Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
18. Thomas on Operation, Motion and Doing: Immanent vs. Transitive Action
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/018-thomas-on-operation-motion-and-doing-immanent-vs-transitive/

[0:00] Contra Gentiles I have a little problem here about about Thomas's name, but what he's doing in this in the third book, chapter twenty two or capitulum chapter, little chapter twenty two, Thomas is going to distinguish

[0:21] three operations. It's kind of a funny use of the word operatio given the other text, right? But tit for tat, right? If the word motion was used by Aristotle in the De Anima to cover not only motion in strict sense, but any operation, right? Why not sometimes use the word operation to cover the whole mess? Huh? See, it's a little bit like Shakespeare's and Aristotle's uses of imagined thinking.

[0:59] Sometimes they use them interchangeably, huh? But anyway, I think what Thomas is doing though in this particular text, we're taking the act which is not a form, right? Huh? The fundamental distinction we had was between what motion and form. One way of putting it, right? Okay. The question is, what shall we call in general those acts that are not a form but are like motion? I don't call them activities or you know act.

[1:38] You know, we could call motion, but using motion kind of a broad sense, we even understanding and sensing and so on, and making would be called motion. Huh? In this text, Thomas calls those three what operations? But at least he's distinguishing that kind of act, and without wanting to give a name, I'd say he's dividing the act. He's distinguishing the acts that are not forms into three.

[2:09] Okay, and what are those three? See, well, one is going to be the immanent act, huh? Like understanding, sensing, loving, huh? One is going to be the what active transitive, huh? Like making, producing, right? And then one is going to be the old what imperfect act of motion. Okay.

[2:35] He says, "Nam quaedam operatio, one the certain operation, is of a thing as moving another, " and the examples again are calefacere and secare, right? Okay, that's one kind of operation, huh? That's what we call the transitive operation. It's active, right? Huh? Okay.

[3:00] Another operation is of a thing as moved by another, and the examples are calefieri and secari to be heated, to be to be cut, right? And that goes back to the two senses we first met of of ability, right? The ability to act upon something other than yourself, right? The beginning of motion in another as other, right? That's not the imminent operation, is it? That's the transitive operation, and then the ability to be moved by another, right?

[3:30] As other, huh? And then there's an operation that is a perfection of the one operating, existing an act, right? Not tending to in aliud in another, right? Transmutandum and changing another, right?

[3:56] By the which, by the first of which it differs from passion and motion, by which actu existentis, right? Existing in act rather than ability. By the second, from the action that is transforming exterior matter. An operation of this sort is intelligere sentire, velle, to understand, to sense, and to will, right? That's interesting, huh? I have a little, you know, a little stretch there to use the word operation for these three things because it seems kind of funny, right?

[4:29] Right. Particularly motion. Yeah, yeah, yeah, more so, yeah. And even before in that earlier text when he was just contrasting the transitive operation of making something with the one that remains within the doer, right? And that vindicates to itself the name of operation, and the other gets the name of facere or or making, huh? Okay.

[4:56] Um, how would you translate that, huh? You know. Yeah, operatio. Yeah, how would you translate that? You see, I mean, it sounds a little bit funny to me in English. There are three kinds of operation, and one is that of a of a thing as moving another thing, right? And one is that of being moved by another, and one is that that remains within the doer. Okay.

[5:25] So you mean it remains in the doer? You use any common words with that? What do you describe the others? Well, you see, the operation of being moved by another is the one most properly called motion, although in the other text where he's quoting the De Anima, Aristotle will call understanding a motion, even though it's not an imperfect act like motion seems to be, right? But he says if you call it motion, you shouldn't call it motion, Aristotle says, or if you do, you're using motion in a different sense.

[5:58] Okay. And Thomas is imitating Aristotle. He referred to Aristotle the De Anima. But now he's using the word operation and seems kind of what I would say, you know, you shouldn't be using the word operation, Thomas, for motion. Or if you do, you're using operation in a different sense. But it seems that you're going to have some similar problem with about almost any any word there, right?

[6:21] I used to toy with the word doing in English, right? Huh? You know, and let's just test you out here. You see, when I'm understanding something, am I doing something? What would you say? Yes. Yeah. Okay. And I'm loving somebody. Is that doing something? Okay. And when I'm seeing or hearing or smelling, am I doing something? That seemed too forced to say that. Okay. Well, that's the third one, right?

[6:52] Okay. Now, when I'm making a chair or when I'm making dinner, am I doing something? I don't see any problem calling those two, say. Yeah. Um, but when I'm falling,

[7:10] um, am I doing something? It's more being done to you. Yeah. Yeah. See. Or when I I'm being warmed by the fire, am I doing something? That seemed to me a little bit forced there, right? But when you're running, you're doing something. Yeah. Yeah. You could, you know. So I don't know if the word doing there would be any more stretch than the word operatio is, Here, huh?

[7:45] Even though you might say, like in another text of Thomas, where he says the operatio is most properly said for the imminent, right? The operation that doesn't go just the outside, huh? And we have a certain tendency to use the word doing in that same way, right? And then we give the word making to a doing that has a product done. But you could still, you know, quite freely in English, I think, say say that when you're making a table, you're doing something, right?

[8:14] Like the average man in front of me, you're doing something, and I'm doing nothing when I'm understanding some theorem. See. So the operation is kind of a a Latin what imported word, huh? You know, purpose has got a prejudice against that, huh? But you could perhaps substitute the word doing, and though it has a certain problem there, right? No more problem than Thomas has with operatio, maybe less.

[8:51] I don't think you can find maybe a word that doesn't have a certain problem, right? Okay. So, but as far as speaking, I could maybe have two ways of speaking here. I could say. Every act is either a motion or a form. If it's a motion, and then I'd give these three, right? Or I'd say every act is either a doing or a form, and there are these three doings, right?

[9:24] So apart from the problem in what you call that thing you're dividing, it's clear there's something different from form, right? And that there's at least these three different kinds of doing, or these three kinds of motion, or these three kinds of activity, right? No, again, I'd give you an action. I have some of the same problems, right? Because it would apply more to two of them than to the to the motion, huh?

[9:53] Or else I could go back and and just use the word act and say now using the word act in the in the narrow sense, you know, where where it's

[10:08] distinguished from form, right? Because it's more appropriately called act, huh? Because it's called act first, right? Okay. So I mean, there's a number of ways of naming, and they all seem to have a little difficulty to name that act that you're dividing into these three. But the division of those three seems to make make sense, huh?

[10:34] And that's very important, as Aristotle says, for understanding happiness, huh? You can't be happy doing nothing. Well, I could be happy doing nothing. Just a minute now. You're watching TV, or you're doing something.

[10:50] But if you have to be doing something to be happy, then what kind of doing is it? Is it making something? Oh, I'm happy. You know, some people think they're happy. You know, when they're retired, they're going to be, you know, sitting around making things. But can that really be true happiness? If true happiness is a perfection of me,

[11:16] it's my it's my greatest perfection, happiness. I mean, happiness doesn't mean you know contentment. You know, this degradation of the word there, right? I'm using happiness to name my my end, right? And therefore, my greatest good, my greatest perfection. Well, how can that be a doing an activity that is perfecting as something other than myself? That's what making is, right? And how can it be motion, which is essentially an imperfect act, and which is always incomplete when it's there?

[11:51] When it's complete, isn't there? What kind of a doing is that? You see, I'm proceeding here by what? Either or syllogism, right? Therefore, it must be the activity that remains in the doer, right? And is a perfecting of the doer, right? Which is also separated from from motion, because it has in common with motion that it's in the the motion is in the one moving, right? And and this activity is in the one doing it, huh?

[12:26] But the one is in a perfect act, and it's never complete when it's there. And the other is essentially a complete act, huh? Now I don't have to decide whether it's understanding or sensing, or or loving, right? But it's going to have to be in that genus of act, and it can't be in the other two, huh? For the reasons we gave. That's why I'm critical of Karl Marx, right?

[12:55] He makes it the ultimate thing for man making, right? Because that's essentially a perfecting of the thing made. And if you read Marx, though, he tries to get around that by saying that man in transforming the world around him transforms himself, and there's some truth to that. But that doesn't eliminate the fact that it's accidental to making that the maker be perfected. So if you try to make my highest perfection consist essentially in making, you're saying my highest perfection consists in perfection of something other than myself.

[13:36] So it's really profound what Aristotle is saying there in the way that illumines the consideration of happiness. And what kind of activity is it that happiness

[13:48] consists in? huh? Does it consist in directing armies, directing the city? Because even that seems to be a kind of transitive operation, right? So maybe it has to consist in these more speculative ones, right? Like listening to Mozart or something like that,

[14:15] tasting wine or something like that. But an activity of that sort, right? When you have to, you know, go and distinguish them too. When you have an ability to make something,

[14:32] a city or a song or something, aren't you actualizing something? Not even per accident, but actualizing that ability to exercise that ability, aren't you going into act yourself? When you are making something, yeah. Like say, I can I can direct the army, but I am not directing it. That ability in me is not, you know. Yeah, yeah. So there is a but that activity itself is essentially a perfecting of the one directed, isn't it?

[15:11] The spiritual director is he perfecting himself as such. You know the beautiful. I don't know if you ever had a chance to read the Saint Margaret Mary article or autobiography. You know, her spiritual director becomes Christ, right? He says, "Where you could find a more a more accomplished lover, he says, in myself, you know what I. " And but but but you see the severity of Christ you know directing her right?

[15:42] But it's Margaret Mary who's being perfected by this all this Christ does not. He's a perfect director. huh? Yeah. Thomas said, somewhere that, men desire to be causes. contradictions It could be, yeah, yeah, and and they're trying to be, you know, like God, I suppose, in being makers, huh? You know, but even you know, but that's true. Thomas never sees that as their ultimate what perfection. It's it's seeing God, huh?

[16:12] As he is, huh? Loving God, but seeing God as he is and loving him are which of the three kinds of operation? Well, it's the eminent one, huh? Remember Saint Thomas when he's commenting on the passage of Christ, "Be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect." Yeah. He explains that that that can only consist in becoming like God, which is doing what God does, which is.

[16:39] Yeah, knowing himself and loving himself for all of eternity. Yeah, and part of the idea, you know, he rested from all he'd made. He rested in himself, you know. So you can see even that kind of making, you know. Some some people, you know, run around today, you know, saying that God wasn't quite happy until he made things, you know. That's that's a bit a mistake, huh?

[17:04] When he divides operation from motion, and then operation of the two kinds, when making. So does that mean whenever a making is a motion that's accidental? Is making itself always operation as opposed to motion? Or are there some makings that? are... Well, the making is said of the maker, right? Right where the motion is in the thing being what moving, right? Although you got a there's a lot of subtle things there because if you're acting upon, you know, something already there, right?

[17:45] Then you're acting upon it is in a way in the thing you're acting upon, and then there are kind of subtleties you get to God, who doesn't require something to act upon to to act, right? But you can still distinguish in God between an activity of God, not that there you know two different activities in God, but

[18:06] the thing proceeding to the outside, right, and the thing remaining within. Within, you know, it's too subtle for us right here. Okay. Would you say that the making is not the perfection of man, but something like it, in so far as he becomes like God? In well, I'm saying is that making is a perfecting of the thing made, huh? Right. Yeah. Yeah. As such, right. Yeah. It's accidental that the maker himself would be perfected by his making.

[18:46] Because there are makers who make without being changed at all. Yeah, yeah. But it's not just because that, but if you examine what making really is.

[18:56] To be accidental to making. Yeah, or see, it's accidental to the teacher that he learns, even if it happens almost all the time, right? Because I think it may do, right? That the teacher learns something when he teaches, right? But he's not a teacher in so far as he's learning the very thing. No, he's a teacher through what he knows, right? Right. Not through what he does not know, is coming to know, huh?

[19:22] Okay. But people are deceived by the accidental because if you're teaching anything that has any profundity to it, you're going to be learning all the time as you teach, right? But that shows that you're not a what perfect teacher, huh? A lot of times, you know, professors say, in the old days, you know, that if I knew as much now as I knew at the beginning, of the

[19:47] the course as I know now, I would have taught the whole thing differently. Could teachers say that, right? W? Which shows, you know, that because you were learning, you were not really the teacher you would be if you if you do these things, huh? And you know the old joke about keeping ahead of the student, right? Well, it's not true. that that's the way the academic life is, huh?

[20:12] And especially if you're suddenly tossed into something, you know, that you haven't taught before, much, you know. Because you say that even when you're even when you're making something and learning, yeah, how to make that thing better, and and therefore your your art is is being perfected. Yeah, that's part of you, but but so part of you is being perfected, but but it's always with reference to something that's much lower than than God.

[20:41] Yeah, essentially you're learning how to make this thing, right? But am I a maker in so far as I I don't know how to make? That's obviously you know accidental, isn't it? Right? I'm not a maker to not knowing how to make,

[20:59] or even to learning how to make. Right? I'm a maker to knowing how to make, right? Yeah. What? I'm a maker, though. What makes me to a maker, a carpenter, is because I know how to make these things, huh? Yeah. And if I I have to look, I'll get the book out somewhere. Do I stand not quite yet a maker, huh? I got to get a book out and read up on this, so I can I can make this thing, huh?

[21:31] And now then I'd be a maker, right? Once I know how to make it. Okay. So we we. Book of how there's not one word there to name that act that's opposed to or distinguished from form, right? But Thomas in the one text uses the word operatio. Sometimes use the word motus, right? Okay. But you have to be aware of, you know, that maybe the the stretch a little bit in those words, huh?

[22:00] And maybe isn't a particularly right word, right? I say I'm somewhat inclined to use the word doing as a translation of operatio. look at my note here, big print there, how should operatio and the above text be translated? But and I suggest one way of doing it is to use the word doing if you don't want to, you know, use the Latin word operation itself.

[22:27] The nail would be doing pounded. Yeah. Or the the chicken would be doing cooked. Yeah, yeah. So did it look yeah, a little stranger, yeah, yeah. Another way I would do it, but you could take the word motion a bit the way Aristotle does, right? And Thomas refers to the De Anima and say, well, we'll call these all motion, right? But the word motion is not univocal there.

[22:55] And Aristotle, that's the way Aristotle speaks in the De Anima He'll sometimes say that understanding is a motion of the mind, sensing is a motion of the senses. Other times he'll say more carefully that they shouldn't maybe be called motion, or if you're using the word equivocally, right? Okay. But if you, you know, there's a little precedence there for stretching the word motion.

[23:24] And so you could use the word motion for if you use the word motion by Aristotle for sensing and understanding, as well as for motion strictly speaking, right? And it seems you could then use motion for for making too, huh? You seem to be you know moving when you're making those things too. So it seems so stretched the word motion there.

[23:50] The other possibility I see is to, and it's all these kind of defect is to use the word act, right? Because we define even motion as the what? Act of so it's an act, right? And a fortiori the other two are an act, right? And you say yeah, but you but you've been using the word act there to cover form too, yeah. But we first call motion or something like that an act, huh?

[24:14] So but you might want in in making the division say, and I'm going to distinguish the acts that are not what forms, right? And there's a reason there to use the word act there because originally it was used for something other than form anyway. And there you don't have the problem of of I mean forgetting the problem because of form being called an act, but. As far as the three things are being said of, act is said of all three.

[24:42] So that's, you know, way I'm doing. And none of this affects the the distinction in sense, but it's in the name and what's in the name. But but so you could call it the act or the act in an act form, or you could call it motion with a little bit of stretch for one of them at least, right? Or operation or doing with a lot of little stretch, right?

[25:05] Okay. Now. A couple other little texts here, where Thomas is talking about. This is even more particular, but he's contrasting knowing with the appetite and desiring and so on. And it's in reference to one of the words we've spoken here, namely the word motion. And he says, the act of the grasping power, which is the way he often refers to the knowing power, is grasping things, huh? Knowing is what.

[25:41] Thing is known insofar as it's in the knower, so it's got to be grasped. That's beautiful, beautiful. The act of the grasping power, the knowing power, is not thus appropriately called motion, as the action of the desiring power.

[26:05] Now, why is that? This goes back to something in the sixth book of wisdom. For the operation, I use the word operation, right? You use act first. For the operation of the grasping power is perfected in this that the thing grasped are in the one grasping. Okay, the thing known has to be in the knower, and even even the great Empedocles saw that, right? Except he didn't quite understand the way the thing known is in the knower, but he realized part of the truth about this.

[26:39] But the operation of the desiring power is perfected in this that the one desiring is inclined towards the what desirable thing. And then he makes a distinction, and therefore the operation of the grasping power is likened to quiete to rest. Understand? You see the word understand. Um, and

[27:09] sometimes we use you know, the first act of reason is sometimes called understanding what something is. Sometimes it's called what grasping, simple grasping. But understanding at least the word this marvelous English word stand, that's not motion, is it? Okay, and therefore the operation of the grasping power is likened to quiete quiete, but the operation of the desiring power is more likened to motion. Okay, so although we might use the word motion kind of loosely as Aristotle does, even for understanding or what sensing, it's more appropriate to use it for what desiring, right?

[27:55] For the action of the desiring power. And Aristotle talks about that a bit in the sixth book of wisdom, where he says the good is in things, huh? And the true is primarily in the mind. So you see, kind of contrariety the two, but this is related to it.

[28:22] Now another text on the same thing, but on the scriptum super librum two sentences, distinction twenty-four, question three, article one, solution. And he begins by saying, "Motion, as the philosopher says, est via ens a way into being.

[28:40] Whence, in the parts of the soul, motion is properly said to be the inclination towards something. And therefore, to those powers to which inclination does not belong, to them properly motion is not what attributed.

[29:00] Inclination, however, is in the desiring power, which moves to doing something. And therefore, the acts of the desiring powers are called motion, but not properly the acts of the grasping powers. It's the same point, and it's consistent from beginning to end.

[29:38] Now, my little text here from the sentences, scriptum super super librum three sentences, distinction thirty-five, question one, article two, solution one, not two. And we looked up the text, and it was never right, you know. And we concluded that he was, you know, always giving us. He never came into his head, you know. And he thought it was kind of funny, you know.

[30:08] He says the will not only is motive in regard to the exterior motions, which are opposed to rest, but it also moves the interior motions, as, for example, that the understanding itself,

[30:26] which are which are what equivocally called motion, as is clear in the third book about the soul, for they are acts of the perfect, right? By motion in a strict sense is the act of the imperfect. And therefore, they are more assimilated to rest than to motion. So sometimes he will say that. Now he has a text here in the commentary in the Psalms there, Psalm twenty.

[30:57] And this is a proportion that Thomas has now. He's commenting on the proverbs there, but anyway, the proportion. Sicut se habet desiderium ad gaudium, sic motus ad quietem ad quem per motum pervenitur. As desire is to joy, so motion is to what? Rest.

[31:26] So rest is, I mean, joy is more like what? Rest and desire is more like what? Motion. Come interesting, huh? And there resembles a little bit the intellect, where he said that, as Boethius says that reasoning is to understanding as motion is to rest, huh? And then we say sometimes, well, rest can come before after motion, and then I was distinguishing two understandings, one before reasoning, which I call natural understanding, and one after, which I call what?

[32:05] Reasoned out understanding, right? Well, and so something like that in the in the will, where you have love is first, right? And then desire, and then what? Joy, right? And here in this text in in the Psalms, he's saying desire is to joy, as motion is to what? Rest. Well, what about love now?

[32:35] Is love like motion, or is it like the natural understanding? Is it like the the rest that is before motion? He didn't say here, but makes makes you you kind of think, huh? Yeah, it's before it's before the motion, but then also the doctor of love says it it remains throughout, yeah. So it's there present in joy. But when Thomas defines love,

[33:04] and he actually defines love by the heart, right? Okay, and the heart is first known as the ability more to desire, but the way Thomas would define love is that it's the conformity of the heart with its object.

[33:21] That way, speaking of love is the conformity of the heart with its object. Seems more like rest than it seems like motion. But when your heart is conformed to this object, but you don't have it, then you pursue it, and that's what desire seems to be, huh? But then, if you if you get what you love and desire, then your heart comes to rest, huh? Our hearts are restless until they rest in thee, right?

[33:48] Okay, so it has a sort of resemblance, right, to those things in reason, huh? Although in other texts he's kind of emphasizing the fact that that the word motion is more properly applied to desire, right. Then to the activity of the knowing power, even though we kind of assimilate reasoning to motion, because you're inclined towards the thing, and perhaps also you could say that there's another likeness between love and understanding, and that you say that the end is potentially contained in the beginning, that it's the end of the science, yeah, and in the same way the love that is present in the joy, yeah, is the same, but yeah, it's kind of drawn, is yeah, so there's kind of similarity there, yeah.

[34:41] Okay, let's come back now. Just Do one more thing here So I think they're very interesting. and I when I remember first seeing text like this, and I said, "Gee whiz, I've been misunderstanding these things all my all my life."

[35:00] And these two texts, one is from the Summa Theologiae the Prima Pars, question 54, article 1 ad 3, and the second one is from the De Spiritualibus Creaturis, article 4 ad 6. But they're both talking about the distinction that we met a little minute ago, a few minutes ago, between the action that remains in the doer and the one that what produces something outside the doer. The one might be called a doing, the other a making, but however you call them.

[35:34] look at the one from the Summa Theologiae first, He's going to make a distinction between these two. It's a very interesting distinction, I think. So it's part of this, you know, but kind of final thing. He says the action quae transit in aliquid extrinsicum, the action which passes over to something outside, est realiter, This is very important now. The word realiter, est realiter medium inter agens et subiectum recipiens actionem.

[36:14] He's saying that the action which passes over to something outside, right, is really a middle between the one acting and the subject receiving the action.

[36:31] So if I'm kicking you, right, my kicking you is really in the middle between me and you. Okay. But the action which remains in the one acting is not really a middle between the agent and the what object.

[37:00] But only according to the modum significandi, which is almost the grammatical way it's said. I see. Notice these grammatically; these are similar. I kick you. I see you. Grammatically, my kicking seems between me and you.

[37:25] And likewise, my seeing you, I see you. Grammatically, seems like my seeing is in between me and and you, right? One case is kicking between us, another case is seeing between us. And likewise, if I love you, my loving is between me and you. Thomas is saying no, the action which remains in the doer is not really a middle between the agent and the object, but secundum modum significandi tantum.

[38:00] Almost like the grammatical way in which it is said, huh? And isn't there, you know, logical fallacy there in the sophistical refutations that tied up with those things? Okay, but really, he says, yeah, this is the real dope now, Really, however, it follows upon the union of the object with the agent.

[38:31] So my kicking you is what brings us together, huh? I said why? But it's not my seeing you; it brings me and you together. Me and you have already come together, and my seeing you is a result of me and you coming together.

[38:55] From this, from this fact, right, that the understanding becomes one, excuse me, that the understood becomes one with the one understanding. You know Aristotle speaks there in the *De Anima right? The sense in act and the sensible are one, right? In act. From this, that the understanding becomes one, or the understood becomes one with the one understanding, there follows understanding, the act, as it were, an effect differing from both.

[39:30] So I see something because that object that I see has been united to my eye in some way, and I understand something because what I understand is united with my understanding, and my act of understanding follows that union between me and my object. It's not really in between me and my object, but our way of speaking grammatically would seem to indicate it, just like my kicking you, right?

[40:00] Or my kicking came between you and me. I understand you. I understand a triangle, right? Strange, huh? Now the same doctrine here in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Article Four ad Six. Now Thomas says the same thing, but a little different way. But it's kind of strikingly he says it here too. Every operation,

[40:32] in some way, is taken as a middle, right, between the one operating and the object of operation, right? In some ways, taken as a middle between the one operating and the object of operation, this might seem to be first a little different, right? Either realiter there, just as in those actions which proceed from an agent to changing something outside of it, huh? Or secundum modum intelligendi, the way of understanding, huh?

[41:10] More different from modum secundum modum significandi, tantum. But I think he's thinking the same thing, huh? Or secundum modum intelligendi, just as to understand and to will and things of this sort, which although there are actions remaining in the agent, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics, huh? Nevertheless, they are signified in the manner of other actions as tending from one to the other, huh?

[41:48] That's kind of interesting because it kind of shows the way our mind works, right? That the activity that is an acting upon another, really, huh? The activity is really more known to us than the activity of what understanding or loving somebody or seeing something or smelling something or tasting something. So much so that we fall back upon the first way in our way of signifying this in our way of understanding the second act, right?

[42:22] But those in the know realize that really it's not between the two, huh? That's kind of that's remarkable to see that, huh? It's a little bit like

[42:41] why do I love this person, right? Well, it's because this person made an impression upon my heart, right? That's why. And you know how even in daily speech sometimes you know there's a party and so on and something gets kind of attracted to somebody you know, and people say you know you made a big impression upon her, right, or vice versa, right? See, but the result of say her making a big impression upon your heart is you start to like her.

[43:21] Is it? But her making a certain impression upon your heart through your eyes and so on is her being united with your heart, right? And so when she makes an impression upon your heart, the result of that is that you start to like this creature. You see, that's that's that's what's really taking place, right?

[43:48] But our way of speaking and our way of You know, I mean, it's kind of strange to say that, huh? I say, "secundum modum intelligendi," right? You know, because you know that's not really the way it is, right? But that's the way we we kind of conceive it, huh?

[44:12] It's it's my loving you that is really between us, right? Or am I knowing you is we between us, huh? Of course, when Aristotle speaks of sensing or understanding, he kind of gives a definition for the cause that they're an undergoing, right? So it's because

[44:45] the senses or the understanding have been acted upon by their object in some way, right? That they've been united with their object, that they begin to sense it or to understand it, huh? The same is true about loving, huh? Because the object has made an impression upon your heart, do you begin to like this person, this thing, huh?

[45:12] Is the love the being acted upon itself, or a result of being acted upon from the object? What he seems to be saying here, and he and he says, you know,

[45:29] the thing, intelligere et velle right, huh? He's saying for both of them that what's really taking place is not that the understanding or the willing is in between the the one understanding or willing and the thing understood or or willed, right? But the object has been united with the power first in some way, and the understanding or the loving or the willing is a result of that.

[45:59] So it's not really a middle between the two. And that to me, my first time receiving texts like this in Thomas, I say I've been kind of misunderstanding this all my life, you know. It kind of you know without really thinking about it, huh? You don't accept it, huh? You say that last thing again. The way he speaks here, what the the what it really is is not a middle, but it's.

[46:39] We're saying that secundum intelligere et velle, which are which although their actions remaining in the doer, nevertheless they're signified in the manner of other actions, as from one tending in the other, right? Yes. So.

[46:56] And the remaining in the doer, there's a union between you. The emphasis on the spirituality of his creatorism is that he begins by saying every operation in some way is. taken. Taken as the middle between the one doing and the object operation, but in one case it's really so, right? In the other case, it's only secundum modum intelligibilis, so it's not really so, right? It's not the operation that is uniting you, in other words.

[47:21] In the case of the of the the immanent operation yeah. But in the case of the extrinsic one, the making, right? It is. The reason it's not uniting you is that it's already there. If you think of again, St. Francis de Sales speaks of love as the complacency in the good, so it presupposes being well pleased by a good that's presented to you by your intellect or senses.

[47:46] So, so love always follows some kind of. Yes, it's like saying I find her agreeable, and then I start to like her, right? But when I find her agreeable, she's already in some way united with me.

[48:03] Like Aristotle's metaphor of the wax and the seal, the mind receives the form of the wax receives the seal. Yeah, Shakespeare does that a lot. I teach a lot in friendship. You know, usually have a page or two of Shakespeare, then Thomas's article, and one leads into the other. So if you say in understanding and willing, the object is acting upon.

[48:34] Understanding or will. That may be so. I mean, at least the one's a bit more known to us. But what he's saying basically is is it the union of the two, right? You say. It's not accomplished by the operation, but it's the effect of it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now the operation is an effect of the union. It's not the middle uniting the two, huh? Yes. I see.

[48:54] This is you know, there's there's a most obvious difference between the immanent operation and the and the other one is is the one we first say, right? This passes out to something extrinsic, right? The other one remains within the doer, right? Okay. So understanding, sensing, loving, remain within the one understanding, sensing, loving, huh? But making doesn't remain within the the maker, but it passes out to the thing made, right?

[49:22] In that way, unites you. Oh yeah, but I mean that's the first difference to see that, right? Okay. The second difference, and this is the one here, right? And this is a more subtle one, right? That the average person, I think, would kind of miss and maybe be surprised by, you know, and that is that the

[49:43] the making or the acting upon another is really in between you and the one you act upon. But the understanding or sensing or loving is not really between you and the thing you understand or sense or love, but the union of you and the thing you understand or Sense or love is the source that union of the understanding or the sensing or the what loving. Yeah, that's kind of a subtle thing that Thomas is saying there, and it kind of fits into this context because we're distinguishing these three kinds of motions or operations.

[50:24] And you can see how how sensing and knowing and loving are related. That is, that there has to be the before the love occur, there has to be the union caused by the knowledge. Yeah. But the knowledge results from the union caused by the sensing, and the the sensing itself is a result of two things being in the same place or near each other. So you can't see something unless it's near.

[50:52] Now, if you kiss the girl, then what? What kind of operation is that? That's going out. That's acting the father, right? That's getting into real trouble. You might say that is. You might say that is is is really in between the two here, but that's a transitive operation, as I can see. He can't bring these things home to people sometimes. Is the ability to love a passive ability or an active, or is it something a little bit different than both?

[51:30] Thomas is almost the first article about love is that it's passio, right? And especially the love, it's a sensible one, right? But even the other one is. So is it? Would you say there's really a

[51:46] kind of hidden transitive operation from the object to the passive ability? When we speak of it as. Well, the object, the object, love acts upon my heart through my senses or through my reason.

[52:07] So is is the is the acting of the object on you? Is that transitive operation? The object doesn't really do anything, though, right? And you wouldn't love if nothing was done to you. What I mean is, your sensing is sort of an active power. I mean, it's true that the thing informs your sense, but the thing's not changed by being seen. No, you

[52:44] go back to the order of those three that Aristotle begin with. You know, it's kind of interesting the order that he he had there. The first one was when he's first saying, you know, we're making know what act is.

[53:07] No, that's not that part of it Please, I'm thinking of Yeah, I was thinking back at the time when he's arguing against the errors during the third reading there, and he took it's

[53:36] the first example, the house builder, right? And then he took the what sensible itself, right? The one which acts upon it, right? And then he took the senses, and the sensible there seems to be like a what active ability, right? It acts upon it, huh?

[54:04] So to some extent, it is from the outside, isn't it? Seems to be, huh? Right. So even in these imminent operations, there's there's a transitive operation. Yeah, well, ours are not as imminent as God's would be, you know. God's operation, because he gets nothing from the outside, huh? But but the beginning of our knowledge is from the outside, from things. Unless you're one of these modern philosophers, it doesn't receive anything from the outside.

[54:35] It's not acted upon by the outside, huh? Is out of touch with things. And so, it knows there's. But you know that when Thomas is going to explain the word, right? And he'll talk about how these operations get more and more within, huh?

[55:01] And even you know when he talks about reproduction, right? You know when fire reproduces itself, it acts upon something outside of itself, right? When the human being reproduces himself, the baby comes from within, right? And even to some extent in the plant, the fruit in some sense comes from within, but then it falls to the ground, right? Okay, and then generates, huh? Or in the case of the human mother, the baby is already alive and kicking inside, right?

[55:33] And then, but eventually, it comes outside, right? Huh? So you know when Thomas, this is the Summa Contra Gentiles where he gives that, right? And then he starts to talk about the what the senses, right? Where where it's even more immanent huh? See, but nevertheless, it starts in the outside, and even to some extent through about about reason, right? So he's he's graduating up to to to understanding of.

[56:04] The word of God and how it comes forth in a completely immanent way, right? But the higher you go up in the in the creation, the more you but have a inward proceeding, right?

[56:21] But you never quite get perfection in God because in God, in no way does the outside influence the the going forward, huh? But the angel be in between because although the ideas wouldn't come from from sensing or something, in other words, they're always united to him. Yeah, but but again, but but the the angel's understanding is more immanent than ours, right? Because he doesn't receive from the senses from the outside, huh?

[56:50] You know, as Augustine explains, you know, he he makes these things and he makes the ideas whereby they're made in the angels. So, the angels he is made by something outside itself, you might say, but in his knowing of but his natural knowing, he's not receiving from from things, huh? It's kind of prior to things, sharing in God's knowledge more. In his knowing of himself, it would be the most immanent, wouldn't it?

[57:14] I suppose, yeah, because then he doesn't need an infused idea from God to understand. Yeah, but for at least in this life, for our soul to understand itself, it has to, you know, yeah, we don't know ourselves. yeah, yeah. We have to get up. We have to know other things first, right? And exterior things. So we start the senses, and but with the angel, his knowledge of himself would be to himself, yeah, and it would only be less immanent in God's because he receives his nature.

[57:46] Yeah, well, somewhat, yeah, it's any more imminent than ours. That's the point. So as you go up towards God, you get more and more the idea of a operation that remains within the doer, and less and less dependence upon the outside. And also because it's not his same as him, it's kind of nice when you're doing geometry, right, and making these things, huh?

[58:11] And you know, we have to find a flat surface out here to draw things. A flat surface up there. So you're getting higher and higher there, the imagination than you are even of the senses, huh? The imagination is more immanent than the senses because they're being acted upon by the things outside of us.

[58:39] Okay, that's enough for Lectio 5 huh Little additions here from Thomas. So we're going to meet. We're going to do nothing. We meet tomorrow like the regular. That's okay with me. I mean, yeah, okay. You want you want two sessions on Saturday, or we're going to do on Saturday and Sunday now? Maybe should two on Saturday. I would think. Okay. Not one on Sunday, probably Yeah, we're not quite in the market for a while anyway.

[59:11] Okay. Okay, so.