Wisdom (Metaphysics 2016)
2. Metaphysics Proemium II: 'Doing' and Making, Wisdom as Knowledge of First Causes, and the Six Marks of the Wise Man
Class of 2016-05-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7c-wisdom-2016/002-metaphysics-proemium-ii-doing-and-making-wisdom-as-knowledge/

[0:00] Now, take the example that Thomas has there from Aristotle. Aristotle, when he talks about a stone, a heavy thing falling to the ground, right? He doesn't want to say that the stone is the mover. That the mover of that downward motion of it is. The agent that gave the thing its what weight, okay.

[0:35] But now, take this example. Now, suppose suppose I got a stone in my hand, right? And I leave go of it. What does the stone do? Do you find that accurate? It falls down. See, yeah, but it's really being moved, right? Okay. All right. Take a second example. Suppose you take an ice cube out of the. My wife says refrigerator, but I say ice box. We have a terrible fight about this.

[1:14] She tries to get me to say refrigerator, and I say ice box. You're from the east. You're from the midwest. Midwest, yeah, yeah. My parents always said icebox. Yeah. So I say you take an ice cube out of the ice box, and you leave it on the counter, right? What does it do? What's it going to do? It's going to melt. Yeah. Okay. Or you put a you know piece of butter on the hot pan.

[1:43] What does it do? Melt. Yeah. See, so these are examples of being acted upon, right? But it doesn't seem to be too forced to say doing, right? But I don't I don't say it the the yeah yeah yeah yeah. So I think so. What we're in agreement that comes with translation, not the doing, right? Huh? So if you ever get the ninth book of wisdom, there I'll I'll speak of a fundamental distinction now between acts is between form, right, and doing, right, and and you have these three doings that Thomas calls the operations, the poor guy.

[2:22] And maybe maybe it's okay enlightened a little bit, but you know, but in English we can say doing, you know, because you wouldn't say that the form of a thing is is its doing, right? It's doing that, huh? That the clay is doing a sphere or something.

[2:44] You say I'm doing something. I make it into a sphere, right? And I mold into sphere, but you wouldn't say that the the shape of the clay is the doing of the thing. So I think it's not a bad way of speaking, huh? Form between form and doing, right?

[3:02] Of course, the first thing we think of form is is shape, right? Because that's the shape that's the form that's most known to us, right? When you get to the soul, you talk about substantial form. You you've got to move it, right? But it's in that line of form rather than the line of of doing.

[3:22] So. Well, strange what Thomas does, right? Because he distinguishes by name sometimes motion and operation, right? And motion is the imperfect act, the act of what is able to be insofar as it is able to be still. And operation names the act of the perfect, right? The act of the actual.

[3:52] And and then he he points out, oh, with Plato's way of speaking sometimes, right? And even Aristotle, you could translate motion over, right? But seems kind of awkward thing to do in some ways, right? And then in this text, he does with the word operation, right? Maybe it's kind of like the word "cat." Kitten the imperfect has a different name, than the perfect, but you can still maybe.

[4:19] We see with the word "doing," you know, we distinguish between doing and making sometimes, right? And making is is a operation that goes outside, right? Something outside. Why sensing or understanding as one remains in the in the doer, right? And you say, well, why does the

[4:42] but is making kind of doing? You'd say yes, right? But why is doing sometimes kept for this activity that doesn't have an exterior product, right? See, when the case of making is opposed to that kind of doing, and making there's a product, right? Okay. So if I'm doing something like listening to the music of Mozart, nothing to show for it. If you're doing something like making a chair, you've got something to show for it.

[5:14] A Chair, right? You know. And so making adds something, right? That's quite sensible and noticeable, right? And you got a chair when you get done, right? Got an apple pie when you get done, right? You got a glass, whatever it is. And so making is a doing that has a what something in addition, right? Something noteworthy, right? And so it gets a new name. That's making. And then we keep the name doing for the doing that is not a making, right?

[5:47] Okay. But nevertheless, you could say making is a doing, right? So it's you know already you got it for two of those three things that Thomas is talking about, right? And then it's maybe what and not too much of a stretch to say that the what does the stone do when you leave go of it? What does the butter do when you leave go of it in a hot pan?

[6:13] You know, it melts. See, what does the ice cube do? It melts, right? I was taking an example. I was saying, you know, teaching is acting upon the mind of the student, right? I told you this guy was. Telling me, you know, that he started teaching philosophy there in one of the universities in the East, there, West, I guess, and he talks about looking down these students, you know, and they look at him, say, "Why are you doing this to me?"

[6:41] You know, it's like they're saying back, you know, like this philosophy, "Why are you doing this to me?" You know, but you're suddenly acting upon them right now, and they are undergoing, right? So you're like moving them, and they're being moved by you, right? But now, as I'm saying, Duane is saying, in a school, what does the teacher do? Presumably, he teaches, right? It's hard to see what they're doing now, propaganda, is but he he teaches, right?

[7:09] That's what he does, right? What does the student do? Learns. Yeah, yeah, but learning is really like motion, you know, being moved, yeah. But you would call it doing, right? That's the student does. He's learning, and so you can use the word doing there for something that's being moved in a way, right? Though the student is not moved, you know, as much as the stone is, right?

[7:34] Anyways. Okay. So, on the whole, the sign of knowing is the ability to teach, right? This is like a third sign here, right? And because of this, we think that art is more reasoned out knowledge and experience. For the artist is able to teach while others are not able. You can say why this is so, right now. Okay. And so, if you ask the teacher why is it so, and he can't explain, he's kind of feeling he can't teach fully, right?

[8:13] Okay. Now he gives another sign here. Further, we think that no one of the senses is wisdom. Are you wise because you hear, or you you smell, or you, you know, no? Although they are the chief ways of knowing singulars, huh?

[8:34] Because if you challenge my memory, you got to go back to the senses, right? So they're the chief way of knowing singulars, right? But the senses do not say the why it is so about anything, such as why fire is hot, but only that it is hot. You find out if you stick your finger in it, right? Okay.

[9:08] Okay, so now notice he's done, right? Huh? He says that he has sensing in the beginning, and from that arises memory, and from many memories experience, right? And then from experience, what? Knowledge universal, which he's calling art, using that kind of a new sense, right now. Okay. So you see the order there, right? Okay.

[9:30] Now he's going to start to distinguish among the arts, right? Huh? So he's already started looking before and after here, very definitely, right? Right? Because sensing is before memory, right? Memory is before experience, and experience is before a knowledge of universal and knowledge of why, right? Which is what artists trying to be, right? Okay.

[10:06] Okay. It is probable that the first one finding any art beyond the senses common to all was admired by men, right? Not only because some of the things found were useful, but also as being wise and distinguished from what others, right? Huh? So it's interesting, huh? That we kind of admire the man of art for things he can make, right?

[10:36] Huh? Not just because they're what useful, right? He seems to know things, right? Huh? Man invented the telephone, right? Huh? These kind of marvelous things being invented, right? Huh? Okay.

[10:52] Now, many arts having been found, right? Some being for necessities, right? And some for passing the time pleasantly, right? Like the poetic art, right? Or the art of music. Always the finders of the latter were considered wiser, because their sciences were not for practical use. See? I said talking. That's no more questionable now, especially in our democratic customs, right? Huh? Okay. But even with us, huh?

[11:34] Would you think of Shakespeare or the carpenter as wiser? Yeah. And you know, Plato speaks of Homer as the teacher of all the Greeks, right? Who said this carpenter was the teacher of all the Greeks? No, no. And yet the chair seems to be something more practical, right? And useful than the Iliad.

[12:13] But the Iliad arouses more what wonder, right? The Odyssey. That's no more difficult to see, though, right? Once all these sciences having been built up, those sciences were found that are neither for pleasure, like the art of music or the poetic art, nor for necessities, right? Farming and fishing and making houses and so on. And first in those places where men had somewhat leisure, they had some division of labor, and some men were freed from the very what practical things.

[13:04] Hence the mathematical sciences first begin around Egypt, right? For there the priestly class was allowed leisure, right? Now it's kind of funny how two of my great teachers up in the vault there were priests, right? One was Monsignor Dion, and there was Father Boulay, right? Well, because at that time we had a surplus of priests in Quebec, you know. And so that some priests, you know, could become you know what scholars or thinkers, you know, right, huh?

[13:37] And they didn't have a lot of parish duties, you know. I remember in the parish there in Saint in Shrewsbury there that I went over to see one of the priests there to talk about something about the CCD program, right, and so on. And went to his room there in the parish house there, and while I was there, that phone was ringing like every half hour, if not sooner.

[14:03] And some, and and how can a man, you know, you know, sit down and read the commentary on the Gospel of Saint John in this situation, right? And my brother Mark and I taught in California, you know, and we got into a parish there. And so, Oh, if I had known you a couple of college professors in the C C D program, right? Oh, he says, but we'll we'll keep you as substitutes, right?

[14:31] So every night, every night it was Tuesday night, or it was that they had the thing. We come back from from Saint Mary's College there, and waiting for a call. You know, there is always somebody who wants to come in. Then we have to run down to the thing and get the the little thing they're going to talk about that night or something, and come back and eat our meal, you know, and prepare the thing, you know.

[14:51] So, but anyway, I remember a woman coming in, you know, and to see the pastor. I can't get my boy to come to the CCD, you know. Can you talk to him? I say, by God, you know, parents can't get the kid to come to CCD. You know, the pastor's got to go talk. to him Like I mean, the kinds of demands upon these people, you know, but but in Quebec there at that time, you know, and I don't think it's in good safe shape now.

[15:22] The church is in a lot of troubles in Quebec. And but yeah, but the priestly class was a lot of leisure at that time in Quebec, right? And so,

[15:34] deaconic and what deacon is not a priest, huh? He had a dozen children, but but Monsignor Dion and Boulay, you know, you know those three were the three greatest teachers there, right, huh? And they had leisure, right, Deconic used to have in his office down the the university there. He had he had a bed that he could sleep on, right, huh? And you know, I'd sometimes after dinner, I'd I'd go back and study in the library, something like that, you know.

[16:05] And then I'd be going back when the library was closing, right? And it's about nine ten o'clock at night, and here is deaconic walking down to his office, you know. So he had some leisure too, but but he had to find some quiet place. Okay.

[16:25] Now I mentioned how Aristotle using the word art here now in kind of a what very loose sense, right? It's not art as distinguished from what prudence and science, like he does in the sixth book of the ethics, right? So he says, what the difference is between art and science, or episteme, as it would be in the Greek, right? And other things of the same kind, like foresight or prudence, right, has been said in the ethics, right?

[16:53] So if you want to go to, you know, distinction of the virtues of what reason, right? In the ethics, you have what in the end of the first book there you have the distinction between the moral virtues, right? And the virtues of reason itself, right? And then in the second, third, fourth, and fifth books you deal with the moral virtues, right?

[17:19] So in the second book you get the definition of moral virtue and so on, and then the third book you meet courage and temperance, right? And then the lesser moral virtues in book four, and then book five is all devoted to justice, right? And then comes the sixth book, which is the virtues of reason, right? And you have what natural understanding, right? And you have episteme, and you have sophia wisdom, right?

[17:46] And you have art and foresight, and prudence, but Greek and I we call it foresight, okay? And that's what it means really, the word, okay?

[18:00] But he's been using art here just in the in the loose sense or broad sense of a knowledge of the what universal and and aiming at a knowledge of the cause, right? Okay. So now what conclusion is

[18:18] going to draw here now? But that, for the sake of which we have now made a discourse, is this: that all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first what causes and beginnings, right? So if the man who knows the cause is wiser than the man who just knows that it is so, right? Well then the man who knows the cause of the cause, if the cause has a cause, right, is wiser, right?

[18:46] And in the fullest sense, the man who knows the what first cause, right, the cause that is not a what effect of anything, right? Okay. So cause and effect, like what genus and species in logic, right? The same thing can be a cause and effect, but not a the same thing, right? Then, but maybe there's some effect that is not a cause, but there's also what a cause that is not an effect, right?

[19:13] And that's the first causes, right? But that, for the sake of which we have now made a discourse, is this: that all hold what is called wisdom. That's the other name he uses, right? But he often refers to this book as first philosophy, but he also calls it wisdom here. But wisdom is a word that could be applied what to God. We wouldn't say God's the first philosopher, right?

[19:38] So in some sense, first philosopher is more accurate, but wisdom is common to what we our way of speaking, right? Okay. They all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first causes and beginnings. Now, the distinction between the word cause and beginning is given where?

[20:02] Beginning primary to natural philosophy Yeah, but it's in the fifth book of wisdom, right? In the fifth book of wisdom, he takes up the meanings of the words used in wisdom, especially, and in the axioms, and to some extent everywhere, and he begins with the word beginning, and then he goes on to take up the word cause, right? And so beginning is a little broader than what cause. Right, every cause is a beginning, but not every what?

[20:32] The Cause, right. But sometimes the word beginning is applied more to some causes than others, right? So you wouldn't speak of the cause called end so much as as a beginning, right? But you'd speak of the mover or maker as a beginning, right? And even to some extent, another way, matter is a beginning, right? Okay. So sometimes the word beginning is appropriated to some cause. So in the apocalypse, right, God says, "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last."

[21:06] And then finally, he says, "The beginning and the end," right? Well, in both cases you're talking about a cause, right? But the end is the cause of the causes, they say, right? Fourth kind of cause Aristotle distinguishes. But when you say God is the beginning, you're using beginning now as as opposed to end, right? And God is a cause in the sense of the what? Mover and maker, yeah.

[21:34] Now, when Aristotle says in the in the physics here, if you recall, that uses the term beginning, causes, and elements, right? And when he distinguishes these words in the fifth book of wisdom, beginning is more general than cause as we said, and cause is more general than elements, huh? But if you wanted to appropriate these three words to different kinds of causes, elements would refer to what?

[22:01] Primarily material causes, and beginnings would refer to what the movers or makers, and then causes for the form which makes a thing to be what it is, and the end, which is that for the sake of which, right? Which in some way the cause of the what of his being causes, right? So beginning can be you know appropriated, right? To the to the most of all to the to the mover or maker, maybe lesser to the matter, right?

[22:36] But in that particular one, it's most of all to the mover, right, the maker. And so when God says, "I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end," he's a cause in the sense of mover and maker when he says beginning, and when he says end, he's a cause in the sense of that for the sake of which, yeah. Okay.

[22:57] So in in the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? Huh. The first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles is about God in Himself or by Himself, right? Then the second book is about God as the beginning of things, right? As the maker of things, the creator, and so on, and then the third book is about God as the end of things, right? And then his providence, you know, directing things to the end.

[23:26] So it corresponds to the second, third books to I am the beginning and the end, the arche and the telos, right? In Greek, it's a beautiful. Like Thomas explains that right?

[23:42] What's the psalm say? Right. Sing joyfully to the Lord all your land. Serve the Lord with gladness. Come before him with joyful song. Know that the Lord is God. He made us as we are. His people, the flock, he tends. What's Why is that Theology that? That's that's the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? See, so I say, you know, I I pretend that it's like Augustine there, you know, I read that.

[24:14] Ha! Not us to read the summa con Gentiles right? But it's beautiful that we have those three things, right? Know that the Lord is God. That's what he is in himself. He's God. He made us as we are. That's he's the beginning, the maker, and then.

[24:33] Yeah, yeah, because he's the end, and he's directing things towards the end that is himself, right? That's beautiful, right? That's why we have to go on the next part. Enter his gates with thanksgiving, His courts with praise, right? And to me, there's an order there, right? That thanksgiving is less what.

[25:00] It's more proportioned to us, right, than praising God, right? And so we ascend from thanking God to what praising him. So we we thank him for what we receive from him, right? But we praise him for all that he is apart from. Yeah, yeah. So you're kind of ascending there, right? It's beautiful, right? But even the order there is, you know, sing joyfully to the Lord all your land.

[25:26] Serve the Lord with gladness. That's more like the obeying God, right? And it's more like the morals, right? And Thomas, when he gives the reason, why does Aristotle consider the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, right? Because the virtues of reason, in some way, are more perfect, right? But he gives two reasons, right? One is he says the moral virtues are more known to us than the virtues of reason, right?

[25:54] So people know more what courage is, and they know what wisdom is. Right. They don't even know about natural understanding, right, and so on. And and the other reason he gives is that by the moral virtues, though you are disposed for the what virtues of reason, right? So in the order the thing goes, sing joyfully to the Lord all your lands. Serve the Lord with gladness, right?

[26:18] And then come before him with joyful song. Well, you are disposed to coming before God, right? Because your passions are calmed down, your your mind is getting purged, and so on. Some of your sins are being washed away, and so on. And so you are you are being disposed, right? But why is it put in a musical context? Sing joyfully to Lord all your lands. Serve the Lord with gladness.

[26:49] Come before Him with joyful song. Know the Lord. Why do you? What's the mention about music? We talk about that we had a little friendship course to be here one time. Friendship course, yeah, yeah,

[27:07] yeah. What does Shakespeare say? If music be the food of love, play on. Well, that's what the Pope say, right? And they talk about the role of church music, right? Because charity is what a kind of love, right? Okay, and music is what the most perfect expression of love, right? So it's as appropriate thing in church thing, right? I am going through my Mozart collection now. Going through the operas now.

[27:45] You realize the music is tied up with love. You know, it's amazing how Mozart covers all kinds of love, right? Now, magnificent, magnificent. But there are a lot of nice statements about music and love and Shakespeare, right? The

[28:14] Thomas says there'll be music in heaven, you know, properly speaking, huh? I wonder how those angels can enjoy that, huh? I say what Così fan tutte. So, it takes us even the angels to come down to listen to it. One time I saw a concert. Così fan tutte

[28:39] was was doing one the Mozart bicentennials, you know, his birth. You imagine how short Mozart's life was. I was present for both bicentennials: the bicentennial of his birth and bicentennial of his death. Right, and so one of those bicentennials, my mother said to me, "What do you want for your birthday? " I said, "I want tickets to this. " They're they're having you know two concerts devoted entirely to Mozart alone, right?

[29:03] And one was vocal and one was instrumental music, right? And the the instrumental music was they were playing the the first symphony that Mozart wrote and the last symphony he wrote. The marvelous thing, you see, and and then the other one was they did Così fan tutte in concert form, right? They're dressed up in all the fancy clothing, and they sing all the arias, right? And the orchestra plays everything, and you don't have all the maybe the acting and so on, but I mean, by any means, they get the whole, the whole thing.

[29:35] It's all musical, right? So that's when I first heard that. Then the second bicentennial was when my son was at West Point, and they they did two Mozart operas at West Point, not students. I mean, they brought the New York City Opera in, you know, and so on, and they did the magic flute and so on. Kind of marvelous, you know. The there's a big auditorium. I don't know what it's called.

[30:02] Whatever is the name of the big auditorium there, and people come in from all around, you know, to hear it too, as well as the students, you know. So kind of beautiful. Glad they did that. We have we have John Paul II and Benedict. You know their remarks. You know, upon hearing Mozart's Great Room, you know, it's pretty marvelous. Very nice praise of Mozart. John Paul II said the Church cannot fail to do homage to Mozart.

[30:38] So I do, you know, just to protect Mozart, you know, from people who think his music is too secular, isn't it? Okay. But that, for the sake of which we have now made a discourse, is this: that all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first causes and beginnings, right? You see how that comes out of this, right? Seeing the order all the way up to art.

[31:05] So as has been said before, I'm kind of summarizing here. The experienced man seems to be wiser than any of those having just what sensation, right? But the artist, the man who knows universal, in some way, the cause, then the what experienced, right? The chief artist and the handicraftsman, right? The the chief art, right? It was a more ultimate what end, right?

[31:35] So just think of the great chef who's going to make the final product, you know, is going to go out on the table there for the king, and somebody else is preparing maybe some ingredient for it, you know. But that's as far as they go. They don't know what the end part is going to be. things are all brought together. You know, oh my goodness, you know, magnificent thing fit for a king, as he say, right?

[31:55] To sit there, okay. And then he says the looking sciences more than the what making, huh? Now you know in philosophy we speak of what practical philosophy, which is like the making in a sense, dealing with praxis action, and then we speak of in Latin speculative philosophy, but in Greek they speak of theoretical. But the English word looking, yeah, looking, because looking is for the sake of seeing; it's not for the sake of doing looking at such, right?

[32:29] Okay. Now go back to the end here of the proemium. You can see the first thing he did is the last thing he mentions in the epilogue there, right? On the end of page five, there, the last paragraph there. What is the nature of the knowledge thought? Then has been said. We haven't got to that yet. That's going to be now in two and three, right? And what is the goal that the investigation and the whole knowledge of our road must reach?

[32:55] The goal we're aiming at is to know the first cause, which turns out to be God, of course, right? But we just learned what the goal is now, right? Huh? In the first what reading, right? Now in the second and third reading, we're going to ask, talk about what kind of knowledge is wisdom, right? We know what the goal is, right? What kind of knowledge is it?

[33:21] We kind of hinted that it's about the first causes, but he's going to come back. On this, so let's begin to look at the second reading.

[33:38] Since we seek such knowledge, this fact to be considered about what sort of causes and about what sort of beginnings is wisdom, the knowledge. I already showed that in a way, right? At the same, he's going to talk about kind of knowledge it is. Perhaps he says, "It would become clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise man." Right?

[34:04] He's going to work out a what a six-part description of the wise man. We think first that the wise man knows all things, so far as possible, right? Not having any knowledge of these what in particular, right? I used to always say to students, "I say, what's the pejorative sense of a wise guy?"

[34:36] Say, "Wise guy, oh yeah, wise guy, know it all, right?" Isn't that how you say? Just the wise man, in some way, knows everything, right? In what way is it possible, though, for a man to know everything?

[34:53] Yeah, he must know it in what in general, right? Okay. Now it's not until the fourth book of wisdom that you learn that wisdom is about being in the one, right? Now, that's most universal, right? Now, then you get into the distinctions of act and ability, right? And substance and how much and how and so on, right? Now, but this, in a sense, is maybe most known about the wise man.

[35:25] We say about people in life sometimes, you know, he's got it all together. We said, "You know, some people don't have it all together."

[35:38] They had it all in some way, right? Huh? You find the saying "to pan all," right? To go to a man who's who's wise in his area, he seems to know everything, right? Doesn't he? You know,

[36:07] I've had I have a couple of world histories in my the house there, you know, and since I've talked to Dave Faye, who's a very good historian and kind of pure historian, right? But kind of he admitted that that was the goal of history, you know, to see world history, right? Just kind of see the whole the whole thing, right?

[36:36] What's his name He was Chicago. William McNeil, right? Well, one that's the most interesting one, I think. Anyway, it's a dividing world history, and so I finally met him at a conference there. And guess who he was speaking about? The potato in history. Yeah, he was

[37:05] talking about how how how Hitler never would have come to power with the strength he did, had it not been for the potato in Germany, right? I guess during the Thirty Years' War, right? You know, they marched into Germany. They would take whatever food they could, the armies, right? But didn't get the potatoes because they were under the ground. That's what the pheasant survived on, and that's built up the pheasant group.

[37:30] You know, that became the the the stock of the German army, right? And the German army was now, first at West Point, you know, the old museum. You know, it's not the new one, but the old one. There was a statue of the Prussian soldier, right? And it said, "The foremost soldier of the modern world." You know, they admired that, you know, because they admired that, you know, even though they were enemies in sense, right, in both World Wars.

[37:55] But they admired them as really being the being the best soldiers around the world. But the potato was important for that. Kind of funny. It's one of the funniest men.

[38:14] Okay. Then we think wise the one who's able to know things what difficult, not easy for man to know. To sense is common to all, hence it is easy and nothing wise, right? Okay. Um. Now, is that common thought that we have? Aristotle is proceeding here in the sense of common that the a wise man is a man you admire, right? You admire men for knowing something that's easy to know.

[38:51] You know, if I come in, you tell me how many chairs in the room. Oh my goodness, you know. What an accomplishment! Yeah, so a man knows things

[39:07] difficult to know, right? Okay. So when he says "we," he's not using as I say to the students, he's not using the editorial "we. He's talking about "we" in general, right?

[39:35] You understand the cosmos, right? Huh? Let me just know the cosmos, is it? The universe, huh? Further, we think wiser in every science; the man more what? Certain. Okay. Now he's giving two things in this sense. I I stopped there. Well, when do you go to a wise man?

[40:03] You're not too sure, right? I remember a question I couldn't solve. My teacher certainly couldn't solve either. And so, at Laval there, I was reading Thomas and of course following the lecture of Dionne and finally I put. together. two and two right after ten years, so to speak, not seeing him. I said, "Well, gee, miss, it just seems so quick, you know, it came." I think I'll go and check him with Dion.

[40:39] And so I came down to see him, and I started in a very orderly way'cause I see he says, "I know where you're going." He says, "I said, well, damn it, can I go there?" And I said, "You knew what I had to say, you know, huh?" You see, but you go to someone you're not in what? Too sure, right? Especially if you're in doubt, right? Okay.

[41:02] So if a doctor is not too sure, you know, you might want to call on a specialist, right? Who thinks is wiser, right? So he's more certain about what should be done for you, right? You're not too sure to do for you sometimes a doctor, right?

[41:20] I remember coming, my doctoral thesis. I'm going to go see what De Koninck thinks. De Koninck says, "Why do you ask me? When you got Dion?" I said, "I don't know what you think anyway." Okay, he says.

[41:34] But isn't that true, right? That we go to somebody we think is wiser. See, with it would be generals, right? Go to the man, go to Napoleon, right? Don't know what to do. What do we do, Napoleon? He's wiser, you know. The first battle, and the one we're able to teach the causes. We saw that being developed before, right? Now, so this is what he knows all things in some way.

[42:05] He knows things that are difficult to know, right? He knows he's more certain about what he's saying, and he's what? Yeah, the causes, right? Because we're able to teach, right?

[42:23] Heisenberg, you know, in a monastery book I've read, the Heisenberg, he always goes back to the to his first encounter with Niels Bohr, you know. And

[42:36] what do they call that in Germany? There, Bohr came on a speaking tour of Germany. Called the Bohr Festival or something like that. You know, they're so impressed, right? And Heisenberg was a young student at the time and heisenberg when bohr first came there. But Bohr had a reputation of knowing more about the atom than anybody in the world. You know, it's called the Bohr Festival. I just went down in history, you know.

[43:03] But Heisenberg, you know, in the question period, he posed a question, you know. And looked at him, and he gave him an answer, you know. Then after the question period, he came over to Heisenberg and he says, "Let's go for a walk, you and I." And that Heisenberg said that walk, you know, determined his whole way of thinking about the atom, right?

[43:26] He keeps coming back, you know, to Bohr. Bohr is quite a man, and. Of course, you know Bohr and Einstein. There was a showdown there at the, you know, the

[43:39] being a physicist there. Einstein, I guess, was using these thought experiments, and he came up with a real good thought experiment to attack the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. And the next day, you know, Bohr come back and refute, you know, Einstein, and finally Einstein gave his last attempt. And Bohr was really worried, you know, and actually in the photograph, you know, them coming out, you know, Einstein is looking kind of, you know, cocky, you know, and Bohr's, you know, wants to continue the conversation, you know.

[44:17] So Bohr had a had a sleepless night, to say the least, and he discovered that Einstein had failed to apply his own theory in his thought experiment. So he came back the next day and pointed out the defect in Einstein's thing, and that was the last time Einstein tried to challenge him publicly. See, he's quite a man, this little Bohr, right? And Einstein was kind of more of a loner, anyway, you know, and and Bohr had, you know, he had great influence upon people, you know, and but the fact Heisenberg always comes back to, feels more, you know.

[44:56] But anyway, because he made a play out of called copenhagen right out of the, you know, because Bohr was very nervous about Heisenberg coming to see him about the atomic bomb, you know what the germans are doing, you know.

[45:26] Okay. And the sciences, huh? The one for itself and for the sake of knowing is more wisdom than that for the sake of its what results, huh?

[45:43] So Einstein is seen to be what wiser, right? Than the man who makes things, huh? As if knowledge is what he understands the universe, right? Huh? We can't do anything about the universe, but. Yeah, yeah, but if he's if he's a man who understands the universe, right? Because the general theory of relativity gave a great impetus to what cosmology, right? Huh? And so this man seems to understand the universe better than anybody else.

[46:15] Will be he's the wise man, right? Because that's the ultimate thing. It seems like the universe, right? Huh? We don't know about God. I mean, but you know, you know, like the whole is more than the part, right? Huh? So if you understand the cosmos, you're really, but you're not going to do anything with that knowledge of the cosmos, probably, right? So. It's more knowing, right?

[46:38] And God's unchangeable, so I can't do anything with God. And the one ruling is more wisdom than the one obeying, right? This is true even with the what practical arts, right? That the chief artist, right? He commands, and the others what? Obey, right?

[47:05] So MacArthur commands, right? And the others what obey, and he seems to be what? Wiser, right? Okay. I like that time when MacArthur was visited by a friend there, you know, another general, and they sat down to eat, right? And the guy noticed that MacArthur wasn't eating anything, and so finally he said why aren't you eating?" so macarthur said, "i'm too tired to eat." So finally said good night, went to bed, you know.

[47:44] Next morning, this guy got up and he said to the officer of the day, "Say goodbye to MacArthur for me. I don't want to wake the guy up. You know, he was so tired. He had gone to the front. He said two hours ago."

[47:58] So, but the British thought that MacArthur was the best general on our side there. Of course, they say after Patton and MacArthur had been in the same same area, it would have been.

[48:17] Yeah. Okay. So even the practical things, you see this, right? The one ruling is seen to be more more wise, right? For the wise man ought not to receive orders, but to give orders, and he ought not to be persuaded by another, but the less wise by him.

[48:37] Well, it was the Inchon landing, right? I guess they they didn't think that it could work, you know. And I've read several accounts of it. You know, people were present at the time, and they you know they they sent down the head of the army there, the chief of staff, to try to dissuade MacArthur from doing it. And and the navy was opposed to it because they didn't think they could do it, and everybody was waiting in tension, you know.

[49:03] When MacArthur got to the speaker, you know, and he got there, you know, and he started knocking down them, you know, and so so finally they they they agreed, you know, that he should do it, right? And then after he went back to Washington, they sent you on your own. We wash our hands, and you know, it's like it's like the pilot there, you know.

[49:38] Okay, so these are the six things, right? Okay. Now it's this last one here that is what they say, sapientis est ordinare in Latin, right? It belongs to the wise men to order, right? And I talked to you about Thomas's famous distinction of the knowledge of reason there in the premium, his own premium to the Nicomachean Ethics,

[50:07] and he distinguishes the knowledge of reason by the order it considers, right? And he doesn't take the distinction of order that we have in the senses of before, right? Because that would be too what general, but it takes the distinction of order in comparison to reason, right? To distinguish what, the knowledge of reason, right? And so he says, there's an order which reason doesn't make but considers, and this is a natural order, right?

[50:45] Then there's the order which reason makes in its own acts, the acts, the order which reason makes in the acts of the will and the emotions, and the order that reason makes in exterior matter, like here, this chair, and then he divides it, natural philosophy, right? And then logic, and then ethics, practical philosophy, and then the mechanical arts, as they're called, the art of carpentry and all the other arts of working exterior matter.

[51:14] But when Thomas begins that, he quotes, goes back to here, right? Sapientis est ordinare. Wisdom is the what? Highest perfection not of the senses, but the highest perfection of what? Reason. And it's proper to reason, he says, to know order, right? Therefore, wisdom is the highest perfection of reason. Most of all, sapientis est ordinari. It's of the wise man to order things, right? That's what Aristotle is saying here, right?

[51:44] So it's a harmony between what we know about reason, like in the definition of reason by Shakespeare, right? Where the culminating part is looking before and after, right? Knowing order, right? Considering order, right? And the wise man, right? Must be therefore the man who orders everybody else around, because he himself has got the highest perfection of reason. His reason has wisdom, which is highest perfection of reason.

[52:17] So in some sense, the wise man directs all the other what? Arts and sciences, huh? Here you can see why logic is in some sense close to wisdom, right?

[52:33] Because logic directs us to use the reason whereby we acquire all the arts and sciences. Such and so many, he says, are the thoughts we have about wise men and what? Wisdom, right? So you can put it in either way. You could say the wise man knows all things in some way, right? Or you could say wisdom is a knowledge of all things in some way, right?

[53:01] Or the wise men knows things are difficult to know, right? And wisdom is a knowledge of things difficult to know, right? Okay. And so on for each of these things, right? You can transfer it from the wise man to wisdom, or from wisdom to the wise man, right?

[53:24] Okay. Now he goes into some of the consequences of this. Following the same order, of these to know all things necessarily belongs to the man most of all having a knowledge of the universal, because the universal is said of what many, and some universals are said of an infinity of things, right?

[53:52] No odd number is even. That covers how many numbers. There's infinity of odd numbers, right? Okay. Are these to know all things necessarily belong to the man most of all having a knowledge universal? For he knows in some way all things placed under the universal. So wisdom is going to be a knowledge of the most universal, right? We find this out what that most universal is in the what fourth book of wisdom, right?

[54:32] It's a knowledge of what being and the one, right? Okay. Aristotle shows those two are equally universal, right? Now, okay. Comes up a lot of one here in the Gospel of John too, right? They all be one as we are one, so on.

[54:54] And secondly, right about difficulty, right? And perhaps now, why does he say perhaps, right? Because maybe the first causes are even more difficult, right? Okay. So he's very careful, and perhaps, right? The most universal are the most difficult for men to know, for they are furthest from the what senses. Okay. I

[55:22] never seen a modern philosopher who seems to know about substance, quantity, quality, or about act and ability, right? Huh? You know, they find those things very difficult to know, right? They don't understand the the good. They don't understand one.

[55:41] You know, it's very difficult to distinguish between the one that is the beginning of number and the one that is convertible with being and universality. You don't get, you know, it's very difficult, right? So in some sense, these are most difficult, right? Because the furthest from the senses, because the senses know the what singular, right? So if the senses, which is the beginning of our knowledge, so knowledge is singular, right?

[56:06] And this is the easiest. And wisdom is a knowledge of the most universal. That's as far away as you can get from the starting point, right? Okay. But he says perhaps because the knowledge of the first cause is even more difficult, right? Huh? Okay.

[56:24] It's interesting that he argues from that because he's he's shown that the wise men, some way. You know knows all things, and then that he knows things most difficult for men to know, and he and that can follow from that. Right? He doesn't have to go to the cause yet. This is the difficulty, right?

[56:46] And the most certain of sciences are those most of all about what comes first. Now, why is that, right? Because you need to consider fewer things.

[57:03] Take the example whole and part, right? Which is easy to know, a whole and part, or to know hydrogen and proton neutron? See, you can know many more things to know that, right? By whole and part, you can know what. Yeah, yeah. In some sense, the more universal is easier, right?

[57:32] It's more known to me that a whole is more than a part than it is that the more certain than that hydrogen is more than than water. Let's say is more than hydrogen or more than oxygen or whatever it is, right? H2O, they say, huh?

[57:54] And those whom fewer things are more certain than those about from addition as arithmetic than geometry, right? Now, I see this in my study of Euclid, which I got from Sterix and Sisinni gone by Euclid.

[58:17] I go to the county house here on Monday night, and there is some prisoner whose name is Euclid. I like to meet this guy, you know, and I brought up with him, And so one of the guys said, well, I know him. He said, he's in my neighborhood, but he's a Filipino. He says. I said I wonder how he got the name Euclid. I wonder how he got the name Euclid.

[58:35] So maybe I'll meet this guy someday, you know. But I see enough European of his envelope there, you know, and you know we put the envelope here and the money here, and so and so his name Euclid, huh? Please Jordan, but

[58:52] but in geometry, you see, if you take what simplest in geometry is the point, right, and what simplest arithmetic is the one. Now they're both indivisible, right? But the point has got position, which the one doesn't have, right? So you have to worry about the position, right? So if you have the three ones in the number three, you don't have to ask are they in a straight line or are they, you know, like a triangle, you know, you know they're not in; they don't have any position, right?

[59:21] But in geometry, the points have to be in a straight line, or they have to be in a triangle, or some other pattern, right? And so the geometry requires more things, right? Well, sometimes in Euclid's theorems, you need more than one case. They call it right, because the thing can be situated differently, right? And if you give a good edition like Heath, you know, he'll give from Proclus or somebody, you know, who distinguishes the cases, right?

[59:49] And they see that Euclid will take the most difficult case, and then needs a lesser, easier case of yours to dumbbells, right, to figure out, right? And Aristotle does it sometimes too, you know. But

[1:00:03] I suddenly see a theorem. I'm not quite so sure. You know, they have to distinguish cases here, or you know, you know. And I realize it's not as certain as with Medicaid because of the fact that there's more things involved, even in the point, right, than in the one, and that's position, right? Okay. Then you go from geometry, let's say, to What natural science, right? Well, body has not only length and width, but it's got all kinds of other things, right?

[1:00:33] In addition to what you have in geometry, right? And so, the more things you have to consider, the less certain you are. You get into ethics, or you know, and into politics, right? Then you really got what? You got too many things to consider, right? Okay.

[1:01:00] So he's kind of showing, right? Why it's more certain. And the science which considers causes is more fit for what teaching. huh? He's more able to teach the wise man. For those who teach who give the causes of each thing, right?

[1:01:17] Now, what about this knowledge being what for itself, right? And not for the sake of doing, right? Understanding and knowledge for the sake of themselves, especially belong to the knowledge of the most what? Knowable. For the man who desires to know for itself, will most desire what is most knowledge. And such is that of the most what? Knowable. And most knowable are the first things and the causes.

[1:01:49] For other things are known through these and from them, but not these through what comes under them, right? This is the famous distinction Aristotle makes elsewhere that comes up in the second book, you know, but comes up in the beginning of the Physics, too, right? That what is more known to us is less what? Knowable. What's more knowable to us is less knowable. Okay. And you'll see this better when you get to the ninth book, you know, because Aristotle argued that act is more knowable than ability, right?

[1:02:19] So the more in act something is, the more it's what? Knowable. But things in motion, so they catch the eye and what not stirs, so as if motion is most known to us, right? But it's not most knowable because it's hardly there. Doesn't really exist, right? When does my walking home exist?

[1:02:44] Well, part of it's gone by, and part of it is to come, and what's there now? Any of my walking home in the now? See?

[1:02:58] Kind of thing is that it's in the past and doesn't exist anymore. It's in the future, doesn't exist yet, and in the now, it doesn't exist. So far they're all about it you say. How do you understand that?

[1:03:15] Okay. So the cause really explains the effect, doesn't it? The effect doesn't explain the cause, but we tend to know the effect before the cause. So what is more known to us is less knowable, right? It's a very profound thing that we leave it for almost the last,

[1:03:41] and that is the chief science and more ruling than the subordinate, which knows that for the sake of which each thing ought to be done. But this is the end, right, and the good of each, and as a whole, the best in all nature. I know what the best in all nature is. What is the best thing? Because that be most of all the end.

[1:04:08] From all the aforesaid, the name sought falls in the same science, for it is necessary that this looks at the first beginnings and causes.

[1:04:19] For one of the causes is the good, and that for the sake of which. But notice, where the end is a cause, it's the cause of all the other causes, right?

[1:04:30] So sitting is what what the carpenter is aiming at, something to sit on, right? And that's why he gives the the back here a little bit of a what an obtuse angle here, right, to the seat, right? If you made an acute angle, it'd be, you know, wouldn't be successful chair. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So sitting is why he makes a chair, right? And it's because he makes a chair that the wood becomes the wood of a chair, and why the shape gets into it, right?

[1:05:01] But sitting is really the reason for everything, right? Because God is good, we are, as Augustine says, right? Aristotle will be saying the same thing, right?

[1:05:18] Okay. So this is still, in a sense, emphasizing most of all that wisdom is a knowledge of causes and a knowledge of the first causes. Okay, but we're also hinting that it's going to be a knowledge of the most universal too, right? Okay.