Aristotle: First Philosophy (Wisdom)

Aristotle: First Philosophy (Wisdom) #

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The Matter and Order of Wisdom #

paper · Metaphysics WS01 · 54 pages · PDF · WS01_The_Matter_and_Order_of_Wisdom.pdf

Covers: Essay on what wisdom (First Philosophy/Metaphysics) is about and the order of its matters, and the order of the fourteen books; builds on the Proemium of Book 1 (980a21-983a23) read with Aquinas’s exposition.

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Introductory Note for the Fourteen Books #

foreword · Metaphysics 01 · 3 pages · PDF · WS02_B1_01-Intro._Note_on_the_14_Books.pdf

Covers: Introduction to the fourteen books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: why the name ‘Metaphysics’ is a custom, why Aristotle calls this philosophy wisdom simply (versus natural philosophy and ethics/political philosophy as wisdom in a qualified way), the name’s meaning as coming after natural philosophy, and how best to study the books (Aristotle with Aquinas’ exposition, plus notes and translations).

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Aristotle’s Proemium to Wisdom #

reading · Metaphysics First Reading · 6 pages · PDF · WS02_B1_02-Aristotles_Proemium_to_Wisdom.pdf

Covers: Metaphysics I.1-2: ‘All men by nature desire to know’ through the nature of the knowledge sought (wisdom) and the goal of the investigation.

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Note for Aristotle’s Proemium to Wisdom #

note · Metaphysics Proemium · 9 pages · PDF · WS02_B1_03-Note_for_Proemium.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Aristotle’s proemium to Wisdom (Metaphysics). It explains the two divisions of the fourteen books (editorial/reference and logical/understandable). It compares the proemium/main work division to the prologue/play of Romeo and Juliet and to Plato’s Timaeus. The last pages discuss wisdom as sweet, savoury, refreshing and restful.

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Note for the Second Book of Wisdom #

note · Metaphysics 01 · 3 pages · PDF · WS02_B2_01-Note_for_Second_Book.pdf

Covers: Introductory note explaining why the Second Book (alpha elatton) of Wisdom (Metaphysics) comes after Book One’s Proemium and review of predecessors and before Book Three: how we may discover what we do not know, the road to follow in wisdom, and the order of the dialectical questions in Book Three. Notes that Books One and Two show wisdom must be sought in the four kinds of cause with a first cause in each, likens this to the Nicomachean Ethics Books One and Ten, and the Phaedo’s balance of hope and fear.

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Note for Second Book of Wisdom, Reading One #

note · Metaphysics Reading One · 10 pages · PDF · WS02_B2_02-Note_for_Reading_One.pdf

Covers: Commentary on the first reading of the second book of Wisdom (Metaphysics II/alpha elatton): whether knowing truth is easy or difficult for man, and how the causes of difficulty lie either in the thing (matter, motion) or in us (separated substances, God); with analogies to understanding people and to loving; the last page discusses the dependence of the learner on a teacher and modern pride.

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Note for Readings Two through Four #

note · Metaphysics Readings 2-4 · 4 pages · PDF · WS02_B2_03-Note_for_Readings_Two_through_Four.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Readings 2-4 of the Second Book of Wisdom (Metaphysics alpha elatton). It explains the principle “propter quod unumquodque, illud magis” (what makes a thing so is more so) with examples: fire and heat, water and wetness, premisses and conclusion, end and means. It applies the principle to show that the cause is more true than the effect, and notes Aquinas’s qualification that it holds only among things of one order. It ends by arguing that there cannot be an infinite regress in causes, comparing limits, points and beginnings, and that a first cause exists in the same way as an unmoved mover, a good desired for its own sake, and genera with no higher genus.

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Aristotle, Book Two of Wisdom, Reading Five #

reading · Metaphysics Reading Five · 1 pages · PDF · WS02_B2_04-Reading_Five.pdf

Covers: Translation of the close of Metaphysics II (alpha elatton): listeners’ expectations follow custom; mathematical precision is not to be demanded in things having matter; so first consider what nature is, and whether one or several sciences consider causes and beginnings.

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Note for Second Book of Wisdom, Reading Five #

note · Metaphysics Reading Five · 6 pages · PDF · WS02_B2_05-Note_for_Reading_Five.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Reading Five of the Second Book of Wisdom (Metaphysics II, alpha elatton). It distinguishes what we know from how we know it and argues that the way of knowing in each reasoned-out science must fit its subject matter, not custom or individual inclination. It compares this to the arts working different materials and to Thomas’s comparison with the moral virtues, and ends by mentioning paideia.

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Note on One as Subject of Wisdom #

note · Metaphysics WS02_B4 (Note on One as Subject of Wisdom) · 7 pages · PDF · WS02_B4_NOTE-One_as_Subject_of_Wisdom.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary distinguishing the one that is the subject of wisdom (convertible with being) from being and from the one that is the beginning of number, and undivided being from undivided and distinct from others; draws on Aquinas (De Veritate, SCG II, In X Metaphysicorum lect. 1, In IV Metaphysicorum lect. 4) and the division of Book 10 and the opposites of Book 5.

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Introductory Note to the Fifth Book of Wisdom #

foreword · Metaphysics 01 · 2 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_01-Intro._Note_to_Fifth_Book.pdf

Covers: Introductory note to Book Five (Delta) of the Metaphysics (“Wisdom”): explains that the words distinguished in Book Five are those used in the axioms and in wisdom, so their distinction illuminates the beginning, end and middle of reason’s knowledge. Notes that these key words are equivocal by reason (many meanings with an order among them). Gives Thomas’s threefold division of Book Five: names of causes, names of the subject of wisdom or its parts, names of the properties of the subject.

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Note for Word Beginning #

note · Metaphysics 02 · 6 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_02-Note_for_Word_Beginning.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on the word ‘beginning’ (archê) in Metaphysics Book Five, the reading on the senses of beginning. It covers why beginning matters to wisdom and first philosophy, and how it relates to before and after and to the word one. It ends with Aquinas texts from the Scriptum on the Sentences.

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Note for Word Cause #

note · Metaphysics 03 · 10 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_03-Note_for_Word_Cause.pdf

Covers: Commentary on the word ‘cause’: its importance for the philosopher, the four kinds of cause as senses of the word, Aristotle’s enumeration of predecessors’ opinions in Book One, cause said analogically (not as a genus) of the four kinds; with appended Aquinas texts (In I Physicorum; Scriptum super IV Sententiarum on instrumental causality).

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Note for Word Nature #

note · Physics 04 · 3 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_04-Note_for_Word_Nature.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s note on the many meanings of the word ’nature’: why it matters for philosophy, how the senses are related (by ratio, generalization, likeness of ratios), with a text from Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles listing the senses. It ends on nature as a cause of order, citing Physics VIII 252a11-12 and Aquinas’s commentary In VIII Physic., lect. 3, n. 993.

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Note on Word Necessary #

note · Metaphysics 05 · 5 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_05-Note_for_Word_Necessary.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s note on the word ’necessary’ (Metaphysics V, chapter on the necessary), citing Aquinas on cause and necessity (De Malo, Scriptum on the Sentences) and the division of the fourth sense of necessary against the first three, ending with the necessity of end from the Summa Contra Gentiles III.

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Note for Word One #

note · Metaphysics 06 - Note for Word One · 5 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_06-Note_for_Word_One.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s note explaining why Aristotle considers the word ‘one’ in Metaphysics Book Five (Delta) before ‘being’ and substance, and why understanding ‘one’ is necessary. It is a commentary on the reading of the word ‘one’ (Metaphysics V, ch. 6).

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Texts for the Name Being #

note · Metaphysics 07 · 11 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_07-Note_for_Word_Being.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s note on the word ‘being’: why a philosopher must understand its senses and their order, and the four groups of meanings taken up in Metaphysics Books 6-9. It ends with a passage from Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 65, on God’s knowledge of singulars.

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Note on and Texts on Whole and Part (Aquinas on Whole and Part) #

note · Metaphysics 08 · 17 pages · PDF · WS02_B5_08-Aquinas_on_Whole_and_Part.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s note on the threefold distinction of whole and part (integral, universal, potential) drawn from Aquinas, with Latin texts (De Spiritualibus Creaturis a.11 ad 2; Sent. I d.3 q.4 a.2 ad 1), related to Aristotle’s reading on ‘part’ in Metaphysics V (Wisdom). Later pages continue with texts on whole and part.

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Note for Sixth Book of Wisdom #

note · Metaphysics Intro · 1 pages · PDF · WS02_B6_01-Intro._Note_for_Book_Six.pdf

Covers: Introductory note on Book Six of Wisdom (Metaphysics VI): reading one distinguishes wisdom from other reasoned knowledge and from natural philosophy and mathematics; readings two to four treat being by happening and being as true. Notes that the placed excerpt from Aquinas’s exposition of Boethius’s De Trinitate distinguishes the kinds of speculative science and their methods.

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Note for Second Book of Wisdom, Reading One #

note · Metaphysics Reading One · 10 pages · PDF · WS02_B6_02-Note_for_Reading_One.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Reading One of the second book of Wisdom (Metaphysics II): whether truth is easy or difficult for man to know. He distinguishes difficulty in the thing (matter, motion) from difficulty in us (separated substances, God), with analogies to understanding people and to loving. It ends with a remark on the dependence of the learner on a teacher.

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Note for Sixth Book of Wisdom, Readings 2-3 #

note · Metaphysics Readings 2-3 · 6 pages · PDF · WS02_B6_03-Note_for_Readings_Two_and_Three.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Metaphysics VI (Wisdom), Readings 2-3, on whether everything happens by necessity and on being per accidens. It quotes Aquinas (De Malo Q.6, De Sortibus, ST I Q.116 a.1) against views that all things happen by necessity, and on how reason can take as one what is per accidens.

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Note for Sixth Book of Wisdom, Reading 4 #

note · Metaphysics Reading 4 · 25 pages · PDF · WS02_B6_04-Note_for_Reading_Four.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s commentary on Reading 4 of Book 6 of the Metaphysics (Wisdom), on the distinction between good (chiefly in things) and true (chiefly in the mind), drawing on Aquinas (ST I, Q.16, a.1). The 25-page file also appears to include appended Aquinas texts, e.g. Scriptum super IV Sententiarum, d.1, q.1, a.4, on sacramental instrumental causality.

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Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Eight, Reading One #

reading · Metaphysics Reading One · 9 pages · PDF · WS02_B8B9_01-Eighth_Book_of_Wisdom.pdf

Covers: Translation of Metaphysics Book Eight (Eta) in full: recap of the claims about substance, sensible substances as matter, form and composite, and the unity of definition and of matter and form, ending with the cause of unity being what moves from potency to act.

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Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Nine (Ninth Book of Wisdom) #

reading · Metaphysics Reading One · 13 pages · PDF · WS02_B8B9_02-Ninth_Book_of_Wisdom.pdf

Covers: Translation of Metaphysics Θ (Book Nine), from the opening on ability (potency) and act through the end of the book on being as true and non-being as false. It opens on the senses of ability, and ends with there being no deception about incomposite substances or unchangeable things.

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Proemium to Wisdom and Reason #

foreword · Metaphysics WS03_01 · 3 pages · PDF · WS03_01-Proemium_Wisdom_and_Reason.pdf

Covers: Short introductory essay linking wisdom and reason: wisdom is the highest perfection of reason. It draws on Aquinas’s proemium to the Ethics (sapientis est ordinare), Shakespeare’s definition of reason, and Metaphysics II on truth. It ends with a note that the papers on the definition of reason are placed under this heading.

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Aristotle: Proemium to Wisdom #

reading · Metaphysics First Reading · 6 pages · PDF · WS03_02-Aristotle_Proem_to_Wisdom.pdf

Covers: Translation of the proem to Metaphysics I (chapters 1-2): all men desire to know, sense, memory, experience and art, the nature of wisdom, and the knowledge sought, ending with the goal of the investigation.

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Shakespeare’s Exhortation to Use Reason, with a Proemium (and appendix on Aquinas’s division of moral philosophy) #

other · Shakespeare WS03_03 · 10 pages · PDF · WS03_03-Exhortation_and_Proemium.pdf

Covers: Hamlet’s exhortation to use reason (Hamlet IV.4 “What is a man…”), a proemium explaining it, an appendix quoting Hamlet I.3, and a closing passage on the division of moral philosophy into monastic (ethics), domestic, and political.

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An Exposition of Hamlet’s Exhortation to Use Reason #

paper · Shakespeare WS03_04 · 55 pages · PDF · WS03_04-Exposition_of_Exhortation.pdf

Covers: Essay expounding Hamlet’s forty-nine-word exhortation to use reason (Hamlet IV.4, “What is a man, if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed…”), giving five reasons for using reason, including that man is an animal with reason, becomes like God by using it, and reaches his chief good through it.

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Hamlet’s Exhortation to Use Reason #

paper · Shakespeare WS03_05 · 23 pages · PDF · WS03_05-Shorter_Lecture_on_Exhort.pdf

Covers: Essay (shorter lecture) on Hamlet’s forty-nine-word exhortation to use reason (Hamlet IV.4, “What is a man, if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed…”), giving five reasons for using reason; ends with man’s being true to himself and achieving his chief good.

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The First Definition of Reason #

paper · Shakespeare WS03_06 · 115 pages · PDF · WS03_06-First_Definition_of_Reason.pdf

Covers: Essay arguing that Shakespeare’s Hamlet (IV.4) gives the first definition of reason: the ability for large discourse, looking before and after. It concludes that the philosopher, whose wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, must most of all look before and after. It also includes a section on a definition of comedy.

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Necessity and Difficulty of Beginning Well in Philosophy #

paper · Metaphysics WS04_01 · 3 pages · PDF · WS04_01-The_Need_to_Begin_Well.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s essay on why beginning well is necessary in philosophy (the beginning is small but powerful, with three corollaries) and why it is difficult (with four corollaries, including the need to go slowly and to return to the beginnings). It is a general introduction to first philosophy and wisdom, not a translation of a text.

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Texts on Necessity and Difficulty of Beginning Well #

foreword · Presocratics WS04_02 · 31 pages · PDF · WS04_02-Texts_on_Beginning_Well.pdf

Covers: Common foreword and first collection of key texts (Parmenides DK 5 and DK 2, then texts from Plato and Aristotle) on the necessity and difficulty of beginning well in philosophy.

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Distinction of the Beginnings of Philosophy #

note · Metaphysics WS04_03 · 2 pages · PDF · WS04_03-The_Beginnings_of_Philosophy.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s short essay distinguishing three kinds of beginnings of philosophy: (1) beginnings about things, (2) knowledge of the roads or methods to follow in thinking, and (3) dispositions of will and emotion that help one use reason well. Philosophy is defined as reasoned-out knowledge (episteme, methodos). No Aristotle passage is translated or cited.

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Beginnings of Philosophy in Will (and Emotions) #

note · Metaphysics WS04_04 · 6 pages · PDF · WS04_04-Beginnings_in_the_Will_and_the_Emotions.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s essay on the dispositions of will and emotion that begin philosophy: wonder (about the universal, what and why, causes, especially natural things), together with hope of overcoming difficulty and fear of error, and related dispositions that foster friendship among philosophers.

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Distinction of the Roads in Our Knowledge #

paper · Metaphysics WS04_05 · 3 pages · PDF · WS04_05-Distinction_of_the_Roads.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s essay distinguishing the roads in our looking (speculative) knowledge: the first, natural road from the senses into reason; the second, road of reason as reason (common and private roads of reasoned-out knowledge); and where each is to be considered (natural philosophy and wisdom, logic, and the start of each particular science).

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An Introduction to the First Road in Our Knowledge #

paper · Other WS04_06 · 16 pages · PDF · WS04_06-First_Road_in_our_Knowledge.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s essay on what a road in our knowledge is (order of before and after) and the first road, from the senses into reason; it ends by discussing errors of Spinoza, Locke and Berkeley about the general and the universal whole. Not a translation of Aristotle.

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Second Road in our Knowledge #

paper · Other WS04_07 · 6 pages · PDF · WS04_07-Second_Road_in_our_Knowledge.pdf

Covers: Essay on the second road in our knowledge, the road of reason as reason, based on the before and after in acts of reason: understanding what a thing is before statements, statements before reasoning; guessing before knowing; and thinking out (distinctions, definitions, order) before reasoning to conclusions. Uses Euclid Book I and Aristotle’s De Anima as examples. It is part of a series on first philosophy and wisdom.

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The Before and After in the Acts of (Looking) Reason #

paper · Other WS04_08 · 8 pages · PDF · WS04_08-Order_in_Acts_of_Reason.pdf

Covers: Essay on the second road in our knowledge, the road of reason as reason: the order among the acts of looking reason as distinguished into three (Aristotle and Aquinas: grasping what something is, composing/dividing statements, reasoning) and into two (Plato and Albert the Great), tied to the books of the Organon. Ends on grasping preceding judging.

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The Third Road(s) in Our Knowledge #

note · Other WS04_09 · 2 pages · PDF · WS04_09-Third_Road_in_our_Knowledge.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s short essay on the third road in our knowledge: the private road of each reasoned-out knowledge (way of defining, making known its beginnings, limit of judgment, way of demonstrating, causes used, rigor, and order of determination). It contrasts natural philosophy and mathematics, citing Physics II and I and Euclid’s Elements.

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Distinction of the Beginnings about Things #

paper · Metaphysics WS04_10 · 4 pages · PDF · WS04_10-Distinction_of_Beginnings_about_Things.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s essay distinguishing beginnings common to all reasoned out knowledge (e.g. being/non-being, whole/part, before/after) from those private to each science, with Boethius’s division of statements known through themselves to all vs. to the wise; ends with axioms of before and after in first philosophy.

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Contradiction and the Growth of Reason #

paper · Metaphysics WS04_11 · 34 pages · PDF · WS04_11-Contradiction_and_Reason.pdf

Covers: Essay on how the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction (the principle of non-contradiction) are the seeds necessary for the growth of reason and knowledge, as part of beginning well in philosophy. Not a translation of a specific Aristotle passage.

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Foreword to Consideration of Mistake or Error #

foreword · Metaphysics WS05_01 · 3 pages · PDF · WS05_01-Foreward_Wisdom_about_Error.pdf

Covers: Introduction to a series on the causes of mistake or error in our thinking: etymologies of mistake and error, the wise man’s concern with eliminating error, and the plan for a following paper on the division of the causes of error.

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Division of the Causes of Error #

paper · AquinasCommentary WS05_02 · 3 pages · PDF · WS05_02-Division_of_the_Causes_of_Error.pdf

Covers: Berquist’s short essay on Aquinas’s division of the causes (occasions) of error into those ex parte intellectus (understanding, including senses and imagination) and ex parte affectus (will and emotions, especially pride), citing Aquinas’s commentaries on Timothy and John.

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Pride as a Cause of Error #

paper · Other WS05_03 · 26 pages · PDF · WS05_03-Pride_as_a_Cause_of_Error.pdf

Covers: Essay on pride as a root and mother of error, drawing on Thomas (Super I ad Timotheum, De Malo, Summa Contra Gentiles I.5) and Shakespeare; concludes that pride, like a tree stump, is the most stubborn part of the tree of error.

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Shakespeare on Error #

paper · Shakespeare WS05_04 · 17 pages · PDF · WS05_04-Shakespeare_on_Error.pdf

Covers: Essay on Shakespeare’s treatment of error: the etymology of error as wandering (Comedy of Errors, Troilus and Cressida), disordered movement of reason, and bold or proud imagination as the beginning of error (Morocco, Arragon, Malvolio, Parolles), with reference to Aquinas’s bonum imaginatum.

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Friar Laurence on Stumbling #

paper · Shakespeare WS05_05 · 14 pages · PDF · WS05_05-Friar_Laurence_on_Stumbling.pdf

Covers: Essay on Friar Laurence’s advice in Romeo and Juliet (Act II, Sc. 3), “Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast,” unfolding three senses of running. It concludes that modern philosophy stumbled into a “bastard philosophy” by revolting from nature or true birth, and ends with Polonius’s advice in Hamlet (Act I, Sc. 3).

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