Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
48. Certitude, the First Causes, and Which Philosophy Is Most Like Wisdom (Logic, Nature, Politics)
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7b-wisdom-2006-colorado/048-certitude-the-first-causes-and-which-philosophy-is-most-like/

[0:00] now. Um. Now the third attribute of the wise men are wisdom, that is most what certain, right? Okay. And now Aristotle is going to reason, huh?

[0:21] From its being about the most universal, and he recalls the principle there, and actually uses the same example in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle is showing how one episteme is more certain than another. He says that the science that

[0:46] needs to take into account more things is less certain, right? Than the science that is what actually takes into account lesser things. Okay, and he gives the same example as is given in the Post Analytics that arithmetic is more certain than what geometry, the science of numbers, than of geometry. And they usually begin to show how geometry is more involves more than than the numbers by taking the beginning of both the point, first thing that is defined by Euclid, and the one, which is the beginning of number.

[1:31] And the one and the point are both indivisible, but the point has, in addition to being indivisible, it has a position; it's here or there. And that's why the Greeks sometimes spoke of a point as a one or unit having position. Okay, and so if you think of the number, say, three, which has three ones in it, and think of three points,

[2:07] because of the position of the points, the three points can be on a straight line; you can draw a straight line through them, or maybe one point would not be on the same line. Okay, so there's more to be considered in geometry. Therefore, you'll be less certain. And I think I mentioned before we were talking about this the other day.

[2:32] I see this in a concrete way when I'm studying the theorems in geometry and looking sometimes at Heath's notes or what Proclus says as to necessity sometimes in some theorems of distinguishing a number of cases. And I know if you read Heath's notes and so on, that he's very often quoting or referring to what Proclus or some other mathematician before. And sometimes, you know, they distinguish all the cases they should, or and they're distinguishing more cases than they needed to, and so on, right?

[3:07] And I realize, and Heath also points out that Euclid will take the most difficult case of the other cases to us. So now we get all the other cases we need, you know. I realize I'm not as certain here as I am in arithmetic, where I don't have to worry about where the three ones are and three because they're not anywhere. But I have to in geometry sometimes take into account where the line might fall or where it might end up or something.

[3:36] And so, in fact, geometry is less certain than what arithmetic. And then when you go from, let's say, the sphere in geometry to the sphere that is the Earth, well, you get something more to consider now: matter, right? And all the attributes of matter, the changeableness of matter, and so on. And then there rises all kinds of things. Is it really a perfect sphere, or is it flattened at the poles?

[4:06] You know, for some reason, because of the matter. So you have to take into account more things. It's going to be less certain. So it's easier for me. Say I can be more sure if I count the people in this room. Number seven, right? If I go out to, you know, the Yankee Stadium there for a baseball game, I'd probably never be sure about the number of people there.

[4:34] Really, people are leaving and coming, and who knows what's happening to them. And so I have to take into account so many more things.

[4:46] So you you know that. Now, when you go from from natural philosophy to political philosophy, you have to take into account even more things, right? Because political philosopher has to take into account not only what man is by nature. That's that's enough for the natural philosophers. But what he is in addition by custom and by choice and so on. And now there's all kinds of more things to be considered.

[5:13] Okay. So arithmetic is more certain than geometry. Geometry is more certain than natural philosophy, and natural philosophy is more certain than political philosophy. That's why Thomas says as you go down to the sciences about doing and get more and more particular the more things you have to take into account.

[5:40] Well, I'm just illustrating in this order certitude, arithmetic, geometry, natural philosophy, political philosophy. The principle Aristotle gives in the Posterior Analytics repeats here that the science that has to take into account more things to know something is going to be less sure, and the one that takes into account less things is going to be more what certain. Now, if you look at wisdom as being about the most universal,

[6:11] and every other science being about something what less universal. As you go from the more universal to the less universal, you have to take into account more and more things, right? So as I go from animal to let's say quadruped to dog to a particular kind of dog, I'm adding things to think about, right? Okay. And vice versa, as I go from the less universal to the more universal, there's less thing to take into account, huh?

[6:45] So therefore, the most universal must have to take into account the least things, right? And according to that principle we saw in the Posterior Analytics, therefore it must be the most what certain, huh? Okay. And you can see that has a sort of connection too with the axioms being the most certain. But the axioms, as you know from examining the the words in the axioms, the axioms have the words that are the most universal.

[7:16] And that's why you have the same book, Book Five of Wisdom, which is about the names used, especially in wisdom, and those are also the names used in the axioms. And you can see that, you know, in the most universal names like being and its opposite, non-being, those are used very much in wisdom, but they're also

[7:47] used in the very first axioms. Something cannot both be and not be, same time, same way. Don't they get a kind of complexity from being equivocal? That they. They do, yeah, but nevertheless, I'm just saying that the axioms are the most certain statements of all, right? And the connection between that and their having as their parts the most universal. Okay, that's just kind of a kind of a little connection I'm making in your mind.

[8:16] The basic reason Aristotle is giving here for saying that the most universal is most certain is that to consider the most universal involves considering the least things to know, right? And as you descend from the more universal to less universal, there's more and more things to be considered, right? When you get down to history and you know the practical, in particular, there's all kinds of things to be considered, huh?

[8:46] And therefore, you have the less and less certainty suited to your descent huh. And also, listen. When you're down low, you are including your understanding of the most universal. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's you have additions. Yeah, yeah. The basic reason he's giving is the one from the Posterior Analytics, huh? That still sounds strange. The difficulty thing. Yeah, I said there's a little bit of a paradox there, and and that's why he says the word schedon," right?

[9:16] Okay. But he's willing to put up with that, you know, in order to keep in the first three. You know, you're just thinking that wisdom is about what is malista katholou, the most universal, huh? What is said of all, right? And now he's gonna go to the other, right? Okay.

[9:37] Um. Okay. Now we look at the reasoning to the second. Right here. You know, it's kind of obvious here that the if the wise man is more able to teach than others, and he's more able to one is more able to teach because one knows the causes, huh? And so a little maybe confusion in the text here because is the fourth attribute of the wise man? He's most able to teach causes, or just he's most able to teach, huh?

[10:30] Well, before it said he's most able to what? Teach the causes, right? And then you say, well, the guy who can teach the cause of the cause, he's more able to teach, right? Why, huh? And therefore, the man who can teach the first cause is most able to teach, right? Or you could just say like you see the same here. The wise man is more able to teach, right?

[10:53] One's more able to teach the more one knows the causes, and therefore, the wise man is most able to teach. He must go all the way to the first cause. That man would most of all know the causes, huh? Okay.

[11:12] So sometimes when I teach this, I give the fourth attribute. He's most able to teach, and then I go back to the thing. But in the case, it'll work out, huh? That he knows the first causes, huh?

[11:30] And then he says, "What knowledge is the most desirable knowledge? Huh? What's the knowledge that most of all makes you know, right? And you most of all know when you know the cause,

[11:48] and most of all when you know then the first cause, right? So the knowledge that's most desirable, he says, for its own sake, must be the knowledge that most of all makes you know, right? That you most of all know when you know the cause. You know more, you know the cause of the cause, and you know just the cause. So you know most of all when you know the first cause, huh?

[12:15] And it means most knowable in itself, huh? Okay. So if wisdom is a knowledge most desirable for its own sake, it must be the knowledge that most of all makes you know, right?

[12:34] Just as something is what If something is most desirable because it's most pleasant, right? Something is desirable because it's pleasant, then what's most pleasant would be most desirable, right? So if something is If some knowledge is desirable, simply as knowledge, it must be because you really know by it, right?

[12:53] And the man who knows the cause, most of all, knows something, huh? Right. The man who merely knows that something is so doesn't know it as much as is knowable. So the man who knows then the first causes must have the knowledge that's most desirable for its own sake.

[13:13] And now it comes to the sixth one which we had referred to if you might remember in the course when we're talking about why it is that the end is a cause so important for the what? Wise men, huh? And goes back to the truth that the end is the cause of all the other causes, huh? But Aristotle here is going to tie up the idea of the end as a cause or the good as a cause because you know the end and the good are the same there as we know from our study there in the second book.

[13:48] And that if he orders everybody else, huh? Okay. And you order others to a what? An end, right? Huh? And the wise man orders everybody else, he must most of all know the end, right? Not just the end of this or that, but the end of the whole thing. And that would be the what? The greatest end or good in the whole of reality, huh? And since end is one of the causes and the cause of all the other causes, he must most of all be knowing the what?

[14:22] First cause, huh? Okay. He says it's the most architektonikotate, the most architectonic, the most chief of all the sciences, and is more a chief one, commanding one, than the one obeying. And that such a science would be the one knowing the ou heneka that for the sake of which, it's got to be done, and this is the good of each. But more generally, the best in the what whole of nature, right?

[15:00] In te fusi pasi That's kind of an expression we can probably say in English. In reality, you know. But you see it in Thomas sometimes in rerum natura, right? Okay.

[15:13] So from all the things said, huh? The sought name, the name that we had named, falls in the same science. And notice the principal conclusion now. This is what theoretica of the first beginnings and causes, huh? For also the good, and that for the sake of which is one of the what causes, right? Okay. Aristotle reminding us of that because this is the least known cause, huh?

[15:50] Now. Just as a way of thinking about these things a little bit more. I have a question about the most desirable. Yeah. You say it's useless, right? Because if something has no use, then it's better than something has a use because it has goodness from itself. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But the the attribute is that wisdom is the knowledge which, just for the sake of knowing, right, is most worthwhile to have.

[16:25] See, Aristotle could reason, a number of ways from that, right? He could reason, say, like we do in the dianoia, that knowledge of a better thing, right, is better knowledge, right? And therefore, wisdom must be a knowledge of the best, right? And eventually, he'll bring that out, right, in the third reading. But at this point, right, he just wants to bring out that wisdom is a knowledge of the what first causes, right?

[16:54] And so he develops the argument by saying that if you're seeking knowing just for the sake of knowing, you're seeking what most of all will make you know. But we most of all know when we know the cause, and that was manifested in the first reading, wasn't it? That the man of art or science is more knowing than the man of experience because the man of experience knows only that it is so, but the man of art or science knows why it is so.

[17:27] So it's the cause that most of all illumines us. Most of all makes us know why, in fact, matter know what, because that goes back to causes too, as we learn in the second book of the Posterior Analytics. So,

[17:43] if wisdom is a knowledge that most of all makes us know, and that is by knowing the cause, and obviously the man who knows the cause of the cause knows the cause even more, right? And most of all, then the man knows the first cause. So it's the first cause that most of all illuminates us. Most of all makes us know. So wisdom is a knowledge that most of all makes us know.

[18:08] It must be the knowledge of the first cause. Now, sometimes as a kind of exercise of the mind or a dialectical exercise of the mind, I give the students this kind of a paper. I say, now, now that we know a little bit about what wisdom is, what is most like wisdom of the other kinds of philosophy? Which is more like wisdom, logic or natural philosophy

[18:49] or political philosophy? Of which ethics is the the element, says Thomas, say right. And I say, examine this now from the six attributes of the wise man, right,

[19:05] and see if you can give arguments. Maybe some might be for one of these, and some for the other. And I do this, you know, for kill at least two birds with with this stone. It's going to concentrate your mind on those attributes of the wise man again, right? And at the same time, you'll begin to see that the other parts of philosophy has some likeness to wisdom.

[19:30] That the word philosophy is said of these not purely equivocally, that they have something to like this, huh? Now take the first attribute, the wise man. He knows all things in some way, right?

[19:49] Of the three we mentioned, logic, natural philosophy, political philosophy, which seems most like wisdom, as far as this attribute is concerned, which seems most universal in that sense. What political philosophy? Well, political philosophy is about human things is that as universal as natural philosophy, which is about the whole universe. About logic always came up. Yeah, logic. Yeah, and and Thomas often remarks about how logic, in some sense, is about all things.

[20:24] You see that in the categories and so on. And that's because reason is open to all things, and that's why Aristotle said in the Diadema there that the soul is in some way all things, huh? Because of sensing and reason,

[20:42] huh? So, from that first attribute, logic seems the most like wisdom, and that's why, as you know, in one of the two major divisions of being in reality, being according to the figures of predication, right? You see, and you see, well, that that's that's logic. That's that's the categories, right?

[21:07] If you go to that chapter there, where Aristotle in the Categories distinguishes between universal substance and singular substance, and universal accident and singular accident, he's making a division there, and he says, "Tone on tone of beings, right? Some exist in another, but not set of another, and some set of another, but don't exist another, and he goes on, right? But tone on tone you see, the universality of logic, huh?

[21:41] " When he begins his consideration of substance, he starts from logic and what it is and definition, right? Okay. So logic must be wisdom, right? There is no first philosophy. My first attribute, you might argue that anyway, right? Now you come into the second attribute, huh? Which is that the wise man knows what? Yeah, things most difficult for us to know.

[22:13] Yeah. Now Thomas, you know, when he talks about logic, he says logic should be learned before the other forms of reasoned out knowledge, because it teaches the common road of reasoned out knowledge we have to follow in all the sciences. And so, just as Aristotle said in the fifth reading of the second book, you have to know the road to follow in geometry, say, before you try to acquire geometry, or the road in ethics before you try for ethics.

[22:42] So, before all the sciences, you have to learn logic, right? And here he says we don't follow the rule we follow for the most part that you consider the easy before the what difficult, because he says logic habit maximum difficultate. It has the greatest difficulty, huh? And you can see the difficult people have in logic because of its immaterial character. You can see how all these modern logicians I guess you want about this, didn't you?

[23:14] These modern logicians, um, they want to substitute, you know, class for the universal and so on. They can't. They can't deal with these immaterial things.

[23:31] Now, if you go back though to the to the chapter we had on why things are difficult to know, and the cause of difficulty is in the things, or what?

[23:43] In us, right? In us was the problem in in wisdom, right? But in things that we have the problem in natural philosophy, and so things like matter and motion and time are very difficult to know too. See, there is some argument there with probability, but maybe this is about the things that are really difficult to know. You see. Although the immaterial things are even more difficult to know, but we set that aside.

[24:12] That it wasn't there. This might seem to be it, huh? And to some extent, I suppose the guy trying to defend political philosophy says, "Well, you know, these things are less or contingent than natural things, so they're harder to know, and more complicated, right? " And so on. And you know, they ask Einstein, you know, why is political science and such a mess compared to natural science, and it's a bit of a more complicated thing, he says.

[24:44] So, the guy exercises the mind, does he? kind of exercise of the mind I'd say? Hey, there is a little bit of you know. Of that second attribute in these, but at the same time you think about that attribute again.

[25:01] Now the third attribute is what? Yeah, he's more sure what he's saying, huh? Now, of these three, which would be least wisdom? Yeah, yeah. Which is more sure, logic or natural philosophy? Logic. Yeah, yeah. Hey, rack up a little one for logic, right? I just said focus because you're a logician, no?

[25:35] Um, but from the the first attribute, right, and from the third, logic might seem to be wisdom, huh? From the second, it's a little more difficult, huh? Because logic involves difficulties because it's immateriality, and in fact, you can't imagine universal. And I mentioned how even Socrates represented as trying to imagine universal. There's the young man and the Parmenides, and the moderns have this difficulty all the time.

[26:09] I mentioned how how Locke, you know, can't understand triangle in general, and he's trying to make the he's trying to imagine universal, right? So you can see there's difficulties, but then natural philosophy has some tremendous difficulties too, right? And I suppose politics has its own. So that's a little ambiguous, but the first and the third, hey, logic is winning the race so far, right? Okay. I tell him, you know, to reason, you know, for each of them, and then see which one comes out the strongest, huh?

[26:40] Now you get to the fourth one, huh? That he's most able to teach, huh? Now who wins the prize here? Who'd be lowest on the totem pole, as being able to teach?

[26:59] No it's Logic. Natural philosophy, yeah, yeah. And you know, you know how Socrates was always pointing out the great men of Athens, right? They didn't teach their sons, and

[27:16] Napoleon couldn't teach what his generals to fight as well as he could fight, huh? It Seems you can't teach these things so well, huh? But of natural philosophy and logic, which is more, um, who's more able to teach?

[27:34] The one who knows logic can teach better. So maybe you'd give a little bit to the logician there, or what? What do you think? Well, if you're just giving causes, it seems you get to real causes. Aha! See, if the man who knows the causes were able to teach, who knows causes more than the natural philosopher? Chalk one up for the natural philosopher, right? What's interesting is in that great dialogue, the the Phaedo, right?

[28:11] Simmias is pushing Socrates against the wall. He wants Socrates to show, if he can, that the soul must survive death. Okay. And Socrates says, "We're asking for a lot here, right? "

[28:34] Because what he's asking for is a reason why it must continue to be, huh? Not just you know a reason why it might or it's likely or probably so, but the reason why it must be, huh? And that's the reason because the cause, right? Boy, he says, "Let me recall for you my experience as a natural philosopher, right? " He goes back to his experience as a natural philosopher because it's to these guys you'd most of all get illumination about causes and the kinds of causes and so on.

[29:09] And Aristotle himself, when he discusses this later on in Book One, he recalls the opinions of the natural philosopherism, and then he he using them to decide whether there's only four kinds of causes. So there's much evidence, right, that the natural philosopher among all these men most of all knows what the causes, huh? And that's where Aristotle will say later on in the sixth book of wisdom that if there were no immaterial substances, then natural philosophy would be what wisdom, right?

[29:49] And he actually gives natural philosophy the title second philosophy. You know, wisdom here is this is first philosophy, but natural philosophy is second philosophy, right? So number four, you know. And and if that's the the the goal of the wise men, right, to know causes, know the first causes, and the natural philosopher most of all knows causes, right? Well, then when he had the greatest claim to wisdom, I think he's the strongest.

[30:18] Aristotle seems to say that in the sixth book. If you when you read the sixth book. How does logic consider causes, and I guess maybe dialectic a little bit? Well, logic does talk about you know demonstrating from cause to effect, right, and from effect to cause, and it even talks in the second book, you know, about how you can reason, say, from maybe the end to what the the parts are and so on, right?

[30:45] Okay. But isn't he getting this distinction, the four kinds of causes, from the natural philosopherism? That's the guy who's reading, you know. But perhaps a logician would would be. More than the political philosopher, right? Because he deals with all kinds of causes. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But at any rate, the natural philosopher comes out on top here at number four, right? Okay. Now, how about number five?

[31:14] What natural philosophy? Well, number five is yeah. This what so? Yeah, yeah. So, natural philosophy would certainly come out on top as being of these three, the knowledge most desirable for its own sake. Political philosophy is not for its own sake; it's for the sake of doing what is good or better for the city, huh? Right. Logic is not for its own sake. Yeah, logic is just a tool, right?

[31:39] In fact, when you first divide philosophy, we divided into looking philosophy and the philosophy of doing, theoretikae and praktikae, right? Logic isn't even a part of philosophy. But if you want to call the tool philosophy, philosophy, but that's to use the word philosophy in a sense, right? Then I admit that logic is the third kind of philosophy, but that's by the ratio of logic to philosophy. It's a tool philosophy, and especially of looking philosophy.

[32:12] Who was it that collected all the works together under the title Organon or Tool? Yeah, yeah. Who was it that? I don't know. That's in the Greek tradition. I mean, the Neoplatonists, whenever Aristotle's books have been gathered. Socrates says we need.

[32:35] No, he says we need a techne peri logous, an art about arguments. He doesn't call that a tool, but I mean, I mean, he might, he might accept that we're speaking. But you see, political philosophy at least is one of the chief parts of philosophy, and it's practical philosophy, and it's the chief part of practical philosophy, right? So it has it has a greater dignity in that sense than logic, huh?

[33:04] So logic comes in third there, in some sense, huh? Okay. Although there is, you know, a similarity of logic in some ways to wisdom in terms of its universality and its immateriality, right? But that's only in the sense of being desired for its own sake. You find a few crazy logicians running around who think they're studying it for its own sake, but they end up with something that's not useful as a tool.

[33:33] Yeah, so that's its problem. It's not useless. Yeah, yeah. It's funny, the symbolic logicians, you know, over at University of Minnesota, admitted that the stuff was useless for knowing reality. So I don't know what the hell they're studying it for. They must have studied it for its own sake because it had no use. And

[33:50] but anyway. Like swinging a hammer in the dirt. Yeah, yeah. Now, what about the sixth attribute of the wise man that he directs and orders everybody else?

[34:02] Political philosophy, yeah. Now, now, logic and political philosophy seem to have more claim to that, huh? Because, yeah, when Aristotle is showing in the beginning, he comes back in ethics. You know, what is this about? And he's going to show us about the the end of man, right, and so on. And then, to whom does it belong to know this, right? And he's going to conclude that belongs to political knowledge.

[34:33] And the reason he gives is that the knowledge that commands others aims at a higher end, right? So the knowledge that is about the the last end, happiness, must belong to the art that commands all the other ones, huh? Okay, the medical art commands the art of the pharmacist because health, which the doctor considers, is the end of medicine, which the pharmacist considers. So the one that commands all the rest must be the one that is about the last end.

[35:11] Okay. And so the political knowledge or political foresight, they might say, Burquist, you should no longer practice the art of logic. We're drafting you as of today, and we're going to give you a little training in military art. You're going to practice the military art from now on. Go out on the battlefield. Okay. I say, so he seems to be directing everybody else, huh? And so the Straussians and people like that, they want to try to make political philosophy wisdom, if anything is wisdom.

[35:46] But then you might turn around and say, "Hey, but the logician, logician teaches us how to think, huh? How to define and demonstrate and proceed dialectically, and it teaches us the common road of reasoned-out knowledge. So doesn't the logician direct everybody else? Your reasoning is incorrect, or you made a mistake, you made a fallacy there. That was a fallacy of such and such. So it's a logician, huh?

[36:13] Checks your reasoning. Who seems to be in some way directing all the other forms of what reasoned-out knowledge? So he's a very great likeness to the what wise man, huh? And.

[36:31] You might even raise a question in terms of that. Isn't isn't the logician then directing the what? The wise man, because he he has an episteme as Aristotle says, huh? And isn't the logician directing anybody who's seeking reasoned out knowledge because he thinks of common road of reasoned out knowledge? I would just solve that objection. You wouldn't really say the tool directs the the person who's using it.

[37:00] Well, no, but I mean you could say, the logician is the man who knows the common road of reasoned out knowledge, and everybody in the other sciences has to follow the common road of reasoned out knowledge. So he's going to direct all the other scientists, right?

[37:18] So why doesn't he direct the wise man, huh? And the logician is also the man who distinguishes the kinds of mistakes that are made everywhere and how to avoid these mistakes so far as possible. So. Doesn't determine the end. Yeah, yeah. Doesn't everyone have to be a logician in order to do the other sciences? Yeah, we're not we're not we're not denying that exactly. We're saying you know is the logician who's telling the wise man how to proceed, because the wise man is pursuing a reasoned out knowledge of being as being, right?

[37:56] And the logician is a guy who ex officio, right, is about demonstration and definition and how you should define, how you should demonstrate. And so the wise man goes to the logician, tell me, tell me how to define, tell me how to demonstrate, tell me how to. What the principles of logic? What? The principles, but the wise man considers the principles of logic by which the. Okay, is there something by which the wise man is more directive, even in knowing, huh?

[38:28] Is the end. Yeah, but you're forgetting what we could... The natural way, right? Yeah, the natural road, yeah. The natural road is supposed to. Yeah. Yeah. Is there a reason why the consideration of natural road should belong to the wise man? Because it's about the axioms. Not about the axioms. What I mean is the axioms express that knowledge. It orders all the other. Yeah. Yeah. And the natural road is the road to wisdom, right?

[38:57] It's appropriate the wise men talk about it for that reason, but there may be other reasons, right? But unless he had a more basic road to talk about than the logician, right? And a road that explains why the logician does what he does, right? We mentioned before that belongs to the natural road, the inborn road, as Aristotle says in natural philosophy there, in the first, in the proemium to natural philosophy, where he speaks of the inborn road, right, from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature.

[39:31] And that's the reason why we know things in a confused way before distinctly, huh? So that pertains to the natural road, but that's the reason why in logic we study definition and division and distinction, right? Because that's how we go from the confused to the distinct, huh?

[39:54] And why can't you affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing? Because the same thing can't both be and not be at the same time, and it's the wise man who defends that, right?

[40:09] And likewise, you talk about demonstration; you have to understand about cause and effect, and the wise man understands about these things more so, right? Nevertheless, you can say, hey, the what? In this respect, the logician and, in another way, the political philosopher, right, have a great likeness to the wise man in terms of their seemingly directing everybody else to some extent, anyway, huh? Say, we're directed in some way in our own life by everybody else.

[40:42] I mean, by the political authority, you know. And I always say to students, you know, when they confer your degree after four years, right? There's a formula that the president of college uses, you know, in virtue of the authority invested in me by the board of trustees and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, right? You see, so we can't really what

[41:08] confer a degree except as you know being in accord with the directions for this sort of thing in the laws of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, right? And and that we're licensed to give degrees and so on and to carry on this nefarious activity that we do.

[41:30] So to some extent, with some probability, right, you can reason that logic is wisdom. There are several ways you can reason that it's wisdom. You can reason for some the natural philosophy is wisdom, and then for what even political philosophy, huh? But mainly from its what directing others in some way, huh?

[41:58] But now I've asked the students after giving the reasons for each of them, huh? Which is useful for the sake of what seeing that they all have some some likeness to wisdom. They're all not something equivocal, philosophy, but then also the the fact that of which one which is strongest, you might say, huh? Which has the most claim to wisdom of the three?

[42:32] In terms of numbers it's a logic Yeah, but if you say this is outweighed by the fact that wisdom is chiefly about causes and about the first causes, and natural philosophy would be the knowledge of the first causes if there were no immaterial things, and we're, you know, well then you see natural philosophy has most of all the claim to wisdom. Aristotle seems to confirm that in the sixth book, right, when he says that if there were no immaterial substances, then natural philosophy would be wisdom.

[43:07] As it is, though, natural philosophy is is second philosophy, right? And this is first philosophy. Logic is more like wisdom in its mode, but in some ways, yeah, this is the thing you know. And I mentioned how when Monsignor Dionne first came down, I, I met him, and and Kasurik was, you know, confirming in my mind that natural philosophy was was more like wisdom, you know. Well, in its substance In in some sense it is, but in other ways, right?

[43:41] Logic is more like wisdom because of its immateriality and its universality, and so Dion would quote what Proclus says that mathematics purificat oculum mentis and the thing that he quotes there purifies the eye of the mind, being reason, uh, somewhat from the material world, uh. But Dion says logic even more so purifies the mind, uh, because logic is even more immaterial than than geometry, uh. But that's a different sort of thing, right?

[44:20] But in terms of causes, and even knowing that there are immaterial things, this is properly called metaphysics, right? Not metalogica Who would want to call it metalogica I have my problems with metaphysics, but you probably understand metaphysica. It touches upon some truth about this. It's transphysica as, Thomas says here in the commentary. Proemium, I guess it is.

[44:50] I think it's used for exercise, right? Because it makes people think about the six attributes, and think about why these things seem to be

[45:03] like wisdom, and maybe maybe appears to some to be wisdom. Maybe the Straussians think political philosophy is wisdom because they read Aristotle saying that, huh? That that some sense political knowledge directs all the rest, huh? And I guess Cicero thought of rhetoric as as wisdom, huh? But you know, he says there, right, that the wise man should not be persuaded by others, but they should be persuaded by the wise man.

[45:27] Well, I'm the guy who can persuade everybody else, or most of all can persuade other people, so I must be the wise guy, huh? You know, We said some some similitude there, huh? And the so-called sophists, right?

[45:41] Historically, I guess the term sophist are covered as people who taught many things. But the one thing the sophists had in common is they taught rhetoric, they taught the art of persuasion. Now these guys are called the wise men, right? They're the sophists. huh? A young man wants to hear Protagoras. huh? A famous sophist is coming to town. I told you how Murray sometimes says some famous speakers coming in.

[46:05] You know, Protagoras, by the way, will be in town tomorrow. Hopefully, the students will they'll see the conviction there and and read this. Well, this is this guy with a grain of salt.

[46:19] So that