Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
50. Metaphysics Book Three: The Fourteen Questions Around Plato's Position
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[0:00] have to die in the Father and one, you know. He's always kind of kidding them a little bit, you know, They're idiots, but let's say our prayer. We're all here. We're missing somebody. Two, three, four, five, six. Everyone's here. Okay. Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly.

[0:28] Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, Pray for us and help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Now we come to the second part of the enumeration of questions, which is the questions about the causes, and there's altogether about twelve questions as Thomas distinguishes them. But the first six questions—excuse me, there's fourteen questions—but how are these questions divided?

[1:01] But here you see the importance of Plato again. You could say, for the most part, certainly, that Plato is the first what metaphysician. If I use that word, right, the first first philosopher, right? He's the first philosopher,

[1:24] with a somewhat exception for for Anaxagoras, but the first philosopher to talk to any extent about anything besides the material world, right, sensible world. And the first man, therefore, to talk about something after natural philosophy that is even more more wisdom, right? So there's a certain prominence to the position of Plato in the third reading. Because what he does, you could say, is to divide everything according to the opinion of Plato, and everybody else comes in in contrast or opposition to the position of Plato.

[2:06] So he doesn't neglect anybody else's opinion, but everything comes in as arranged around the opinions of Plato or opposition to the opinions of Plato's. Okay. Now, there's two things unique to Plato here. One is that he has universals, forms separated from matter, and the first twelve questions are about that.

[2:35] And then the last two questions, the other position of Plato, he had these mathematical things that are separate from sensible things. So he divided the fourteen questions into twelve that are about the universals separated from matter, and then the two that are about the mathematical things.

[2:57] But in that first group, you really see the Platonic position there as the one around which every other opinion is grouped by reason of its, if not agreement, its opposition to the position, in the first six questions, okay. And the second six questions, which Thomas attaches to that part, are about how the beginnings of causes are. The first six are more what they are, right, and the last six is how they are, how they are as far as being one or many, how they are as far as ability and act.

[3:36] Okay, but the first six are built around the position of Plato that there are universals separated from matter. Okay, so let's look at the first six questions. But they're divided into two parts. Two of them are dealing with this idea of a cause separated from matter, distinct from matter,

[4:09] and four of them are dealing with what? Excuse me, I'm doing the reverse order here. Two of them are dealing with universals, right, and four with a cause separated from matter. Do you see that? Okay, so the position of Plato is, is kind of unique and makes him kind of the first metaphysician. He's speaking about universals separated from matter, and so he has two questions about universals, right, and four questions about what?

[4:45] Is there something distinct from matter as a cause? So let's look a little bit at that. The first question: and whether the beginnings, and the elements, are genera, which is something what, universal, like the forms of Plato, or that into which is divided, existing within each thing.

[5:25] So it's like asking, are the first causes the causes? Are the universals like the genera, the forms of Plato? Or they like the earth, air, fire, and water into which, Empedocles divided everything.

[5:44] Is it that? Now, if Hegel begins with, say, being, as the beginning of all things, right? Which position this is? So, like the tagene, or that is ha tiarei, and you parkoneta. Tagene, sorry, with the. Yes. Yeah. Marx or the modern natural scientists would be starting with that into which is divided, existing within each thing, right? Like atoms and molecules and the rest of the things that they say, right?

[6:32] What's the fundamental question? Is it? And which position is more reasonable? Let's take a simple example because you see the point more easily. There, let's take the word cat. Printed on the board, C A T.

[6:54] Suppose you want to know that, right? I could divide it into C A and T like Empedocles would do, right? What is that? It's C A and T. That's what it is.

[7:07] Suppose there's some truth to that, right? What's water? It's H two O, right? Same way speaking, right? Okay. You missed the whole point. What is that on the board? It's a word, right?

[7:30] What do you when you know what's on the board better? You say C A T is a word, or C A T is C A T.

[7:47] Well, word would be tagene, right? The genus, right? C A T would be that into which is divided and existing in it. Huh? Something to be said for both, right?

[8:02] And man walks. What is that? Straight sentence. It's man walks, right? Two words. Two words. Yeah, it's man and walks. That's what it is. That's one answer, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? It's eight letters. If you take away man and walks, what do you got left? Nothing, right? It's man walks. That's what it is. No, it's a statement. You missed the boat. It's a statement. So which is it?

[8:30] There's something to be said for both, right? Okay. Now the second question, assuming. That the man who says that cat is a word, or man walks is a statement, right? But it's something universal. Then the second question is: Whether it is that into which at last they divide the indivisible things, or the first, whether man or animal is more a beginning and apart from the kath' hekaston, the individual.

[9:10] Well, as Thomas explains in the commentary, in the second question, you're talking about two kinds of division. One is the division of a genus into species.

[9:29] If you keep on dividing that way, what do you end up with? infima species Yeah, the infamous species, huh? The lowest species, huh? There's another kind of division. Aristotle, he talks about definition in the first, in the proemium to Natural Hearing. He says that the definition, in a way, breaks up what the name says, equivocal or says in a in distinct way. So you can divide circle into plane figure contained by one line, every point equidistant, and so on.

[10:06] Now, if you divide in that way, what do you end up with? The least universal. The highest. Yeah. So you divide square into equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. quadrilateral is more universal than square, right? You divide quadrilateral into rectilineal plane figure contained by four lines, and rectilineal plane figure is more universal, right? You keep on getting something more universal. So if you divide in one way, you end up with the most universal.

[10:36] You divide another way, the less universal. Now, stand back, huh? And think of the three possible positions that have been mentioned so far in this so thing here. One thing that Thomas sees as common to all of them is if you want to know something, you have to take it apart. You have to divide it, right? That makes sense, right? But here you have three different kinds of division.

[11:05] One is the division, you might say, of a kind of quantitative whole into its parts, right? Like when you divide cat into c a n t. One is the division of a genus into species, and one is the division that a definition is, huh? So one you end up with the earth, air, fire, and water, or something like that. Other one you end up with the most universal.

[11:31] Another one you end up with the what? Least universal. Now. Just emphasize the idea. If you want to get to the beginning of things, and especially the the inside beginnings of things, is any way to proceed except by dividing, taking them apart?

[11:55] Them, after all, the analytics are called the Greek word for taking apart, right? Ah, so you have to divide to get to the beginning of things, huh? And one way to divide is divide a molecule and atoms and atoms into electrons and protons and neutrons, if they can be divided, right? That's one kind of division, right? Another is the division of a genus into species. Another is the kind of division that's involved in defining and breaking up the thing into the parts of the definition.

[12:28] Now, there's an enlightenness here to looking for the matter of the thing, huh? Because as Aristotle says, when he takes up the four kinds of causes, and then he gives the corollaries, and then he gives afterwards, he goes back to the four kinds of cause, but shows how generally they can be understood. He says all parts are like matter, especially composing parts, huh? So division might seem the way to get to the beginning of things, and especially the beginning in the sense of parts and something like matter, right?

[13:03] And it seems to be three kinds of division here, right? And therefore, three probable opinions as to what is the beginning of things: Earth, air, fire, and water, or proton, which means first, right? Electron, neutron, or the most universal, like being, with Hegel, right? Or the less universal. They might be more apt to take the less universal for the forms, huh? Dog and cat, more so than animal, right?

[13:35] Now, if you ever study the the reading on whole and part, there on part in particular in the fifth book of wisdom. You'll notice that Aristotle here is bringing into this discussion here, or questions, three kinds of part.

[13:58] And according to these three kinds of parts and whole, three kinds of what? Division, right? They leave out one of the four kinds of parts and whole.

[14:12] And that's the sense in which a whole can be divided into matter and what? Form, right? Now, why does he leave that out? Because in the first book of Natural Hearing, in the end, you end up with matter and form, as you probably know, at the end of the first book of Natural Hearing. And in the twelfth book of Wisdom, you're talking about the intrinsic beginnings of things.

[14:46] It's a little more general than matter and form. You could say it's ability and act. Every creature is composed of ability and act. But that's the kind of division, the kind of parts, that's left out of this what? Questions, huh? As if that kind of whole and part is less known to us, right? And even though it's closer to the truth, it's left out. I'm kind of struck by that, huh?

[15:17] As if there's some difficulty in understanding that. Because if you have a whole, in the sense of a kind of quantitative whole, like in the word cat, there C A and T, you can put the C here and the A here and the T here. They're very clearly different parts, right? And even to some extent, if you divide a genus into species, dog and cat and horse, you can.

[15:40] This is a dog. This is a cat. This is a horse. They're all apart from each other. And even if you put a definition into words, right? Like the definition of square. Square is divided into equilateral, right-angled, quadrilateral. Well, you can take the word quadrilateral, at least, and equilateral and right-angled, and talk about them kind of separately, right?

[16:06] But matter and form, you know, you got a a ball, rubber ball here, right? Put the rubber here and the and the shape here, right? Can't do that, can you? It's kind of it's kind of a difficult thing to to to understand a bit, right? So I'm struck that Aristotle uses only three of the four central senses of whole and part here. But says something about the one left out that it has some special difficulty for us, huh?

[16:38] But that's the one, But that's the one which is really the true answer. When you're talking about what are the the Composing parts of of

[16:50] mobile being or natural thing, matter and form, or what are the composing parts of being? It's an ability and act left out. And the other place where I see something like this is in the proemium to

[17:13] natural philosophy, where Aristotle wants to show that we know things in a confused way before distinctly, and he first gives a reason why we do, and then he gives three kinds of examples. And the first kind of example is the sensible integral whole. Well, that's like the one Empedocles has, the quantitative whole. The parts are outside of each other in a quantitative sense. And the second way he manifests manifests it is from the composed understandable whole, the definition.

[17:49] And the third way he manifests it from something very much like one for the general in particular particular, from the more universal sensible. There's something in the hill, yeah. Well, it's like an animal, yeah. It's a mountain lion, yeah. It's one I shot it last week. So you're going as we're from the more general to the what less general, same three kinds of whole and part that you have here.

[18:13] The one that's left out is the one he's going to go to at the end of the first book of natural hearing, matter and what form.

[18:23] If you talk to a man in the street and you said what are the parts of the word cat? He undoubtedly say C A and T, right? He probably wouldn't say the letters and the order of them. I'd be surprised if you said that? if you'd ever been to a philosophy class, right? He says there's something obscure about that sense or hard for us to understand.

[18:44] So those are two places, the proemium to natural hearing, and the first two questions here in the third reading, uses only three of the four senses. So it's nice to go from this to that reading in the fifth book and back again, and then to the twelfth book and end of the first book of natural hearing. But but also, as I say, there's a certain affinity between that and the next four questions.

[19:15] Because the next four questions are about the other part, universals separated from matter. Well, these first two questions are about universals in a way, right? The second part separated from matter or distinct from matter. But in a way, parts are like matter, right? So he begins from the idea that beginnings of things are the parts of things, are the beginnings of things. Is there matter, right? Is something else that's less known?

[19:47] Now let's look at the four questions here. About matter, and now notice the importance Aristotle attaches to this. Melista, most of all, zetetea ought to be investigated and considered. Whether, besides matter, there is some cause, kath' hauto as such, or not. Okay, that's the third question, but the first among this group of questions that revolve around agreeing or disagreeing with Plato's idea that there are causes separated from matter.

[20:27] Is there some cause besides matter, right? Or is that the only cause? Now notice in that question, Aristotle takes for granted that matter is a cause, and of course all the early Greeks looked only for that cause. Now the later Greeks looked sometimes for other causes besides matter, but they all also had an opinion about what matter is. As if it's not really doubtful that matter is a cause, right?

[21:03] Because everybody agrees. So he doesn't ask the question whether matter is a cause, as if that really isn't a question or doubtful. The question is: Is there any cause besides matter? That's the first question. See how intelligent that is, huh? Okay. Now,

[21:30] if he has some reason to think that there's some cause besides matter, and you know my simple example, I take the word cat, which depends upon c a and t, and that's a dependence upon the parts or matter from which it is composed. And then I bring in the word act, and I say, well, that's made out of the same letters, same word. No. So you're forced by the truth itself to say, hey, I think the word cat depends upon something besides c a and t.

[22:05] Pretty, pretty important insight there, right? When you say. But now, if there's something besides c and t, like the order of c a t, c before a and a before t, does that order exist apart from the matter, or does it exist only in the matter? It exists only in the matter? It exists only in the matter, the same way for the shape of the table, right?

[22:41] But two things are made out of the same wood, but one is a table and one is a chair, let's say. There's something here besides the wood, which is necessary to understand why this is a chair and this is a table. You see.

[23:01] But now this is the next question: Is that kind of cause that there is besides matter, right? Sometimes it only exists in matter, right? Like in examples I gave, the order of the letters, the shape of the chair, the shape of the table. But is there also some cause besides matter that does not exist in matter? You see. Well, now that's a real disagreement, right? Because for Empedocles and other guys like that, there is a cause other than matter, right?

[23:44] But it only exists only in matter. Okay. While for Anaxagoras, as we were talking about earlier today, there not only is that, but there is a cause which he calls the greater mind, that is a different cause from matter, but which doesn't even exist in matter.

[24:10] See how these questions are perfectly what ordered, right? Sapientis est ordinare. Perfectly ordered, huh? He sees this not really a question that matters a cause, right? The first question is: Is there any cause besides matter? And the answer to that is yes. The next question, in order, is: Does that cause other than matter is it found only in matter, as the shape of the wood or the order of the letters?

[24:40] Or is there in addition a cause besides matter that's not even in matter? Of course, Anaxagoras thought that, and Plato thought that, right? See, and he had reasons for it, right? But the materialists and so on and the early thinkers would think either there's no cause besides matter, and that's the only cause they talk about, or if there is, it's only something in matter. You see. Perfectly ordered.

[25:09] Now, is there some truth in saying that there is a cause in addition, there's some kind of cause in addition to matter, and this kind of cause is found not only in matter but also some outside of matter? What about those ones outside of matter? Is it just one of them, like the greater mind that the Anaxagoras spoke of, or are they many, like Plato spoke of these forms and maybe even the mathematical things?

[25:45] So the great thinkers there, Plato and and Anaxagoras, agree that there's some cause in addition to matter, and even outside of matter. But they disagree as to whether it's one or many.

[26:05] And sometimes even among Catholics, I run into people who, they kind of, oh, they admit that there's a God, and and and that God is, you know, maybe immaterial and so on, but they're puzzled about there being what, angels and other kinds of things. And I was in class one day and made some reference to the angels and this assumptionist seminary, right? And these little puzzled and he said,

[26:34] do angels really exist? No, I said was they are more real, I said, than you are. But it shows you, right? Even even a Catholic, right, can be puzzled as to whether there's just this one God or whether there's there's these many immaterial substances. So it's not an easy question to ask, right? So in this group of four questions, you can see the first three questions are perfectly ordered, cannot be otherwise.

[27:04] Now the fourth question is a little more particular, because it's talking about Plato thinking about the what it is of a thing, being something what, by itself apart from the composition of matter and form. So Aristotle is talking about the synolon, like you or me, huh? You and I are what a man is plus something else, something material in us, right? But Plato thought what you and I are, exists apart from you and I, right?

[27:40] So this is the question very much about forms, huh? And it's worth sticking in there because of this being the main position, right? About what is apart from matter, right? So either they are or some, what? Either they are or some are or none are or some are. Yeah, whether there is something, right? Put around there, in line 34, whether there is something para to synolon and he says I call synolon the whole altogether when something is said of matter, like man is said of material man, right?

[28:20] Or dog instead of material dog, or there's nothing, right? Or of these there is and of those there is not, right? So like the infima species, maybe, they are not the other ones. And how such things of are among beings. So that's the fourth question, right? Okay. So that ends the first group of six questions, but you can see how. In those questions, not only do you take account of Plato's position that there are universals in the first two questions, separated from matter or distinct from matter in the second four, but in a way you bring in other people's opinions too, right?

[29:01] By reason of their opposition to thinking that universals are the beginnings of things, rather than the quantitative parts of the thing, or in so far as they are opposed to there being something distinct from matter or distinct from matter and not in matter, and distinct from matter and not in matter, whether one or many. Okay, and then this very unusual position of Plato, which is discussed a lot in the seventh seventh book of Wisdom,

[29:36] but we see the relevance of that too from our discussion of act and ability that matter is not the first cause, and the first cause is not material, but that's something we know only after a study of act and ability. Now, starting at 9. 9...6a there, You have the second group of six questions and the first group of twelve questions. And these now are about how the causes are right, how they are,

[30:16] and whether and the beginnings whether they are determined in number, which is Aristotle's way of saying what singulars, or in form or kind. Aristotle here seems to be assuming that the beginnings are what limited, right,

[30:41] in some way, right. And you may recall in the first book of Natural Hearing, in the eleventh reading, after he's shown in the tenth reading that the beginnings are contraries, but then in the eleventh reading he asks how many beginnings are there, right? And you know there's at least two because the beginnings are contraries from the tenth reading. But what he does is to say well there can't be just one beginning because the beginnings are contraries and contraries are what two, right?

[31:18] So eliminates there being just one beginning. Then he takes the opposite extreme. Is there an infinity of beginnings, huh? And he he constructs there if you recall, four arguments against there being an unlimited multitude, huh? And then you're left with the idea that the multitude of them is what limited, huh? Okay. And then the next thing he does is to say now, are two enough. And then he shows that we're forced by the truth itself to say there's a third thing besides the contraries, the subject of the contraries.

[31:53] But then he says that's enough to have change. And so he's going to reason against there being more than three, huh? Okay. I just mentioned that because he seems to be assuming here that the beginnings are what limited, right? But there's two ways of being limited, limited in number or in kind. Now, to to illustrate the the question a little bit there. Suppose you take

[32:29] letters, let's say, huh? Okay. Now, are the a's and the b's in English language bookshelf here and so on, all these other printed documents, are the letters limited in number? A limited number of a's. So use them up and you've got no more to use, huh? No. Limited number of b's. No. So you could say that the letters A, B, etc. Are not limited in number, are they?

[33:10] But is there another way in which the letters in the English language are limited? Kind. Yeah, there's just 26 kinds, right? And Greek has what, one or two less, huh? Something like that. Okay. So you see the distinction now. He's asking whether they're limited in number or in what kind.

[33:38] But now suppose we had all these modern inventions, and the only way to get letters is for Perkins to type them out, right? So Perkins is typing away and so on. Now Perkins is going to go on typing all day long, and there's no limit to the numbers of A's or B's or C's that he could type, huh? Okay. But there would be a limit to the kinds of letters he could type with his typewriter, huh?

[34:03] Okay. Now if you think of the typewriter, the typist rather in this case, namely Berquist, is a typist limited in number or in kind?

[34:22] Well, Berquist is the only typist around, right? So Berquist is limited, the typist is limited in what number as well as kind, right? Now of course Berquist is a different cause of the words than the letters are. The letters are inside the words. Berquist, to the best of my knowledge, is not inside the words. He's an extrinsic cause, huh? So in this example, the intrinsic causes of the words on the page are not limited in number, but they are limited in kind to 26 kinds.

[35:02] But the extrinsic cause, the maker, right, the typist, is limited in what number, right? Okay. Now what's true about the universe? Are the beginnings of things limited in number and kind,

[35:26] or are some causes limited in kind but not in number, and others limited in number but not in kind? Limited in number, not kind. Well, go back to my example of the words on the page there, right? The intrinsic causes are not limited in number, but they're limited in kind, huh? It's only 26 letters appearing in the words on the page, right? But there's no end to the A's and B's and C's in number, right?

[36:05] But in my example here, the extrinsic cause, the efficient cause, is one in number. What is it about the universe? But but you said not just one in number, but not in kind. What that's an obviously you're one in number, you're one in kind, right? Right. Okay. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. But more than one in kind I'm one in number, right? It's just one typist.

[36:38] Well, as you know, there's a distinction between the inward causes of things, like matter and form, and the outward causes, the outside causes of things, like the mover and the end. And there might not be the same answer to this question for both. And actually, in the in the twelfth book of wisdom, Aristotle will argue that the inside causes of things are not limited in number, huh?

[37:10] Because there's always new ones being generated and so on. But they're limited in kind, act and ability. But the outside causes, the first mover of the universe, right, or the end of the whole universe, is going to argue, are one in number. Okay. It's going to be a diffuse answer to this, huh? So that's the first question about how the beginnings are, and the first four questions, in kind of a broad sense, will be about how they are as far as being one or many, huh?

[37:47] Okay. And that's the first question. huh? I'm getting a little hint as to what the answer is in the twelfth book, huh? He's not going to give a simple answer, right? He's going to say we have to distinguish between the inside causes and the outside causes. And the inside causes are not limited in number, but they are limited in kind. The outside causes are also limited in what number, huh?

[38:15] Factor one. Okay. That's very interesting. So it's a profundity Aristotle when he asks these questions. Um. Now, next question. Whither of corruptible and incorruptible things, there are the same or other beginnings? Okay. On the one before, is there a difference? What's the difference between whether principles in number or species determined, in which in reason and in subject?

[38:59] We're always talking about the distinction that we had in the first part of the dialectic, the universals, you know, en tois logois right? And then the ones that the particulars we were talking about, the ones in the subject, the matter, and you divide the thing into earth, air, fire, and water.

[39:20] Just like we said, you know, the the kinds of parts that you have in atoms, let's say, are limited in kind, right? Proton, neutron, electron, but there's not a limited multitude number of protons in the world or electrons, right? There's always new ones coming in or old ones going out of existence, and so on.

[39:54] Now the next question is, whither of corruptible things and incorruptible things, there are the same beginnings or other beginnings? Huh? Okay. There's another question attached to that, but this is really Thomas classified it first as the second question. Now, if you say that corruptible things and incorruptible things have the same what beginnings, right? Why do these same beginnings produce sometimes corruptible things and sometimes incorruptible things, right?

[40:35] If you say that you don't have the same beginnings, right, of both, apart from the question of what are the is there is there first causes of all things, right? But it doesn't raise the question so much. He says if there are different beginnings for corruptible things, different causes for corruptible things and for incorruptible things, in order to explain why the one are corruptible, the other are not, are the beginnings or causes of corruptible things also corruptible?

[41:08] Say, because clearly the beginnings or causes of incorruptible things must themselves be what incorruptible, right? If the beginnings and causes of corruptible things were corruptible, then they would corrupt, huh? And then there would be any corruptible things in the world. See, and it seems to go on forever having corruptible things like men and dogs and cats and trees and so on. Well, if you reject that, then you've got incorruptible beginnings or causes of corruptible things as well as of incorruptible things.

[41:44] So why should you know incorruptible causes here cause incorruptible things, and and incorruptible causes here cause corruptible things? A problem, right? It's a lot of problems about that, huh?

[42:08] And again, if you don't have the same causes of corruptible and incorruptible things, you don't have the same causes of all things, do you? But if you do have the same ones, why should sometimes result in corruptible things and sometimes in incorruptible things?

[42:26] And this is almost, or could be considered, I suppose, almost a per se division of being, right? Corruptible and incorruptible. It's like the distinction between necessary and contingent being. It seems to be a division of being as being, huh? So that's an important question, right?

[42:53] And then he says, huh? Further, the most difficult of all, and having the greatest doubt. And here you see he's kind of stretching our division here. What you mean by one and many, right? Yeah, that's one thing. I know a lot of the fathers. I think Origen and maybe Gregory of Nyssa divide being into visible and invisible. That's kind of material and immaterial, almost, isn't it? Yeah.

[43:20] He talked about that, right? He talked about whether there are material substances only or also immaterial substances. Further, whether being, or excuse me, one, and to one,

[43:40] just as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, is not something other, but the very substance of things. So Plato said that what there is the one itself, right? Okay. And Parmenides said also there's a being itself, right? Something is just being.

[44:02] Or whether there is some other thing subject to this, which is really being and the one, as Empedocles said, philia, love, is what really what makes things to be one, right? It's not oneness that makes them to be one, the one itself, but love, right? Okay. Or others said that what all things are one, because they're all made out of fire or water or air or something else, right?

[44:34] So the natural philosopher has said, there is something one, which is responsible for the unity of things, but that something one is something other than one. It's water, air, or fire, or it's love, right, and so on. But Plato and Pythagoras are saying no, it's not one substance like fire or water, air. It's just the one itself.

[45:11] What? Why would they think that? Well, it's partly, I suppose, because of the influence of their mathematical studies, right? And what is that one in Euclid?

[45:28] If you look at Euclid's definition of the one there, in the seventh book of the Elements, you can see, like all the Platonists, he's confusing the one that is the beginning of number with the one that's convertible with being.

[45:43] But that one is seems to be just one, doesn't it? It's not one dog or one stone or one ball or one triangle. It's just one. They also have one there, and

[45:59] because they identified that one that's being of number with the one that's convertible with being, they said basically what you have is just the one and the numbers, right? It's all there is. The one. What is that one that's the beginning number? It's one something. No, just one.

[46:23] One itself to itself. But when he says "to an," huh? You know, then one wonders about what one who is I am who am right? You see, this is touching upon what I am who am right.

[46:42] Is there something that is just what it is to be? You see, so this thing could say I am who am, or is being always something else? Huh? Being a dog or being a body or something else? Huh? Just me touching upon upon I am who am right. This question, huh? And Aristotle says it's the what? panton chalepotaton, the most difficult of all, and placed placed on aporian echon having, the greatest difficulty, right?

[47:20] Thomas thinks that Aristotle arrives at God as to hen right for God to be is what his substance is, huh? So this is a very profound and difficult question, but the Pythagoreans and the Platonists. Make hen. He mentions hen first, one because that comes into the mathematical, right? But they make this to be just itself, and the others want to make something. hypokeimenon on the subject of this, right?

[47:54] As Empedocles says, love, and another says fire, or like Heraclitus, or water, like when the Greek early philosophers Heraclitus said, "Is wisdom not to me, but to reason to be that all things are one?" But what is that one that they are, right? Is it just to be one, or is it fire or water or air, right, or something of that sort?

[48:28] And the last question, right? In this group of four, and still kind of in the idea of one and many, but not as clearly as the first two of course. And whether the beginnings are as universals or as what the singulars of things.

[48:50] Now you don't realize how difficult a problem that is for us. You're trying to understand really here in the first causes a universali in causando, right? A universali in causando is very difficult for us to understand.

[49:09] It's much easier for us to understand a universale in predicando. So, and then we could contrast universale in predicando, the individual, right? Okay. So you could contrast man himself by himself, the world of forms, the universal, right? Or this man right here, right? Okay, this individual man, right? So is the first cause like man himself, universal? Or is it like me, right? Well, my causality is very limited.

[49:51] I told you I was in the parish church on Sunday there with Matt and Maria, I guess, and a bunch of the grandchildren there. And this guy worked with in the package store, you know, saw these grandchildren. He says, "You know," he says, "you're responsible for this."

[50:09] And but after all, I'm not responsible for every human being. Take me right down to it, you see. My causality doesn't extend very far, a little ways, but not not very far. And but I seem to be really a cause, as he admits, right? See, I'm sure this guy worked with in the package store wouldn't think that man himself, you know, is a cause of these, right?

[50:32] They're all partaking of man himself or something like that. But man himself seems to extend to all men, doesn't it? It seems to have a universality, an extension, right? That I don't have.

[50:46] So what is the first cause like? Is it like man himself? Well, that would explain it's extending in some way to all things, right? Or to all men. It doesn't seem quite real, man himself. I'm real. I'm a real cause out there, but but I don't have much. I don't extend very far in my causality.

[51:10] So what you're looking for is something that is not exactly either one of these, right? Something that seems, on the one hand, to be a real cause, like me, an individual, right? But unlike me, not limited, a universal cause, universale in causando. And our mind kind of fluctuates between the universale in and predicando, what is said of many or said of all, and making that the beginning of all things, like Hegel does, right, with the idea of being, or like Plato does to some extent with the forms, or else taking these apparently more real examples of causes, like you and me and and your pet dog or cat, but their causality extends on a little ways.

[52:06] So we're the truth is somewhere in between there, right? Looking for a universal cause, which is an individual, albeit a quite unique individual compared to me, and it's not universal in the way the universal and Predicando is, right? But like that, it's common and extends in its causality to

[52:31] many, many, many, right, things, huh? So you see our mind fluctuating between two positions, between a cause like me that doesn't extend very far, and something that does extend very far but doesn't seem quite to be a cause, like the universal, right? It's said of all, but is it really a cause of all?

[52:56] So we can't quite get the idea what the universal cause is. That's why you go to things like the sun because it seems to affect. the cause Yeah, yeah. The sun seems to be an example of universale in causando because it's an individual thing, right? It's not a universal; it's an individual thing, and yet causality seems to extend to the whole earth and maybe beyond too, but to all the things that are growing down here.

[53:27] And so, Ron MacArthur, as I told you, was traveling with that other philosopher and McCar. And the sun was coming up, you know, beautiful sunrise, and look at that gorgeous universale in causando. and the other guy said he got the logic of it, and

[53:49] so looking for something more like the sun, something that is an individual but universal in its causality. I'm an individual, but not universal in my causality, right? The universal in predicando is universal, but not it doesn't seem to be a cause. But you need that intermediary one. So you could argue on both sides, right? You can say, well, Berquist is a cause, so it must be Berquist rather than man himself.

[54:20] huh Berquist doesn't extend very far, so he can't be the cause. Can't be the cause of being as being, or even the cause of man as man. Man himself seems to be a better example of universality there, because it extends to all men. But is it really a man himself that all men partake of, and so on? That's all that they get to be men. You see, what do you need your parents for then?

[54:47] If your child is a is a man, a human being, because they partake of man himself, what did they need you to to become a man, right? You see how the mind could could fluctuate between those two.

[55:01] I'm trying to get the idea of a universale in causando. So, those are the four questions about how the beginnings are. As far as being one or many, huh? It's kind of a broad sense of one and many, huh? And the first two questions obviously are more easily seen. The third one's a little different, but even the third one, you ask, "whether, the one is what?

[55:32] Just the one, or whether it's one matter like earth, air, fire, and water, or whether it's one thing like love or something? " It's not just one. That's a question in some sense about the one, right? Okay. And then that's why another reason why he mentions one before being, but there's also the question of being involved in there. And the last question is, to some extent, a question about one and many, huh?

[56:00] Because the individual is one, and the universal is something one set of many, so it involves the one and the many, So he has four questions about how the beginnings are, as regards to one and what many, huh?

[56:18] The next two questions are extremely important, very interesting, and this is how they are as far as ability and act. Kai it's very brief here we're at the end of line 10 and then going to eleven. Kai dunamei e energeia energia, and are they an ability or are they an act, huh? And you know the importance of that from our study of the ninth book of wisdom, right?

[56:47] So if the first causes are inability. They'd be something like matter, right? Either matter, or in a way, Hegel's position, right? That being is the beginning of all things, or being being the most confused and indistinct now, which is like a kind of matter that's not formed yet, right? And just as the evolutionists try to get things out of matter by some kind of evolution, so Hegel is going to get out of being this confused, indistinct, and therefore potential in a way, right?

[57:23] He's going to get try to get everything out of that, huh? And in that sense, when Marx said, you know, he's going to set Hegel on his feet, that Hegel is standing on his head, right? Because he thinks that thought comes first, huh? Of course, we know that matter comes first, right? And so we're going to turn Hegel up and put him on his feet, but there's a likeness in what Hegel's saying, right?

[57:51] Because as you know, even from your study of Porphyry, genus is to difference as matter is to form, right? Because genus is something indistinct and undetermined in comparison to form, or even the species which is called form, right? And it's determined by the difference to this species or that species, right? And of course, being is even more general than than the genus, right? So it's like most what potential, and most in need of being what determined, right?

[58:26] To be more actual. So in a way, to say being in Hegel's sense, right, is the beginning of all things, is in some way like saying matter is the beginning of all things, because you're saying what is most potential, at least actual, is the beginning of things, and then there's some kind of evolution of the thing, you know, that gives rise to determination and distinction and so on.

[58:52] But Aristotle, as you know from the ninth book of wisdom, thinks that act comes simply speaking before what ability. And to some extent, Plato was saying that with his forms, right? There's a form as, a kind of act, and he's saying that the forms come before other things. So in a way, Plato was saying form comes before what ability. But Aristotle, even more so, when he gets to the tenth or ninth book of wisdom, will say that act is before ability, simply speaking.

[59:25] Is that clear? Okay. And the second question is extremely interesting too. These last two questions are about how the beginnings are as far as ability and act, right? And the first and basic question is, are there any ability or an act? And that's what we've been talking about so far.

[59:49] And whether other than according to motion? Okay. Now, obviously, if you think that the beginning of all things is matter, everything comes to be by what motion, right?

[1:00:04] If you think only that there are material things and so on, and bodies, and these nothing comes to be from these things except through motion. Um. But suppose you find out in your study of the soul that the human soul doesn't really depend upon matter for its existence, or suppose you find out in your study of motion that there's an unmoved mover, and the unmoved mover is not a body, right?

[1:00:39] And so, but go back to the example of the soul, which is more to my purposes here. If you see that the human soul doesn't depend upon matter, can it really come into existence by the transformation of matter, by the change of matter? Can you really do that?

[1:01:03] If something came into existence by transforming matter, it would depend upon matter for its existence, wouldn't it? So in the book on the generation of animals, Aristotle says that the understanding soul doesn't come from the parents. Okay It comes from the love But knowing that the understanding soul is still the form of the body, it would not what exist before the body of which it is the what form.

[1:01:34] But how did it come into existence? Not by transformation of matter and motion. It came into existence by what some people call creation in the strict sense, right? So Aristotle, in a sense, is asking here, right? Do things come to be only by transformation, by change, by alteration, by motion, or does something come to be? It's some other way, right? And this is really about creation. And is the first cause of all things?

[1:02:10] It might be a mover too, but does it give rise to things at first by motion? In this case, matter would be by eternal, right? Or does it first give rise to things by creation? Aristotle is touching upon that, right? If You look at Aristotle's position about the human soul. That it doesn't depend upon matter for its existence. It doesn't come into existence by the alteration of matter.

[1:02:35] It doesn't come from the parents. And yet it doesn't exist. It's not eternal like Plato thought of the forms. The soul is eternal because it's the form of the body. Well, then he's really approaching the idea of what that the human soul came into being by creation. And if the separate substances other than the soul came into being too, they would come into being by what creation.

[1:03:05] So it's an extremely profound question, right? These two questions here I like them very much, both of them. But the first one is easier answered than the second one. They're both they're both difficult. But the first one we saw answered really in our study of the ninth book of wisdom. So these ones are preparing the way for the ninth book of wisdom.

[1:03:31] So all these things, right, Bring forth pulling much upward, much doubting right. All these things right.