Wisdom (Metaphysics 2006, Colorado)
57. The Nine Questions on What Wisdom Is About: Causes, Axioms, Material and Immaterial Substances, Accidents
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[0:00] bit. So he says the first doubt about which in the Peri ton aporon we have disputed a bit. He's thinking at the end of the last book, is whether it belongs to one or to many forms of reasoned out knowledge to look at the causes.

[0:23] Now, as you know, there are four kinds of causes, right? And it seems that the natural philosopher is going to talk about two of them, namely matter and mover. With the exception of that mathematician turned natural philosopher, Pythagoras, right? All the other natural philosophers talked either only about matter as a cause, or the later ones about matter and the mover.

[1:02] So matter and mover seem to be the causes to consider in natural philosophy. Okay, because that's some probability to that, right? Because all the natural philosophers talked only about one or both of those causes, with the exception of the what Pythagoreans, right? But even the Pythagoreans talked about numbers as if they were what things are made out of, a little bit like matter, right? So you can see from the witness of them that that seems to be the only cause they talk about them.

[1:36] And you know, you pick up physics, and they talk about what force and mass, you know, and that seems, you know, something like you know mover and matter. It's not really the same thing, but it's like, I remember saying to Kasurik, when I was a young beginner there, you know, when the force was something like the mover, he just laughed in my face, like to be so stupid and naive and and uneducated.

[2:07] But nevertheless, force and mass have a certain likeness, huh, to to the mover and the matter, which again is confirmation. This seems to be what the natural philosopher, natural scientist, would be talking about, huh, about all these other causes, huh? And then you go to mathematics, and you say, well, the reason why these opposite angles are equal are because the lines intersecting are straight, and so you seem to be showing it by the form, huh, form of these things.

[2:44] So forms what the geometry talks about, huh? And you go to ethics, and what does he talk about? The ender purpose of man, right? What was your intention in doing that? You see that he wants to know, right? So it doesn't seem like the the same science talks about all four causes, but different sciences talk about different causes, huh? And not the same ones, huh? If you look at natural philosophy, mathematics, and ethics.

[3:11] So what does wisdom talk about, right, huh? What causes does it talk about, huh? If wisdom is talking about immaterial things and unchanging things, how can you talk about the matter and the mover, right? And how can you have end if nothing is moving for the sake of something, right? See, so there's a little question there, right? About what causes wisdom might be about, huh? Now the next question, huh?

[3:51] It's already to some extent a question about substance, but in another way, it's really a question about beginnings, huh? And whether the first beginnings or the first causes of substance, huh?

[4:11] Only belongs in science, or also about those beginnings from which all show or demonstrate. He's referring to the axioms, huh? As whether it is possible, right? For what? To affirm and deny one and the same thing of the same thing, huh? And about others of this sort, he's referring to the axioms, right? In other words, are you looking only for the beginnings and the causes of substance in this science?

[4:46] He's taking for granted you're going to look for the what? Beginnings and causes. causes of substances because they're the fundamental things, right? And so if you're looking for the first beginnings or causes of all things, you're looking for the first beginnings and causes of substances, right? So he's not, you know, even making a question of that, right? But is that all you do, or do you also talk about the what?

[5:12] Axioms, right? The statements from which all these sciences, in some way, show what they do show, right? And notice sometimes Aristotle will say the fundamental axiom is you can't affirm and deny the same or the same in the same way at the same time. Instead of saying you can't both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? And that kind of shows the affinity between logic, which talks about affirming and denying as such, right?

[5:40] And wisdom, which talks about being and unbeing, just these two principles are kind of what almost the same thing, right? Just like later on you get to the distinction of the kinds of being by the distinction of the figures of predication, right? Do you see the? Affinity between logic and and wisdom that Monsignor Dion was putting out in the first encounter with the with the man, huh?

[6:06] Okay, you see that? And this is a question I think that maybe occurred to Aristotle more than that the Greek philosophers before him had a what

[6:22] disagreement about, huh? Okay. Although you could say you know Parmenides had talked about the axiom of what being and non-being, huh? He says they always come back to this, so he had talked about it a bit. But notice now the the question there. On the one hand, it would seem that we don't have to consider the axioms because the axioms are the statements known to themselves by all men, right?

[6:49] So you don't have to consider these. Just use them, right? Right. You don't have to have a consideration or investigation of what's obvious, right? No, you just use what's obvious and build upon that, right? But then on the other hand, you know there are these sophists going around denying the axioms, huh? And even Heraclitus seems to be denying the axiom of being and non-being when he says day and night are the same, and the living and the the awake and the asleep are the same, right?

[7:27] You see. You see the great Heraclitus saw that change is between contraries, and the change is from one contrary to the other, and that we all say that one contrary becomes the other. We all say the hard becomes soft, right? The soft becomes hard. We all say the day becomes night, the night becomes day. And becomes means comes to be, right? So obviously one contrary comes to be the other, so one contrary is the other, right?

[8:01] Now did Heraclitus really think that? Well, Parmenides reacts to people saying those sort of things, right? And saying that's impossible. And if that's what change involves, then there is no change; it's an illusion, right? But maybe Heraclitus is just pointing out what seems to be a contradiction in the way we all speak. And in the first book of Natural Hearing, Aristotle unties that apparent contradiction, huh? And it's not as hard as the ones that come later on, like in the sixth book, with Zeno and so on.

[8:38] But you should start there, right? That's the first major contradiction or apparent contradiction in change, huh? And Aristotle goes forward by untying that contradiction. It's the first major example of what we saw here in the first reading. And so sometimes when I do that in a natural hearing, I go to this business about the role contradiction and how important it is throughout philosophy and science and theology.

[9:11] But it's appropriate to do it there because that's the first major contradiction that ties our mind up, and the untying of it, goes forward to a deeper knowledge of these things. But maybe Heraclitus knew that, huh? Maybe Heraclitus was just speaking paradoxically, like Chesterton does, right? Because he wanted to stimulate our thinking, huh? And we have a fragment of Heraclitus where he says, "They do not see how that which is opposed agrees."

[9:41] And he takes example of the arrow, right? And one hand is pushing in this direction, and the other hand is pulling in this direction. They're pulling and pushing in opposite directions, but that's the way they get what force for the what arrow, right, huh? If I was pulling and pushing on the table, you know, I'd be opposed to myself, right? But with the bow and arrow, when I'm pushing with my left hand outward and pulling back my right hand, I'm actually what making the arrow go faster and right through you, you know?

[10:19] So maybe Heraclitus, right, is hinting there. He doesn't really think day and night are the same. Does he really think the sleeping and the waking are the same? Well, we have another famous fragment of the great Heraclitus, where he says, "We should not act and speak like those asleep." And he goes on to explain why. It's most profound what he does there, huh? I would say he knew the difference between day and night, huh?

[10:53] But he was what making us stop and think, huh? In the same way that that strange statement of Socrates, you know, wasn't a bad genealogy to say that Iris is the offspring of Thalmas, huh? Makes you stop and say, "What does that mean, huh?" So why do we say that day becomes night if day can't be night? Why do we say the hard becomes soft, right? You know, At least don't think, huh?

[11:24] Ria Framans of Heraclitus too, you know, where he talks about men do not understand the things they meet every day. Although they think they do, But it reminds you of Socrates. But it should be the other way around, because Heraclitus came before Socrates. So Heraclitus was aware of the fact that men thought they knew or understood what they do not understand, and maybe he was raising these contradictions like Socrates did to show men that they don't really understand as well as they think they do these things.

[11:56] And then war is the father of all, right? The untying of these contradictions will give rise to the minds going forward. So there's a reason to think we should consider the axioms given the attacks upon them by the sophists and so on. On the other hand, because they're obvious to everybody, it seems we shouldn't consider them, right? Okay, so that's the first problem about substance, but in a way, it's kind of in between the first question and the questions about what substance is about.

[12:35] Now, if it is about substance, whether there is one about all or there are many. Now, this is question arises, assuming now, right, that there are both what material and immaterial substances. If there is only material substances, then natural philosophy would be wisdom, and we should even be involved in what we're doing right now, right? But even in natural philosophy, there's some evidence that there are immaterial substances, whether it be the greater mind of Anaxagoras or the unmoved mover, which we show is not a body in the eighth book, or whether it's the human soul that can exist apart from the body after death, or whether it's the forms of Plato or something, right?

[13:37] But assuming that this truth is true that there are immaterials, about material substances, could there be one science about both? Or you might say, well, wisdom is about all things, so it must be the same wisdom about material substances and immaterial substances. Otherwise, wisdom wouldn't be about all things, right? And you wouldn't be looking for the first causes of all things. That seems to me pretty convincing, right?

[14:07] But then it seems, hey, you can't know these two the same way, and you know it seems kind of funny to have one science about animals and angels, wouldn't it, Father? That would seem kind of strange, you know. You don't seem that they can be known in the same way, and especially you know if you read in the Republic of Plato, huh? Where Plato talks about our soul as being what faced out towards material things.

[14:38] In order to consider immaterial things, you got to turn the soul 180 degrees, as it were, in the opposite direction. But you can, on the way, you can turn it, let's say, 90 degrees and see these mathematical things, right? And then turn it all the way around, and now you're facing the what, immaterial substances, huh? A little bit like in Christian mysticism, there, the Dark Night of the Soul, right?

[15:07] We're kind of turning away from the sensible world and looking upwards, huh? And Plato's way of speaking there reminds me of Aristotle's use of the word tropaia in the fifth reading of the second book of wisdom. A different turn of mind. Washington Irving uses that in that Mountjoy, huh? Mountjoy's got a poetic turn of mind, which prevents him from really getting to metaphysics, huh? But

[15:45] it's much more vivid in the view there of the Republic, right? That the soul has to turn its direction away from the material world, huh? To the mathematical world, and then all the way around to the what, immaterial world, huh? Looking the opposite direction.

[16:07] The name suggests it too. This one's name from the denial of the other. Yeah, yeah. So it would seem that there can't be one reason out of knowledge of both. Now, if that's the true answer to that question, then there arises another question.

[16:28] And if many, right? Whether all of them are subgenera of the same genus, huh? Like we might say, you know, arithmetic and geometry really aren't the same science. But they're both, but subgenera. They're both in the genus of mathematical philosophy, huh?

[16:50] Or some of these should be called wisdom, and the others ought to be called something else, right? Okay. Okay, and you could say, you could maybe multiply that a bit and say, yeah, and which would be wisdom, or would both be wisdom, right, or, you know, or just one of them wisdom?

[17:20] Then he attaches two other questions, which are not, as regards what wisdom is about, but they're kind of involved in the previous ones because the previous ones arose. From thinking that there are both, what, or supposing that there might be both, immaterial as well material substances, and then which is wisdom about, or is it about both, and so on? Those questions arise, right? So he attaches the two questions at this point because of their connection.

[17:48] But as far as the dialectic is concerned, it's a really a different dialectic, right? It's dialectic about the things themselves. And this, of course, is an even more important question than this. The question of what wisdom about the things themselves is more important than the question about what wisdom is about. But, um,

[18:12] and whether one should say that sensible substances alone should be said to be, or whether there are besides these other substances, huh? Namely, the immaterial substances, separate substances.

[18:34] Now, if there is some truth to the assertion that there are in addition these immaterial substances, are they of one kind, huh? Like Anaxagoras seems to speak only of the greater mind, apart from matter, or are there many genera of these substances, like those making the forms, and then between the forms and sensible things, the mathematical substances, and these are the Platonists, right? Plato and his followers, huh?

[19:14] Okay. Interesting. In the first book, there Aristotle sometimes says we Platonists, including himself, right? Because he himself has spent twenty years in school Plato, right? So in some sense Aristotle is a Platonist, but

[19:33] he doesn't entirely agree with Plato, as you know. So in some sense he's not. Okay, so that's the end of the five questions about substance, but the distinction is between the first, what, three,

[19:53] and the last two, okay. But sometimes the first of those first three questions I kind of see as, um, uh, whether maybe make it just more boldly and say would there wisdom should consider the axioms too or not, right? And then you would make it a kind of a separate thing, huh? Okay, but certainly the second and third questions are very much about, um,

[20:24] about what substances should wisdom consider, and then the last two are questions about. Substances there are or are not in reality. You see that.

[20:39] And the last three questions are talking. Now, does it belong to wisdom to consider not only substances but also accidents? And of course, this first question will be answered in a way in the beginning of the fourth book.

[21:04] So, whether it's about substances only, the theoria. Notice I see Aristotle using the word theoria there for what, instead of episteme or the methodats, huh? I see them do that in parts of animals too. I use that word theoria.

[21:27] It's almost like saying you're looking at, right? Philosophies are looking at, and this kind of philosophy is looking at that, and that one is looking at this, and so on.

[21:40] Or is it also about the sumbebekota, what happens to the substances, kath' hauto okay? Here philosophy is about what belongs kath' hauto to its subject as such to itself.

[22:00] Now, to some extent, as I said, that question is answered at the beginning of the fourth book because there Aristotle shows that wisdom is about being as being, right? But then he raised the question, yeah, but being doesn't mean one thing, right? But then he points out that there are many meanings of being, but they seem to be connected, right? And the first meaning is what substance, right?

[22:29] But the other meanings of being, like quantity and quality and so on, have a ratio to substance. They're all in substance, and one is the size of substance, and one is the disposition of substance, and so on. So, if it's equivocal by reason, then we should consider what both, right? Okay. Both come under being as being, but nevertheless, substance is what primarily is about, because that's the first meaning of being.

[23:05] It's primarily about that, and so in books seven and eight, he takes a being according to the figures of predication. He talks mainly just about what substance, right? And that's kind of the principal being. So, you can see that we don't deny that the consideration of the wise men extends to accidents, but not as much as to substance, right? Just as later on we find out it talks even about accidental being, but not by being as such, right?

[23:34] It's very brief. Now, next two questions are more particular ones, and I don't think that they are in the dialectic that much developed. But let's look at them a little bit. Kind of interesting to see the way Aristotle,

[23:52] what what seems on his mind as he puts this, and towards these, and this is still talking about accidents, but now more particularly, about the same and other, right?

[24:08] And like and unlike, huh? Well, same and other can be said in substance, but also in other categories, like and unlike, I said in quality, huh? What's interesting that he should enumerate these things. It seems somewhat at random that he singles these out, huh? But maybe there is something peculiar about these things that that he seizes upon, huh? About same and other, about like and unlike, and contrariety, And of course contrariety is discussed at some length in the tenth book, ex officio, but same and other, it's almost like distinction there, right?

[24:56] Same and other, and of course in dialectica, which has a likeness to wisdom, same and other is one of the books, huh? Right, seventh book is it? Of the places About same and other, yeah. Um, and like and unlike, a little bit like same and other,

[25:23] and they're always talking about contrariety, huh? In dialectica, from the dialogues, and then my favorite and about before and after, huh? Okay, of course we saw in the ninth book of wisdom the importance of what seeing the before and after of act and ability, but in parts we didn't read there about substance and quantity and quality, Aristotle talks about how substance is before accidents in more than one way.

[25:56] So before and after has quite a role to play in talking about substance, quantity, quality, and the before and after in those, substance before all the rest, and even some accidents before others, right? And then we ourselves saw the before and after in act and ability, and of course being kath' hauto is before accidental being, right? And so on, so interesting that though it seems might seem at random at first sight, he's enumerating some of these things, right?

[26:32] They seem to have a prominence in dialectic and a prominence in the physics, but he refers explicitly to the dialecticians, right? You know, if that's

[26:46] appropriate, right? The fact that dialecticians talk about these things, right? But there's no problem, right? If the dialecticians talk about these things, as really belonging to wisdom, because dialectic isn't really the same thing as wisdom, is it? See, dialectic is reasoning from probable opinions to even tentative conclusions. But wisdom is the supreme, you know, demonstrative knowledge, the supreme episteme, right? So why should talk about what the dialecticians talk about, huh?

[27:14] Would it be a sign that there's something pretty universal? Yeah. the affinity between them, yeah, yeah. But but to me, I think if you understand the part we read this summer about the before and after of active ability, how important that is for the whole wisdom and for the whole philosophy to understand those things, huh? That seems to me kind of the culmination, the crowning part, might say, of the book nine, right?

[27:55] And it's of universal importance for wisdom, but also for the whole philosophy, huh? And so, and yet, if the dialecticians talk about these things, why should the wise men talk about them? Again, it reveals the affinity of these two sciences, huh? See.

[28:14] But you might say, why do you have a whole book devoted to distinguishing the senses of word? That's what the dialectician does. He distinguishes the sense of the words, right? That's the second tool of dialectic. What is the wise man doing this for? You know. Of course, the wise man is not only distinguishing the senses of these words, but he's showing their order and connection, right? He's maybe going beyond the dialectician, but there's a certain proximity of the two to each other, huh?

[28:41] Kind of amazing to see that likeness. So in the in the first of accidents, it's things that through themselves pertain to substances, and here it's things that through themselves pertain to being. Well, no, no. What what he's doing is the first question is saying, does wisdom consider only substances, right, or also the per se accidents of substance, right? Right. That's that's one question, right? And then the next question is a little more particular because it singles out certain things, right, that on the one hand seem to be emphasized by the dialectician, right, who has a likeness to the wise man, and therefore they might seem appropriate to the wise man, but because the dialectician makes so much of them, maybe there's something that belongs to

[29:34] dialectic rather than to wisdom, huh? You see. So it's a more particular question, seems, because he's asking about about these things that seem to have great universality and therefore appear. In the dialectician's work, take take the first one. It's more particular because things that are universal are are well. Well, no, no. He's he's he's asking about same and other, right? Like and unlike, contrariety, and about the before and after.

[30:10] But just take the same and other. Let's take an example. Do you know the dialogue called the Protagoras? Okay, now in the beginning of Protagoras, they talk about the Socrates' conversation, the Protagoras, about the parts of virtue, right? They talk about what we would call the four cardinal virtues, but he has an addition in there, piety, right? So you have prudence and justice and piety and courage and moderation, right?

[30:48] And Socrates asks Protagoras, are these five names of the same thing, or are they names of other things? And the comparison of the face, right? Like the the nose and the eyes and the ear, right? It might be parts of the face, but the eye is not the ear, and the nose is not the eye of the ear, and so on. And Protagoras says, well, they're like the eye and the nose and the ear.

[31:16] They're different parts of virtue. They're not the same exactly. Okay, so that's the position of Protagoras. Within Socrates begins to what attack that position, right? And tries to show that they're really all the same thing, and one is not the name of a different part of virtue, but they're all naming the same thing. But now

[31:48] there is a little bit of truth in what Socrates is trying to maintain there against Protagoras, but there's also truth in what Protagoras is saying. And you can see Thomas sometimes following Aristotle and Cicero and so on will sometimes say you can take the four cardinal virtues as four different virtues or as four what aspects that should be found in any virtue. So every virtue involves some kind of strength, you know, and some kind of moderation and some kind of balance or justice, right, and so on.

[32:25] So there's a way in which you could say these are what things that must be found in any virtue, four things that must be found in any virtue, or you can take in this other way where they're naming different virtues which have one or another of these in what excellence, right? So courage consists more in strength and and temperance more in moderation and justice more in this giving each thing its due and so on and.

[32:54] Foresight more in being what purely reasonable, right? But there's a partaking of reason, in every virtue, huh? So there's something of a reason, in every virtue. So that's just interesting dialogue there. It's about the same and the other, right?

[33:15] And Mino asked Socrates, you know, you know, is knowledge really better than right opinion if they both direct you to the good? What's the difference, you know?

[33:27] So these are things that come up in the dialogues, and therefore they belong to dialectic, do they really belong to wisdom to do. Does dialectic deal with those questions probabilistically? Yeah, you could say well, yeah, maybe dialectic deals with them with probability, and wisdom is going to talk about these things with some necessity. Okay, so interesting group of things he says. So he says the the Dialectician, hoi dialecticoi peirontai they try, right?

[34:04] skopein talking these things. ex tôn endoxôn from probable opinions, monon only, huh? Okay. Further, and this is just going now like the accidents, of the accidents, right? What about those?

[34:29] And what would be an example of that? Well, to take contrariety, right? It is belonging to wisdom not only to say what contrariety is,

[34:41] but also to answer questions like, does one contrary have only one contrary? That was relevant to the other question, remember? And again, that comes up in the Protagoras, right? Because Socrates is going to, in one of his arguments, is going to argue that wisdom and temperance are the same thing, huh? And he's going to reason from wisdom and temperance having the same opposite, the same contrary,

[35:15] and from a thing having only one contrary. So if wisdom and temperance have the same contrary, and the contrary is only one contrary, then wisdom and temperance must be the same thing, right? Now the opposite of wisdom is what? Folly or foolishness, right? And the opposite of being, if you're not temperate, you're going to be what? Fool, right? You're going to act foolishly, right? The man who drinks too much acts like a fool, right?

[35:45] The word fond, huh? I'm fond of the girl, but the original meaning of fond is foolish. You see that still in Shakespeare, right? So, in temperance, in wine or woman or whatever it is, is to be foolish, right? So foolishness is the opposite of temperance, and it's obviously the opposite of wisdom, right? And there is only one contrary, therefore, Socrates tries to show, I guess, by a little induction, that contrary is only one contrary for a thing.

[36:16] Therefore, wisdom and temperance must be the same thing. That's interesting that Socrates doesn't try to argue in that way that courage and wisdom are the same thing.

[36:35] That's significant, huh? Because courage is more like the foolhardy. It seems to be more opposed to the coward than to the foolhardy. But temperance seems to be more opposed to the fool.

[36:53] So, he's asking, do you also talk about the accidents? Oh, the accidents, right? It's getting even further away, right? But the dialectician does, huh?

[37:06] Would the wise men, see as far as the dialectician. huh? I don't think these last two questions here are discussed as much as the other questions we've met in this reading, you know. But I think they're very interesting that Aristotle brings them up, right? And talks about them a bit, huh? But it's only going to have the importance of the question whether there are immaterial substances as much as material substances, and if there are, whether you have one science about all of them or not, huh?

[37:38] Now, of course, eventually you find out in the sixth book that wisdom differs from mathematics and from natural philosophy by its immateriality, huh? But what you're considering in wisdom is things that can be without matter, and things that cannot be with matter.

[38:09] And you consider first those things that can be with matter but need not be with matter, like being or one or substance, and then those things that cannot be in matter, namely the immaterial substances, huh? And

[38:29] the immaterial substances are less known to us than those things that can be with matter as well as without matter, right? So the order of wisdom is what seems to be towards the immaterial, as Monsignor Dionne taught us so you consider those things that can be in matter but need not be in matter, right? Before those things that cannot be in matter, huh? So you're going towards the immaterial.

[39:02] Further you go, right? But you have to be led by the hand from material things, even in wisdom. And so Aristotle is leading us on the ninth book of wisdom from act and ability as are found in motion, right? But that's not really interesting, as he says. We have to go through that, right? And then he rises up to the universal consideration of act and ability in the middle part, right, where act and ability can be found even in the immaterial things, huh?

[39:34] You see. So he's going. He's really, you might say, he's more in wisdom in the second part of book, nine, right, than in the first part, right? But you have to be led up from the act and ability as are found in motion, huh? And from motion, as act to operation and form as act, and so on, in this universal consideration that comes there. And in that way, you could say wisdom follows more of the natural road than mathematics does, right?

[40:10] Not as much as natural philosophy obviously would, right? But much more so than mathematics, huh? And in going from the effect to the cause, when you go from being as being towards the first causes, you're going towards the first cause of being as being, so you're going from the effect towards the cause. So you're following again there more the natural road, huh? In mathematics, you're you're knowing more the cause before the effect because you're dealing with this abstracted accident, quantity, and shape, and so on.

[40:44] And that's why when Descartes and Spinoza, following him, want to proceed everywhere as you do in geometry, they're really going against the natural road. In that sense, they're further from the natural road than the so-called empiricists like Locke and so on. And interestingly, in the Essay on Human Understanding, Locke, you know, talks about how he sees in conversations of men all the difficulties come from the fact that they don't use the word in the same meaning, right?

[41:15] And he even talks, you know, in passing, you know, how the words seem to have a sensible origin, right? So he sees something, you know, of the natural road there. And he criticizes Descartes, you know. He's got problems of his own too, Locke, but but he doesn't seem to be. The empiricism is named from experience, right? The very name seems to indicate, right, that you're proceeding from experience.

[41:46] They don't always do that, but but but it seems that they're closer to the natural road in some way than the rationalists, huh? Who want to proceed everywhere like you do in in geometry, and therefore, as Descartes says, you know, after cogito, he jumps up to God, right? And then he goes from God to show that nature is because God is the cause of these things, so he goes from the cause to effect.

[42:10] And then, what's his name? Spinoza makes that universal rule. That what is the order in our thoughts is the same as the order in ideas. So that's a kind of gross thing. In the way Hegel is influenced by Spinoza, is he makes what's first in our thoughts the most confused idea we have of being in the beginning to be the beginning of all reality? The whole Hegelian system, you know, is proceeding there without Hegel.

[42:43] You know, it just happens automatically, you know. But there's a gross confusion there. Our first thought corresponds to the first thing, so to speak.

[42:59] So this afternoon we can look at the third reading, okay? Okay.