Wisdom (Metaphysics 2016)
7. Metaphysics Proemium III: Speculative Arts, Leisure, Words Equivocal by Reason, and the Six Marks of the Wise Man
Class of 2016-09-15
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/7c-wisdom-2016/007-metaphysics-proemium-iii-speculative-arts-leisure-words-equivocal/

[0:00] Now he goes to something that's more difficult as you go along, right? He's going to talk about the more practical arts and the more speculative arts. It is probable that the first one finding any art beyond the senses common to all was admired by men, right? Not only because some of the things found were useful, but also as wise and distinguished from what others.

[0:35] These painters, you know, they know how to what? Have perspective, you know. One thing I was admiring the painters is how. Well, I'll give you an example here. I first came to Worcester there, renting a room, you might say, in in houses, you know, divided into rooms and rented out, and so I got to have a little something in there. So I was down the bookstore downtown Worcester there, and they had these prints, you know, beautiful finished scenes, right?

[1:08] So I put these up on the wall, you know. Well, I'm going to put my stockings up in the morning, or something like that. Look over at the at the thing. I noticed the weather. I looked from I was over on this side of my room or on that side of my room. I was looking right down the thing. How the heck can you do that, right?

[1:32] And some painters they can draw the eyes right, so they seem to what follow you around, right? And my friend Washington Irving, you know, talks about you know the servants, you know, something you know strange about that painting over there because his eyes follow you. You know, like he's alive or

[1:56] something. It's kind of funny, you know. But that's really, you know, you kind of admire it, don't you? You know. And the first guy that made beer or wine, you admire not only because it's useful what he made, but because you know he seemed to be, you know, how'd you discover that? You know, how'd you, you know, seems to be wiser, right? Huh? Okay. I was trying to get the wonder. There, my son Paul.

[2:25] There, you know, making the popcorn, right? You know, you get the little grains at the bottom. The thing, I show them into the bottom of the thing. They went up, and then, and I put the lid on. And eventually, the lid is coming off, and it was, I'm admired, you know, by what I could do, right? You know, yeah, because they're little tiny things, and then, you see the lid being raised.

[2:51] Wow, Daddy can do, you know. That's something practical, making popcorn, right? Huh? And I was gonna turn the kernel there, and pay debt. So it is probable that the first one finding any art beyond the senses common to all was admired by men, not only because some of the things found were useful, like popcorn, but also as wise and distinguished from others, right? Now, many arts having been found, some being for necessities, right, like the art of cooking and the medical art, and so on, and some for passing the time pleasantly, right, like the what

[3:35] musician, right, huh? And the what dramatist, right? So on. Always the finders of the latter were considered wiser because their sciences were not for practical use. Now, let's stop from one here, huh? What does the word poet mean in Greek? Maker,

[3:57] yeah. So why are the poets called poets? Yeah. Carpenter. What is this a? maybe kind of a figure of speech Yeah, what figure of speech is it? Antonomasia. Antonomasia, yeah, yeah. In other words, in Aristotle calling Homer the poet, right? Is a double what? Yeah. Among all makers, right, the dramatist or the tragedian or the the epic, you know, he is the maker, right? Now you get the maker for the poets, right, as we call them, but you realize that what it was meant in Greek, and then among them he is the the maker, you know, okay.

[4:45] So they're admired more in some ways, right? And everybody thinks that what Shakespeare is what wise, huh? You know, more than the carpenter or the cook, right? You might enjoy what the cook makes or something, you know, but do we think him as wise as Shakespeare? No. We'll strive to please you every day, Shakespeare says, at the end of the epilogue of the plays, right? Huh? We'll strive to please you every day.

[5:21] Well, the arts for pleasure, like that, right? The regard is why is it, right? Hence, all these sciences, having been built up, those sciences were found that are neither for pleasure nor for necessities, right? The necessities would be like the art of cooking, the art of what, making clothes, right? Or the tailor, whoever it is, the art, the medical art, the art of making wagons and so on, right?

[5:51] Making house housebuilder art. And they had ones for pleasure, like say the poetic arts and the musical arts, right? But even painting and so on.

[6:09] Then they were found first in those places where men had leisure, but that's again a sign that is not for what practical things, right? Hence, the mathematical sciences first began around Egypt, right? For there, the priestly class was allowed leisure, right?

[6:31] I mentioned my my probably my three greatest teachers up there, involved were Charles DeConick and Monsignor Deane and Father Boulay, right? But Monsignor Deane and Father Boulay were what priests, right? And there was at that time, before Quebec fell apart, there was a a what surplus, you might say, of priests like nowadays. And so, some priests who who were you know in the educational thing, right, would have more what leisure, you might say, right?

[7:08] And you know, they could pursue theology and so on at a much deeper level than most men could, It's kind of nice, huh? Yeah?

[7:28] I remember in the parish, Raymond Shrewsbury there years ago, I was involved in the CCD and so on. You know, remember when I already talked to one of the priests in the parish house there, you know, up in his room there about doing the CCD there. And his phone was ringing the whole time I was there. It was ringing all the time. I realized you know how busy these guys are, and you know, and how can you do, you know, just how can you do theology?

[7:59] The phone be every five minutes, you know, just you know. You think some people think they see their mass and they, you know, going loaf the rest of the day. They don't. They don't.

[8:14] For there, the priestly class was allowed leisure, right? That's well, geometry, that's right. Aristotle has a little footnote here. You might say he's not talking here precisely about the difference between art and science, right? For art is what great reason about making, right? And science is about knowing, more, you know, and so on. But these are talked about in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, right?

[8:42] The virtues of reason, prudence, and art, and what science, and they're all distinguished there, right now. What the difference is between art and science and other things of the same kind, like these, prudence and so on, has been said in the Ethics, right? And in the Nicomachean Ethics, in the sixth book, right now.

[9:07] Now, one thing there in the sixth book, he distinguishes between episteme, which they translate scientia, right, and sophia, which we translate as sapientia or wisdom in English, right now. Different virtues, right?

[9:29] But in the the fourteen books of wisdom, right, Aristotle calls wisdom an episteme. Is he mixed up, or is the word episteme equivocal here by reason?

[9:50] So St. Thomas would say because Aristotle was such a great philosopher. Yes, yeah. Now, review a little bit here. I don't know if I've explained this before, but

[10:04] Aristotle, you know, in the book called the Politics, he says the man who considers something from its origin gets the best understanding of it, right? So when you ask how does a word become equivocal, not by chance, now which happens many times, but how does a word become equivocal by reason, right?

[10:31] Well, I would distinguish two ways to begin with, right? I guess do by two or three, you know. Think about it again. You could say three ways, but I know something. Looking back at my old text there in the computer there that I had, the second, third one put together under second one, right? But they're distinct, right? So there's two or three ways, right, that a word can become equivocal by reason as opposed to what by chance, right?

[11:05] The gentleman who comes to my house on Tuesday night for philosophy, his name is Richard, right? I remarked to my oldest brother was named Richard. Now, why you two guys should be both called Richard? Is there a reason for that?

[11:21] I didn't ask him how he got the name Richard, but. And I think my brother Richard got the name Richard because my my mother's father was named Richard. He was the firstborn. Yeah, yeah. So she must have persuaded my father to give him the name of her father, which was Richard, right?

[11:42] So his name is Richard Harlow Burquist. Harlow was one of my father's brothers. Okay. So I know this guy Richard's name, but you know, it's by chance that they both have the name Richard, right?

[11:59] Apparently, there is two Winston Churchills in print, right? One is my hero there, and the other guy is something that's quite different, but a novelist and so on, right? There is a funny letter from Churchill to him about how they should distinguish themselves. It was by chance, right? Huh? You know. And

[12:21] I remember myself, and I read, you know, Churchill did write a novel right? And uh this guy's a novelist, right? So it really was confusing, you know. I mean, I'm confused too, you know. So one way that a name becomes equivocal by reason, and it's closest to inevitable, this one, is that when a name is said of, say, two things, for more or less the same reason, right?

[12:51] It's sometimes kept by one of the two as its own name, its own private name, right? And the other one is given what? A new name, right?

[13:05] Now there are two ways this takes place, right? Sometimes it's because one of the two has nothing noteworthy in addition to what is common to the two, so it keeps the common name, and the other one has something noteworthy, right? That's added to what they have in common, so it gets a new name. Going back to my mother there, right? Sometimes we distinguish man from the animals, and sometimes, without insulting man, we say he's an animal.

[13:48] So animal can be said of the beast and of man with more or less the same reason. And then animal means what? A living body that has senses. Well, you're a living body. You're alive. They have senses, right? And what's his name here? Let's see. Habibi. Hhabibi. Habibi. Let's. You gotta get a foreign name, you guys. You're Maronites. Yeah. Argos.

[14:22] He's he's a living body. He's alive, I can tell, and he has senses, right? So living. So animal is said of you and and Habibi. Where is his name? Um. With the same meaning in mind, right? Okay, so it's not equivocal, right? But sometimes we keep the name animal for the beast, right? And we give a new name to man because there's something noteworthy, namely reason, beyond what the other animals have.

[14:54] Okay. So now, in one sense, man is an animal, and in another sense, he's not, right? So I used to say to my students, if the biologist says that man is an animal, he's not insulting you, you know. But if your girlfriend says you're an animal,

[15:11] she's insulting you, right? You know. And so my mother didn't like that. I used to call man an animal, right? So sometimes we divide man against animals.

[15:22] Now, sometimes it's the what reverse, right? So sometimes I take the word say understanding, right? Understanding can name the act of the mind, but sometimes the mind itself is called the understanding, or the intellect in Latin, right. And so man has an has an understanding, and the angel has an understanding, right?

[15:56] But the angel understands all kinds of things right away. Man has to go through a discourse, has to run hither and thither, how many times until he begins to understand things, right? Is it hard to understand? So the angel has understanding in a full way, right? So sometimes he keeps the name understanding for his own, and man is given a new name reason. And reason is divided now against what understanding, right?

[16:35] So in one sense understanding is divided against reason. In another sense, you say reason is one kind of understanding, right? So this is what you could say about episteme and Sophia, right? Or if you said in English knowledge and wisdom, right? Sometimes we divide wisdom against knowledge, right? Although in the broad sense of knowledge, wisdom is knowledge too, right? It's the highest knowledge, right? Because there's a great excellence in knowledge, right?

[17:12] It gets its own name, wisdom, right? And knowledge is kept for the geometry and natural philosophy and the lesser ones, right? So it's two ways that

[17:30] now there's another way. Words become equivocal by reason now, and that is by what being carried over, right? Okay. After carried over, there's two ways they're carried over.

[17:52] Sometimes they're carried over by dropping part of their meaning, or being generalized, you might say, right? Other times they're carried over by what Horatio or ratios huh

[18:13] So when we have the word before there, right? Now. The word "before" first means what in time, right? And that was carried over to "before in being," and then to "before in knowledge," and then "before in goodness," right? But it's carried over by a likeness of what Ratio is there, right? Okay. Sometimes they say philosophy is carried over to logic. Logic is not philosophy; that's just the tool of philosophy.

[18:43] Okay, but the tool of philosophy can be called philosophy in some sense, right? So that's by ratio, right? Okay. Or being is carried over. what Thomas says from what substance to what quantity and to quality and to quality by the ratio of quantity to substance. It's the size of a substance, right? Quality is the what disposition of a substance, huh?

[19:12] So those are different ways, right? But when you carry say before in the sense of being, right, or to before in knowing, well, if this can be without that, but not that without this, then you say if this can be known without that, but that without this it cannot be known without this. There's a likeness of ratios there, right? Okay, like four is to six as two is to three, right?

[19:50] So there are different ways the names are carried over, right? Okay. So in the ethics, he distinguishes episteme and and sophia, but he'll call sophia sometimes episteme, right? No contradiction, right? See, we sometimes distinguish between reason and understanding, right? And then sometimes we say the reason is a form of understanding, right? Okay. He's giving that second definition of reason, right? The ability to understand reason and direct yourself and others.

[20:29] And what's all this discourse for, right? The Aristotle said, huh? I know we've been going from what one thing to another, right? We've been running from sensing to memory to experience to knowledge of the universal, right? And then from the what practical arts to the what more speculative arts, right? The arts for pleasure and so. And we say that the man of art is wiser than the man of experience because he knows the cause, right?

[20:59] Wisdom is going to be knowing what the farthest in knowing the cause because sometimes a cause what has a cause, right? So the man who knows the cause of the cause is wiser than the man who merely knows the cause, right?

[21:17] Leading up to the idea that wisdom is going to be a knowledge of causes, but ultimately about the very first causes, or first cause is just one, right? But that, for the sake of which we have now made a discourse, is this: that all, all, meaning all the philosophers, what is called wisdom to be about the first causes and beginnings. I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.

[21:47] So, as has been said before, the experienced man seems to be wiser than any of those having, right, sensation. The man of art than the man of experience, because he knows why, right? The chief artist than the what? Handicraftsman, right? The looking sciences more than the what? Making, huh?

[22:13] Thus it is clear. Now he backtracks. You know, I've gone too fast, for you guys. I know. Thus it is clear that wisdom is about beginnings and causes, right? You kind of anticipate it's going to be not just about any beginnings, causes, but about the very what first ones, right? Okay, but let's let you guys digest this a little bit more, right? You know, let's slow down a little bit.

[22:37] wisely and slow; they stumble and run fast, right? Let's say the wisdom is about beginnings and causes, right? Okay, that's enough for today, right? See, now get some more time, though, right? Okay,

[22:55] now let's ask more formally the question: What beginnings or causes is it, right? Okay, since we seek such knowledge, huh? This is the proemium to the fourteen books of wisdom.

[23:17] Since we seek such knowledge, is thought to be considered about what sort of causes, right? And about what sort of beginnings is wisdom the knowledge? Huh? He's using cause and beginning as kind of what synonyms here, right? But in the fifth book of wisdom, he's going to show that beginning is said more generally, right, than cause, right?

[23:42] We tend to use beginnings, you know, a lot for for matter and for the maker, right? But there are kinds of causes besides that, and then there are beginnings that are not really causes, right? You know, when Thomas talks about the Father, God the Father, he says he's a beginning, right, because the Son proceeds from Him, right, but he's not really the cause of Him, right?

[24:10] Is so. About what sort of causes or beginnings is wisdom the knowledge? Perhaps he says, huh? See, that's one of his philosophical modesty. Thomas says. Perhaps it would become clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise man, right? Okay.

[24:32] Okay. He's going to work out here. He's going to think out a six-part description of the wise man, right? Huh? Okay. And it's an order in which he thinks them out. We think first, he says. That's order, right? That the wise man knows all things so far as possible, not having a knowledge of these in particular.

[25:08] Now notice that going back to the definition of reason, right? Huh? In Shakespeare, reason is the ability for a larger discourse, right? To be able to make a discourse about what the. Universal, right? And you might suspect then that the wise man can make a discourse about the most universal things, right? He sees everything in some way, right? Not in particular, but in general, right? That the discourse of the wise man is the is the largest of all, right?

[25:41] In other senses too, but in this sense, huh? Now this seems to be kind of most known, right? And you know when when my friend here Boswell thinks that he really admires Johnson, he seems to know everything, right?

[26:05] Yes, I just think about everything, right? But I used to say in class too, even the pejorative sense, huh? Of the wise guy, huh? Wiseman, what are you, wise guy? Know it all, right? You know, we think in some way that the wise man knows everything, right? But not in this pejorative sense, right? You know, Even that's a witness or a sign, you know, that this is kind of most known about the wise man.

[26:30] Okay, Wise guy, That's a know it all. Then we think wise the one who is able to know things difficult and not easy for a man to know. Well, don't we admire the wise man, right?

[27:02] We admire Einstein as being wise, right? Huh? But did Einstein make the atomic bomb? No. Why do we admire Einstein as being wise? Well, the general theory of relativity, right, led to kind of an explosion of that part of physical science called what cosmology, right? The cosmos in Greek is named from the word cosmos, right, which means order, right? You know, but Einstein seems to understand the whole universe.

[27:41] He understands everything, right? You know, seems to be wise, right? And it's kind of hard to understand the universe as a whole, isn't it? Yeah. But we admire the wise man because he knows things that are easy to know that everybody knows. Two plus two is four.

[28:07] Then we think wise the one who is able to know things difficult and not easy for a man to know. That's kind of common opinion, right? Call somebody wise because he knows things that everybody knows, right? Two senses common to all, right? Hence, it is easy and nothing wise, huh?

[28:32] Like the taste of candy, huh, Especially when I was a, little boy. Further, we think wiser in every science, right? The man, what? More certain, huh? So the third thing, huh?

[29:07] Now, is that a common opinion about the wise man that he's more sure of what he's saying? If you're not too sure about something, don't you go to somebody you think is wiser in this matter than you are, right? As if, because you're not so sure, right? Even a medical doctor, right, might go to a specialist, right, if he thinks, huh? It's

[29:36] kind of funny the way up here. I was listening to Rush Limbaugh, right? They're always talking about Hillary's health. Now, you ever heard that, you know? And apparently, you know, the doctor said she had bacterial pneumonia. Well, apparently, in the big book that they use, you know, in the in the Obama's medical plan, right, no such thing.

[30:08] So, how do you recommend treatment for something that has no name? Yeah, yeah, it's funny. Take out that. So the third thing is that he's more certain, right? More sure, huh?

[30:39] I know, so a little paradox there, right? That he what? He knows things difficult and not easy for man to know, and yet he's more what? Certain, huh? Say.

[30:59] Is the wise man knowing the same thing when he knows what is most certain, and when he knows something that's most difficult to know?

[31:20] It's a kind of paradox there in what he's saying here. It reminds me of the paradox in the *Premium* to the three books on the soul, right?

[31:35] Aristotle begins the *Premium* to the three books on the soul by saying, you know, that we say that all knowledge, as such, is good, right?

[31:47] I used to go talk about that to students sometimes, and I compare knowledge and love, right? I'd say he's saying that all knowledge is good, right? Well, if I'm a terrorist, is it good that I know how to make a bomb?

[32:08] See, the knowledge as such is not bad, right? I might misuse my knowledge, right? See, it's like saying, you know, is it good that you have a body that is strong? But a man might abuse his what? Strength might beat people up, you know, for no good reason, right?

[32:39] Is it good to be beautiful? a woman might, you know, misuse her beauty, right? Lead people astray and so on. So, a spy should be beautiful.

[33:04] So, but not all love is good, huh? If I love to torture people, that's not good, right? If I love to steal, if I like to seduce other men's wives, it's a challenge, you know.

[33:24] So, if you love something good, that's good, right? Your love. If you love something bad, that's bad, right? But if I know something bad, is that bad? In fact, you know, there's the same knowledge of opposites, right? So, ethics is a knowledge both of virtue and of vice, right? And so, if it was bad to know the bad, then all knowledge would be bad. But in fact, all knowledge is good, right?

[33:52] But by accident, right, it can be bad for someone, right, to know something, right? It's good to know how to open a safe. Secretary, when the secretary down by father's office would show me how to open the safe, you know, in the office.

[34:20] That's how you got to be independently wealthy. Aristotle says after saying that all knowledge is good, he says, "But some knowledge is better than others, right? " And he gives two reasons for saying that this knowledge is better than that knowledge. One is that you know a what better thing, and the other is that you know better what you know. You know more with certitude, right?

[34:58] And now he says, this is the proemium of the three books on the soul. In both of these ways, the knowledge of the soul would seem to be better than most other knowledge.

[35:15] It's better than most other knowledge because the soul is the best thing in the whole material world. Okay, living things are better than non-living things, and that's because they have a soul, right? So you're knowing the best thing you can know in this material world, right? The next thing is better than my friend here is saying, "The effort is very good, right? " But the soul is a very great thing,

[35:46] and it's also, in one sense, the knowledge of the soul is very certain because we have what great certitude that we are alive. I'm sure I'm alive. See?

[36:01] But Aristotle says, you know, in the three books on the soul, that to know what the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world.

[36:12] So is he most certain in his knowledge of the soul as regards knowing what it is? See, but he's more—he's most certain that he does have a soul because he's most certain that he's alive, right? See, he has this internal knowledge, right? Huh? Even those crazy modern philosophers, you know, who deny, you know, the reality of matter sometimes, like Barkley, you know. you know, the famous thing, you know, Johnson kicked a stone and said, "I refute him thus."

[36:49] Common sense isn't it? My experience. Yeah, yeah. I mean, either never, but you know, that they're alive, right? Huh? I think therefore I am, and so. But maybe it's not exactly in the same way that that the knowledge of the soul is a knowledge of the best thing, and a knowledge that is what very certain, right? Okay. But you can hardly deny your inward experience of life, huh?

[37:14] Okay. So it may be that there's some answer to why Aristotle can say that the wise man is both what knowing things difficult for us to know, and he's most certain, right?

[37:30] And there's something in our common experience about that, right? We go to the wise man because we think he's more sure of what he's saying than other men, right? And we admire him because we think he knows things that are really difficult to know. See, but we don't maybe stop and think there's a paradox there, right? Huh? See. But

[37:54] in the you know twelfth book of wisdom, Aristotle is knowing the first cause. It's very difficult to know. In the fourth book, he's knowing among other things that something can't both be and not be.

[38:10] To be or not to be—that is the question. He can't both be and not be, right? That's going to be very certain, right? The axioms, right? The wise man knows the axioms better than anybody else. And one reason is because the axioms are all stated by words what equivocal by reason. The wise man knows these right. The whole fifth book is about that right. I told you an example I used to use in class right, to show the importance of knowing this, huh?

[38:45] I quote my mother again. I say, my mother didn't like it when I said that man is an animal. I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. That's better, Dwayne. And I said, so an animal is only part of what a man is, right?

[39:10] But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant. So sometimes what is only a part contains more than the whole. Hey, I said something. So a whole is not always more than a part. See. You just untied the knob of the universe right there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, this is the most common type of mistake, you know, I used to pretend you're there talking up to the floor, right?

[39:41] You know, he's sophist. Deceiving these poor students, you know. But the most common fallacy, which I said was the most common fallacy, right? The fallacy of equivocation, right? The fallacy of equivocation is maybe even more apt to be done with words equivocal by reason than by chance, because there you can see more that that's a different, different meaning, right? Well, you're confusing the two main senses of whole, right?

[40:15] The composed whole is put together from its parts, right? And universal whole, which is set of its parts, right? Now the whole is put together from parts is always more than one of those parts. And universal whole, which is set of many particular kinds of things, right? Many particular animals, is always set of more than any one of those particulars is set of, right? So when you say that animal is a part of man, you mean a part of the definition of man.

[40:46] And the definition of man is, my mother was happy to find out, is more than animal. It's an animal that has reason, right? So animal is only a part of the definition of man, and the definition of man is a composed whole, and it's put together from more than just animal, from reason as well, as I informed my mother. She was happy to know. But when I say that what animal includes more than man, I'm talking about animal as a universal whole, and it's said of man and many other things besides man, right?

[41:21] So you're mixing up the two different what holes, right? Animal as a universal whole, and animal as a composing part of the definition of man. See, we can't distinguish those senses, right? And so they're caught by the sophist. Pretend Aristotle comes up to the floor, right? Says, "Shame on you! Misusing logic, right now. Logic is good, but you are misusing it to deceive your students, right? I usually have to show them the need, you know, for the fifth book, among other things, right?

[41:59] And how the wise man knows the axioms in a way that nobody else does, and he can defend them, right? But the axioms are what are most what certain.

[42:09] Yeah, but as the first cause, that's most difficult to know, right? You know, it's hard to be certain about that. you know Um. And be more able to teach the causes. Okay, that's kind of clear from what went before, right? And explain why, right?

[42:36] You know, theology is is wisdom, as Thomas explains in the first question of the Summa. But you know, we as as Christians believe that God became man, right? Well, then our friend was Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, right? Why did God become a man, right? And Thomas talks about that. Why did God become a man, right? And that's what the man can explain. That he seems to be wiser about these things, huh?

[43:08] Or Thomas will ask, you know, why did the second person of the Blessed Trinity become man, rather? You know, it goes back to the fact, you know, that the second person is also called the what Logos, right? And points the fact that Logos in Greek can also mean reason, right? Well, as Aristotle says in the

[43:29] tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, reason more than anything else is man, right? There's certain appropriateness in the Word of God becoming man, right? Also in the Son of God becoming man, because we're sons by partaking, you know, of the sonship of Christ, right? So he seems to be wiser. Theology can explain why God became a man, or why the second person, particularly, became a man, and so on.

[43:59] You know, these two great minds, there, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, they say that this is not the only way God could have saved us as becoming man, but it's the best way he could, right? You say, ah, yes, this is something, right? And then he's actually explaining why this is the best way, right? And how you keep on discovering other reasons why it's good that he saved us in this way.

[44:25] Okay. And of course, there's a connection between being certain and knowing the causes, because you know, if you know the definition of demonstration, syllogism, making us know the cause and that which it is the cause cannot be otherwise. So when you know the cause, you kind of know why it must be so, right? In geometry, you can see.

[44:50] Now the fifth thing about the wise man. Am I running over time here? I better let you go. Yeah, we'll pick up this next thing Yeah we'll we'll start the second reading from the beginning, but we just but he's working out a six part thing. He's got a couple more to give here, right? And he's going to. Many things you learn from that, but he's particularly interested in seeing that.

[45:12] Therefore, must be about the first causes, right? Very thorough guy, Aristotle. You know, basic guy.