I'm developing, say, that hypothetical syllogism, to, see the purpose of man, huh? And you start by seeing the ratio that the act with reason is to man as seeing is to the eye, right? And then you construct an if-then statement. If seeing is the purpose of the eye, then the act with reason is the purpose of man.

[25:12] And that's all based on the proportion, huh? And then you take as your second premise, of course, what everybody knows is seeing is the purpose of the eye. And then you syllogize that the act with reason is the purpose of man. But then you want to go further, right? Because the purpose of man is not just the act with reason, but the act of reason done well, right?

[25:35] But likewise, the purpose of the eye is not just to see, but to what? See well, right? Otherwise, why would they give you an eye glasses, huh? And so I say now, let's go back to our proportion. That seeing is to the eye as the act with reason is to man. Now, if I add to seeing, well, seeing well is to the eye as the act with reason is to man.

[26:01] Does the proportion still hold? No. And you take something simple, usually you know. First, I can say, seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the ear, right? Seeing well is to the eye as hearing, walking, hearing well, is to the ear. Well, you better check off hearing well. If you check off walking, you are in trouble. But if you check off hearing, you know, I bet you would find some guys checking off hearing, right?

[26:31] No, no, it's hearing well. And now you are forced to say that if seeing well is the end of the eye, then hearing well is the end of the ear. And so, if seeing well is the end of the eye, then the act with reason done well is the end of man, right? So you are forcing, right? And you want to see well for a day or two or something?

[26:51] No, throughout life. So you want the act with reason done well throughout life. Ain't got the definition of it done. So if you you know inductively you can see that importance of proportion, huh? But then when you get to theology, you see it in the what? Parables of our Lord. They're all based upon proportions. And I love the you know the church fathers there. You know they try to put Christ on the on the spot.

[27:24] huh? Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar. And Christ says, "Well, show me a coin of the realm. Whose face? Whose image is there? " And so on. They say Caesar's, okay? And then Christ says, "Well, then give to Caesar's what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's. And now Christ is using a what? Proportion, right? But then when you read the church fathers, they come back upon the proportion, and they say, "What are you giving to Caesar?

[27:49] What has the image of Caesar on it? What then do you give to God? What is the image of God on it? What is the image of God on it? The soul. " You know, it's beautiful the way they develop it, right? But you start with with seeing a proportion, and then you understand one ratio maybe more exactly, right? Like that, and then. you syllogize or reason to the other one, then that's really beautiful.

[28:11] So it's dominated by that. And then when Aristotle speaks in the the book on the poetic art, you know the best metaphors are based upon what proportions, the best similes. My stock example is, you know, I say your father, he got one daughter, she's a beautiful young lady. That she's all you got, and today is her what? Wedding day, right? And she's a little bit like that enough, It's kind of funny because usually it feels like that on a wedding day.

[28:42] And you go and you discover that she's what? Dead. See now, how would you poetically express that in the very, you know, that that sense of loss?

[28:57] Shakespeare says, "Death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field." I always challenge people in class come up with a better line than that. It's beautiful, isn't it? But it's based upon a what? Proportionate. Like is no. Death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. Beautiful flower springs up, and suddenly this frost.

[29:28] So it's of universal importance when you explain the Our Father. You know, forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us. Of course, you can have as you know a proportion with just three terms sometimes, huh? Like nine, nine is yeah, like nine is to.

[29:57] Well, eight is to four is four is to two, right? A simple example, right? Yeah. Nine is to six is six is to what? Four. Yeah. yeah. See. So God will be to you like you are a neighbor, right? But then he tells a parable about that same thing, where the servant was forgiven, and he goes on and throttles the other servant. So that's kind of fertility, Our Father, huh?

[30:28] So even the Our Father there is based on a that petition is a proportion there. When there's someone who's given these proportions, using it to make known act, but he's also extending power to act. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So this is an example then of a name equivocal by reason of a likeness of what? Ratios, huh? It's one of the six kinds of name equivocal by reason. Let's go back to to my division there.

[31:15] A name becomes equivocal by reason, as we were saying the other day, either by being kept by one of the things which it is said, right, has its own name. Well, the other one is given a new name, right? Or it becomes equivocal by reason of being carried over, right, from one thing to another. Now that's divided into two: either by reason of losing part of its meaning, kind of generalizing it, like the word "undergoing," the word "passio," or by reason of what ratios, huh?

[31:55] And by reason of ratios, there's three ways: either by the ratio of the second to the first, or by their having other ratios to the same thing, right? Or by reason of like ratios to what? Different. things. To other things, yeah. So here, you seem to be using analogies. So it's by like ratios to other things, huh? So seeing is to the eyes, hearing is to the ear, and then in a more extended right, as the form is to what matter, okay?

[32:35] Or vice versa, right? The matter before it's formed is to the matter when formed, like the eye before it sees is to what seeing, right? So you're seeing a likeness of what? Ratio. Yeah, yeah. So the word "act" then can be carried over from motion, right, to form. So he's making new meanings of the word. Yeah, yeah. The word "the word act" is is is said of these not equally, right?

[33:05] Or exactly the same, right? He's not. He's not looking at. If you see, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. If there's a common meaning here of act, it's only imperfectly, right? Separated from these things because it doesn't belong to them exactly the same way.

[33:27] He does start with the people, right? Because we say "act of motion" first. Yeah. What are these other? Yeah. Is he taking you know all the ways "act" is used as a word and explaining them, or is he giving to "act" a new new meaning? Well, in fact, in DA Lite, to some extent, we we carry over that word ourselves, you know. But. Not as far though.

[33:53] Yeah, we might speak, you know, you know, the house, the statue is now actually finished or something, you know. We might use the word "act," but Aristotle is being more precise here, Chris. So he's seeing

[34:10] that act is equivocal by what reason, huh? And it's interesting. Back in the fifth book, when Aristotle is distinguishing the meanings of being and so on. He does have a a lexio reading there on on the word ability right, but he doesn't have one on the word act. And that guy Thomas Aquinas, who notices these things, says why doesn't he do that right? Well, he says form has not been manifested enough yet.

[34:42] And in the great eighth book of wisdom, which is on substance and on substance from starting from natural philosophy, where you introduce the idea of matter and form, right? After that, it will be more what capable of what distinguishing adequately the senses of the word act. So Aristotle doesn't do that in the fifth book, huh? Why you'd expect him to do it, right? Okay, and of course you notice here that he tends to use the word substance almost for for form because he has in mind the greatest example of form being an act, which is substantial form rather than the exemplar form.

[35:26] So it's appropriate that that book nine come after book what eight, huh? For that reason, if nothing else. But again, if you say that you know, I don't know if you know book eight, but Aristotle talks about matter and form in the genus substance there, and then the composition of the two. huh? So you read a really beautiful book, Um, but he's in the book seven. That's that's the book I'm.

[35:53] When I first went out to teach at TAC, there the faculty they asked me to do the seventh book of wisdom. I says of all the books, but you insist. I'll be I'll be learning with you, but book eight is a little more you know concrete there matter and form and so on. But in in a way you can say you're seeing matter and form, you're seeing ability and act, but in a more what particular way.

[36:19] And when you go to book nine, you're seeing act and ability in a complete, the universal way. You say wow, you should say that or think that or feel that. If you look at Thomas's text in the question one seventeen article one in the prima pars, where he talks about the the teacher right and how the teacher leads the student from less universal things to more universal things.

[36:49] And you can see the philosophy doing that here, huh? Aristotle is a kind of remarkable teacher. I mean, this may be you know his notes or something, you know, and and and obviously in his teaching he would be unfolding these things more, right? And that's why you need Thomas to help unfold these things. But

[37:11] you see Aristotle the order is there, huh The orders are perfect. Now I'm going to make another philosophical. example. I think, in the remaining moments, because I want to save for this afternoon's session the next part of this text, where Aristotle is going to talk about the distinction among acts, huh? Okay. To use the fourth act of dialectic, and then. In sense, yeah, the third tool, yeah.

[37:48] And that's beginning at the line six there, right? Legetai energeia. Things are said to be an act. ou panta homoios, not all. in the same way way, right? And he's going to start to do it. Let's leave that part for this afternoon because that'll take the rest of Lectio 5, right? And I get into these things. It'll extend into Saturday, right? Okay. But in the remaining time here, let's just rather than start something new, right?

[38:22] Let's go back upon something, huh? That follows upon something we said before, huh? We talked before about our wisdom and reason connected, huh? And we saw there are two connections between the two. Okay, we'll put that again. But now, is the love of wisdom, right, which is what the philosophy is named from, is the love of wisdom and the love of reason connected?

[38:56] Yes. Well, and what is then the connection, say, between the two? If you love something, then you love its perfection, its well-being, its acceptability. Well, it's going to involve amiability. But can you love wisdom without loving reason? No. Because wisdom, as we saw before, was the highest or the greatest perfection of reason. So if you love the highest or greatest perfection of reason, you must love reason, huh?

[39:34] I say to students sometimes. Is there a connection between the love of health and the love of the body? And can you really love the body without loving health, which is the the good of the body, huh? But again, would you love health if you didn't love your body? Right. Okay. But now, what about the reverse?

[40:01] Can you love reason without loving wisdom? I love reason, but don't love wisdom. Is that possible? What a nature of reason. is it? You love the act of reason. if you love reason, and therefore you like it to act well. Yeah, maybe not. It's wisdom now is the highest or the greatest perfection of reason, and it's maybe not as obvious, right? That if you love reason, you must love its highest or greatest perfection.

[40:39] If you love its highest or greatest perfection, then you must love reason. Okay. So I to make the point there that if you're introducing a student to the philosophical life or trying to get them have some interest in being a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, right?

[41:01] How can you do that? They don't have any love of reason, huh? I guess someone could love reason not for its own sake. Well, that's the point, see, and a very good, very wise man that I know, St. Augustine, and it's in the my favorite work of his at least, the De Trinitate, the one on the Trinity, huh? De Trinitate Augustine has a beautiful phrase there. He speaks of a immature and perverse love of reason.

[41:41] So if I had a love, could you have a love of reason in some way, without loving wisdom? Yes, you could love it for the sake of

[41:53] food and sleep. Yeah, yeah, and just for lesser things, right? Huh? So you could even have an immature love in that sense, right? Would be an immature love of reason, and maybe even a what perverse love of reason, huh? If you know what wisdom is, right, and how it's related, that is to say, to reason, huh? Kasurik used to have in his little translation there the first two books of the Physics there the Thomas's Commentary.

[42:22] used to have a passage in there from Albert the Great, huh? Where Albert the Great was saying, you know, that if you study these lower things for any other reason than to know God,

[42:34] unless you be you know forced to it by some necessity, like a doctor has to study certain things, right? But if you're just studying them for their own sake, you don't study them for the sake of knowing God. If you have a perverse attitude towards knowing, huh? You see, I think Augustine has something of that, right? Meaning he talks about an immature and perverse love of reason, huh?

[42:57] But a mature love of reason, only and a true love of reason, right? You'd have to love wisdom, right? They go together, huh? So I sometimes like you know to first think about the connection between wisdom and reason, like we did in the other day, right? And then following upon that, the connection between the love of wisdom and the love of reason, huh? And how they go together.

[43:21] And I predicted, huh? In some ways, even more strongly. If anything, so could you say kind of following, Albert the Great, huh? And that if you love reason, some sense without loving wisdom, that you have an immature or perverse or both. They love a reason, huh?

[44:03] I guess immature would mean you are not yet capable of it. So what you are not capable of is not very loveable. But usually, with you know, you used to get these books. Not a good change of title recently, but Prometheus books. You know, have you ever seen those? You know, publishing house Prometheus books. As you might guess from there, they're they're they're a couple of there.

[44:26] But every time I get the catalog, I always think of that phrase of Augustine. Because they're always talking about reason there, right? But it's an atheistic reason, and it's a you know evolutionary humanist reason, and so on. But I always think, you know, that this love that they claim to have a reason now—that's why they're rejecting, you know, religion and faith, everything, you know—is an immature and perverse love of what reason, huh?

[44:55] You know. Now another thing, which is a little different, that but another point here. Um. I've known Catholic philosophers who profess no interest in theology or no serious interest in theology.

[45:18] Now, is there a disorder there? In other words, if you're a Catholic and you're a lover of wisdom, right, must you not love revealed theology even more than first philosophy? Yeah, because even the least glimpse of the highest things is more desirable than the full knowledge of the less. Yeah, yeah, but going back to what Aristotle says in the Proemium*, the fourth thing he says about wisdom is that it's the best and most honorable knowledge because it's the most divine.

[46:09] Okay. Now, I sometimes like to to use the phrase "knowledge of God" because when Aristotle is explaining in what sense it's the most divine, he says there's two senses in which knowledge can be divine,

[46:28] and one is that it's about God, right? The other is that it's had by God. Okay. Just like there's two ways in which you could call knowledge human, because about human things, or because it's had by human beings, right? And geometry, for example, is human knowledge in the sense that it's had by human beings. One of the few knowledges we have, but it's not human in the sense that it's about the human, huh?

[46:58] But the the ethics or the politics is human in both senses because it's about human things and it's had by human beings, right? Okay.

[47:12] Just like Shakespeare's definition of reason is a knowledge of reason in both senses, the knowledge about reason had by reason. Okay, so wisdom Aristotle correctly teaches us is the knowledge of God in both senses. It's about God, and he syllogizes about God because he says it's about the first cause. The first cause is God, therefore, it's a knowledge of God. But he also, with the common opinion of all the great Greek philosophers, either God alone is wise, or at least God is most of all wise.

[47:58] So, from Aristotle's own statement there, if we could share in God's wisdom. Then we would have wisdom in a higher sense than our natural wisdom. Because the natural is just about. God. yeah, yeah. Now Aristotle might not know that God has spoken to us and so on, but obviously a Catholic knows that. or should know that. Okay. So if he doesn't want theology more than first philosophy, is he a lover of wisdom?

[48:33] He's a lover of his own ability, or something. Well, he doesn't. You know, he doesn't realize that wisdom that God is most of all wise, and therefore, if he loves wisdom, he must want to share in God's wisdom. Aristotle doesn't know that God is going to share his wisdom the way he did, right? Because he's before Christ, and he he doesn't seem to know the Hebrews or anything like that, right?

[49:05] But you know, if Aristotle was made aware of the fact that he's sharing God's knowledge is offered to us, then he would have to either what want that knowledge, right? Or else he would cease to love wisdom. You see it right? But of course, Aristotle wasn't exposed to the to the sharing God's knowledge. But when you get now to the modern philosophers and medieval philosophers, the medieval philosophers, they all subordinate philosophy to theology, which they must do as lovers of wisdom, knowing what theology is.

[49:45] When you get to the modern philosophers, they reject theology, but then they're going to really corrupt the love of wisdom, and end up loving something other than wisdom. So Sartre ends up loving freedom, you know, whatever he means by freedom. And and Hegel says the end of history is freedom, you know, and others end up being lovers of power.

[50:20] Not very many lovers of wealth, you know, but this one Scottish philosopher, his most famous book is the The Wealth of Nations. So in a sense, he's a lover of wealth, right, rather than wisdom. But most of them are into the love of power, you know, and that experimental science gives you. But then the ones who are more democratic, you know, they don't get so plebeian. It needs to be the love of equality.

[50:50] I mean, I mean, it falls rather flat, as Hegel says, the end of history is equality. You know, the end of history is very flat. But say the end of history is liberty. You know, that sounds kind of impressive. Here's your second law. But but you know I I ask students you know sometimes the word philosopher said of these guys instead of the Greeks is equivocal right because if they're not lovers of wisdom but lovers of wealth or power or or freedom then that's not what the word philosopher originally meant The words now become equivocal and equivocal maybe more by chance than than by reason.

[51:34] I mean is there a reason to call a lover of liberty you know as a supreme good a lover of wisdom? I don't think there is is there.

[51:47] I mean if Berquist loves Mozart more than wisdom what should we call Berquist? A lover of Mozart you know if I love candy more than wisdom if I love wine more than wisdom I should be classified as a lover of wine. My person being very tight I may have sophistically tried to get out of this but you call a man a lover of what he loves most of all right so if these guys are lovers of power or or freedom that's the supreme good for them they're not philosophers

[52:28] the word is equivocal. Well I mean that it just playing with words though and they say that because the word philosopher originally meant a lover of wisdom and so I'm asking the question are the philosophers in the original sense of the word I'm not saying they have to be that's not the question or they should be but asking that I'm saying are they lovers of wisdom or are they lovers of something else

[53:00] you know if you read most of them are emphasizing power and then later on the idea of freedom but that is the absolute good for Hegel or for for Sartre and people like that freedom

[53:16] of course the Greeks would say you know well power is good if you use it wisely freedom is good if you use it wisely use it foolishly is not good at all it's extremely harmful huh you know the terrorists you know getting power there but wise use of their knowledge huh

[53:40] so should we take our siesta when act is used to define motion the first meaning of act is motion then aren't you using motion to define motion that's a good question see and it it shows the difficulty of defining motion one difficulty right. But what's interesting in the order of the eight books of natural hearing is that the first book comes before the third.