Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
17. Act as Form and Act as Operation: Metaphysics IX, Perfect vs. Imperfect Act, and Happiness
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/017-act-as-form-and-act-as-operation-metaphysics-ix-perfect-vs/

[0:00] way out. That's that's a road to out of confusion. We better do something more important than this, and we go over there. Yeah. So, are we all ready? We're ready to go. Technician. In the. Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, illumine our images images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor.

[0:39] I pray for you, of course. Help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:49] So, since we found out what act is, now we're going to talk in the second part here about the distinction of acts, and we're going to look at Aristotle again first. And Thomas, of course, logically divides us into what two parts, right? And in the first part, he's distinguishing between act in the sense of form and act in the sense of motion or operation, activity. And then the second part he's going to be talking about the infinite, right?

[1:24] And this is the part that you have in Thomas's text too, and how the infinite is made actual in a different way than these other things because you can't fully make it actual ever. So it's a kind of strange act, huh? But as Thomas remarks in the in the commentary, this is true also about motion and what time and things of this sort. And then the other part here that Thomas's Latin text doesn't have, and my Latin Greek text has got in the brackets and so on, is the one where Aristotle is distinguishing between what he's going to call energeia as opposed to kinasesa, what Thomas would call operation as opposed to motion, what he'd call perfect act as opposed to the imperfect act that

[2:14] is motion. And as I say, Thomas doesn't comment on that because it's not in there, and it's a little bit questionable how the text was supposed to be exactly, but it's obviously connected with the distinction about the infinite, even Thomas's way of thinking, because the infinite has that same the same kind of actuality the infinite has. You said something is able to be divided forever, right? And the and the actuality of that ability is something like that in the actuality of motion.

[2:44] I'll see, huh? Okay. Right. So, to to some extent, the first distinction is between act in the sense of form, and then motion or operation as something like that. And then this distinction about the infinite, apart from what it says in itself, is also touching upon that distinction between motion and operation as it's called, I think Aristotle's text calls it kinasesa, Line thirty-four there. Tēn men oun energeian legō ..., tēn de kinēsin ...

[3:27] So energeia it keeps for what Thomas will call operatio and kinesis for motion. But we'll come back to that with some texts of Thomas too.

[3:45] So he says things are said to be. This is line about what six there. This is things are said to be an act, not altogether likewise, but proportionally, either as this in this, and towards, or towards that, so likewise this in this, or towards that. What is he's talking about there? Well, you're more apt to see that the form,

[4:16] just as this form is in this matter, so that form is in that matter, right? Okay. Why as this activity is to that, so that activity to that, right? So I might say as seeing is to the eyes, so hearing is to the ear, right? Or as

[4:37] you know, this shape is in that chair and in that wood, so this shape here is in this wood, right? Okay. So he's making the distinction between form and what? Matter. Form and motion, huh? Okay. Oh. Yeah. That you could say they could use the same prepositions they wanted to, but you could say more that form in matter as opposed to motion to the ability for that motion.

[5:06] Okay. I suppose you think of the ability producing the motion or the activity, right? We think of the form as being in the matter, huh? So that's the way of bringing out the a little slightly different. So in hoc versus ad hoc. Yeah, yeah, a little slight difference in in the kind of proportion there is, huh? And therefore the sense of the act. As Thomas mentions here in the commentary, instead of saying form to matter, he says what?

[5:34] Usia, right? When Thomas says well, it's because he sees usia as being mainly form, and form means perfection and so on, right? Well, it's a little bit annoying that Aristotle says usia instead of form, right? But that's the way Thomas what understands it, right? And as Aristotle's peculiarity referring to form as substance or calling it substance, but you will see that back in books seven and eight when you talk about substance, where you always start to call what form substance, huh?

[6:03] Because so different from the modern way speaking, because we always speak of matter as substance, the modern man, right? And forms are all accidental, right? Once Aristotle knows about substantial form, and he knows that that's even more. Nature than matter, it's even more substance than matter. Then he starts to call form substance, so so he's got some thing. But you see how how far he's moved from what the moderns say.

[6:28] Well, modern interpreters take him to say to differ from Thomas's notion of substance because he doesn't include any matter in substance. They say. Yeah, yeah, that's kind of kind of stupid. Anyway, okay. So this distinction between matter, I mean, act in the sense of form and and

[6:49] act in the sense of motion or something like that. Activity. Isn't that towards another potential? Yeah, yeah, towards another, towards this. That that's for the the motion, the operation, right? See, and even in English, we'd probably see it something like this. You might say, as seeing is to the eyes, so hearing is to the what ear, right? We're using the word two there with motion, activity, right?

[7:17] Okay. So the potentiam is the ability to hear or something like that. Yeah, yeah. Well, it could be the other ability to move something, or it could be motion to the ability to move too. But something along the line of motion or activity or operation. But with form, we're more have to say that what as the form is to the matter, but the form is in the matter, right?

[7:39] Yeah. Yeah. So he's very concrete there in the way of distinguishing between those two, huh? And so he he does the first, the second, then the second, the first. Say that again. What do you mean by that? He says in hock, that's the first. hock's the second, and then he does put motus ad potentiam. Yeah, Well, he said two things at the same time. Instead of saying, it'd be a bit more clear to say, sometimes we say as this is to that, as that is to that, right?

[8:08] And then this is in that, as that is in that, right? Okay. So we see the ability to see is in the eye, just as the ability to hear is in the ear, right? You're speaking of a form in matter, okay?

[8:26] Right. Not that you couldn't at some time, you know, use maybe two, huh? But you could more clearly, maybe, but more distinctively say in right.

[8:46] Is there reason he says in hoc first? Well, I don't see any any great significance in that at this point, but So you can go on. Because he reverses it when he says right. In fact, then it is tamengarhos kinesis pros dunamin, tada hos usia pros tinahulena. And then you can use the word pros again with what both right. So it's not you know an absolute

[9:25] confinement of one to saying towards something that are in this right. But you you can say more that the form is in the matter than the activity right. That's proceeding from the powers and the power. huh? And you're more happy to say that the activity proceeds from the power than the form proceeds from the matter right. So this is a way of of bringing that out but doesn't mean you can't sometimes use the other prepositions it's not a a completely cutting off thing.

[10:00] At least with Aristotle in this text the the reason that he uses the same for both different both kinds is because they're he's he's making a proportion there so. Yeah I mean there's a there's a proportion but he's trying to bring out that if you have two forms in in their appropriate matters there are more those ratios are more alike than that of an operation or motion to its power.

[10:30] Right. It seems like the reason that he uses pros here rather than in huling is because he's just making a proportion whereas if he had just of two different of the two different kinds of the form to matter and the

[10:49] kinesis to dunamis but if he had been you know saying if he had made you know a comparison of two ratios in which he was speaking of two different examples of form with respect to their matter then I think he would have used in. He is using the word in there right. Well but I'm looking at the at the line number nine. Yeah. And then he goes back using the word pros for both.

[11:16] Right. Yeah but by saying he's using a different preposition above he's talking about distinction of the two because he wants to bring out that these two ratios are more alike each other than those are right. Exactly It's like when you have the word in and out huh.

[11:37] Kind of interesting thing there. Aristotle in the fourth book of natural hearing he distinguishes eight senses of in and out huh. But for some reason he doesn't order them there like he does with words equivocal by reason in the fifth book of wisdom huh. Okay. Well Thomas comes upon the text there and he says well let's order them right. Like Aristotle shows we should order them in the fifth book of wisdom right.

[12:12] And Thomas sees that in and out are like say beginning or something like that, or before and after and so on. It's by proportional, by proportional likeness that you have, huh? And that you begin with the ratio that is most known to us, most what sensible, right? On the case of beginning, the one that's most sensible is the point is beginning the line or the edge of the desk here is the beginning of the desk, and among the eight senses of in, the one that is most sensible is we're in this room.

[12:51] And so he begins with the sense in which things are in this room, and then he orders the other ratios by their what distance, huh, from the first, huh? And the likeness, of course, will be greater to your immediate what predecessors in the line, huh? So the second sense of in is a part in a whole, and Thomas is showing how close that is. The other one is that if you cut the part away from the whole, then it's in there just as a what, as in a place, yeah.

[13:31] So this, you know, if someone hits me in the mouth and loses my teeth, right? So you can take them in, take them out again. Then my teeth are no longer in my mouth as a part really, but as in a what place, huh?

[13:47] And then he goes to the sense in which a genus is in the species, huh? And the genus is a part of the species or the definition of the species, and so it's similar to a part in a whole.

[14:05] Well, then he goes to the reverse of that, species in genus, and now you're taking another sense of whole, the universal whole, and it's subject parts, eh? And of course, when you talk about the species being in the genus, it's not actually in the genus, is it? It's only in their ability. Well, the body is in place. Actually, the part is actually in the whole, and the genus is actually in the what species?

[14:35] So the fourth one you're moving away because you're having something in something only in ability, as opposed to the first three senses, which are much more alike. It's in there in act. And then he moves to the sense in which form is in what matter, huh? And of course, form is originally only in ability in matter, and he can move to that because it's like species in genus, because genus is like matter, potential.

[15:06] But species in genus is more like part and whole because in some sense the genus is like a universal whole. Of course, when you get that far, you say, "Well,

[15:19] shouldn't form and matter be before species in genus? " Because species in genus is something up here in the mind, and form and matter is out there in the sensible world, huh? But if you look at the order of the meanings, species in genus is more like genus and species insofar as it's a part and a whole, and form and matter not like that. But in thinking about it too, you can see that species and genus is really thought of by us before.

[15:52] And the the example I always give to give this is, you ask the average guy or anybody, he's doesn't know I'm setting him up, and you say,

[16:03] "Suppose you have a piece of clay, right, in the shape of a sphere, and you mold it into a cube, right? What has changed, the clay or its shape? " What would they say?

[16:18] The shape. Yeah. Is that true? It's actually the clay that's changed. Yeah, yeah. But but they'll tend to say that the shape has changed, as if the genus was changing from one species to the other. So you're falling back upon the earlier sense, which is more known to you. That's a sign that Thomas has ordered them what perfectly, huh? So as you move from one ratio to another ratio, the later ratios are not as much like the original ratio as the ones in between, huh?

[16:56] And you're more like your what? You're more like what's ready right before you or after you than anything else, huh? So you see the species and the genus. Well, it's like genus and species because it is kind of a part and a whole, right? And it is like form and matter because it is in the in the ability of that thing, huh?

[17:18] Is it? And the sixth sense is what the whole and the parts, huh? Well, form is to matter like whole is to parts. Aristotle gives that proportion if you remember in the when he takes up the four causes and he comes back to them and generalizes them, and he says all parts are like matter. So form and matter, whole and parts, huh? Yet whole and parts seems kind of really much more distant from part in whole, just the opposite, huh?

[17:49] And then he goes to you know I got you in my power, and that's still a bit like form and matter because two senses of ability, right? But another kind of ability. We have species and genus and form in matter. It's in that kind of passive thing, right? Passive ability. I got you in my power, huh? That's the what? Different kind of ability, huh? Okay. It's interesting, huh?

[18:15] Because we saw with the word ability that that the active ability is before the what? Passive ability in meaning. Aristotle taught us, huh? The guy sits down to play the piano. We see the ability of the pianist, not the ability of the piano. Perkis gets beaten up in the ring, but Cassius Clay sees his ability in Perkis doesn't have any ability, right? Except you realize that Randy's in some sense he's beatable, breakable, bustable, so on.

[18:49] So, but in the ability of matter, it comes before in the ability of the what? Mover or maker? In the order we make the senses there. The word ability to be a different order. In the last sense of it, I left my heart in San Francisco. So I mean, this is true here. I mean, you realize that when you have a likeness of ratios. It doesn't mean that the likeness is equal throughout the whole thing, right?

[19:24] And so, this form and this matter and this other form and that its own matter, they're more alike, right? Than form and and motion, and this seeing as to the eye is hearing as to the ear are more like each other than form and matter. Okay.

[19:48] If the likenesses are not alike, so it greatly depends. Not equal, not equal. They're alike. All right, but greatly depends on the order that you put it in to see the likeness. Well, as the beginning is that this is one of my favorite tongue twisters. You know, after we go through the four senses of in and out, not in and out. Excuse me, the four senses of before and after.

[20:14] I say to the students, in what sense of before does one sense of before come before another sense of before? Really ties about good, you know. But you know, I might tie you guys up for that, but I don't know. In what sense of before, in which of the four senses of before, does one sense of before come before another sense of before?

[20:39] Yeah. Now, why is it in the third sense that one sense of before comes before another sense of before? Because we name things as we know them. Yeah. You have to know things, at least be aware of them, before you can name them. And Thomas gives that principle, in his commentary because that principle is explaining the order that Aristotle has in the word beginning, huh? In the fifth, in the beginning of book five.

[21:05] And so, we name things as we know them, huh? Or the order of naming follows the order of knowing. And so, if we know, if our knowing starts with the senses, then the most sensible meaning, the meaning that stands out to the senses, will tend to be the what first meaning, huh? And so, when I try to explain why the first meaning of before and after is time, huh?

[21:32] You go back to the fact that time is the number of the before and after in motion. So you're talking about the before and after in motion, and Shakespeare has Ulysses tell us, "Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs." So the before and after in motion is going to be the sense of before and after that is more known to you or most known to you.

[21:53] And then you'll gradually move away from that by closer or further likeness from that original one. Okay. Can now you? Comes to the second part of the second part, where he's talking now about a strange kind of actuality that you have in the infinite. He also mentions the emptiness, so you can't really empty something out; something else always comes in, right? I think the example of the infinite here is more easy to see.

[22:34] And we say, for example, that the he's thinking of the infinite here now as tied up, I suppose, with the continuous. So the continuous is defined as that sometimes in natural philosophy, that which is divisible forever, right? That which is able to be divided forever. So is that ability able to be actualized?

[23:08] Well, you can start cutting the line in half and cut the half in half and half in half and so on, but you can never fully actualize the divisibility of the what line. Can you? No, that's proven in the sixth book of natural hearing. So he says this is a different kind of act from the act of the statue or the chair or something, because that can be fully what realized, right?

[23:39] And now the the act is fully arrived. You might say when the chair has been completely made. The same way we're seeing, okay, can actually see something, can actually understand something, but the so the potency can be, you might say, fully actualized. But this is a kind of strange ability or potency that can never be what fully actualized, and it is some sense of ability, isn't it?

[24:09] And some of what act? Okay, it's different. But now this is going to enter into the understanding of the difference between motion and what Thomas calls operation, or Aristotle calls energeia this part here, which is in brackets in my text, because there's some question about its authenticity, but seems to be quite solid doctrine. Aristotle's distinguishing here between an activity or an act that is imperfect, like motion, and one that is perfect that he wants to eventually call energeia, or there's a question of what is the best name for that.

[25:04] But how does Aristotle here distinguish these two acts? He says that one act never has its what? Its end, right? Perhaps the best way of showing it, mine is the one that starts around around line twenty three. Just take a simple example of these two kinds of activity.

[25:48] When I am walking home, have I walked home yet? And when I have walked home, am I walking home? Okay. So so long as I am walking home, you have to say that I have not walked home. So the activity walking home, when it is, is never what complete or perfect. It's never reached its end. And when I have walked home. And when I have walked home, I'm not walking home anymore.

[26:23] So whenever walking home exists, it's always what incomplete, not fully actualized. Of course, our grammar reflects that, you know, perfect case and so on, right? Okay. But the point is the point is, the perfect case, when that's true, then the activity no longer exists.

[26:48] So walking home, whenever it is, is essentially incomplete. It's essentially an imperfect act. Now contrast that with, I seeing you. When I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? Yeah. So that is an activity that's called what? Perfect, huh? And that activity could be called, you know, the Latin Thomas, for want of a better word, calls it operatio. But whatever name you give it, or any here Aristotle giving it here, whatever name you give it, it's to be contrasted with motion in the stricter sense.

[27:32] Although sometimes motion is used in a loose sense to cover both of these, and Thomas will refer often to the dynamis where Aristotle sometimes says. But either we shouldn't say that that sensing and understanding are motions, or we're using the word motion equivocally, huh? Okay. But the difference is that motion, the strict sense, as you learn in the third book of Natural Hearing, is always an imperfect act.

[27:56] It's always incomplete. I'll take another example here. When you're building a house, right? Have you built the house? No. And when you have built the house, are you building the house? No. So when you're building a house, it's always a kind of incompleteness about this act.

[28:20] But when you're understanding what a square is, have you understood what a square is yet? Yeah. And that's the other kind of motion, the perfect one, right? Just not so properly called motion, but should have maybe a new name of operation or energeia, okay?

[28:43] And then for the ladies in my class, they always say, "Now, when when I'm loving you, have I loved you yet? " Well, if loving was a motion in the strict sense, then when I'm loving you, I haven't loved you yet, and that would be a terrible thing, right? So that's that's the clinching with the young ladies, huh? That when I'm loving you, I have what? Loved you, right?

[29:10] Say. Um. And notice how, in this respect, something like learning is, in that sense, resembles more motion in strict sense. When I'm learning something, have I learned it yet? No, because then it would be perfect, right? So so long as I'm learning, I haven't learned it yet. But if you take understanding or seeing, right, or hearing, right, or loving, then these are what perfect acts, huh?

[29:47] Do we have a word in English besides operation for that? Well, make some suggestions, you know. But you know, Aristotle keeps the word energeia for it, and in English, you might just keep the word act, right? Yeah, or just the word act. Keep the word act for the perfect act, right? And call motion the imperfect act. But now to get it clear, what words would be the best to use here?

[30:15] I'm going to show you some kind of surprising texts of Thomas sometimes, where he seems to be stretching the word, you know. But you know what's in in a name? The idea is to see the difference between these two things, huh? The the thing with the imperfect act and the perfect act, huh? If you use act, then it'd be a lot like form and matter in terms of naming, right?

[30:40] Well, if you use act to name the acts that are not forms, right? Okay. Because there's a tendency to do that anyway, given the origin or the thing. And you say there's the imperfect act, which is called motion, right? Imperfect. And the perfect act, we might just call an act, right? Or you could say activity you wanted to, or operation, but I don't know if there's the really improvement upon saying act.

[31:08] But the thing to see is the distinction of these two, huh? And then, interesting application Aristotle makes of this around line twenty-five. To ethics, huh? That what kind of act must happiness consist in?

[31:33] Yeah, the perfect act, right? Yeah, yeah. Now, there's another distinction which Aristotle doesn't seem to make here altogether precisely, but Thomas says it's made in the ninth book someplace. But a difference between an activity that remains in the doer, like understanding what something is or seeing something or loving somebody, an activity like what making something, huh? Okay. And that distinction could be made between, in English, sometimes between doing and making, huh?

[32:16] We talked about that before in in the ways of naming, right? That sometimes we divide doing into what doing and making. And one doing keeps the name doing, and the other one gets a new name making because there's something noteworthy that there's a product besides the activity itself. But if there's no product besides that, you're doing something, but you don't have any product, nothing to show for it.

[32:46] And so we just call that a doing, huh? And give a new name to the other. So sometimes you'll see this distinction of motion or activity or act as distinguished from form. Into these three, you have the the doing, where the activity remains within the doer, right? And can be this this perfect kind of act. Then you have the making, where it's transitive and perfecting the thing made.

[33:17] And then you have the what motion, right, huh? The essentially imperfect act. But as far as happiness is concerned, you'd want to say it's going to have to be a perfect act. So you're going to exclude the activities like the motion because that's essentially incomplete. But you also have to exclude making as the act that is happiness, because happiness is a perfection of the one who's happy, and making is a perfection of the thing made.

[33:48] And you can say, you know, that Marx, in a sense, is getting off on the wrong track there when he makes man's final goal to be achieved by some kind of making. Because making is a perfecting of the thing made, it's not a perfecting of the maker. Of course, Marx tried to get around that and say, well, you know, as man makes something, he's he's developing himself and so on.

[34:18] But this is the fallacy of the accident. It's accidental to the maker that he be perfected by his making, and people are deceived by that because most of the time when we're making, we have an imperfect possession of the arts. So we're learning something. I remember my brother-in-law being a carpenter and doing some job, and so I'm learning a lot, you know. But to the extent that you're you're still learning the art, you don't know how to make, and you're not really fully a maker.

[34:48] So it's accidental to the maker that he be perfected. If I make McDonald hamburgers, you know, or you make macaroni and cheese every day of your life, right? You're probably not learning anything about making this thing anymore, but you keep on making it very well each day. You flip the pancakes well, or something, and so

[35:12] making as such, per se, kath' hauto is the perfecting of thing made. It's not a perfecting of the what maker, yeah. And the same thing about teaching. Now, most people who are teachers will say that when they teach something, they they learn the subject better, right?

[35:35] But is that kath' hauto that the teacher is learning the very thing he's teaching? No, you teach insofar as you know something, not insofar as you're learning it yourself. So even though it may happen most of the time, right? Unless you're teaching some very you know little things, you're teaching you know the great book, so to speak, huh? It's probably true that every time you teach, you are learning the subject better, and therefore it seems per se, but it's still what accidental.

[36:15] Aristotle says the the accidental deceives even the wise, as if this is the most difficult to avoid in some ways. But it seems to me that the accidental deceives

[36:28] when it's there all the time or most of the time. Then it seems to be kind of you know belong to teachers such to be learning, and of course some people have this kind of fuzzy way of talking about these things, huh? But it's really accidental to teaching that the teacher learns a single thing. So who's this guy we call the teacher? He doesn't learn nothing, and yet he is the teacher, right?

[36:57] So if it belongs to teachers such to learn anything uh what he's teaching uh what he's teaching, no. So teaching as such is a perfecting of the taught, just as making is as such a perfecting of the made. So can the the end or goal of man, which is happiness, huh? Can that be in any kind of making? Or even in teaching, huh?

[37:26] Well, that's not the perfecting of the the man himself, right? The teacher, the maker. Yeah. Could you also admit on the grounds that it's imperfect in itself too? Because, I suppose you're making it, haven't made it. Well, you could make something though all at once, maybe on some cases, huh? But and God is a maker, right? You don't say God's imperfect, right? No, God's a maker and a teacher.

[37:58] Um. So, um, the key thing is that this is a perfecting of the thing, huh? Okay. So God is not more perfect for having made the world, and Christ is not more knowing for having taught us, huh?

[38:22] Okay. So let's look now at some texts from Thomas here that touch upon things he learned here in the fifth reading. Now this first text in Thomas here is taken from the De Potentia, the Quaestiones Disputatae, De Potentia. Question one, Article one, Corpus. Okay. And a couple interesting things in here. Thomas begins by saying that potency is said from act. Okay. And now he says act, however, is twofold.

[39:10] To it, first act which is form, and second act which is operation. Now you may recall the definition of the soul. It's the first act, of a natural body, and so on. And you know Aristotle explains what he means by first act there and what he means by second act. And he'll make it a comparison to, say, geometry, right? When you acquire geometry, that's first act, and then when you think about these geometrical things by that form of geometry in your mind, that formation of your mind, that second act, right?

[39:45] Okay. And so you find Aristotle and Thomas the same thing here. Following the philosopher speaks of first and second act, but first act is form, second is operation. I say I thought it was the reverse. I thought motion was act call it act first, right, And then form. It might just be the order of being. Yeah, it's obviously a different sense of order, right? Huh? And of course Thomas knows that.

[40:25] And then the next thing Thomas says, and just as can be seen from the common understanding of men, nothing private about Aristotle, the name of act was first attributed to operation. For thus, as it were, all understand act. And you can see that in our own language, right? If you ask me what is an act, I don't give an example of an act. They wouldn't give you a form, would they, as an example of an act?

[40:53] They'd give you a what, operation, something like that, wouldn't they? Okay. So Aristotle is doing, as as Cardinal Newman said, is clarifying what we all know to some extent and making it distinct, and then he'll build upon that and come to see things maybe we don't all see, but it's through the things that we all do see clarified that he goes forward.

[41:21] But now in the next thing here, Thomas talks about how the name act. Which he just said was first attributed to operation rather than to form, is now carried over to what, forma. But notice what he says here: secundo autem exinde. From there, it was translatum.

[41:43] And notice the word translatum there. You know the Greek word metaphor, and the Latin word translatio, and so on. They're the same exactly etymologically. They both mean what carry over, right? But as they've come into English,

[42:06] translation refers to not carrying over a word, but to carrying over the what, meaning, and metaphor is carrying over the word but not the meaning. And there's no real reason why it should be that way, but that's the way it happens. But Thomas will speak very often translatio nominis, the carrying over of a name, because he could apply it to either one, right? So secundo autem exinde he says, fuit translatum ad formam.

[42:40] It was carried over to form. In quantum forma est principium operationis et finis. Insofar as form is the beginning of operation, the source of it, gives rise to it, right? And insofar as form is the end of some kind of operation, form is the end of generation, as you know.

[43:13] Now, is that the same explanation of how the name act is equivocal by reason, with the one given by the philosopher in the fifth reading of the ninth book of wisdom?

[43:28] How is Aristotle? What kind of of name equivocal by reason was Aristotle explaining act to be there? Or how is he showing that the name? Let's put this way: how is he showing that the name act set of, let's say, motion and form or operation and form, is not purely equivocal, but is equivocal by reason? How does he show that there? A likeness of ratio. Yeah. And Thomas is showing it now by what?

[43:59] Ratio. To something. To one. Yeah. That a name is carried over from a first thing to a second thing by the ratio of the second to the first. Now, remember the example we had of Aristotle, or Thomas rather, where he said, the word being is carried over from substance to quantity by reason of the ratio of quantity to substance. It's the measure of the size of substance, huh?

[44:28] Or the word philosophy is carried over from looking philosophy to logic because logic is the tool of that philosophy, huh? So now act is carried over from operation to form because of two different right ratios. It's the beginning of the source that gives rise to the operation, or because it's the result of an operation like making or something of this sort, where form is the end of generation.

[45:00] So there's connection between you know something like making and moving, you know, and the form that's at the end of this, and it's through being an act in some ways. We'll see better the third part here that that one does something, right? So it's some a ratio of form to operation, either of beginning or of what end. So what do you think about that? It's a different explanation, right?

[45:32] And is it is one of these two explanations correct and the other incorrect, or is it possible that with the same name you might explain that it's not purely equivocal, but it's equivocal by reason by reason of more by more than one reason? Is that possible?

[45:55] Well, then it would be wouldn't it be a different meaning? Be another meaning? I wouldn't say it's necessarily a different meaning. A little bit there's some truth to what you say, but I mean, but as far as the name being equivocal by reason, you're showing it in two ways, right? Yes. You're giving two reasons for saying that we're not using this word perfectly equivocally, right? Okay. There's something the same because it's the same matters that are being compared.

[46:23] Yeah. Yeah. But but maybe when you have a name that's equivocal by likeness of ratios, you're more apt to have a a common confused notion, right? Okay. But here you just you have just two different what meanings, right? Rather than one common one, huh? It lends itself less to it. That's that seems to me than this other one does. But like we were saying before, remember how the distinction of kinds of things and distinction of meanings of words can sometimes come together, right?

[46:58] And and here you have something different where there's more than one way to understand how a name could be said equivocally by reason of some things, huh? And remember the thing I was giving you before, and I've seen it in Thomas sometimes too when he's explaining the word healthy, right? Sometimes he'll speak as if the first meaning of healthy is the healthy body, right? And then other things are said to be healthy, not because they're a healthy body, but because they're a sign of a healthy body or a cause of a healthy body, or something like that, right?

[47:32] Well, then it's being said, the name is being said equivocally by reason of the second thing, right, having a ratio to the first. Okay. But then other times Thomas will stick what healthy with in the healthy body with the other ones and say all of these are said by other ratios to health, right? And so one because it's the subject of health, one because it's the sign of health, one because it's the cause of health.

[48:05] And then you're you're you're you're saying what? They're all called healthy, but by other ratios to the same thing, health. Is it? What was the first? I say sometimes he'll speak as if the healthy body, right, is the first meaning of healthy. Okay. That that makes some sense, right? And then we carry the word healthy over to my complexion because it's a sign of that good condition of my body, huh?

[48:41] And we carried over to my exercise or my diet because it causes my health, right? You see. So it's carried over from one thing to a second thing because of the ratio, the second to the first, right? Okay. But you could also say that the healthy body has a different ratio to health than the sign of health or the cause of health, right? So the subject of health, the sign of health, the cause of health.

[49:15] Then you use health, right? One the same thing, health, and you call the body and the complexion and the exercise all healthy by other ratios to the same thing. I see Thomas use both things in texts, right? And there's a little different in the way you look at it. You see? Yeah. What were you? You were comparing the two, Aristotle's and Thomas's ways for naming. Well, right now I I'm just using two other kinds of not too entirely different.

[49:53] One is the same as here. I'm using this another kind, other than Aristotle, in another context to show that one the same name healthy. There's one one way to say that the word healthy is said equivocally by reason of my body, my complexion, and this, right? And Thomas has two ways of showing that it's not by by chance that they're called healthy. And it seems to me that that someone might come along and say.

[50:22] Instead of explaining being as meaning first of all substance, and then accident by its ratio to substance, let's say that being is said as substance and accident, right? By the two of them having other ratios to existence, huh? Because the one has existence in another, and the other has existence not another, right? So they're not related to existence in the same way, huh? And you could do that, huh?

[50:54] You see, we have to take note of that possibility here, and this is an interesting text for that. But as far as act being a name equivocal by reason when said of these two, this confirms, right, that one should consider it as a name equivocal by reason, huh? But it shows a little difference in the way you understand, because the reason why you say it's equivocal by reason is not the same, is it, huh?

[51:26] And there may be a reason, huh? Then the next thing Thomas says: Whence, likewise, twofold is ability or power or potencia, potency. One active to which corresponds the act which is operation. Okay, and to this first the name of ability seems to have been attributed. So the ability for operation or motion seems to be called an ability before the ability for form. The other is the passive ability, which corresponds to the first act, meaning form, first in the other order, which is form, to which likewise it seems secondarily the name of ability or power has devolved.

[52:25] So that's a nice little text of Thomas. Okay, now another little text of Thomas here, which is taken from the commentary on the Sentences, the fourth book of the Sentences, Distinction 17, Question 1, Article 5, the third question, odd one. Eventually we'll post these on the website.

[52:58] This is nothing altogether new. because it's talking about the distinction we just made between motion and operation, huh? Okay. But Thomas's language here is all interesting. He says, "Motus dupliciter dicitur Motion is said in two ways, as is clear in the third book about the soul. He's referring back to Aristotle. I remember just seeing that this summer and I was teaching it again. There is a certain motion which is the act of the imperfect, and this is the way Aristotle speaks of motion there in the third book of Natural Hearing, which is a going forth from potency to act.

[53:38] And and such an act must be what successive, right? Because it always expects something in the future to the perfection of its kind. In that, and according to Aristotle in the Ethics, a part of motion is of a different species from the whole motion, just as clear in alteration, the motion which is to whiteness, of which part is a motion to the middle color, differing in species, if it be taken what separately, huh?

[54:07] Okay. The other motion, notice he's using the word motion for both of these, right? The other motion is the actus perfecti. Okay. So he's saying there's two motions, like Aristotle says in the anima And one is the actus, the act of the imperfect, the other is the act of the perfect, huh? But then he goes on to say, "Quae magis operatio dicitur," okay, which can more be called operation,

[54:38] which does not expect something in the future to the completing of its species, and he gives an example: sentire to sense, right? Like my seeing you or hearing you. And such a motion is not successive, but subito Suddenly, right? Remind me, the crowds are out there yelling, you know, and the pope died. Subito, subito, like the you know, they did, yeah, all at once. They're not in succession, yeah, okay.

[55:08] And if it happens that such a motion is in time, this will be per accidens, he says, huh? Because it is measured also by each instant of that time in which it is said to be, just as to be a man is in time and in instants. And such motion is a motion of free will, right? That's what he's talking about. That point.

[55:40] Now, this is a another text from the. Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber Two, Capitulum One. Thomas is going to talk about if you if you read the Summa Contra Gentiles, he talks about the operation of God in the first book and in the second book. In the first book, he talks about the operations that are immanent and don't proceed to something outside. And then the second book, and begin the second book, we're talking about God as the maker, right?

[56:20] Then he's talking about the operation that proceeds to the outside. So in the course of this text, Thomas will be distinguishing those two operations, and that's different from the the text and the two motions, because that's more like the one that Aristotle is distinguishing there. Aristotle distinguishes these two as well, huh? and this is you know important when you're distinguishing foresight and art, among other things. So he says a perfect knowledge of anything cannot be had unless its operation is known.

[56:57] For from the manner of the operation and its kind, the measure and quality of the virtu virtue is weighed or measured, but the virtue or power shows the nature of the thing. That's another text in St. Paul too, right? From the things I've seen, you can see the power of God and in His nature.

[57:23] For according to this, or in this way, each thing is apt to operate an act that has such nature and so on. Okay, but now the prior one, here, there is, however, a twofold operation of the thing, as the philosopher treats in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. And this is somewhere other than the text we had right there today. One which remains in the one doing it,

[57:52] and is a perfection of the one doing it. The Latin is una quidem quae in ipso operante, in the one operating, manet, remains the one operating, and est ipsius operantis perfeccio, is a perfection of the one operating. And he gives three examples: sentire to sense, intelligere to understand, and velle to what? To will, okay.

[58:25] The other operation is one that transits to an exterior thing, which is a perfection of the thing made, that is constituted by. And he gives the example: calefacere to eat, secare to cut, et aedificare, right? Okay.

[58:46] Now he says both of the foresaid operations belongs to God. The first operation, in that he understands, he wills, he rejoices, he loves. The other operation, in which also belongs to him, in which he produces things in being, and conserves them and rules over them, right? Okay. And then because the first operation is a perfection of the one operating, the second and a perfection of the thing made, the agent is naturally before the thing made, and the cause of it is necessary that the first of the four said operations is a ratio, the reason for the second and precedes it naturally as cause and effect, which clearly appears in human affairs for the consideration and the will of the artist is the beginning and the

[59:44] reason of his building. Okay. He says now naming these things, the first therefore of the foresaid operations, being the simple perfection of the one operating, vindicata

[1:00:01] for itself the name of operation, for or also action, actio or operatio. The second, which is a perfection of the thing made, takes up the name factionis or, making, ah, whence those things are called manufacta, which through the action of the art from the artist are proceeded, proceed into being. Okay. Now in English we sometimes use the words what, doing and making like I said before, right?

[1:00:34] And when the philosopher says you know that foresight is right reason about doing and art is right reason about making, it has that distinction in mind, right? It's important now.

[1:00:49] Now, one more text here from the Summa.