Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
20. Substantial vs. Accidental Form, Existence as Act, and the Transcendentals
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/020-substantial-vs-accidental-form-existence-as-act-and-the-transcendentals/

[0:00] Well, I'm talking about the definition of tragedy. You mean, or what? In in drama and in music. Well, I'll take one at a time. I say, if Aristotle has defined correctly tragedy, right? Then he's defined it by the good of the emotions. He says an imitation. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly.

[0:29] Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written. In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. A few little additions here to the consideration of the first Just uh part of the middle part there, the fifth reading. We had distinguished if you remember last time with some texts of Thomas. More precisely, the three kinds of acts. And one might also, here as a kind of footnote, um distinguish between substantial form and accidental form.

[1:14] And of course, the two of them are alike proportionally, just like the matter of accidental form and the matter underlying substantial form are alike proportionally. Understand a proportion, you have to understand in what way exactly the ratios are alike. And sometimes in class, I take even a mathematical proportion and illustrate in obvious way how you could misunderstand or what it would be to misunderstand the proportion. Like say four is to six as two is to three.

[1:55] Well, let's see. Two is an even number and three is an odd number, so it's a ratio of an even number to an odd number. Four is an even number, so six must be an odd number, right? Well, obviously that's not the way those two ratios are alike, aren't they? Well, let me try again now. Two and three are prime numbers, right? So it's a ratio of one prime number to another prime number.

[2:17] Four and six must be two other prime numbers then, right? Well, now in what way then are is four to six like two is to three? Well, the likeness consists in that four is the same parts of six that two is of three. And for the dummies in the classroom, we say if you imagine six as three twos, four is two of those threes, so it's got the same parts of six four does that two has of what three?

[2:50] Yeah. So likewise, you say I don't see the likeness here. How is the first matter to man and dog like clay is to sphere and cube? Sphere and cube are two accidental things in a way, two accidental forms. Man and dog are two substances. I don't see any likeness, do you? And clay is an actual substance, and this first matter is not an actual substance. I don't see any likeness.

[3:20] Do I just see all kinds of difference? Huh? Well, in order to understand that proportion, you have to understand in what way they are like. And they are alike in this way, that just as the clay is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not able to be both of them at the same time, but when it's one, it still has an ability for the other, but if it became the other, it would cease to be the former.

[3:48] So likewise, the first matter is able to be a man or a dog, but not at the same time. But when it's one of them, it still retains an ability to be the other, but if it were to become the other, it would cease to be the former. Now you see what the likeness consists in. So when we extend

[4:11] the word form from maybe accidental form, which Aristotle first was taking the example, wasn't he of the mercury there? The one you're going to worship there, right? The statue. Because mercury is really what? That's an accidental form there. And so you carry over the word form by a proportion, just like the word matter. There, there's a likeness of ratios. But then, like Aristotle did when he was pointing out the difference between the act called form and that called motion, and we were pointing out the difference between these different kinds of activities or doings, whatever you call them.

[4:49] So you might compare substantial form and accidental form. And one text where Thomas does this fairly explicitly is in the Summa Theologiae, in the Prima Pars, in question seventy-seven, in article six, and in the Corpus. And he begins by saying, what do these two have in common? And he says that substantial form and accidental form come together partly, and they partly differ. They come together in that both of them is an act, and by both of them something else is in act.

[5:30] And then he starts to say how they differ. And he says by substantial form something has existence simply and without qualification. So by my soul, for example, I am right. But by the accidental form, one is not simply, but in some qualified sense. So I am not by my health. I am not by my geometry, but I am healthy. I am a geometer, right? But when I received my soul, I came to be.

[6:07] When I received geometry, I didn't come to be. I came to be a geometer. So the difference between simply and some respect. And the substantial form comes to a subject which is only in ability. And the accidental form comes to a subject which is an actual substance. So Thomas points out then that act is found in the substantial form before the subject to which it comes. But in the case of the accidental form, actuality is found in the subject to which it comes before the accidental form gets there.

[6:50] And that's why the accidental form is what we call property. It can be an effect of the substantial form because that is an act. But then he gives another distinction, which is I think very important. And I know myself I've been confused upon this for years.

[7:10] But because of this basic difference, you can say that matter is for the sake of substantial form. Substantial form is the end of matter. But is substance for the sake of accidental form?

[7:33] You might think in some way because accidental form is an act, and by it the subject, the substance, is an act in some way at least, right? That in some way it's for the sake of that. But no, Thomas points out it's just the reverse. The accidental form is for the sake of perfecting the substance. So I'm not for the sake of my geometry. My geometry is for the sake of me because I want to have all the perfection of being from being just a man.

[8:04] I need these accidental forms to complete me as a man. So that's kind of a very subtle thing there. So those are some of the differences. You can spell these out more.

[8:20] What they have in common, they both have the name form. Both are an act. Both are a first act. Both are in a subject in some way, though we use the subject more properly there with the accident. To both, their subject is in some way. How do they differ? By substantial form, something is simply or without qualification, while by accidental form, an existing subject is only in some qualified way.

[8:50] The subject of substantial form considered before or without substantial form is existence only in ability, while the subject of accidental form is actually existing before it has an accidental form before it has an accidental form.

[9:06] The subject of substantial form is substance only in ability. While the subject of accidental form is an actually existing substance. By substantial form, its subject is an actual substance. By accidental form, an actual substance is in some qualified way. By their union, substantial form and its subject are one per se. But accidental form and its subject do not form something one per se. They are one per accidents, if you go back to the fifth book of the wisdom, hence subject is more properly said of what we see as accidental form, while matter is what we see as substantial form.

[9:52] Substantial form is in the genus of substance, not, however, as a species of that genus, but as a beginning of a species of that genus. But accidental form is in one of the genera of accident, such as quality as a species.

[10:11] The subject of accidental form is in the genus of substance as a species or individual of a species of substance. But the subject of substantial form is in the genus of substance, only as a beginning of some species or individual some species. Actuality is found in substantial form before its subject. Its subject is actual only through substantial form. But actuality is found in the subject of accidental form before in accidental form.

[10:43] Hence, as we said before, substantial form can give rise to accidental forms that are proper to the substance. Matter is for the sake of substantial form, but accidental form is for the sake of its subject, which is kind of unfolding down a little bit. So there's a lot of differences you could say, but Aristotle doesn't go into them. at least in the text that's come down to us.

[11:09] But he does talk about those differences in the first book of Natural Hearing and in the eighth book of Wisdom, where he talks about substance and matter and form, and also in the seventh book. And he also talks about in the De Anima when he makes the proportions between the soul. You know, if the eye was a natural body composed of tools, its ability to see would be its soul, right?

[11:34] And so on. So he's making these proportions, right? Okay. Now, one more thing here. Are motion and form—the two kinds of act—be distinguished using motion now in the broad sense. Are there the only kinds of act there are? Those two.

[12:05] Every act is either some kind of motion or some kind of form. Some kind of operation or some kind of form. What would it be besides that? Well, if you had a form that wasn't in matter. Well, it'd still be a form, though, in some sense. Now, there might be—you know—you might distinguish that form from the substantial form, but you'd still be talking about a form, right?

[12:34] What he says. So, esse is the act. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Is essay existence? Is to what exists, right? If they're not the same thing, as act is to what ability, right? So, you know how we say three is the first number. About what you say all. Maybe there is a third kind of what act. Now, I don't go too much into that.

[13:13] But how would that fit into what's been said so far if you talked about existence as another kind of act? If you had substance without a form.

[13:30] Substance without form. If you could have that, I would think that would be an act. Yeah, but actually, substances always have a form, or they are a form, really. Okay. It's when you speak of the separate substances. But you know, Aristotle doesn't seem to be explicitly thinking of the distinction there between the substance of a creature and its existence. I mean, some people say Al-Farabi is the first guy to very make make this very explicit, and it's in Avicenna and and consequently in Thomas and so on.

[14:02] But Thomas does seem to think that Aristotle has arrived at the idea that God is I am, who am I? But you know, the texts are are brief and so on. So, they're not a thing that he talks about here, at least what we have. Um. In in the Sumas, like in the Summa Contra Gentiles, for example, you first show, because of theological order, you show that in God, the substance of God and his existence are the same thing.

[14:31] And then, the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, when you show that they're not the same in the angels, in us then he's got to distinguish between this substance and existence that Ability and act if you wish and matter and form us, then he's got to distinguish between this substance and existence that. Ability and act, if you wish, and matter and what form. It would seem that is the

[14:58] going back to all these ratios. Is the ratio of existence to the substance of the thing when they're different more like the ratio of form to matter, or like that of understanding to the ability to understand, or seeing to the ability to see? Which is it more like? Do you think? Form and matter. Yeah, it seems. It seems to me it is, and at least in the super contragentiles, when Thomas has shown this thing about the angels, he wants to make clear that you don't confuse this composition of substance and existence in the angels with the kind of composition that we have in addition to that of our substance being composed of matter and form.

[15:41] And then he works out the differences between those two kinds of composition, which I don't intend to go into here right now. But that kind of shows that it's closer, right? And of course, you want to separate things that are closer, just like you would separate operation from motion, and you wouldn't bother to separate operation from form so much if you've already separated motion and form, right?

[16:06] Okay. Why would you say it's more like form? than operation? Well, I'm just kind of proceeding here from the way Thomas does. But is existence really a doing something? Does it seem to be a doing something? It seems to me that there's a before and after there. You know, I think therefore I am. In a sense, what what Descartes is doing there is says I'm doing something, right?

[16:36] Therefore, I must be. And you say to yourself, well, doesn't that kind of involve an axiom that you must be before you can do something? Would you try to prove that you must be before you can do something? Would you? No, I don't think so. And even if you're doing something at the moment you you are, right? Still, I mean, it seems like you could be in some case without doing something, but not so.

[17:02] You're not vice versa. So that going from what is more known to us than doing, like Descartes, in a sense, is going from what's more known than doing to the being. Just like when we show the that the being and the soul, the understanding soul, doesn't depend upon the body, we show that because it doesn't do everything in the body and through the body, it doesn't understand the universal in the body.

[17:29] So if it's doing something not in the body, then its being is not entirely immersed in the body, right? So you go from the doing to the being, right? So it seems to be the being more on the side of what. Something before doing, huh? In the same way, we we tend to go from the doing of a thing to its what form, because what it does, as opposed to what other things do, is because of its form.

[17:59] So we come to know the different kinds of soul because what they do, or what they do, what the body does through them, right, huh? And so we we distinguish the living soul and the sensing soul, the understanding soul. So in the same way, we can, in a sense, in the same way we can in a sense, not only come to an understanding of our kind of soul through our understanding, through our act, to what we do, but also something about our kind of what existence, huh?

[18:29] Through that, huh? So it seems to be more on the side of the form. Of course, there's a connection between form and existence because form is in some sense a beginning of existence. Through every form, we have some kind of being, huh? I don't say it's the entire cause of it. We don't want to say that because you might have something causing itself to be. But in some sense, the form is a beginning of the kind of being you have, huh?

[19:00] Or the way you partake of being. So it's more on the side of form that has to be distinguished from than doing. Do you see that a little bit? Just a couple of things way Thomas speaks here, huh? Like in the Summa Theologica, question seven, article one. Thomas says, "Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium est ipsum esse." What is "maxime formale," right? Of all things, is ipsum esse, huh?

[19:33] Now you might say, well, if you wanted to fight me, you could say that all he means by "maxime formale" is most actual, right? I think he would agree that that's most actual because it's the act of every other act, in a sense. But he does use the word "formale" there.

[19:52] And in the question four, article one, on three of the same prima pars. When I say the esse hominis, the being of man or of horse or of some other thing, ipsum esse, the esse itself, is considered as formale, huh? At ut receptum and received, huh? Not ever as that to which to be belongs, huh? So it's considered as formale ut receptum. That's the idea of being in the thing, right?

[20:23] Received in it, huh? Remember Aristotle's proportion there, right? Form is more said to be in the matter, right? More than the operation is said to be in the ability.

[20:37] Okay. Is form said to be in the matter because accidental forms? Clearly, in here and but. Well, I'm mentioning mentioning the form and matter is is the fifth sense of in.

[21:00] It comes right after species in but genus. Yeah, of course the species is not actually in the genus, but that's the way form is in matter is contained in the ability of matter in some way. So it's like that. So by certain likeness there, they just say in.

[21:22] But you know, sometimes you know how Plato in the Timaeus and so on, he always speaks of place as if they were like matter. So go all the way back to the first meaning of in, in place. And there's a there's a proportion there, just as in the same place, the same chair I'm sitting in right now, I can get up and leave, and some other guy can come in there and sit down, right?

[21:47] And so, in the place in which Berkwist was, now someone else is, and then someone else could be. And in the very same plane, which sphere was, now there is cube, and now there is pyramid, and so on. So you see the kind of similarity between the two, and so the Platonists, you know, sometimes speak almost that place is what matter, but that wouldn't be true. But there's a likeness there, a likeness there, and isn't one?

[22:19] That's one of the four opinions about place that it's matter. One that it's form, because it doesn't assume likeness to form, and it doesn't assume likeness to to matter, although. The obvious difference is that place is something extrinsic, and matter and form are something within. My brother Mark is always very puzzled about Aristotle giving us a probable opinion because it doesn't seem very probable to him. But but you see the Platonist, you know, talking this way, you know, you you realize there's kind of a likeness there that it's good to see, but not too.

[22:52] This likeness is a slippery thing, as Plato says. A very dangerous thing. What do you mean when you say forms and matter in ability? Is that originally it is in there in ability, but then. Yeah, I just have to distinguish when the form is actually in some. Yeah, well, then it's be made actually, yeah, yeah. In the beginning, it's in there in ability. So that's the fifth sense of in.

[23:17] There's two senses. Aristotle doesn't give them as separate. No, he just seems a likeness. So, but like I suppose, you add the difference to the genus there, then you make actual something that's potential in the genus. But of course, there's more there's more distinction in sense between the difference and the genus, and between the form and the matter.

[23:39] Okay, but it'd be the sum of the two. But the city's a difference. Even if the form is actually there, right? And they're just an ability to begin with.

[23:53] Okay. Why couldn't you say the form? You don't need another act of existence, but just the form when it's actually in the matter that's makes the thing. Yeah, well, that's what you'd say at first, and this is a very subtle distinction between the substance of a thing and its existence. What's kind of interesting in the transcendentals The first two transcendentals are being and thing, right? And what's the difference between being and thing?

[24:34] Well, it's kind of different than it is with the with the last four transcendentials, because as Thomas says, at the last four transcendentials, you're not adding something real to being; you're adding either negation, like one means undivided being, and aliquid in Latin means you're distinct from other things; you're not them. So it's kind of a being of reason, you might say, negation that are added to it, but not something real being added there, right?

[25:08] And then in the in the true and the the good, Thomas goes back to the third book about the soul, where Aristotle says the soul is in some way all things after he's talked about sensing and understanding. And so the soul, in some way is, all things, and this gives rise to these other two transcendentials, because the the will, in some way is, open to all good too, and so you have the the true and the good, right?

[25:37] Okay. So it's not based upon a distinction in things, the distinction between being and one, let's say, huh, or between being and and another or aliquid, or between being. Good or being and true, but they differ in definition. But now you talk about the first two transcendentals, being is said taken from to be. Why thing is taken from what it is, and reason wants to know what is.

[26:20] What it is, it's not exactly the same thing to know what is, and what it is, huh? And so in those first two transcendentals, um what is characteristic of uh of everything except God, right?

[26:39] The one seems to be taken from existence or to be, and the other from the what it is, the substance of a thing. And so when we define definition, we tend to use more the word thing. You say definition is speech making known what a thing is, right? Because the difference between the thing and being seems to be that being is so named from to be, and everything that is can be said to be, obviously.

[27:08] But everything that is, we can talk about what it is too, right? And it's what it is, and it's to be, or it's being. Are they the same? It's kind of implied there the distinction there.

[27:26] So it's immediately that they're different in notion, but you're saying they're also different in reality. Yeah, it it seems that the distinction between the first two transcendentals right corresponds to some extent to a real distinction in the thing

[27:48] between what it is and its existence, even though you maybe don't think about the time, right? So that's how you kind of phrase there that reason wants to know what is and what it is. It's not exactly the same thing to know what is and what it is, right? So it's kind of a hint there, right, of that distinction between what a thing is and its existence in those, huh?

[28:19] Or or take another thing when you're in the posterior analytics, you know, and Aristotle distinguishes the basic questions for the demonstrator and does it exist, and if it does exist, then what is it, right? As if they're not the same question exactly, huh? So that there's kind of hinted there this distinction between what a thing is and its existence, but in the beginning we don't see it too clearly, huh?

[28:50] And and the only places where I know where it's developed really is in these kind of theological works, right, where you talk about. God is I am who am and so on. You bring out that these are the same in God, and then in another place you bring out that they're not the same in creatures, and that

[29:14] would lead you to recognize the existence of the thing as a kind of act with respect to what has existence, and then you have even another sense of act. So when we're first knowing, the first time we try to grasp what it is, we're not really sure whether it is right. I mean, you could have somebody could say, are they flying horses? That would be the definition, flying horse or something.

[29:46] But unless you can show that it is, it may be that what you are saying is nonsense. I just get quid nominis I mean, unicorn. The word unicorn has has meaning, right? But there is no definition of unicorn in the strict sense. There is a definition of the name, maybe, but not not definition of the thing. So that's kind of a subtle thing there. So is that where you would first be concerned with whether it is?

[30:10] Because you have God, right? That's the definition of the name. Then you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You have to have some quid nominis to ask the question, right? So you ask whether it is to see whether to go on with what it is. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what Aristotle, when he defines what nature is, he says, kind of like a footnote, he says, have I, uh been out of order here, not asking whether nature exists first and determining that before I ask what it is.

[30:42] But then he says that it's obvious that nature exists, right? Therefore, it's not necessary to try to show that. The man who tries to show that thinks he doesn't know what he does know, right? And then he says that seems to be possible because as Socrates showed, you can think you know what you don't know, which means you can't always separate what you know what you don't know.

[31:01] Therefore, you can make the first mistake, and these guys do. But as I say to students, most men make the mistake of thinking they know what they don't know, and thinkers make the mistake of thinking they don't know what they do know. They kind of go the opposite extreme, and and Socrates himself almost seems to be in that when he says in the apology, "I don't know whether to die is is good or bad."

[31:24] Right. Well, of course, there is obviously in many ways you don't know some things about death, right? There is kind of some kind of obvious sense which death is clearly something bad. To be alive is good. To to be dead is is bad, and Socrates is saying, "I don't know. If I claimed to know that it was bad, I would be just like you guys claiming to what I don't know."

[31:42] But he seems to be always getting down to the opposite extreme of thinking he doesn't know what he does know. And of course, that's what most thinkers are like today, right? They want to avoid claiming to know what they don't know, so they go to the opposite extreme and claim to not know what they do know.

[32:04] Ends up not knowing anything, right? Claiming not to know anything. What do you make of those arguments that Thomas gives, like in the De Ente, where he says, you know, you can look at the parts of the essence of the thing and see that existence isn't there, and therefore you say that existence is a part of the essence. He says that. I'm not clear of that text that you're referring to.

[32:27] I was looking at the phoenix or the other things. He says you can look at the parts of the essence and say. You mean the definition of the name, you mean? I think so. Yeah, you can have the definition of the name, you know, without. Well. You can have a word that means something, but whether there's a thing corresponding to it is something that you don't know, and you can therefore ask, does it exist, right?

[32:47] Yeah. But it it involved it involved a contradiction, you know. You know, I mean, I mean, you go around asking, does a square circle exist? Now, saying, well, it's kind of a stupid question to ask. To me, it's impossible for a square circle to exist. Now, so you should be able to see that if you know what a square circle is. It's just you know, but you can't really understand what a square circle is because the two are incompatible.

[33:18] Just kind of almost playing with words. But isn't that showing the distinction between what is and what it is? Well, it seems like he yeah he wants to. I don't have a textbook in my memory, but he seems like he wants to say that you can look at the essence of the thing and see that their existence doesn't belong to it. Is not a part of the essence, rather, and that therefore you can conclude there's a real distinction between the essence and the existence of it.

[33:50] It's not a minor part of the essence, I think, because it's strange. Okay, let's go back here now. One thing too again about the thing I was pointing out that the distinction of kinds of things that this universality also corresponds to distinction of senses of the word

[34:15] struck me that that's kind of another likeness between wisdom and dialectic. I don't know if you know the third book of of the wisdom which is all dialectical. In the beginning of the third book, Aristotle gives four reasons why we should proceed dialectically at first here in wisdom. And Thomas and and apparently Averroes before him in commenting on these four reasons say for these reasons also Aristotle in other books you know proceeds dialectically before he tries to determine the truth.

[34:53] But then the Averroes and Thomas I guess following him say but there's something unique about this third book that Aristotle has put all the dialectical into one book yeah while in the other parts of philosophy he has a particular dialectic about place let's say another dialectic in the first book you know and he gives reasons why it's appropriate the wise men have this kind of universal doubt and there's more than one reason he gives which I don't want to go into all of them but one of the reasons he gives is because of the likeness of dialectic and wisdom.

[35:29] So the dialectic seems to be as were a principal part of wisdom because that's a kind of a nice compliment to Plato who identifies dialectic at the highest point even though there's a distinction between dialectic and wisdom.

[35:46] But when you see the great importance of distinguishing the senses of these words right and that it corresponds to a distinction of kinds of things. Well, of course the second tool of dialectic is what the distinction of the senses of a what word right huh okay now again of course Aristotle you can say in in almost all of his books he distinguishes some senses of a word right.

[36:16] But you could say like with the third book hey the fifth book of wisdom a whole book devoted to this see and this is unique huh sure he distinguishes the senses of in and out there in in the fourth book of natural hearing but he doesn't have in in the eight books of natural hearing a whole book devoted to distinguishing the senses of a what of of words right.

[36:42] So it's not like a principal part or a chief part right of of of these other sciences but why do you have the whole fifth book why do you have like a chief part

[36:56] well part of it is because of the again this likeness of wisdom to dialectic. The second tool of dialectic is to distinguish the senses of a word. Of course, because wisdom as a science or a episteme is about these most general things, and they are all named equivocally by reason, he has to do it, huh? And because he defends the axioms, and the words in all the axioms are equivocal by reason, and the same words as you have used, especially in wisdom, he's got to what really stop and do this in a very thorough way.

[37:36] But then you see another likeness to dialectic, because the tool of distinguishing the senses of a word is is the second tool of dialectic. Very fundamental.

[37:51] Okay, let's look here now.