Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
31. Can Objections Undo Faith or the Axioms? Introducing Book II and How Man Knows Truth
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/031-can-objections-undo-faith-or-the-axioms-introducing-book/

[0:00] theological aside here huh now are you going to do the fact check thing or not do you want to Yeah I have an exposition today that's why okay okay um it's a little different thing now but

[0:21] suppose huh you think of or you run into an objection against Article the faith okay objection to the possibility of the Trinity or the Incarnation or the Eucharist or something like this huh okay and suppose this objection you think of or that you hear right is an objection that you can't untie. Okay, any other time. Now,

[0:57] let's ask a question about this, huh? Would it be reasonable to give up the faith at this point? See, I think some people would say, "Well, yeah, it would be reasonable to give up the faith at this point because your reason sees an objection to the faith and no solution to the objection, right? " So the rationalist would say, "Yeah, it's reasonable. Yeah, you should give up the faith.

[1:25] " Okay. Now, you say no, right? But it doesn't seem, in some way, to be reasonable to give up the faith in this circumstance, right? Okay. Now, how would you say, and maybe you want to talk simply as opposed to in some way, right? Simply speaking, it's not reasonable to give up the faith at this point. Although in some way it seems reasonable, doesn't it? Because you seem to be following reason, which sees a subjection, right?

[2:06] And reason which sees no solution to the subjection, right? And therefore you seem to be following reason in giving up the faith. So why isn't it reasonable, right? You don't,

[2:25] you don't see that the objection is true. You just don't see how it's false. Yeah. You have other reasons. Yeah. Okay. Now, kind of the first thing I would point out is this:

[2:53] there are also objections, right, even to the axioms. Like what I gave you a few minutes ago, right? There are objections to the axioms

[3:07] that almost everybody cannot resolve, right? Now, would it be reasonable to give up the axiom, like my students might be, that the whole is more than a part, or whatever axiom it might be in question, right?

[3:32] Because there is an objection to it that you can see but can't resolve, right? That be reasonable? No, because you know the axiom. Yeah. Can't think of all those other no. You see. You know the you say Zeno has an argument right that you can't walk out the door right and most people can't answer that objection

[4:01] but being unable to answer the objection is that a reason to deny that you can walk out the door yeah yeah now there's something more to be said here though right now you see

[4:23] if I really do in fact know the what axioms right and therefore are sure about them right then I know that this objection against the axioms or this axiom right

[4:43] must have a defect somewhere in it right okay and so is it reasonable because an objection that I know has a defect in it to give up what I know to be true does that make sense see so although it seemed to be reasonable in some way

[5:13] simply if you look at the whole thing right it's not reasonable and the man who says it's reasonable to give up the axiom because there's an objection to it that you see but can't untie right

[5:41] he's saying that because it's reasonable in some way that simply speaking it's what reasonable right but if you consider the fact that the axioms are naturally known by us so we're naturally sure about them right

[6:10] then you see the objection right or you conclude that the objection must have a defect in it huh and therefore it's unreasonable to give up what you know to be true because an objection you know because of that fact to have a defect right see but there's kind of confusion here there is a certain reasonableness about giving it up isn't there because you do have an objection that you reason sees and can answer okay Now I take that because it's more manifest and less controversial, right?

[6:46] So, if you really do have the faith, right, then you know you're sure of the Trinity and the Incarnation, the Eucharist, and all these other things, and therefore you know that the objection that you cannot answer must have a defect in it, right?

[7:09] But is it reasonable to give up what I'm sure about, the faith, because an objection that I know through the certitude of faith must have a defect in it? That's subtle, though, right? But it seems to me, at first sight, somebody would say, "Well, you're not being reasonable. You should give up the faith, just like the other guy said. You should give up the axiom because your reason sees an objection it can't answer.

[7:45] " Now you see, if you and I are in a conversation and you think something, but you don't really know it, but you're this opinion, right? And then I give you an objection that you can't answer.

[8:04] Well, now it might be more reasonable for you to give up your opinion, right? Because you weren't sure about in the first place, and therefore you don't know that my objection has a defect in it, but the objection seems good, and you don't see what any way out of it, right? Well, then it might be reasonable for you to give up your opinion, right? But if you're sure about something, whether it be by natural understanding, like the axioms, or sure something by the faith, and there's an objection against it, whether you see the solution or not, you know it must have a defect in it.

[8:53] So it's unreasonable to give up what you're sure about because an objection you know through your certitude to have defect in it. That's kind of subtle, though, right? But you can kind of see how the rationalists, because of these objections, right,

[9:15] they conclude that it's reasonable, right, to give up the faith or to give up the axioms, and so they're mixing up what is reasonable in some imperfect way, right, with what is reasonable when you look at the whole picture.

[9:40] It's is it reasonable to drink a delicious poison? Well, here and now it seems reasonable. It's delicious, right? And seeing the consequences of drinking delicious poison, the pleasure of it seems hardly hardly reasonable to be indulged in, right? I see. And he's got to settle that, doesn't he? You know, because that's what's happened in the history of human thought. That people have rejected the faith, or rejected even the axioms, because an objection they cannot solve, right?

[10:20] And because that seems, therefore, in some way, to be reasonable to give up either the faith or to give up the axiom. Isn't that reasonable? Because not to be able to refute the objection seems to indicate a lack of true knowledge in what you have or true faith. Well, it seems to show that the thing is false, right? Yeah. See.

[10:48] But in a sense, you are using the less known to deny the more known. De Koninck said you can you can do the history of modern philosophy as a history of the denial of the more known by the less known, right? And that's not really reasonable, huh? De Koninck has that famous Laval Théologique et Philosophique there. the uh. It's in French. The paradox du devenir par contradiction, and it's it's the one that that Hegel uses to show that something can both be and not be, right?

[11:21] And Aristotle solves it in the sixth book of the Natural Hearing But it was a difficulty that ran through the Middle ages too, and in the understanding of Aristotle, and the theologians couldn't solve it, huh? Until Thomas Aquinas, I guess, just about. But Thomas Aquinas solved it with the way Aristotle solved it in the sixth book of the Natural Hearing huh?

[11:50] You know that one of Hegel, huh? You heard this, you know. When you see the paradox du devenir par contradiction, when what is not a circle becomes a circle, right? Hegel is trying to claim that when what is not a circle becomes a circle, in that becoming, it both is and is not a circle, right? And they do this in terms of time, right? And they say, well,

[12:17] there is a time in which the thing is not a circle, right? That time has an end, right? Because afterwards it is a circle, right? So the time which is not a circle has an end, and the end of time is time or the instant. Which is an instant, yeah. Just like the end of a line is not a line but a point, right? Okay. Now, likewise, huh?

[12:46] It wasn't always a circle, right? So there is a beginning, huh? Of its being a circle, right? Now, is the beginning of time, time, or an instant? An instant, yeah. Now, if the last instant, which is not a circle, is the first instant in which it is a circle, then in that instant, it both is and is not a what? Yeah. Now, if you say, "Well, there must be some time between the last instant is not a circle and the first instant which it is a circle, when the intermediate time is it or is it not a circle?

[13:29] " Because it is a circle, then that belongs to the time in which it is a circle. If it's not a circle, right, in that time, then the intermediate time is not in between the two, but it's belongs to the time which it is not a circle. Therefore, the last instant which it is not a circle must be the first instant which it is a circle. They get a contradiction, right?

[13:54] See. Now, the way this came into theology and in the theology of Eucharist to kind of points out some of these examples was in the Eucharist the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the body and blood of our Lord, right? So there is a time in which it is bread and wine, and then a time in which it is the body and blood of our Lord.

[14:22] But one time has an end and the other is a beginning, right? And there is no time in between. So the last instant in which it is bread and wine must be the first instant in which it is the body and blood of our Lord, and therefore you got heresy right now, right? You got, you know, so on. Well, most people cannot solve this, and even the theologians cannot solve this, you see.

[14:49] And Aristotle, in the sixth book of Natural Hearing points out that there is no last instant in which the what is not a circle

[15:10] is not a circle, right? Because the last time, right? But when you are becoming a circle, when you have become a circle, you are a circle, and you are not not a circle at that instant, huh? That's kind of you know interesting thing, and Aristotle developed that. But most people couldn't answer that, right? And so Hegel is denying the fundamental axiom of being a non-being. Because of that objection, and people are getting into trouble in theology, we have this, you know, co-presence of the two, you know, and this is really going to get you all kinds of difficulties.

[15:52] Because how does the body and blood get to be there if the other is not changed into it? And but those are very difficult things, right? But you have to start with easier examples, huh?

[16:09] But sometimes a person is scandalized by the fact that there is an objection to an article of the faith, and that almost everybody cannot answer, and the average Catholic can't answer. But

[16:26] it's possible even to have an objection against an axiom that not everybody can. The most people can't answer, huh? So you have to understand the human situation, huh?

[16:41] Well, tomorrow should we go to back to the book two? Is that agreeable? Yeah, and so we'll look at the first reading at least, huh? Okay. You don't, happen to have a translation of it? Do I do? But I didn't bring it because I didn't know I was going to be doing anything beyond the ninth book. So,

[17:04] so you have a Latin or a Greek or a Latin. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, first thing we got to do, like we do with the ninth book, right? We have to, to some extent, situate the second book. We did a little bit before, but we do again now, in particular.

[17:25] Kind of interesting the way Thomas divides the text there. You know that the he has the second book, the way of considering universal truth, right? And then the consideration of universal truth. Just a good example there for that. He divides the text.

[17:52] Um. He's dividing now books two through what? Fourteen, right? Dividitur ergo ista pars in partes duas. This part is divided into parts. In the first part, he determines those things that pertain to the consideration of universal truth, right? Okay. In the second, he begins to inquire the truth about the first principles and all other things to which extends the consideration of this philosophy, huh? So he's going to talk about what pertains to the consideration of universal truth, and he's going to.

[18:36] Pursue universal truth, but I don't know if that fully explains, you know, my book, what Book Two is about and why it's there, you know. But it's sort of interesting, huh?

[18:51] Because Book Two is going to begin with a consideration of how man is towards knowing truth. That's going to be the first lectio, right?

[19:11] And it's not until the second lexio that he develops the reason why the wise man should consider, right? How man is towards knowing truth?

[19:27] Now, that order maybe is is interesting, huh? You know, why doesn't he show first, right? Why it belongs to the wise man to consider how man is towards knowing truth,

[19:46] and then take up how man, right? But he's going to proceed from the same center that he did to show that wisdom is about being as being in the one many. But he's going off in a different direction, right? To some other matters of wisdom, huh?

[20:16] But you know, apart from why it's here in in wisdom and comes here, do you think it's necessary to consider how man is towards knowing truth? Isn't it necessary?

[20:47] Would it give you a limit of what he's capable, what he should pursue, can pursue. Yeah, yeah. Has kind of universal importance, right, for the pursuit of truth, right? It's extremely general, right? How is man towards knowing truth, right?

[21:10] What's What's interesting here, if you have experience the moderns, said Aristotle doesn't ask the question, whether man can what know truth, huh? But he seems to assume that man can know truth.

[21:34] And the question is, is it easy or difficult for him to know truth? That seems to be the question that Aristotle is going to answer here in this reading, right? To begin with, going to ask answer the question. He doesn't ask it, but you could say that question is presupposed

[22:00] to the first sentence of the second book, right? Because in the first sentence of the second book, he's going to say the consideration of truth is in one way difficult, in another way easy, right? So he seems to be giving an answer to the question: Is the consideration of truth easy or difficult for man? And there's three possible answers: It's easy, easy to know the truth, or it's difficult to know the truth, or in one way it's difficult, in another way it's easy, right?

[22:36] The more, is it? But it seems like three possible answers, right? And perhaps only a fool would say it's what easy, right? And that's it. No problem. No problem. Easy to know truth. You have to pretty much have experienced the life of the mind.

[22:54] But maybe a lot of people say, "Oh, it's very difficult," you know, and that's their answer, right? But? Aristotle's answer involves a distinction, right? You see, and remember what we said before. Perhaps every mistake of our mind, our thinking, comes from not seeing some distinction, or from misunderstanding some distinction, right?

[23:29] Aristotle here sees a distinction, knowing truth, right? That in this way it's difficult, and in this way it's what easy, right? You know, I don't think the average, if you ask the average college professor, he'd probably say it's what difficult, difficult, and then go at that, right? He wouldn't see this distinction that Aristotle sees, right? And is it important to see that distinction, as well as furthermore than to understand in what way it's difficult, way it's easy, right?

[24:12] Think about that a bit, huh? You see, but also think about the question a little bit. Why Aristotle doesn't ask the question that you expect a modern epistemologist, as they call themselves, to raise, you know? Aristotle has not asked the question that comes before. You're assuming that man can know truth, and then you're asking, is it easy or difficult for him to know the truth, right? But the prior question is: Can man know truth, right?

[24:44] And why doesn't Aristotle ask the question that comes before? I see, like we're saying before, one man is wiser than another man because he sees what is before or after what the other man sees. The moderns would say, "Why we're wiser than Aristotle because we see that before the question he asks

[25:10] is the question: Can man know truth, right? " And you shouldn't be asking whether it's easy or difficult to know truth. You know, it's like saying, you know, is it easier or difficult to be God for man?

[25:28] Well, if man can't be God, it's stupid to ask whether it's easier or difficult to be God, right? Um, is it easier or difficult to make a square circle? See, well, if it's impossible to make a square circle, forget about trying to find out whether it's easy or difficult. Um. So, if it's impossible for man to know truth, Aristotle asked the question he asked, right? The guy can't look before and after, right?

[26:02] Right. This is what the modern would say. You see, you? hear these guys; they're pretty much skeptics, right? So, why does Aristotle assume? You know, I remember reading what's his name, Ernst Cassirer. You know, did you know Ernst Cassirer at all or not? Kind of famous neo-Kantian, right? And you started in Germany, you know, and became famous there. But then you came over to Yale, you know, and and

[26:37] at the beginning of the De Anima course there at the faculty, I was quoting the seven wise men of Greece, right? And they said, "Know thyself," right? And this is kind of appropriate beginning here because in the De Anima, the soul is knowing itself, right? So I was kind of picking up on that, right? But the seven wise men put up at the Oracle of Delphi, "Know thyself," and then nothing too much.

[27:05] I say, well, apart from the fact that knowing yourself helps you to avoid too much of this or that, right? Is there a connection between know thyself, the meditation itself, and nothing too much? Well, I guess Cassirer just about his last work was the essay on man, just to be very popular one time, and he quotes the Greek saying, "Know thyself," but then he asserts that this was the end or goal for the Greek philosophers, huh?

[27:44] What's important to know yourself, but to make that the end goal of philosophy rather than knowledge of first cause, is too much. So it's very appropriate the Greek philosophers said, "Know thyself, and nothing too much, " because not only could they have the obvious applications to not eating too much and drinking too much and all sorts of stuff, but even to

[28:08] know thyself, right? To make knowledge of yourself the end of philosophy is to pursue knowledge of yourself too much. You see, this is this is more a beginning, you know, than that. So,

[28:26] why can Aristotle assume now, right? Oh, shoot! I didn't finish anything Cassirer in one of the books says, you know, the Greeks naively assumed that we could know the exterior world, right? And that's a common thing among among the modern philosophers, right? And you know the famous famous statement of Kant, you know, that it's a scandal, he says, that the philosophers have not been able to prove the existence of the external world.

[28:59] And my comment on that is that no, the scandal is that they should have tried to prove the existence of the external world, because obviously the senses and so on. I suppose the moderns would say, if you if you brought this thing to their attention, they'd say, Aristotle naively assumed that man can know the truth, and therefore he jumped into the second question: Is it easier or difficult for man to know the truth?

[29:27] Right. But did Aristotle naively assume that man can know truth? If you say truth can't be known, that that's true. You are assuming that that's true by saying that. Yeah, yeah. And if man cannot know the truth, he can't know it's true that he can't know the truth. So there is kind of obvious difficulties, right? But then there is also things statements that are obviously true, like the whole is more than a part.

[30:02] So it's clear that man does can know the truth. It's not to say how how much you can know it or how adequate he is in doing this. That's the question Aristotle doesn't ask, right? And of course, I love the thing, you know, the truth that statements exist, right? Because the statement statements exist seems to

[30:25] you know show that that that that is true that statements exist, and the man who says statements do not exist can only say that by making a statement, right? So I mean, it's absurd to say that that man what cannot know the truth, right? But that's not to say how much of it or how well he is towards knowing it, right? And how exactly that's what the problem really is.

[30:51] And the problem is not whether you can know truth, but but how well or how much you can know it, huh? And that's the question: the difficulty or the ease in which you can you can know truth, huh?

[31:05] So that's one thing you you might say, you know, because of being in a modern hostile environment, right? You might say that, huh? Now Thomas Aquinas says that the existence of truth is obvious, right? And if truth exists, then you're admitting it. If you say truth does not exist, you're maintaining that it's true that truth does not exist, so you maintain that truth does exist, aren't you?

[31:34] So he's no idea to avoid it, right? So Aristotle is asking the right question. The modern is a little different than than that. I mean, whether or not you can know the external world. Well, that's a different question, yeah. But I mean, just talking about truth, right? So why doesn't he answer? Why doesn't he ask the question? Can man know the truth? That might seem to the modern mind to be before the question.

[32:09] Is it easier or difficult to know the truth? Because that's supposed that you know the truth. Aristotle doesn't ask that supposedly before question because it's obvious that man can know truth, huh? It's a little bit like like like in the second book of the, a natural hearing where Aristotle considers what nature is, but doesn't ask does nature exist? He asks what is nature. He doesn't ask whether nature exists, and he and he comes back upon why he didn't ask that question.

[32:42] Because it's known to itself. It's obvious that nature exists, huh? What's not obvious is what it is, right? In the same way, he doesn't ask, you know, does the soul exist? But what is the soul, right?

[32:57] But he doesn't explicitly in the second book of the natural hearing. But here he doesn't explicitly. Why didn't I ask that? You know, but we're kind of forced to ask. Why doesn't he ask it, right? Because because we're the turn your custom there, and we're dealing with the moderns, but perhaps you know, even as natural thought, we could ask it, right? Why doesn't he ask that question, right?

[33:17] Apart from those moderns, it's because it's pretty obvious that man can know truth. What's not obvious is how much he can know and how easy or how difficult it would be, right? And

[33:34] it's kind of like when the when the seven. Wise men said, "Know thyself. " Yeah. The question was, "What is man, rather than is man? " Yeah. Like that, you gave the example of the student that said, "How do I know I am? " Yeah. And the professor responded by saying, "Who's asking the question? " Yeah. Who's asking? Yeah.

[33:55] Yeah. Yeah. Why Why do so many people think they don't know what they know these They read Descartes first. Custom bad custom. They can't answer objections bad custom. Yeah. That's because their minds out of order, right? They're denying the more known by the less known. as De Koninck pointed out, but how can that be so widespread? It seems very strange. Well, I suppose it's probably influenced the imagination there.

[34:48] You see, in the premium to wisdom, you learn that wisdom is about all things in some way, right? And most of all, it's about the first causes. So you are seeking the truth about the first causes, and to some extent, the truth about all things, right? So, given the universality of the wise man's consideration, even before the reasons Aristotle's only give here in the middle of the book, it seems kind of appropriate.

[35:17] To consider how man is towards knowing the truth, and in addition that he's looked after the premium at his predecessors, right, and they don't seem to have what. Come to an adequate knowledge of the causes, let alone the first causes, and and that seems to uh necessitate this consideration, right? Because hey, all these guys were seeking this universal truth, this truth about all things, and especially about the first causes, and what what they didn't get there, right?

[35:56] " So you might you know kind of raise the question there. Exactly, how is man situated with respect to knowing the truth, especially the truth about all things and the truth about the first causes? That seems to be, you know. So it seems to be a

[36:15] just from the premium and from the the book one after the premium, there seems to be something that moves you to say, "well it's about time? We thought about that. " Say,

[36:32] Aristotle's going to in the middle of the book give the reason why this consideration belongs to the wise man, huh? And that's maybe a little more precise, you know. It seems kind of appropriate even before you see that reason, even what's gone before.

[37:01] So those pork chops are thawing.