Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
45. Philosophy of Looking and Doing, and the Proemium to Wisdom: Wonder, Natural Desire to Know, and the Road from Sense to Experience
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/045-philosophy-of-looking-and-doing-and-the-proemium-to-wisdom/

[0:02] We kind of do it in our human knowledge, not in our divine knowledge. So it's lunchtime. What do you got? Steak left over? Cheese. Let's hear our low prayer. We're all here. In the. Name of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor.

[0:44] Amen help us to understand all that you've written. You know, when the higher angel illuminates the one right below him and all the way down the line, Thomas must have got a lot of help from his guardian angel, right? Because there's no one on earth that could illumine him, right? The highest guardian angel.

[1:11] Now, what does it mean to say that two things are distinct? One is not the other. Good, good. And reason gets into a lot of trouble because it doesn't see a distinction, or it misunderstands a distinction.

[1:36] So, what is the distinction of philosophy? What is the distinction of the kinds of philosophy? What is the the first distinction of the kinds of philosophy? What is that? Looking into it. Yeah, the looking philosophy, to speak English, more or less, and the philosophy of doing. Now, sometimes we use the word practical from the Greek or Latin word for doing, right? Praxis which you saw in the ninth book of wisdom, in fact.

[2:10] And sometimes you see theoretical or speculative words derived from the Greek words for, or the Latin word for looking at. But sometimes, especially with speculative, it has so many others uh different senses in English, right? That we hesitate to use that. But even theoretical has some meanings or connotations that's not so suitable. So I like to call them looking philosophy and the philosophy of doing. And

[2:42] as you mentioned with Boethius, there, when Lady Wisdom comes down to console Boethius in prison, she has on her gowns theta, which is the Greek word for looking at, and pi for the Greek word praxis or practical, the two kinds of philosophy represented there. Although the theta is put above the pi, as if looking philosophy is above the philosophy of doing.

[3:14] But now, how are these two kinds of philosophy distinguished? At first, what's the first way in which they are distinguished? By their end. By their end, yeah. And what is the end of looking philosophy? Understand. Yeah. As the name "looking" implies, trying to see, but to see in the sense of understand. And what is the end of the philosophy of doing? Order one's action. Okay, but it wouldn't be simple to say doing.

[3:54] Okay, but you could be more precise and say not just doing anything, but the end of the philosophy of doing is to do what is good. Or better, huh? For yourself, or for your family, or for your city or nation.

[4:22] Now, most philosophers that I talk to wouldn't know that that is the distinction of philosophy—the distinction, the first distinction of the kinds of philosophy. They'd be talking about some chimera like epistemology, and who knows what they'd be talking about. History, philosophy, probably another part of philosophy, you know. So, because they are ignorant of the distinction of the kinds of philosophy, the first distinction already their mind is out of order.

[4:58] Can't have order without distinction. Now, the distinction of the kinds of looking philosophy is made where in the text of the philosopher. Most fully in Book Six of Metaphysics. Yeah. In the beginning of the sixth book of wisdom, Aristotle will distinguish between natural philosophy and mathematical philosophy. And first philosophy, or or wisdom, right? Um.

[5:43] He does distinguish these partially in the second book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, where he distinguishes between natural philosophy. And mathematical philosophy, but the complete distinction is made in the sixth book of wisdom. Because you don't even know until after the books of natural philosophy, or at least after the books in the books of natural hearing, the few books about the soul, that wisdom and first philosophy.

[6:20] Is something other than natural philosophy that comes after it, huh? And where is the distinction of the kinds of practical philosophy, or the philosophy of doing? Where is that made? Do we have a text of Aristotle where that the three are distinguished? Isn't there something in the beginning of the ethics? Nicomarchean ethics. Yeah, But, Aristotle doesn't in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics distinguish

[7:00] ethics, as we call it, domestics and political philosophy. We do have the ethics that's come down to us from Aristotle. We do have the politics, the political philosophy. If you get the you know the Oxford Aristotle, they have a book on on the household economics, but in the Greek sense of household, which the scholars say is from the school of Aristotle, but they don't think it's by Aristotle.

[7:32] But do you have the distinction between the three made explicitly in a text of Aristotle that we have? I guess he distinguishes from making there, What about the politics? Well, in the Politics, he does in the first book after the Premium, devote himself to distinguishing the family from the city, and therefore, in a way, domestic philosophy from political philosophy. And he's responding to a position of Plato, perhaps, that to rule a family to rule a city differ in degree.

[8:19] Aristotle says no, they differ in kind. Okay, and in order to bring that out, he goes through the parts of the family and so on in the first book. So that's something to do with this, right? But the place where I know that these three are distinguished is in Thomas Aquinas' premium to the Nicomachean Ethics. We've talked a bit about that Premium, where Thomas first distinguishes the knowledge of reason by the order it considers.

[9:01] But then the order which reason makes in the acts of our wills and consequently what we do, he later on in that same Premium distinguishes into the three. Incidentally, the first was called monastic, not in your sense, but because it deals with one man, and then domestics, then politics. And the whole thing is sometimes called ethics, which comes from the word custom. But custom is as important in talking about the city as talking about the individual.

[9:33] So, but we are accustomed to call monastica, not that, but ethics, right? Okay. So the distinction between ethics and domestics and and political philosophy. The text I know that does it explicitly is Thomas' premium* to Nicomachean Ethics. I don't know, this may be ignorance, but I don't know a text where Aristotle does that explicitly, like he does in the sixth book for looking philosophy, in the sixth book of wisdom for looking philosophy.

[10:09] I'm sure he knew it, and that's partly why there is in the Aristotelian school not only the ethics and the politics, but the economics, meaning the household, the domestics, huh? Oikos domus, huh? But we use the Latin word domestics, or the word for house.

[10:30] Okay. Now, we're going to look at the *Premium* to wisdom here, and it's a longer *Premium* than most of Aristotle's *Premiums*, And although. So it's a premium to wisdom or first philosophy.

[10:55] To some extent, it's also a premium to the whole of looking philosophy, because, as we'll see, wisdom or first philosophy is the end and the goal of all looking philosophy. So to some extent, you're being

[11:20] getting here a premium to the whole of of looking philosophy, and you could say this more than you could about the premium say to the eight books of the physics of natural hearing. And so some things in here, like for example, wonder is the beginning of philosophy. That's something important to know, not only for wisdom but for natural philosophy. You don't wonder about what time is or what motion is, and so on.

[11:52] You don't have the beginning of natural philosophy. And Euclid arouses wonder, eh? Of course, some theorems more than others, huh? And I think I told you a little story about my politician friend sneering at me, a college graduate, reading Euclid, and then I kind of let him snuck him into that famous theorem in Book Three that between the tangent to a circle and the circle, you cannot insert a straight line.

[12:22] But then he went very slowly, you know, and finally he was kind of amazed, and no more sneering at my good natured students anyway. But I mean, you know, at my doing these elementary studies, He wasn't a bit aroused, huh? And

[12:41] that's why I like too that word theorem in geometry, something to look at, huh? You know that 14th theorem. I've been looking at it now for weeks. It's just so beautiful, and it uses two theorems that are beautiful to look at in themselves: the fifth theorem of Book Two and the Pythagorean theorem, and both of those are beautiful to look at. But use both of these beautiful things to look at to look at something else that's so beautiful.

[13:04] Oh, it's incredible! Which theorem? Which theorem is this? The 14th theorem. And what's really new in the 14th theorem? How to make a what? Find the side of a square equal to that of a given oblong, huh? So exciting to see the Pythagorean theorem and theorem five in Book Two being used. These two theorems in themselves you you like so much, right? It's like you know you like this guy and you think he's a very nice guy.

[13:32] You like this girl, and now they've got a baby, and oh boy, you see, double joy. So they're both involved in this fun little baby. See, so both those wonderful theorems are involved in this. This is incredibly beautiful. So, some things that Aristotle will say, like philosophy begins in wonder, or all men by nature desire to know or to understand, depending on how you translate that, that's behind the whole of looking philosophy and not just wonder.

[14:05] So, although it's a premium to to wonder, I mean, excuse me, to wisdom, it is kind of a premium to the whole of looking philosophy, and there are things in there that kind of a a defense of the whole of looking philosophy, but also because it's the end of looking philosophy. And when you look at the premium of Aristotle's the Nicomachean Ethics, ethics, Aristotle will say we want to say what this is about and to what art or science it belongs.

[14:39] And as you know, he answers that second question. The first is about happiness, right? But he answers the second question by saying it's political knowledge, and it's kind of interesting the reason he gives for that. But it shows you that the premium of Nicomachean Ethics is in a way a premium, somewhat to the whole of practical philosophy. And Thomas commenting on Aristotle saying that the ethics is political knowledge, he says, well, the Elementa of political knowledge is in the ethics.

[15:16] I always stop if I'm doing that with the students, and I say, now, what do you think of our politicians? Do you think they had the elements of their of political knowledge? Because they don't know the Nicomachean Ethics, obviously, in the in the crazy decisions or crazy votes they're taking, right? So they lack the elements of political knowledge. I said this here partly for itself, but also another thing I want to point out about these two premiums in particular, the premiums of Nicomachean Ethics and the premium to the fourteen books of wisdom.

[15:55] As far as I can recall, these are the two premiums that have an epilogue. Okay. And an epilogue in which Aristotle recalls what he's done in the premium.

[16:17] Now, in the premium to the wisdom here, Aristotle is going to do two things. Looking at it as a whole, in the premium to the Nicomachean Ethics, he's going to do three things. Now, if you read Thomas's commentary or exposition of both of these, he'll divide by the logical and understandable division of the premium to wisdom. He'll divide it into two.

[16:53] He'll tell you what the two parts are. We'll be telling you, saying that in a minute. When he lays out the premium to Nicomachean Ethics, he divides it into three,

[17:06] and you get a confirmation that Thomas is dividing it logically and understandably into two—the one and the other three—because at the end of the premium to wisdom, Aristotle recalls exactly those two things that Thomas said he's going to do. And at the end of the premium to the Nicomachean Ethics, he recalls three things, exactly the three things Thomas said he's going to do.

[17:38] And the fact that Aristotle has an epilogue means maybe in just these two, and very precise, maybe it's a sign that these two premiums have a kind of what preeminence, right? Because the one seems to be, to some extent, a premium to the whole-looking philosophy, and the other, in a way, to what practical philosophy.

[18:05] And a second thing that they have in common in the order of the epilogue, Aristotle recalls what he's done, starting with the thing he's just last said, and then goes back to the second thing, and then finally to the first thing. Now, just give you the epilogue here of the Nicomachean Ethics, which is

[18:32] at the end of the third chapter, the first three chapters. Of course, I don't put my stamp of approval upon the translation, but it's close enough for my purposes here. This is the last sentence now. These remarks about the student, well, that's the last thing he talked about—who is or is not a suitable student Student of political matters, and so on. Okay, the sort of treatment to be expected—that's the second thing he did.

[19:02] The way of considering these things and so on, and the purpose of the inquiry. Okay, that's the first thing he did. So it's kind of a natural thing, you know. Let's recall what he did yesterday, and then the day before, and the day before that, right? Kind of a natural way of recalling, huh? And then says maybe taken as our preface. Well, the Greek word there is not preface; it's not premium, but it's in the verb form.

[19:32] I think performiasto, right? Let this be our premium, right? So now, in the premium to the wisdom here, Aristotle, as Thomas explains, will do two things. First, what wisdom aims at.

[19:59] That's going to be the first part of the premium. He's going to show that wisdom aims at knowing causes, and then more precisely at the very first causes. But all that is the first part of the premium, and

[20:15] the second part of the premium is what kind of knowledge is wisdom, which involves seeing how desirable knowledge is too. Well, at the end of the second chapter in that division, but the third lexio in Thomas. Just read you the English here, which I don't vouch for as far as accuracy of translation, but close enough for our purposes. This is the last sentence now in chapter two, or the last sentence in the third lexio.

[20:46] We have stated then what is the nature of the science we are searching for. That's the second thing he did, but he calls it first, right? Being the last thing he did. And what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach? What is the goal, right? What is the aim? Okay.

[21:06] I see in the premium say to natural philosophy or to the or to the physics. Aristotle does two things there. He first says what wisdom is aiming at, and then the order in which we're going to proceed. But there's no epilogue at the end, right? Okay. So this is a no way. That's my number again. It's your card too. It's your uh, ordination card. Shocking! you've never let me read your book.

[21:39] It's uh, it's Shakespeare's birthday but one day, by the way. April twenty second, right? Yeah, that Shakespeare's birthday I think is April twenty third. Okay. Sorry about that.

[21:56] The fact that Aristotle would be so formal, right, and so you know precise, huh, that he wants you to see those two things or three things in the case of the Ethics, and that he recalls them, right, and you say, "Oh, gee, what, did I see those three things or those two things?" Kind of gives a prominence to these two premium maybe over all the other premium that Aristotle has.

[22:22] And I say one reason for saying that these two premium have a prominence is that one seems to be the nearest thing to a premium to looking philosophy as a whole, and especially to its end, right? And the other to what practical philosophy and even its end, which is political philosophy, the end of the knowledge. Is that clear? Okay.

[22:55] Actually, I'm a little unclear. The fact that he states what he was intending to do. What's this? The fact that perhaps, to the best of my recollection, the fact that in these two proemia, now almost every book, as you know, of Aristotle has a what? Proemium huh. But the fact that once he's finished

[23:22] the proemium here, and the proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics, he has an epilogue, right, which he doesn't have in the other proemia. An epilogue in which he is explicitly recalling, right, the division of the proemium, in which one case is into two and the other into three, and he recalls them in the same way. The last thing he did, and works his way back to the first, right, is a sign that maybe he wants that these proemia and what is done in them and the parts of them, right, are especially important, right.

[24:02] And why is that? Because one is a proemium in a sense to the whole of looking philosophy, but especially to the the culmination of looking philosophy, which is wisdom or first philosophy, and the other is to some extent a proemium to the whole of practical philosophy, and especially to the end political philosophy in a way, because he says it's a kind of political knowledge, right? He's looking forward to that.

[24:30] Okay. And of course, the epilogue is also confirmation that Thomas has divided the text. Right. And I'm sure Thomas, you know, given his work in other proemia, he could have divided it like he did without the epilogue. It was nice to see the epilogue agreeing with Thomas. But you have to realize that the epilogue is recalling the parts in the what reverse order that Thomas gives them.

[24:54] There's kind of a reason to do that, right? You know, if I try to recall the last week, last three days, I might try to recall what I did yesterday, first, and then the day before, and then the day before that, even though I know yesterday didn't come before the day before it. Do you see that? Okay.

[25:17] Now. Before we pointed out the distinction between the editorial and reference division of a work and the logical and understandable division of the work, you know that. And we pointed out how the

[25:43] editorial and reference division of the fourteen books of wisdom is into fourteen books, right? But the logical and understandable division is not into fourteen parts, but it's into what? Two parts: the premium, and then the drawing out of the work, the tractatus, the treatise. And the premium in the editorial and reference division that Thomas has is divided into three what? Readings, lectios, which occupy then the first three lexios or readings in the first book.

[26:22] In the English edition, if you look at that, the editorial and reference division is into two chapters. Now, I think the one in Thomas's one is easier to use because the first two lectios correspond exactly to the first part of the proemium and the third lectio or reading to the second part. But in the distinction into two chapters, they don't correspond. The first part of the premium occupies chapter one, and the first part of chapter two, and the second part occupies the rest of chapter two.

[27:17] So, as far as referring to the editorial and reference division of the text, as you must when you give the logical and understandable one, it's a little easier to use the lectio one, right? And that's genuinely perhaps true as well, huh? Who provided? What? Who provided the lexio division?

[27:44] I don't know, but Thomas has that, huh? And maybe done himself, or I know, but we look to Thomas, though not for the editorial and reference division, but the logical and understandable one. And the first two lexios in the editorial and reference division correspond in a way to a the subdivision of the first part. The first part is going to be showing what is wisdom aiming at.

[28:20] That's what you're trying to show. And in the first lectio, you'll see that wisdom is aiming at causes. And you could almost, from what he says there, see that it's aiming at the first causes. But then Aristotle draws back and says it's aiming at causes, as if he wants to be very slow to develop the great truth about wisdom. And then in the second lectio he will work out a six-part description of the wise man, which is very interesting in itself.

[28:47] And from that, he will kind of reason right that wisdom is about what is said of all and a cause of all. Okay, they're not the same thing. We'll see that when we get there. But the main thing he's trying to show in the second lectio is more precisely that wisdom is not only aiming at causes but the very first causes. So the distinction between the two lexios does correspond to, in this case, the logical and understandable division of the first part of the proemium Is that formal enough for you us we hate formality in democratic times.

[29:26] That's too bad, but that's gonna impede our knowledge, right? Custom is a tyrant. Now Aristotle begins with the famous statement: All men, pantes anthropoi, fuse by nature, oregontai desire or want to to. And then he used the word eidenai, and you could translate eidenai by to know, and very often it is translated, and it does make sense if you translate it as to know in general. But Aristotle is more apt to use eidenai, and even the Greek dictionary tells you that eidenai has more the sense of to see, to understand.

[30:18] And so you could translate the text either all men by nature desire to know, or all men desire by nature to understand. And most of the moderns say to know, but sometimes you see in the commentaries when they all have the word to what understand. I think Merbeck you might have scire does he? Scire. Yeah, and I don't think that's so correct either. But it's certainly not to know in the broad sense.

[30:50] Scire is, you know, the effect of demonstration, right? Aristotle used the word eidenai which is most related to the word to see. The word idas from there. So to see, but taken in the sense of to understand.

[31:11] Now the sign he's going to give of the truth of that, you know, especially using the eyes, right? You would interpret the way that confirms the first. If you if you take eidenai to mean to know in general, then to see with the eyes is a particular kind of knowing, right? Okay.

[31:37] But if you take eidenai to mean to understand, then be kind of analogy, right? That just as I use my eyes sometimes just to see something, like some of you guys are all looking at the stars, I understand last night the shooting stars or falling stars, and sometimes use your eyes just to see the sunset or something that you were talking about the table. But then we use our our eyes to do all kinds of things, right?

[32:04] Well, likewise, we use our the eye of the soul, which is reason, not just to to make or do something, but sometimes just to see, just to understand, right? And to be kind of a what? One is not a particular example of the other, but t here is a a likeness there, and makes sense doing it either way, huh? Probably the texts, the Greek words themselves, lend themselves more to my second interpretation, but I sometimes use the word to know, and and and then the second one is one kind of knowing exemplifies what we've been saying here about knowing.

[32:40] Okay, that makes sense too. Now, when I get very pedantic about that first sentence, I sometimes ask three questions, huh? And question one is, what does it mean? Question two is, is it true? Assuming we know what it means and that it's true, after knowing what it means, then the third question is, why does he begin there, right? Okay.

[33:17] Now, when he says anthropoi, which we translate men, but the Greeks have a separate word, right, for man in general, huh? As as but we don't have one for man in general, as opposed to woman, huh? So I always have to ask the question: Does he mean men as opposed to women, or does he mean men in general? And we mean men in general. And does he mean men as opposed to boys?

[33:42] No. Okay. And desire, we take people as kind of knowing what that means. What does by nature mean? Born with it. Yeah. Or you could say inborn, right? Kind of a native English translation for natural is what inborn. The Greek says by nature, but you can say in English, this desire is by birth; it's inborn. Okay. And we've already talked a bit about eidenai, right? So we know somewhat what this means, huh?

[34:23] But now this next question is: Is it true? It's probably easier to show as true by saying all men by nature desire to know than to say they desire to understand.

[34:42] But Aristotle gives us a sign of this is the fact that we use our senses sometimes just to know. He's talking about desiring to know just for the sake of knowing. He doesn't say, you know, a sign of this is that all men philosophize. He doesn't say a sign of this is that all men do scientific research, or a sign of this that all men do historical research.

[35:12] No, he takes something that's common to everybody. Everybody at some time uses their senses to what? Just to see something. They look at the sunset, and they look at the rainbow, and they look at the ocean, or they look at the waves, and the rocks, and the hills, and the mountains, and so on, right? And so he takes what is most common, you might say, to men.

[35:36] And this also seems to distinguish us from the beasts, who, although they have many of them eyes, they don't seem to look at the what? Beautiful, huh?

[35:50] They seem to use their eyes to get something to eat or watch out for the enemies and so on, huh? Now, if you're saying to know, he can give a second, a second example or a second sign or witness, and that is everybody to some extent enjoys stories. And as a child, when your mother or father or somebody reads you a story, you want to see how it turns out, huh?

[36:21] So if you're reading Little Red Riding Hood, what's going to happen to Little Red Riding Hood when she gets to her grandmother's house, huh? So you want to know how the story turns out. Because you're going to make or do something with how it turns out. Oh. And sometimes I take the example even for an adult, how an adult may start watching a movie on TV, say, somewhat late at night, or start reading a novel or something, huh?

[36:50] And they sit up watching the movie to see how it turns out if it's interesting, or they continue reading the novel if it's interesting, even though it's eating into their bedtime, huh? And they're going to be less alert next day at the job, huh? They're not going to find from the movie maybe something's going to help them in the job tomorrow. So it's simply out of what the wonder has been aroused by the first part of the plot that they want to see how it turns out, huh?

[37:20] And everybody, to some extent, does that, huh? Aristotle says in the book and the poetic art. I have a cousin who's married to a very practical woman, and my cousin was reading some Russian spy novel. Those are gripping your attention and so on years ago, and it's kind of a thick novel like these Russian novels, unfortunately are. And he couldn't put it down. Finally, finally finished the novel, and he left it around the house somewhere.

[37:52] And his very practical wife picked it up and started to look at it, and she couldn't put it down either. And she was so mad at her husband that he had left it around. You see, so even this very practical woman, right, had some desire to know, and like the person who's watching the movie there at night and so on, interfering with their, you know, night's rest so they can be alert to the job tomorrow.

[38:19] It's interfering with what they do, huh? And she was mad because she wasn't doing her housework, whatever it was, because of this darn novel. I've got to say, so even that very practical woman has some natural desire, right, to know, apart from doing. It's what it's a point that Aristotle is trying to bring out here.

[38:40] Um. Now, a third thing, which is something like the story too, is when you're watching a game or something like that. Well, if it's lopsided, you know, people sometimes, like a baseball game, you know, it was way lopsided. You'll see people maybe leaving the stands in the ninth inning or something, to get on the parking lot and beat the other people. The log jam is going to be there after the game.

[39:09] But if it's very close and undecided or tied up or something, going into the ninth, you won't see that same people going out to the parking lot. Why not? The practical thing to do is to get out there before the log jam develops You can get out of the parking lot and on your way home. But there, what wonder has been aroused? It's interesting. We use the word tied up there.

[39:34] This game is all tied up. And then when someone hits a home run in the lower half of the ninth, say the game is untied. And when Aristotle describes the plot there of a work of fiction, he says it consists of tying out, tying a knot, or knots and untying the knot. That's why Shakespeare says in Twelfth Night, as one of the characters at the end of the second act, "O time the must untangle this?

[40:02] Not I. It is too hard a knot for me to untie." Says Viola there at the end of the second act. That great play of Shakespeare's. So we know what this statement means now a bit, and we know it has some evidence of its being true, right?

[40:21] And of course, you realize in its being true that the philosopher, in pursuing knowledge for its own sake and having the desire to do so, doesn't have a desire that's essentially different from the desire of every man to know apart from doing, but it's a more developed desire, a stronger one, that enables him to investigate even difficult things. But it's the development of a natural desire.

[40:56] Now the third question is, why does Aristotle begin with this statement? Because the goal of this book is to satisfy that desire. Yeah. Yeah. He's going to try to.

[41:19] He begins with the end. Well, it's much more the beginning, the desire to know. But there's perhaps a couple of reasons at least why he begins with this.

[41:32] He wants to show the goodness of knowing apart from making or doing. And as you know, the first definition of good is the good is what all want.

[41:50] But sometimes people want what is only an apparent good. But if all men want something naturally, that's a much stronger argument, huh? The fact that something is wanted is a sign that it's good, right? But not a necessary sign that it's a true good, huh? It might be only an apparent good. But the fact that it's desired is a sign that it's either a true good or apparent good, as good as in that way.

[42:25] But if it's desired naturally, if there's a natural desire for it, that would seem to be a sign that it is true. uh naturally good, and therefore what truly good, right?

[42:37] So, contrary to what a lot of people might think, especially in the very practical, right, modern world, in terms of the major sources that we spoke of this morning of the customs of modern world, they seem to be opposed to the pursuit of knowledge just for the sake of knowing. Both the all three of the groups, right, especially the second and the third, as Heisenberg and de Tocqueville, other great minds, note.

[43:09] So that's one thing, right? You're kind of showing by this that to know for the sake of knowing, knowing that is desired, not for the sake of anything beyond it, right, is something naturally good.

[43:30] Now, second reason that Thomas suggests, you may have seen this in the laying out, the fact that there's a natural desire for this is a sign that it's in some way possible, because nature doesn't give natural desires for what is impossible. And you can see this in the more known natural desires like hunger and thirst. If man, and in this case also the other animals, have a natural desire for food and a natural desire to drink and so on, it doesn't mean you will necessarily get food to eat or necessarily find water to drink.

[44:18] But it does mean that should be what possible, right? It's not in principle as were impossible. Nature does nothing in vain, huh? So if nature has given us this natural desire to know, and this desire for wisdom is really just the fully grown, huh, the desire of the philosopher to know is to the desire of the common man to know, like the man is to the boy, right?

[44:49] The boy. Is not fully grown, and the natural desire to know for its own sake is not fully grown. Maybe in the common man, but in the philosopher, the man who desires wisdom, this natural desire is fully grown. And so, the fact that there is a natural desire for this, emphasizing a natural, this natural, inborn, is a reason to say it's not vain to be pursuing this knowledge.

[45:20] It must be possible in some way, even though it may be found to be very what difficult to acquire. So, a sign of this, he says, is the love of the senses. For apart from their need, and this shows that he's thinking now, desire to know. Period.

[45:46] For apart from their uses, they are loved for themselves. Right there, you have the verb. One of the verb forms is related to agape, huh agapontes, Greek has as many words as you know for what love, right? And it's more distinct that way, like C. S. Lewis points out in the Four Loves. Have you seen that work? But here, agapontes doesn't mean agape in the sense that Saint Paul talks about, or the sense that C.

[46:21] S. Lewis talks about of it, very much. And he says, and especially among the others, that through the what eyes? For as just say in class, you know, most people would rather be deaf than what blind. I think he asked people. And you wouldn't want to be either, right? Which would you rather be, deaf or blind?

[46:55] What? Deaf, yeah, yeah. I had one girl in class who played Bach on the organ. It was a lover of music, and she said she'd rather be blind than deaf because a musician, you know. But I finished her off with. She's a pious girl too. I finished her off with you know, scripture saying, "You know, I'll guide you as the eye, apple of my eye." So that silenced you

[47:23] You know, you're very precious. I'll guide you as the apple of my eye. So, Um And of course, the eyes able to know things what at a great distance, and they know things clearly, and so they're very much loved that way. For not only when you want in order to do something, but even wishing to do nothing, we choose to see before the others, so to speak.

[47:55] And the cause of this is because it most of all makes us know among the senses and shows many differences among the things. Okay, so Aristotle begins this. A consideration of what wisdom is, or what it aims at, by something more general, but is kind of preparing the way for this. You're seeing that to know, even apart from doing or making, is naturally good, and therefore possible in some way.

[48:34] But now he's going to begin to talk about the order, the development of knowledge, starting from the very beginning of our knowledge and going towards the highest. And he's going to be giving us in this next part here something of the natural road in our knowledge. And you could say the natural road in our knowledge is really the road from the senses all the way to wisdom, although most people don't go that far.

[49:10] But as he talks about this natural road, he will give evidence, and you will see it: that one is moving in the direction of wisdom, and that's perhaps the reason why he takes it up, because it's hard to know what wisdom is and what it's aiming at. But if you see that the natural road is going the direction of wisdom, this may give you a clue as to what wisdom is going to be about.

[49:44] And I've mentioned before how, when you ask in class, "Do you think wisdom comes in the beginning of our knowledge, or in the middle, or at the end?" Usually, the students will say to a person

[50:02] that it begins, that it comes at the end. And so the word wisdom here is being used to name what comes, what is the end of our knowledge,

[50:19] and what is the best knowledge. And what is the end of our knowledge? Not only in the sense that it comes last in the order of learning, but also that it's the end in the sense of the goal, the purpose of all this looking knowledge.

[50:42] You mentioned kind of an example of the first part, not in this context. Though when you get a pair of sunglasses and you can see a lot more, you have a delight and just like on a bright day, you put on a pair. of sunglasses Yeah, they look more beautiful. The fall foliage does, and a bright day with sunglasses. I know it's in England there, which is supposed to have the best fall foliage around, and you have that.

[51:09] That delight, yeah, that natural delight, yeah. But you see how men, you see, will put paintings up on their walls, and most people, even you know, you know, working class people, they'll have some kind of a landscape or some kind of a painting in their house. You say, you know, well, be more practical if you put up the, you know, weights and balances or something up there, or the, bus schedule or something.

[51:35] you know. you do something with. What do you do with that? We get up in the wall. And and they maybe don't even reflect what they have up in the wall, right? But this is a sign of what Aristotle is saying, right? That these things up in the wall, rather than than the

[51:55] weights and measures table or something, or you know, recipes or something, right? Okay. So he's going to teach us something about the natural road, but he's not considering the natural road as if that is the what. What he's he's trying to do here, ultimately, he's trying to he's talking about the natural road so he can say something about eventually what wisdom is, huh?

[52:34] So he starts at the beginning, and as Alice in Wonderland says, a very good place to begin, huh? Or as the music girl says huh A very good place to begin. So he says, by nature, right, animals come to be having what sense? And of course, man is an animal, huh? And what is animal and man develops before what is specifically what human, huh? In general, the more general comes before the more particular.

[53:08] So this is the beginning of the natural road, and then he comes to the second thing. From this, there comes to be in some of them. There does not come to be in some of them, memory, right?

[53:22] Because some of them seem to what only act from what is here and now, huh? They don't seem to have memory. But in others, what memory comes to be, right?

[53:41] Now memory represents, say, what further stage along the know of the road, huh? Okay. And I give an example of one of the family cats there years ago. There was something cooking on the snow stove that smelled pretty good, huh? Electric stove. So the cat decided to jump up on on the stove, and when her paws hit the. uh coils whew singed and she wasn't really hurt much, but she kind of fell to the floor.

[54:18] Well, you know something? That cat never tried to jump up on the stove again, in my experience. That cat was what wiser, right? Was it? So, I said, if you had sensing but not memory, right? Would you be any wiser than the baby born yesterday?

[54:43] In fact, maybe the baby born yesterday doesn't need glasses. So, if anything, they're better off than I am, right? But they have no what?

[54:53] They don't have memory yet, huh? Okay. So, I would never advance beyond the baby if I didn't have memory. So, I'm a little bit wiser. That cat is a little bit wiser because he remembers what happened the last time he jumped on it, huh? Okay.

[55:11] My mother used to say to the salesman, "I wasn't born yesterday." But you'd be no wiser than someone born yesterday or even today if you had no memory. So, you can see a little bit. You're moving towards wisdom, aren't you? As you go from something that has only sensing to something that has an addition to sensing, memory.

[55:39] And so he says, "Ah, these ones seem to be more what? phronimoterai, more prudent in a way, huh? So the cat is more prudent now because he has memory, huh? "

[55:57] And then Aristotle goes into what is a little bit of an aside as far as the direct what distinguishing in order of the steps along the natural road. He talks about those who have what the sense of hearing and can learn from others, and he's saying some things that might be hard to know without some precise examination of the bees and so on.

[56:28] Now, around line 25, or at the end of the line 25. There, he's going to go now, though, to the next very definite stage, and that is going to be what experience, huh? Okay.

[56:49] In what sense is it true that that hearing is the sense by which we learn? Well, you can see that, huh? You know, in terms of the spoken word comes first of all before the written word, right? But in terms of learning from your parents, right, to the written messages, it's always by the spoken word. So this isn't absolutely speaking, but just. in the natural order? Well, that's the way you first, yeah, the natural order you first learn by that way, right?

[57:21] And the spoken word is very important in teaching, you know. it always needs the spoken word, huh? and sometimes the written word doesn't come alive until you've heard the spoken word expounding it, huh? And that's why Saint Paul says too, you know, "Fides ex auditu faith or belief is from from hearing, huh? Okay. " All right, Thomas, there in the prayer there before

[57:49] the adoro te devote right? huh Visus, tactus, gustus, in te fallitur sed auditu solo tuto creditur Okay. Now he says the other animals live by images and by memories, but they partake little of experience. Now, experience is the next step after memory. And Aristotle is using the word experience here to mean a collection of many memories of the same sort of thing.

[58:27] And this, therefore, comes as the third thing, as we said the other day, after sensing, memory, and obviously the collection of many memories of the same, which is experience, comes after what one memory, right? Now he says that the other animals partake little of experience because experience already starts to reveal something of the influence of reason, reason bringing together things and seeing the similarities among them, and so you start to collect many memories of the same thing.

[59:01] Well, that reminds me of something like that, you know, and that reminds me, you know, and you see something, you know, in nature or somewhere else, and then you walk along, you see something else, and you remember the other thing, and you start what bring these things together, and that's already showing something of the influence of what a reason, huh?

[59:22] But he says he's kind of jumping there, but the race of men live by art and by reasoning, and Thomas recalls that when he talks about. Or gives a proemium to logic. But going back to the regular, straightforward order here, empiria or experience comes to men from what? Memory. Yeah. Now I have to warn students that sometimes we use the word experience in a different sense. What Aristotle means by experience here is a collection of many memories of the same thing.

[1:00:05] But sometimes when something that you undergo makes a big impression upon you, you hear people say, "That was quite an experience. " You know, I got hit by the car and then you know, went to the hospital and so on. But that's just one sensation, one memory, right, that made a big impression upon you, huh? And that's not what he means by experience here, huh? Okay. That's still back and you know, a noteworthy sensation, maybe memory, right?

[1:00:35] Now here, by experience, he means a collection of many memories of the same. Okay. And so this. Yeah. Is that something that results from the collection? It's just. No, it is is the collection of many memories of the same thing, right? Okay. Now, does this represent um an advance in human knowledge over one memory? Yeah. And I take the example in class. I say, if you got a guy who's been out with one girl, he's had one date his whole life, right?

[1:01:09] Or vice versa, a girl has had one date with one guy in her life, right? Does he seem as wise about women as a man who's had many dates with many women, huh? Or a and remembers them, right? Or a girl has had many dates with many men, and you know, we all think of the man of experience as being what wiser, right? And so, if you're in a political campaign and this is your first political campaign, you don't seem to be as wise as the man who's been in many political campaigns and has memories of all these, and he seems to be what more knowing, right?

[1:01:49] Doesn't there the advance occur from the slight difference in the different memories? Because if you have the same memories, same exact experience many times, yeah, it almost be like having one. Perhaps, perhaps. I'm just saying. In general, we think the man who of many memories, right, brought together, the man of experience is wiser than the man of one memory, right? We think he's wiser about men or about women or whatever it is, huh?

[1:02:19] You see. Um, if you've seen one cat doing something once, and I see you know one cat or many cats doing many things many times, right? Ah. I have an experience of cats. You don't. You have a memory of cats, huh? If you've drunk one glass of wine once in your life, you don't seem to be as wise about wine as a man who's drunk many glasses of wine and has many memories of wines.

[1:02:49] And when he tastes a new wine, he can call upon that experience of wine, and he seems to be wiser about wines, huh? So, notice how you're doing. You're going in the direction of wisdom, aren't you? As you go from sensing to having memory, and then what? finally experience. And even if you take the the first step, sensing, doesn't an animal that has sensation and is therefore aware of its surroundings in some way seem wiser than a tree that doesn't even know what's going on around it?

[1:03:27] You know, if I try to cut off the arm or or the leg or something of an animal, the animal will know it, right? You cut off the the limb of a tree, it doesn't seem to know that having one of its limbs cut off, right? But doesn't the animal that has sensation seem to be wiser than the tree that seems to be unaware of its surroundings?

[1:03:48] Yeah. And then the the the cat that has a memory there, right, of the hot stove or whatever it might be, seems to be what wiser, right? From then on in life, huh? But then the man of experience seems to be wiser than the man of one what memory, huh? I was talking. We were talking about the the nurse and the up there, I guess, the last name.

[1:04:17] You know, when my first son was born, and the not born, but he was still in the womb, and this head nurse that she listened to the baby right when it comes into that thing, and she listened and says it's going to be a boy, told me, and so we didn't know actually, and the doctor didn't say. So it was born. It was my first born, Paul.

[1:04:37] And I happened to run into the nurse afterwards and say, "Hey, you're right. Just ask me any time." She says, "You know, she." So she seems to be wiser about these things. Maybe the doctor, right? She's probably heard or listened to more baby heartbeating, you know. You see, but I'm sure she couldn't do that with her first what time she heard, right? Sensation will not be as wise, and even you know, memory of one heartbeat.

[1:05:06] You've got to listen to many, you know, and have a collection of these, so to speak, in your head. That's what Aristotle is doing, huh? He seems to be talking about the natural road here, and he is. And he's bringing out, and I was borrowing from his teaching here in trying to see the before and after among different kinds of knowing on the natural road. This is.

[1:05:31] Giving us a whole number of things here, and you can fill in some other steps with later texts and so on. But he's not ex professo dealing with that, right? He seems to be

[1:05:45] following the natural road and talking about it so as to discover something about what wisdom might be aiming at, or what kind of knowledge it might be.

[1:06:02] So he says the many experiences are many memories of what the same thing tōn pragmatōn perfect the power dynamei there, right? Of one experience.

[1:06:21] Now the next step here is going to